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CALCUTTA

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EDITORIAL

Our New Address:

The Institute and the Quarterly Review Office was shifted in September 1971 to our new premises, at 35, Theatre Road (Shakespeare Sarani) Calcutta-17. This was necessitated by lack of accommodation in our old premises, which was increasingly felt during the last two years. Perhaps, this is inevitable for any growing institution which needs more accommodation after every couple of years. Fortunately, in our new premises, situated in one of the quietest localities of Calcutta, we have sufficient accommodation to meet our requirements for a very long time to come. In the new premises we shall be in a better position to hold regular meetings and seminars and also to build up a good reference library. The big lounge, the spacious reading room and the beautiful adjoining garden will, it is hoped, make the members feel as comfortable as one could wish for in an institution of this kind.

The Eleventh Year:

With the present number the *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies* steps into its eleventh year of publication. It is particularly gratifying, when we consider the numerous difficulties, both financial and otherwise,

which the journal had to face during the first decade of its publication. Every endeavour is made to retain the academic standard of the journal which has earned appreciation in scholarly circles. We have also been successful in maintaining regularity of publication as far as possible. This is no small credit when one considers the difficulties of journals of this kind resulting in long arrear of publication in many cases.

To commemorate the completion of the first decade of publication, it is proposed to bring out a special index volume covering the contents of Volumes I to X. To meet the increased cost of paper, printing and postage, the Indian subscription rate has been increased from Rs. 15/- to Rs. 20/- from the current year, 1971-72. This slight increase in the subscription rate has been forced on us to cover the annual deficit on journal account.

Annual General Meeting:

The 10th Annual General Meeting of the Institute of Historical Studies was held at the Institute's new premises on 12th September, 1971. Dr. R. C. Majumdar presided. The Director presented the Annual Report for 1970-71, outlining the progress made during

the year under review. The Annual Report brought out one unfortunate trend, a decline in membership. The Director made a special appeal to the members to exert themselves personally to enrol at least 100 new members during 1971-72. One happy thing about the composition of the membership is its truly all-India character. There is no State or Union Territory in India from where we do not have at least a few members.

The progress outlined in the Annual Report certainly does credit to any young organisation, just 10 years old. But the state of the finances, as pointed out by the Director, is something that should cause grave anxiety. On the General Account side the accumulated deficit has amounted to nearly Rs. 23,000/- in ten years. From the Audit Report of 1970-71 and the Budget Estimates for 1971-72, it is clear that, with the existing financial resources the Institute needs a minimum financial assistance of Rs. 15,000/- annually to balance its General Account Budget. This is only to maintain its present range of activities and not for any expansion or development. It has to be admitted that no academic institution can carry on merely on membership fees, journal subscriptions and publication sales. If the private institutions are to function properly, they must be given some financial assistance by the State.

Unfortunately in India there is a tendency in official circles to think that Government funds are meant only for Government-sponsored and Government-managed institutions and projects. It is only if there is anything left over that financial assistance to private academic institutions could be considered. That is why when lakhs and lakhs are spent on Government institutions and projects, the Ministry of Education has allocated only a small pittance of Rs. 80,000/- for grants-in-aid to all the deserving non-Governmental institutions and projects in the whole country. It is difficult to make the officials

understand that Government funds are meant as much for non-Governmental as for Governmental institutions, and that experience shows that better results at cheaper cost may be obtained through private institutions than through Governmental agencies.

The financial position of the Institute in the General Account side was gravely affected by the termination of the Foundation Grant of Rs. 10,000/- a year. The Union Ministry of Education has been giving a grant of Rs. 5,000/- only from 1970-71. An appeal has been made to the Ministry to increase the grant to Rs. 10,000/- from the current financial year. If this is done, it may be just possible for the Institute to balance its budget from 1971-72 with some additional financial assistance from the State Government.

To wipe off the accumulated deficit for the last 10 years, it has been decided to raise donations from members, industrialists and the general public. For this purpose the Institute has been declared as a public charitable institution by the Income-tax authorities under sections 11 and 80-G of the Income-tax Act, 1961, under which all donations made to the Institute would be exempt from payment of Income-tax. The declaration will no doubt facilitate securing donations, but much depends on the kind help and active co-operation of our members in the donation-drive.

Seminar:

On the occasion of the 10th Annual General Meeting a two-day Seminar was organised on 12th and 13th September on *The Modernisation of Bengal in the Second Half of the 19th Century*. The object was to go into the causes, the process and the extent of modernisation of Bengal in the second half of the 19th century either distinct from, or as a continuation of, the trends in the first half of the century. The following papers were presented and discussed.

1. Calcutta, the Primate City : A Study in Urbanisation
—by Mr. Chittabrata Palit (Jadavpur University)
2. The Impact of Railways : A Study in Rural-Urban Relationship
—by Dr. Hena Mukherjee (Institute of Education)
3. Industrialisation and Social Change
—by Dr. Sunil Sen (Rabindra Bharati University)
4. The Transformation of Caste :
—by Dr. Amitabha Mukherjee (Jadavpur University)
5. The Indigenous Versus Western Medical Science : A Search for Progress
—by Dr. N. N. Qanungo (Visva-Bharati University)

Dr. R. C. Majumdar presided. The papers were of a high standard and the discussions most lively. The papers will, in due course, be published in a separate Volume.

New Fellows:

The following new Fellows were elected in 1971 by the College of Fellows under Article V of the Constitution. The names were announced at the 10th Annual General Meeting.

1. Dr. S. N. Prasad,
Director, National Archives of India,
New Delhi.
2. Dr. R. Narasimha Rao,
Professor & Head of the
Department of History,
Osmania University,
Hyderabad.
3. Dr. V. M. Reddi,
Professor & Head of the

Department of History,
S. V. University,
Tirupati, (A. P.)

4. Dr. O. Ramachandraiya,
Professor & Head of the
Department of History,
Andhra University,
Waltair (A.P.)
5. Dr. N. K. Sahu,
Professor & Head of the
Department of History,
Sambalpur University,
Sambalpur, Orissa.
6. Professor T. V. Mahalingam,
Head of the Department of
Ancient Indian History,
University of Madras.
7. Professor T. Raychoudhury,
Head of the Department of History,
University of Delhi.

Annual Conference:

The Ninth Annual Conference of the Institute was held at Tirupati (Andhra Pradesh) from 5th to 8th October, 1971, under the auspices of Shri Venkateswara University, Tirupati. Dr. R. C. Majumdar presided. The Conference was inaugurated by Shri B. D. Jatti, Lt. Governor of Pondicherry, who spoke about the role of historians in the present Indian context. The Vice-Chancellor of S. V. University, Tirupati, welcoming the delegates referred to the historical importance of Tirupati from ancient times. The Director spoke briefly about the Institute and about the two themes chosen for the Conference.

In his Presidential Address Dr. R. C. Majumdar gave an outline of the state of historical studies in India and analysed the causes of the marked decline in the standard of historical research in the country. One of

the main causes, he pointed out, was official interference in shaping the scope and trends of historical research. Such interference was often motivated by political considerations damaging to any objective study of history. The Government may have its own policies in the domestic and foreign spheres. But however laudable these policies might be in the present context and for the purpose of shaping the future course of events, there is no reason why it should try to distort the past to fit in with its present policies and future hopes. Another important factor, as Dr. Majumdar pointed out, was the undue emphasis placed by the Government on public sector projects in historical research and the consequent neglect of private institutions and projects doing much better work and at a much lesser cost to the nation. He illustrated the point by citing several cases where the Government had generously opened its purse-strings for the implementation of Government sponsored projects and institutions with little tangible results to the nation. On the other hand, the Government showed a step-motherly attitude towards private institutions and projects which were working quietly and with greater devotion and showing much better results in the field of historical research.

The two themes chosen for the Ninth Annual Conference were :

1. The North and the South in Indian History : Contact and Adjustment.
2. The Sources of the History of Andhra Pradesh.

On the first theme 17 papers were presented and discussed and on the second 7. There was also to be a symposium on the *Historians' Bias*, but only one paper was read as the other two speakers were absent.

The Conference was attended by more than 150 delegates representing different

Universities and institutions. It was a truly all-India gathering with scholars from Nagaland to Rajasthan and Kashmir to Kerala. The attendance at the paper reading sessions was very good and the discussions were most lively. On the whole the Conference was a great success, in keeping with the past tradition.

We take this opportunity to offer our sincere thanks to the Vice-Chancellor and the authorities of the S. V. University for their kind hospitality. We are particularly thankful to the Local Secretary, Professor V. M. Reddy and his helpful colleagues in the Department of History who made the local arrangements with meticulous care. Our thanks are also due to the band of student volunteers who looked after the delegates and made their stay as comfortable as one could wish for.

A list of papers read at the Conference is given below :

Theme :—*The North and the South in Indian History : Contact and Adjustment.*

(Ancient Period)

Religion and Culture :—Dr. Sharda Devi Vedalankar (Bhagalpur University)

Language and Literature :—Dr. B. R. Gopal (Karnatak University)

Society and Economy :—Dr. H. V. Sreenivasa Murthy (Bangalore University)

Political Relations and Administration :—

Dr. N. Subramanian (Madurai University)

Dr. K. R. Basavaraja (Karnatak University)

(Medieval Period)

Religion and Culture :—Dr. G. S. Dikshit (Karnatak University)

Language and Literature :—Dr. H. K. Sherwani (Hyderabad)

Society and Economy :—Dr. J. N. Sarkar.
(Jadavpur University)

Textile Industry :—Dr. S. P. Sangar. (Punjab University)

(Modern Period)

Religion and Culture :—Mr. S. Krishnaswami
(Madras Christian College)

Language and Literature :—Dr. Prema
Nanda Kumar.

Political Relations & Administration :—
Dr. S. Krishnaswami (Bangalore)

Nationalist Movement :—Dr. A. Krishna-
swami (Annamalai University)

Influence of Aligarh School :—Dr. Mushirul
Haq (Indian Institute of Advanced
Study, Simla)

The Deccan in Gujarat :—Dr. V. K. Chavda.
(M. S. University, Baroda)

Theme :—*Sources of the History of Andhra
Pradesh.*

(Ancient Period)

Professor O. Ramachandraiya (Andhra
University)

Dr. B. S. L. Hanumantha Rao (Hindu Col-
lege, Guntur)

(Medieval Period)

Dr. V. Yashoda Devi (S. V. University,
Tirupati)

Mr. C. V. Ramachandra Rao (Andhra
University)

(Modern Period)

Dr. V. N. Hari Rao (S. V. University,
Tirupati)

Dr. Y. Sriramamurthy (Andhra University)

Dr. Y. Vittal Rao (Telugu Academy,
Hyderabad)

Theme :—*Historian's Bias.*

Paper by :—Dr. Tarasankar Banerjee (Visva-
Bharati University, Santiniketan)

Rapporteurs :

Dr. (Mrs.) Madhu Sen (Jammu); Mrs.
S. R. Shirgaonkar (Bombay); Miss Sujata
Bose (Calcutta); Dr. Sukumar Bhattacharya
(Visva-Bharati); Mr. Prititosh Bagchi
(Serampore).

DNB:

We are happy to announce that Vol. I of the Dictionary of National Biography has already been sent to the press. The printing work has been entrusted to the Saraswati Press, Calcutta, one of the best in India, and every care will be taken to ensure the quality of production one would expect for a publication of this kind by the best international standard. Vol. I will cover all names from 'A' to 'D', about 350 in number. It is expected to be out by February 1972. The other three volumes are also being made ready for the press. Vol. II will cover all names from 'E' to 'L'; Vol. III from 'M' to 'R'; and Vol. IV from 'S' to 'Z'. Each volume will be of approximately 600-650 pages.

For unavoidable reasons the announcement for pre-publication order could not be made in October as originally planned. It will, however, be made in December and circulars will be sent to all our members and subscribers. The announcement will also be made in all the leading newspapers in the country.

The financial position of the DNB Project is still not very reassuring. We still need to fill up a gap of more than a lakh. A part of this we are hoping to get from the Union and State Governments and a part from donations from industrialists and the generous public. In this connection we appeal to our members, subscribers and the public at large for donations. Any donations, big or small, will be thankfully received and acknowledged. We may state here that by a recent declaration the Income-tax authorities have exempted all donations to the Institute from payment of Income-tax.

ANNOUNCEMENT

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SOME ASPECTS OF MILITARY THINKING AND PRACTICE IN MEDIEVAL INDIA

DR. JAGADISH NARAYAN SARKAR

(Jadavpur University, Calcutta)

1. *Conceptualization of War*

There are numerous works on the art and science of war in western countries. Some useful works have been written on the art of war in ancient India. But what exist regarding medieval India do not deal with the art of war as such though these throw considerable light on military administration and conduct of battles.¹ The period covered here is about one thousand years, from the eighth to the eighteenth century. The eighth century is significant to a student of warfare not so much for the first advent of the Arabs in one corner of India as for an important technical change, the disappearance of chariots in Northern India.² The eighteenth century not only witnessed the disintegration of the Mughal empire and the debacle of the Marathas at Panipat but also the penetration of the European powers into the political system in India and application of newer military technique and methods. The present paper attempts to enquire into the extent of conceptualization of war in medieval India and discusses some aspects of military thinking and practice during this period in the background of ancient Indian and Chinese thinking as well as of the ideas of Clausewitz and Jomini of the Napoleonic era in Europe.

Any conceptualization follows prior accumulation of knowledge. The concept of military strategy as a science has grown out of experience garnered through centuries. It is sometimes believed that India suffered from absence of military literature. There might

not have been many exclusive treatises on war but ideas thereon lie scattered in different branches of literature, which show considerable progress in conceptualization. During the early medieval period we have several works like the encyclopaedic *Agni Purana*,³ the *Smriti* commentaries, — of Medhatithi on Manu,⁴ of Vijnaneswar⁵ and Apararka⁶ on Yajnavalkya, — the digest of Lakshmidhara, the *Krityakalpataru* (or *Kalpataru*) including *Rajadharmakanda*.⁷ Again, warcraft was regarded as a part of statecraft and various works thereon also dealt with the art of war. Apart from Kautilya's *Arthashastra*⁸ and Kamandaka's *Nitisara*,⁹ there were the *Niti-vakyamrita* of Jaina Somdev,¹⁰ *Niti-ratnakaru* or (*Rajniti*-) of Chandesvara,¹¹ the *Sukranitisar* of Sukracharya and the *Nitiprakashika* of Vaisampayana.¹² Among technical works are *Yuktikalpataru* and *Samaranganasutradhara*, both attributed to Bhojraja of Malwa (11th century A.D.)¹³ and *Manasollasa* or *Abhilasitartha chintamani* (c. 1131), attributed to Somesvara III of Kalyan.¹⁴ Among the Persian works may be mentioned *Adab u'l Muluk wa Kifayat u'l mamluk* or *Adab u'l Harb wa'sh Shuja'at* by Fakhr ud din Mubarakshah or Fakhr i Mudabbir, a contemporary of Ilutmish,¹⁵ the *Fatawa i Jahandari* of Zia uddin Barani,¹⁶ and a book on jurisprudence, *Fatawa i Qarakhani* of Qabul Qarakhan, a courtier of Firuz Shah.¹⁷ Literary, historical and semi-historical works are too numerous to mention. But special reference must be made of *Baharistan-i-Ghaibi* of Mirza Nathan,¹⁸ of a metrical history of the

War of Succession in mid-17th century, written by a soldier, the *Aurangnamah* of 'Haqiri'¹⁹ and of the *Haft Anjuman* of Udairaj alias Tale'yar Khan containing the military despatches of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh I.²⁰ While all these may not be of the type of the works of Chinese Sun Tzu (Sun Wu). Prussian Clausewitz and Swiss Jomini, they do indicate considerable progress in conceptualization of war.²¹

2. Role of Strategy, Tactics and Logistics

Strategy, logistics and tactics are close partners in war which must work in unison. The first decides where to act, the second brings the troops to the point and the third handles them in battle.²² The importance of logistics was duly recognised by the theorists and practical experts of medieval India.²³ The *Nayaka* of the Hindu writers, the *Ariz* of the Sultanate,²⁴ the *Mir Manzil* of the Mughals assisted by *Mir Tuzaks*²⁵ performed functions, similar, though necessarily limited and less ramified, to those of the military staff of modern times. The importance of supplies and the need of feeding the army on the enemy was realised by Sun Tzu,²⁶ Clausewitz, Jomini,²⁷ Kautilya, Sukracharya, Fakhr-i-Mudabbir²⁸ and Ibn Khaldun. Loyal tributaries sometimes brought provisions, e.g., to Malik Kafur. The usual method was to decentralise the commissariat. Like merchants and providers who accompanied the Abbasid army in Asia Minor in 9th century,²⁹ wandering dealers or *banjaras* supplied corn to the medieval armies, both Muslim and Maratha, in India, though sometimes this failed as in Jai Singh's Bijapur campaign (1666). Failure of supplies contributed to Shivaji's surrender at Purandar (1665), as Portuguese sources tell us,³⁰ and to the Maratha debacle at Panipat (1761).³¹ The echeloned depots of Clausewitz and Jomini to ensure regular supplies were anticipated by Kautilya's stores and *thanahs* or outposts of Mughal times. Difficulties have to be faced by the invader during national resistance owing to 'scorched earth'

policy equally in Spain, Portugal and Russia, during the Napoleonic wars as in Mir Jumla's Assam³² and Jai Singh's Bijapur campaigns³³ and in Aurangzeb's Maratha campaigns near Madras (1692) and Dodderi (1695).³⁴ Forced labour was sometimes used to supplement normal transport agencies, as Kalhana and Manucci tell us.³⁵

3. Terrain

(a) The principle of polarity comes into play in war. So strategy and tactics also become either offensive or defensive. A country's military history is largely influenced by its strategical topography. So both Clausewitz and Jomini emphasize that the first duty of the general is to study the ground carefully before selecting the most suitable theatre of war.³⁶ These ideas were equally known to Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Sukrāchārya and Fakhr i Mudabbir.³⁷ These were illustrated, among others, at the battles of Khajwa (1659),³⁸ Jajau (1707),³⁹ Daulambapur (1612),⁴⁰ and Plassey (1757).⁴¹ Generally speaking, the value of topographical and artificial features would depend on the spirit and ability of the general.

(b) *Bases*: It is extremely essential to have a base or bases of operations (from where the army can get its reinforcements and resources, start for offensive and to which it retreats and by which it is supported during cover for defence.⁴² This is illustrated by Shivaji's changing his base from the level country of Puna to the jungly and rugged area of Javli in 1659, as also Jai Singh's selecting Saswad with its central position as his base against Shivaji.⁴³ A base on a river is very favourable. Lakhau, at the junction of the Dihing and the Brahmaputra in Assam maintained the life-line of the Mughals during Mir Jumla's Assam campaign.⁴⁴ That an extended base is difficult to cover was illustrated in Rajputana in the time of Aurangzeb where the imperial outposts were too scattered to be defended easily.⁴⁵

(c) In mountainous countries the maxims of strategic combinations applicable in the open country are not suitable. Some of the principles of Clausewitz and Jomini⁴⁶ are exemplified in Assam, N.W. Frontier and Maharashtra. Mir Jumla displayed in Assam the 'strong and heroic will', found necessary in such areas by Jomini.⁴⁷ Again, Jomini's dictum that the heights should be secured before operations in valleys and that these are to be directed upon enemy communications was not illustrated in Mughal campaigns in Swat and Bajaur in the time of Akbar (1586). Disagreeing with Zain Khan's advice that the tribesmen could not be subdued without occupying their homesteads Rajah Birbal reached the crest of Malandari pass and was annihilated.⁴⁸ But it was verified in Assam and Afghanistan under Aurangzeb. In Assam Mir Jumla could not secure the heights sheltering the Ahom ruler and his guerrillas.⁴⁹ In the N.W. Frontier the Mughals gained a complete victory over the Yusufzais by capturing a hill top where they made the last stand. In 1672 the Afridis descended from the hill side and cut off the imperialists under Muhammad Amin Khān. Thus the question remained whether the possession of mountains controlled the valleys or vice versa.⁵⁰

Jomini's views that mountainous areas are specially favourable for defence when the war is a national one is supported by some examples in the time of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb — in Balkh and Badakhshan, in Afghanistan ('from Qandahar to Attock') where the Afridis and the Khataks united; in Maharashtra where the war became a people's war after Shivaji's death.⁵¹

Battle Order

The control of the army is 'a matter of formations and signals'. It is a matter of tactics. Clausewitz wanted to introduce 'methodism in warfare'. Jomini mentions twelve orders. Like Sun Tzu, however, the ancient

and early medieval Indian writers conceived of innumerable army dispositions. The compositions of the forces, the configuration of land and the nature of the enemy's battle order all determined the army dispositions. There may be only one arm or combined arms. Jomini, like Sukrāchārya, was against rigid geometrical plans. Both, again, recommend mixture of deployments.⁵²

The five units of the Muslims (Centre, Right, Left, Van, Reserve) betray, according to Ibn Khaldun, Byzantine and Sassanid influence. The Mughal battle order included these five units but was based on Central Asiatic practice and continued with some modifications till the end of the Empire. The Nizam improved upon it at the battle of Sakarkheda, 1724.⁵³

The greatest tactical difficulty is to arrange simultaneous execution of the decisive manoeuvre by different sections of the army. Hence Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Fakhr i Mudabbir conceived, equally with Jomini, the necessity of transmission of the commander's orders by signals or flags, by drums or the horn or through couriers. These constituted a military secret.⁵⁴

5. Principles of War

Some of the principles of war, formulated by Jomini and Clausewitz, were also known to Indian writers and illustrated in practice during the period under review. Clausewitz's first dictum 'to use our entire forces with the utmost energy'⁵⁵ was long ago anticipated by Sun Tzu and Sukrāchārya⁵⁶ and illustrated by the mobility and rapidity of Alauddin⁵⁷ and Sher Khān's attack on Gaur (1538).⁵⁸ Secondly, the Napoleonic concentration of power, duly emphasized by Clausewitz and Jomini, was known to Sun Tzu and Kautilya and illustrated by Timur in the battle of Delhi (1398), making an oblique attack.⁵⁹ The third dictum of Clausewitz, never to waste time, involves

surprise, while the fourth implies pursuit to follow up the successes.

6. *System of operations : offensive & defensive*

(A) *Offensive : Characteristics*

That offensive wars have certain advantages was realised by military experts in medieval India as clearly as Jomini or Clausewitz. But these might also rouse the national spirit in the attacked country, e.g., in Assam and Bijapur campaigns and Rajput and Maratha wars in the time of Aurangzeb.⁶⁰

Some types of operations of offensive war, like enveloping, encircling, shock tactics and pursuit, mentioned by Clausewitz, were equally known and applicable in ancient and medieval India.

(i) The need of keeping the lines of communications open was anticipated by Kautilya (cf. *Visuddha pristha*), Manu and Fakhr i Mudabbir.⁶¹

(ii) Clausewitz's principle of directing the main thrust from the front and the flank or from the rear may be compared with Kautilya's suggestion of alternating rear, frontal or flank attacks.⁶²

(iii) Shock tactics involve sudden mass attack at the enemy's vulnerable point. The Turks first harassed and bewildered the Hindus with mounted archers or light troopers and then charged them with heavy armoured cavalry or struck them from behind. Muhammad Ghuri used this at the second battle of Tarain (1192), feigning flight and throwing his select reserve cavaliers at the disordered Hindus. This exactly anticipated Jomini's observation that the victory will remain with the party having the last cavalry reserve.⁶³

(iv) The operation of encircling or enveloping by attacking the enemy from the front and the flank and in the rear, was perhaps

comparable to the 'pincer movement' of Hitler, the wheeling wings of Hannibal, and 'closing of the horns of the Crescent' (as Gibbon says),⁶⁴ and the flanking parties of the Mongols and the Mughals. Concentration on the flanks was a very old tactics in India. It was used by Prithwiraj at the first battle of Tarain (1191), by Babur at Panipat (1526) and Khanwah (1527), by the Mughals against Himu (1556).⁶⁵

(v) The tactical advantage of combined arms, comparable to the 'fire-and movement' of Jomini, was illustrated at Panipat in 1527, and at Talikota in 1565, when Babur and the Confederate Muslims combined artillery fire and cavalry attack respectively.⁶⁶

(vi) *Deception* : Deception and surprise were two principles of war, which Sun Tzu described as 'strategist's keys to victory'. Deception was well known to Indian theorists like Kautilya, Kāmandaka, the Agni Purāna, and Sukranitisāra, the last of whom speaks of duplicity like the crow's eye. Use of ruse and trickery was a common device in wars in Islam and was well-known to a Moorish essayist, Abu Bakr of Tortosa, to Fakhr i Mudabbir and to Ibn Khaldun. It was used by Muhammad Ghuri in 1192. Again, epistolary diplomacy was effectively used by Krishnadeva Ray against Orissa, Mir Jumla against Shujā, Aurangzeb against Prince Akbar.⁶⁷

(vii) Surprise, buttressed by morale and technique, often proves decisive, and has been acclaimed by Clausewitz and Jomini. But they were anticipated long ago by Sun Tzu ('up-road in the East, strike in West'), Kautilya, Sukracharya and the Agni Purana.⁶⁸ A surprise might be organised with regard to time, place, weapons and method. Fakhr i Mudabbir considers the best time to be midday in summer, the time for after-lunch nap, early morning in spring and mid-night.⁶⁹ Ibn Khaldun spoke of night surprises.⁷⁰ The time element in surprise was illustrated by Sher Khan

at Chausa (1539) against Humayun,⁷¹ by Shivaji against Shaista Khan (1663),⁷² and by Akbar's campaigns during summer and rains.⁷³ Encirclement, flank or rear attack or ambuscade (*Kamin*) at an unexpected place involves a surprise in place, the last being considered the most effective stratagem. At Talikota (1565) the confederate Muslim generals repeated Alexander's tactics by crossing the Krishna by surprise.⁷⁴ Babur's use of artillery in 1526 and 1527 was a technological surprise in weapons.⁷⁵ The use of archers on horseback and the Parthian tactics of shooting during retreat illustrated surprise in method.⁷⁶ Mawardi made the commander responsible for guarding against surprise. Good generals like Timur gave orders at Delhi to prevent night surprises.⁷⁷

7. Systems of Operations (contd.)

(B) *Defensive Strategy*

(i) A defensive strategy aims at neutralising the first forward advance of the enemy, gaining time, protracting the operations, making fortified places, covering sieges and deferring a decisive battle till the enemy's offensive potential is exhausted by marches or privations or is scattered to occupy invaded areas.⁷⁸ These are illustrated in medieval India, particularly in Ahmadnagar, Asirgarh, Assam, Bijapur, Rajputana (Chitor, Marwar, Mewar), and Maharashtra.

Clausewitz's principle not to engage all troops immediately but to fatigue the opponent and use a decisive mass with greatest audacity at the critical moment may be compared with the advice of Kautilya, Sukracharya and Fakhr i Mudabbir. Kautilya asks the general not to move the army *en masse*, but, after assailing and confusing the enemy with one or two divisions, attack it with the remaining divisions. Sukra asks the first skirmish to be started with only half the army. Fakhr i Mudabbir prescribes a similar course even for the aggressor, keeping one part of the army ahead and the rest as reserve (*lashkargah*).⁷⁹

(ii) Fortifications constitute an important aspect of military defence through centuries. The *Agni Purāna* speaks of the 'wealth of forts' (*durgasampatti*). The *Sivatattaratnākara* compares a King without a fort to a snake without poison and an elephant without rut. Strategically these shield the defender, delay the aggressor, and increase the relative value of the defensive forces. Kautilya recommended the erection of a chain of natural forts or strongholds along the frontiers (*antapāla durgas*). Jomini, however, was against making a complete line of defence by building many fortresses and advised constructing only a few. Kautilya mentions four varieties of forts defended by desert, water, forests and hills. The *Sukraniti-sāra* looks at the problem from a new angle and classifies fortresses according to two principles, the physical and human, arranging them in order of the degree of security, referring to forts of kinsmen and valorous troops (as ornaments of all fortresses) and suggesting that there should be mutual dependence among the forts. Details of construction of forts have been given by Kautilya, the *Manasara Silpasāstra* and the *Samaranganasutradhara*, as well as by Fakhr i Mudabbir.⁸⁰

Field-Marshal Montgomery opines that the medieval Indian hill fortresses were as powerful as the best in medieval Europe.⁸¹ The focal and strongest part of the castles in Europe and the Near East was the keep or donjon but it was very unusual in medieval India, the only exception, according to Sidney Toy, being the Bala Hissar in Gulbarga. One of the most powerful and interesting fortifications was Daulatabad (Deogiri) with its essentially Hindu military architecture. Some of its peculiar features were a submerged causeway (instead of drawbridge), the dark, steep and tortuous tunnel, and a special smoke screen device.⁸²

There were three types of Maratha fortresses, — the *gad* (on hill tops), the *kol* (in

level country) and *durg* (on sea coast),— which the people regarded as their mother. The Ahoms were experts in constructing 'ingenious and impregnable fortresses' with *phanjis* or bamboo stakes, pits and palisades of timber, ditches and mounted batteries.⁸³

(iii) *Entrenched lines and turning movements*: Jomini points out that the strategic advantages expected by a defender by fighting in a prepared theatre of war with fortresses and entrenched camps might prove to be futile in practice as these might be turned and outflanked.⁸⁴ Examples in medieval India include second Tarain (1192), where Prithviraj danced to the tune of Muhammad Ghuri, Tukaroi (Tukra, 1575), where the Mughals outflanked Daud, Dholpur (1658) where Aurangzeb turned Dara's elaborate entrenchments. Mir Jumla neutralised Shuja's defences by his brilliant and successive turning movements at Benares, Monghyr and Teliagarhi, and lastly at the water-girt island of Samdah (1659). At Ratanpur (1720) the Sayyid Dilawar was forced to leave his entrenchments and fight on the ground chosen by the Nizam.⁸⁵

(iv) *Scorched Earth Policy*: The sacrificial method of destroying possessions and supplies, adopted against Napoleon in the Iberian peninsula and Russia during the Napoleonic war and against the Nazis by Russia during the second world war, was known to early medieval Indian writers like Lakshmidhar and Sukracharya and also to Ziauddin Barani.⁸⁶ The principle was adopted by the Shahi ruler, Jaipal, against the Ghaznavids,⁸⁷ by the people of the Punjab against Timur,⁸⁸ by Rana Pratap,⁸⁹ Malik Ambar,⁹⁰ the Ahoms⁹¹ and the Bijapuris against the Mughals.⁹²

(v) *Passive* (or static) defence proves futile and is condemned by Clausewitz as idle, Jomini as pernicious and Mao Tse Tung as a fool's talisman.⁹³ Its futility is proved in seve-

ral cases in medieval India, e.g., at Bilgram (1540)⁹⁴ and at Talikota (1565).⁹⁵

(vi) *Defensive-Offensive Strategy*: The power of defensive-offensive strategy was stressed by Jomini. An aggressor may be on the defensive, the defender may turn to offensive. It is perhaps anticipated by the *asana* of Sukracharya. It was adopted by the Ahoms against Mir Jumla (1662), and by the Bijapuris against Jai Singh I (1666).⁹⁶

8. Guerrilla Warfare

It differs from conventional or regular warfare in almost everything, — conception, organization, armament, equipment, supply, strategy, tactics, leadership and command.

Orthodox guerrilla or irregular or partisan war has been a weapon of a militarily weak against a powerful aggressor through centuries. Some of its basic principles were known to the Rajputs, Ahoms, Marathas, Sikhs and the Deccanis in later medieval India as *Qazaqi*. It must be admitted that this was in an inchoate form. But there were some resemblances. Like their modern counterparts the medieval Indian guerrillas turned the conditions of terrain, climate and their own society against the enemy. The geographical and social features in Rajputana, Assam, Maharashtra, the Punjab and Bijapur favoured this sort of warfare. The Indian guerrillas used initiative and flexibility by dispersal, concentration and shifting of position. Examples: Pratap Singh after Haldighat, the Rajputs against Aurangzeb, the Ahoms against Mir Jumla, the Marathas with their light, mobile predatory cavalry (*ghanimi fauj*), the Sikhs against the Mughals and the Abdali.

The modern guerrillas do not need complex mechanical devices or logistics. Fighting behind enemy lines they cripple the enemy, pin him down and disrupt his supply lines and inspire the regular forces and the people. Guerrilla warfare avoids battle but is always

dynamic. By their 'hit and run' tactics combining distraction, surprise and mobility and by their sudden, sharp, vicious and short attacks, the guerrillas strike the mind of the enemy. Similarly the Rathors made 'a terror of their prowess' by unexpected appearances, elusive escapes, closing trade routes and distracting the Mughal General. The elusive Deccani Cossacks made lightning raids on imperial dominions and fanned out to gall the imperialists under Jai Singh. The superb Ahom guerrillas, avoiding pitched battles, and using blood-drinking arrows, made surprise raids and night attacks, and hindered enemy supplies and closed all roads. The Sikhs also adopted 'hit and run' tactics. The Marathas avoided pitched battles (c. 1690). Baji Rao I's forces adopted 'Cossack-like tactics' against the Nizam during Palkhed campaign.

Like their modern counterparts, the medieval Indian guerrillas, nimble as mosquitoes, succeeded because they were ubiquitous and intangible. The Deccanis displayed the qualities of dispersal and coagulation like quicksilver as and when necessary.

Guerrilla operations in medieval India were necessarily as decentralised as in modern times. Waged by the few they rested on the support of the many. The people played a considerable part in these operations, — in Assam, Rajputana and the Punjab, and Maharashtra.

Coordination with regular warfare in strategy and tactics was exemplified by the Bijapuris (1665-6) and the Marathas. Again, a striking example of the relationship between strategic defensive and strategic offensive was illustrated in Bijapur where Jai Singh made a strong case for having two armies, one for defence and the other for offence. Further, the development of guerrilla into mobile warfare was illustrated by the activities of Santa Ghorpade, who combined Parthian tactics with guerrilla warfare and had an inborn genius for handling large bodies of men. Another feature of guerrilla warfare, viz., correct command i.e., centralisation for strategic purposes and decentralisation for tactical purposes, was illustrated by Santa who enforced strictest discipline on his men.

Thus medieval Indian guerrillas were aware at least of some of the principles of modern guerrilla warfare though specific works dealing with the necessary conceptualization might have been lacking.⁹⁷

The above discussion would tend to show that notwithstanding the general uncertainty which shrouds the drama of war there are some fundamental principles of war, deviation from which is dangerous, and adherence to which generally leads to success. Principles of strategy and tactics, governing the planning of war, use of troops and conduct of battles are quite independent of the nature of weapons and military organization, time and space.

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BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION IN BENGAL AND SOME EARLIEST EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A FOREIGN AGENCY IN ENGLAND (1825-1889)

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The genesis of early political organisations and the idea of establishing an agency in England seeking India's political advancement may be traced to the late twenties and thirties of the last century in Bengal. With the dissemination of English education and western ideas that flowed in through different channels enlightened public opinion had begun taking shape in Bengal. By the late twenties, a group of English-educated and public spirited Bengalis, headed by Raja Ram Mohan Roy, had begun to protest against such measures of the Company's Government which affected the interests and aspirations of the people. Their modus operandi was to convene public meetings to express public protests against measures and enactments detrimental to the cause of the country. At such meetings committees were formed to draft petitions and memorials to be addressed to the authorities in India and to the King as well as the Parliament in England. In the beginning, memorials to British kings and the Parliament were entrusted to influential British merchants or lawyers who had resided in India for some time. Subsequently, members of the British Parliament were engaged for the purpose.

'The memorial of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and other distinguished Natives of India' addressed to the King of England in 1825, recommending the restoration of the liberty of the Indian press, may be regarded as the

earliest memorial of the kind. This memorial was occasioned by the suppression of the liberty of the press in India by John Adam, the then Governor-General. An English gentleman, Silk Buckingham, the founder-editor of the *Calcutta Journal*, incurred the displeasure of Adam, for some of his writings in the Journal. Adam suddenly passed the Rule and Ordinance on March 14, 1823, suppressing the Indian press.² The memorial referred to was entrusted for delivery to one Colonel Leicester Stanhope.³ It was rejected⁴ probably, due to lack of earnest advocacy.

Just two years later, when the Company's Government imposed duties on stamp by enacting the Stamp Act, leaders of public opinion in Calcutta, including Indians and European merchants and lawyers, formed themselves into a Committee and petitioned the local Government for the repeal of the Act. Having failed to get a favourable reply, in 1827, the Committee sent one John Crawford to London as "the accredited agent of Calcutta" to oppose the confirmation of the Stamp Act.⁵ This first paid agent of the early constitutional agitators of India did all that an agent could do for the success of the petition. He communicated with Lord Brougham and William Mackintosh for presenting the petition to the House of Commons and sent a long report of his efforts and activities to the Committee.⁶ At a meeting of this Committee, held in November 1828, Crawford's

endeavours relating to the Stamp Act were appreciated. It was decided to appoint him "agent in England to watch over the interests of this Community in concert with the East India Trade Committee in London, Liverpool and other towns under instructions from time to time from the Committee in Calcutta".⁷ The Committee further requested him to accept the Agency on a remuneration of £ 1500 per annum for his services.⁸

Crawfurd received his remuneration for one year for his labour relating to the Stamp Act. Since he also worked as a Calcutta mercantile agent, he had had a part of his second year's remuneration from Calcutta merchants. As an agent of the Calcutta mercantile community he did his utmost for their petitions addressed to the British Parliament.⁹ The petition, recommending the abolition of the monopoly of trade with China and the removal of obstruction to free trade with India, was adopted at a public meeting* held in the Town Hall of Calcutta, on November 15, 1829.¹⁰ In the second year of his assignment as an agent of the inhabitants of Calcutta Crawfurd offered his services gratuitously, when the fund was exhausted.¹¹ He now became an advocate for the furtherance of India's cause during the discussions that preceded and accompanied the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1833.¹²

Another measure of the East India Company's Government which produced widespread discontent among the landlords of the Bengal Presidency was Regulation III of 1828. Through this Regulation, the Government expressed its determination to resume rent free lands included within the zamindaries, for the purpose of assessment. As fresh assessment resulted in the increase of revenue which had been fixed in perpetuity by the Permanent Settlement, the zamindars regar-

ded it as a breach of faith. They thought it was in contravention of the Permanent Settlement—the Magna Charta of the landed aristocracy. They regarded the measure as unjust and oppressive and launched an agitation against it. In 1829, a petition against the Regulation signed by two hundred distinguished landholders of the Presidency was presented to the Government of Bengal,¹³ by Dwarkanath Tagore, Prasanna Kumar Tagore, Ram Mohan Roy and others.¹⁴ The Government, however, did not consider the repeal or modification of the Regulation necessary.¹⁵

Failing to get redress from the Local Government in 1833, certain zamindars of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, engaged one Ram Ratan Mukherji* then in England, to seek redress from the British Parliament against the "disquieting Regulation". Ram Ratan Mukherji published in England a pamphlet entitled 'An appeal to the British Nation against a violation of common justice and a breach of faith by the Supreme Government of India with native inhabitants'.¹⁶ But Ram Ratan's mission also failed and the grievance in question remained unredressed. The result was that discontent increased to such an alarming degree that in January, 1837, a large body of men assembled to resist resumption operations in Chittagong when the civil authorities called in the military and "several of the disaffected were slain in skirmish".¹⁷

The repeated failure brought home to the zamindars the need of concerted action and the necessity for an organisation. And on March 19, 1838, the landed aristocracy of the Presidency formed themselves into an organisation in Calcutta under the name of Landholders' Society.¹⁸ One of the avowed objects

* Among the convenors of the meeting we find the names of Ashutosh Dev, Ramanath Tagore, Dwarkanath Tagore, Ram Mohan Roy and others.

* Ram Ratan Mukherji and Ram Hari Das had accompanied Ram Mohan to England. Afterwards Ram Ratan Mukherji became Deputy Collector of Murshidabad. See K. C. Mitra's *Ram Mohan Roy*, pp. 8-9, Calcutta, 1866.

of the Society was to protect the interests of the landholders, from resumption measures then in progress by legal means.¹⁹ Soon after the establishment, the Society decided to petition the Government against the resumption regulations.²⁰ At a public meeting held on October 31, 1838, under the Society's auspices** it obtained public approval to present the petition (drafted by a sub-committee of the Society) to the Government of Bengal.²¹ As nothing came out of the petition the Landholders' Society not only addressed an appeal to the Governor-General in Council but also decided to take the issue to the British Parliament. In December of the same year it appointed John Crawford as the agent of the Landholders' Society and remitted £100 as remuneration.²² Crawford was directed to arrange the formation of a permanent Committee in London for the management of the Society's operations in England.²³ In January 1839, the Society received a letter from one A. Henderson of London, proposing to establish a branch of the Landholders' Society in London.²⁴

A few months later John Crawford informed the Society that the question of resumption would be brought before the Parliament by Lord Brougham. He also informed that a Society under the name of British India Society had been founded in England for promoting the welfare of both Britain and India. The Landholders' Society decided to open a public subscription in aid of the British India Society. The amount was to be retained till the aims and objects of the Society was fully understood.²⁵ Soon afterwards it received a communication from the Secretary of the British India Society, forwarding a prospectus of the Society and requesting for the Landholders' Society's aid and concurrence for the purpose of securing the welfare and prosperity of both England and India.²⁶ The Society availed itself of the

opportunity and directed John Crawford to work as a channel of communication between the two Societies and remitted to him a further sum of £250, as remuneration.²⁷ Now the resumption issue found a supporter in the British India Society. Lord Brougham, one of its leading members, raised the issue in the House of Lords and demanded that all papers relating to the question should be placed before the House.²⁸ This roused Auckland to action and he issued an order that such rent free land which had an area of less than ten bighas should not be resumed and those having an area of more than ten bighas should be resumed and perpetually settled at one half of the gross rental.²⁹

Not satisfied with obtaining half-justice, the Society resolved that "nothing could be done effectively without the aid of a Parliamentary Agency in England".³⁰ At a meeting held on December 7, 1834, it was decided that "a subscription be opened to establish a permanent Parliamentary Agency in England and that each member subscribing annually, be bound to continue his subscription for five years or a payment in lieu thereof."³¹ A special committee consisting of Dwarkanath Tagore and three Europeans was appointed to translate the resolution into action.³² Nothing, however, could be achieved and on December 18, 1842, the Society instructed Dwarkanath Tagore, who was going to England, to place their point of view before the authorities in England. Accordingly, Dwarkanath had several meetings with the President of the Board of Control at which he drew his attention to the issue of the resumption.³³ He entrusted the Society's appeal memorial to one George Thompson, who accompanied him to India in December, 1842. Thompson came to India as an agent of "The Glasgow Society for promoting the extinction of Slavery and Slave Trade and the Improvement of the condition of our fellow subjects—Natives of India," and particularly to obtain a first hand knowledge of the conditions in

persons.

**The meeting was attended by more than five thousand

India. His visit was also intended to awaken "the native mind itself to a sense of the people's own condition."³⁰ After his arrival in Calcutta, he met some of the prominent members of the Landholders' Society, himself became a member and was elected to its Correspondence Committee.³³ In July 1843, the Society appointed him its unpaid agent in London³⁷ at 6, Waterloo Place, Pall Mall, London. In 1844, Thompson received remittances on account of office maintenance.³⁸ After 1844, the Landholders' Society became almost defunct and we do not know anything about its activities either in India or in England.

Besides the Landholders' Society, George Thompson* worked as an agent of another contemporaneous political organisation of Calcutta, namely the Bengal British India Society. During his brief stay in Calcutta, he had delivered a series of political lectures organised by a group of public spirited Bengalis** headed by Ram Gopal Ghose, Tara Chandra Chakravorty and others.³⁹ In his lectures he pointed out that the people of England were ignorant of the grievances of the people of India and if informed they would be able to support what was just and beneficial for India.⁴⁰ He suggested that they should establish a political organisation for collecting information respecting the true state of the country and sending it first to the Government in India and afterwards to the people of England and Parliament.⁴¹ The members of the Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge were very much influenced by Thompson's speeches and on April 23, 1843, they converted their Society into

the Bengal British India Society for initiation into political life⁴² "to secure the welfare, extend the just rights and advance the interests of all classes of people."⁴³

During its eventful existence of over three years the Bengal British India Society voiced the grievances of the people by petitioning and memorializing the ruling authorities in India and in England as well. Thompson was its London agent. In 1844 it took into consideration the apprehended deviation of the steam link between Calcutta and the Suez and submitted memorials to the Court of Directors and the House of Commons through George Thompson.⁴⁴

But by 1844-45 the Bengal British India Society also became defunct and for nearly six years there did not exist in the country any political organisation of importance. However, the necessity of a well organised political body to represent the wants and grievances of the people at the time of the renewal of the Charter in 1853, led to the revival of the Landholders' Society under the nomenclature of the British Indian Association in October 1851.⁴⁵ The main object of the new organisation was to promote the British Indian administration by memorializing the authorities in India or in England for the introduction of enactments which may tend to promote the general interest of all connected with this country.⁴⁶ For a quarter of a century the British Indian Association was the chief forum of public discussion of practically all the important questions of the time and a medium through which the grievances, hopes and aspirations of the subject-country were communicated to the ruling authorities.

Right from the beginning the Association maintained a permanent agent in England to take care of its petitions and memorials to the British Parliament at a cost greater than before. In 1852, on the eve of the termination

* Parliamentarian and a famous orator, George Thompson was the foremost of that class of British philanthropists who aimed at the political regeneration of India. In 1833, he assisted Raja Ram Mohan Roy in pleading the case of India at the time of the renewal of the Charter. He was one of the founders of the British India Society, London. For details see *National Magazine*, January 1896.

** This group had founded a literary organisation under the name of the Society for the Acquisition of General Knowledge.

of the Charter it drew up a memorial for presenting to the British Parliament containing a catalogue of grievances and valuable suggestions for the establishment of a good Government in the country.⁴⁷ It appointed one G. J. Gordon* as its representative and agent in London to take care of the memorial at the time of discussions on the Charter in the British Parliament.⁴⁸ In 1852 the Association alone had to expend a sum of rupees ten thousand nine hundred and seventy towards remuneration to Gordon and other expenses towards the Association's establishment in London.⁴⁹ In the meantime Gordon died. Had not N. B. E. Baillie, one of the executors of Gordon, succeeded in getting Earl of Honowby present the petition to the House of Lords on April 7, 1853, and Leveson Gower to the House of Commons on June 9, 1853, the submission of the memorials to the Parliament might have been

Soon the Association appointed a Committee of some distinguished persons having interest in India and Indian affairs to choose a successor to Gordon. After a careful consideration of several candidates the Committee elected one G. G. Macpherson for the office. During the progress of the Charter discussion and the sittings of the Parliamentary Committee Macpherson advocated the cause of India with great zeal and earnestness.⁵¹

In the meantime, on March 12, 1853, a Society under the name of Indian Reform Society was established at Clarence Chamber, 12 Hay Market, London, by several of the members of the British Parliament interested in the well-being of India. Among the founders of this Society were persons like John Bright, J. Sullivan, George Thompson, A. D. Seymouir and others. It was established for the sole purpose of taking into consideration

the renewal of the Company's Charter. The founders thought that without reference to the petitions and wishes of the "more intelligent natives of India", it was not prudent to renew the Charter on the evidence of officials and servants of the Company. Therefore, one of the resolutions adopted at the inaugural meeting of the Society read "it is the duty of the Friends of India to insist upon a temporary Act to continue the present Government of India for a period not exceeding three years, so that time may be given for such full enquiry and deliberation as will enable Parliament within that period to legislate permanently for the future administration of our Indian Empire."⁵²

Immediately after the formation of the Society, the British Indian Association opened correspondence with it and remitted to it a sum of £ 250 raised from among members and others, in the first instance.⁵³ It was felt that a larger contribution was called for and a public meeting was held on June 25, 1854, at which it was resolved to raise a subscription for contributing to the funds of the India Reform Society.⁵⁴ Subsequently, the Association remitted to it a further sum of £ 500. Besides in 1853, it paid rupees seven thousand two hundred sixty one,⁵⁵ in 1854 rupees two thousand one hundred eighty-six⁵⁶ and in 1856 rupees two thousand four hundred ninety to its representative and agent in London.⁵⁷

The Indian Reform Society took a lively and sustained interest in all the matters relating to India. At its third annual general meeting the British Indian Association recorded its best thanks to the members of the Indian Reform Society for the warm and sincere interest they took "in the welfare of this country".⁵⁸ At the request of the Association, in 1859 John Bright presented to Parliament the Association's memorial demanding reconstitution of the Legislative Council, employment of Indians to higher offices of

* Gordon had resided in Calcutta for a long time and was interested in the welfare of India.

public service and to bring Indian affairs periodically to the notice of the British Parliament.

The British Indian Association kept regular correspondence with the Indian Reform Society till 1891 and received ready and valuable aid in their operations in England.⁶⁰ But gradually the Reform Society lapsed into inaction and for sometime Indian politics in England had no special body for representation. In 1865, however, was founded the London Indian Society at 10, Denbigh Street, St. George's Road, London, S.W.⁶¹ It was established by some Indians residing in England in connection with study and business, for the purpose of agitating questions of Indian grievances in England and 'diffusing information there regarding the condition of the people of India.' When W. C. Bonnerji, the Society's Honorary Secretary, sought the British Indian Association's guidance and co-operation, the Association while pledging the same wrote "the want of an organisation in England for the agitation of native Indian questions had been seriously felt." It also observed that "the London Indian Society will prove a powerful instru-

ment of good to the mother country".⁶²

During 1865-66, the two Associations exchanged views and opinions on the question of petitioning the Secretary of State for India for extension of minimum age of candidates for the Indian Civil Service examination.⁶³ In 1867, however, the London Indian Society was amalgamated with the East Indian Association founded in that year by Dadabhai Naoroji and other Indians for the ventilation of Indian questions in England. The British Indian Association not only established a regular correspondence with the new body but some of its members enrolled themselves as members of the East Indian Association also.⁶⁴ In later years, the East Indian Association became a powerful ally to the British Indian Association in furtherance of their objects. In 1869 it strongly supported the Association's memorial to the British Parliament for a Royal Commission of Enquiry for India.⁶⁵

Till the establishment in 1889 of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, the East Indian Association was the only body to further the cause of India in England.

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A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF INDIANS IN EAST AFRICA

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With the dawn of independence in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, new and perplexing problems confront the 360,000 Asians settled in these East African countries. Most of these inhabitants are of Indian and Pakistani origin. The term 'Asian' came to be used after the partition of India, as the more accurate 'Indian' was no longer acceptable to the Pakistani Muslims. The term 'Asian' is used here in conformity with the current practice in East Africa but it does not include Arabs, though most of the Arabs reside within the geographical boundaries of the continent of Asia.

Compartmentalisation of society into a three-tier structure was one of the most striking features of colonial rule in East Africa. This was reinforced by economic, social and political discrimination and segregation. The Asian community tended to occupy the middle place in this system while the Africans were always at the bottom. The Europeans remained at the apex of this pyramid till independence was ushered into these countries between 1961 and 1963. The Asians described above, have to adapt themselves to new political regimes which are determined to carry out far-reaching changes in the traditional roles of the different races in East Africa. In order to understand fully the complexity and magnitude of the problems faced by the Asian community in East Africa it is essential to contrast the colonial pattern with that envisaged by the new African leaders.

When Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya became independent they offered generous terms to all foreigners to stay on and become citizens. Some Asians acquired local citizenship; a few who had the means used their British passports to migrate to England; the rest carry on, their business dwindling, unable to make up their minds to go or to stay. Before proceeding to deal with the problems confronting Asians in East Africa it is necessary to understand the circumstances which led to the spread of European dominion in this part of Africa and the role played by the ruling powers in determining the status of Asians in the colonies and protectorates.

Historical background

The territory north of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique was claimed in sovereignty by the Sultan of Zanzibar, at whose court British influence was very strong, though German trading interest was also considerable. Before 1884, both the British and German governments were reluctant to make a political move in the area.

In 1884, a young German, Dr. Carl Peters, founded the Company for German colonisation to provide capital for the acquisition of a colony. Peters went to Zanzibar and with the assistance of some local German business houses, went into the interior. Within a few days he executed treaties with about a dozen chiefs, placing the kingdoms of Useguha, Nguru, Usugara and Ukaine (about 60,000 square miles) under the protection of the

Company. On his return to Berlin Peters reorganised the Company into the German East African Company and demanded protection from the German government. After a slight hesitation (presumably in order to make sure that there would be no adverse international repercussions, since England was preoccupied with her disputes with Russia in Asia), Bismark proclaimed in March 1885, German 'Suzerainty' and 'Protectorate' over the territories and granted the Company all rights of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the British had also started their activities in East Africa. An English explorer, Sir Henry Johnstone, had entered the region of Mount Kilimanjaro, ostensibly to observe the flora and fauna, but with instructions to make treaties with local chiefs. These 'treaties' were taken up in 1885 by some Manchester merchants and others who formed the *British East Africa Association*, later recognised as the Imperial British East Africa Company. The territory thus acquired became the Kenya colony.

During this time, Peters added to his Protectorate the Sultanate of Witu and parts of Swahililand and Somaliland. The Sultan of Zanzibar protested, but a German naval squadron appeared to strengthen the claims of the German company. Since France was also interested in East Africa, England, France and Germany appointed a joint commission to delimit the boundaries of their spheres of influence. An Anglo-German agreement was reached in October-November, 1886, by which a 10 mile wide 1000 miles long coastal belt was left with the Sultan (northern 400 under British influence and the rest under German influence). Territory south of the line drawn from the Kilimanjaro region to Lake Victoria as also Uganda and Witu were recognised as German, while the region north of the line was recognised as British.

France it was agreed, could take Madagascar. Faced with this agreement among the

Powers, the Sultan was forced to accept the 'fait accompli'. The German and British East African companies were not slow to lease from Zanzibar their respective 'spheres' of coast.

The conflict between the various Christian missionaries came to a head in Uganda in 1890. The European situation, however, was not such as to warrant hostilities between Germany and England. In July, 1890, an agreement was concluded, whereby Germany obtained Heligoland and in exchange gave up all claims on Uganda, Zanzibar, Pemba islands, Witu, Nyasaland and some disputed territories in West Africa on the border between Togoland and Ashanti.

The British moved in to occupy the territories over which the Germans had renounced their claim. Their East Africa Company sent a force under Captain Lugard to Uganda to offer the local king Mwanga the Company's protection and powerful assistance. Mwanga was forced to sign the treaty. However, the French missionary interests continued to encourage resistance to the British. Thereupon, the British company decided to withdraw its forces from Uganda, unless it could obtain financial aid from the British Government. Lugard returned to London and organised a campaign to mobilise public opinion in favour of retaining Uganda. In April, 1893, the London Chamber of Commerce stated in a report regarding Uganda :

"The uniform experience of this country from 1568 down to the present region is that colonies amply repay the first expenditure in blood and money, and that they pay both in extension of trade and shipping and in the growth of national power and status. . . . It should be sufficient for us to know that investments of this class are invariably good in the long run."

The British government decided to re-

establish protectorates over Uganda in 1894 and over British Africa in 1895, after taking over British East Africa company. Protectorates were also declared over Nyasaland (modern Malawi), Zanzibar and Pemba.

The ideologues of imperialism had been emphasising the altruistic aspect of colonial expansion : it was a 'burden' which the white man had to shoulder in order to bring the 'light' of civilisation to the 'Dark Continent'. The Berlin Act of 1884 had defined the objectives — to work for the uplift of the African people, to suppress slavery, to encourage the propagation of the gospel.

It is true that many of the primitive communities were exposed to civilisation, and that modern science and technology were carried to the African hinterland. But it should also be remembered that initially most of the European colonies were governed by business companies, and that they exploited the native population so ruthlessly that their own governments were compelled to intervene and to take over the administration directly. And yet the economic control of the big 'monopoly concerns' remained practically unchanged. The 'super' profits from the colonies kept mounting up. The natives were deprived of the more productive lands which were developed as plantations of the forest and mineral resources; they were subjected to forced labour on pitifully low wages on conditions resembling slavery; where vice was more profitable than virtue, the colonialists had no compunction in encouraging the latter; mutual rivalries and jealousies were fully exploited; and above all, the vicious principle of racial discrimination was fully upheld, thus proclaiming that Christianity was to be supported by imperialism only when it brought 'profits', and its fundamental principles were ignored when they clashed with colonial interests.

Under these circumstances, it was but

natural that the African people rose against this suffering and humiliation. The logic of imperialism had inexorably led to African resurgence.

The people of Indian origin who live in Africa today are of recent migration. They first went out to South Africa just about a hundred years ago. Their next immigration, three decades later, was to East Africa — Uganda to be precise — where they went to help build the railways to open up the country. This was a pioneering effort which took a heavy toll of human lives. The hazards were great. The tropical jungle presented a formidable obstacle and then there was the 'tse — tse fly' menace, the sleeping sickness, and many other local diseases to overcome. According to the First Report of the Uganda Railway Committee, out of the 32,000 Indians who went there to work on the project, as many as 9000 had been invalidated or had died.

Having sustained these hazards, many of them decided to remain as artisans and civil servants, while some of them took to business. They were joined by others from India and soon the retail trade passed into the hands of the people of 'Indian' origin. Their little shops ('dukas') could be found in the remotest villages and in due time the produce from these villages began to find its way to bigger markets. It was a two-way traffic and although some people made unreasonable profits — as would happen anywhere in any community — by and large, the partnership worked well. The trails tirelessly cleared by them opened up the country and provided new opportunities to the inhabitants of this region. No better testimony could be quoted than that of East African Royal Commission of 1953-55 which was by no means favourable to the people of Indian origin. It stated : "Indeed, the remarkable tenacity and courage of Indian traders had been responsible for stimulating the wants of the indigenous

people even in the remotest areas, by opening to them a shop window on the modern world and for collecting for sale elsewhere whatever small surpluses are available for disposal".

For long the Asians acted as the middlemen between the British rulers and the African masses, working in unequal partnership to organise the administration and to run the market place. They accepted their handicaps and kept out of places where they were not wanted. They played no significant part in the movement for independence. In return they had the entire retail trade and the bulk of the wholesale and they entered the professions and set up industry.

Asians' Standard of Living

This rose with their income and towns in East Africa came to wear an 'Indian' look. In remote African hamlets the Indian 'dukawalla' (shopkeepers) rose early and retired late to keep a shop open and to support aged parents or young children at school back home. The success of the Asians' industry and thrift continues to be an eyesore to the Africans who are now masters of their own land. This is the most serious of all problems facing Asians in East Africa.

If the various Asian groups cannot integrate, what prospect is there, one may ask, for their integration with the Africans? A majority of Africans are still lacking in business experience and not many of them have much capital and so their introduction in Asian enterprises can begin in only a limited way. Socially they are worlds apart; and the African ruling class, in the best manner of the former colonial class or in recollection of past Asian snubs, stays aloof.

Inter-racial marriage is mentioned only to be dismissed as a solution, because it is a matter for individuals and cannot be adopted as part of Asian policy. In the public services

the principle of Africanisation keeps the top posts among Africans and hinders the entry of Asians at other levels. In politics the Asians gain by identifying themselves with the leading party in one-party States, for they escape possible reprisals from the Opposition; but they can get neither an Asian nor an African elected to represent their minority claims. They have to merge with the people in whose country they have chosen to make their home and win a position for themselves by contribution to the country's social and economic growth.

One glimmer of hope is the rising generation of Asians and Africans who go to school together and learn to adapt themselves to one another's beliefs and practices. It is open to the schools which are rapidly filling and multiplying under Asian teachers to breed an integrated society. The younger generations, the African citizens of tomorrow, are being taught by Asian teachers the lessons of sober and informed leadership. In the years to come such citizens should be able to take over the intermeshing of Asian-African relationships at any points. To the children of both races, collaboration, as they grow up on social, political and economic plane, must be easier than it is to their parents.

On the other hand, time diminishes the prospect of Asians pulling out of East Africa, as the white settlers of Kenya did with British help. The Government of India has no plans for Indians to do likewise, neither has Pakistan. Nehru's advice to "my countrymen" to identify themselves with the land of their adoption was the soundest given. Asians have, however, to take into account the prevailing turmoil and an alarming atmosphere of insecurity diagnosed by the brilliant French author Jean Ziegler whose initial remarks about coups in Africa are quoted below in the context of the future status of Asians in East Africa. Many Africans deny that classes exist in their society to-day.

They should test their convictions against the observations, the data and the theories offered by Ziegler. This will not be an easy process. The author does not sugar his pill. On the first page we read : "Most African regimes show a tendency to develop, as if by fate, into tyrannies. The stages are as follows : emergency, the suppression of basic liberties, a one-party system, dictatorial powers for the president, finally the tyranny of one man or of a group of men who fight for survival (political or even physical) against a whole people becoming more and more discontented". This is not a language to please. Jean Ziegler does not want to please, but to alarm.

Laissez faire attitude of Asians

Despite occasional and specific protests, for the most part Asians tended to acquiesce in this system. There were several reasons for this. On the social level the colonial compartmentalised system suited the Asian temperament. Asians in East Africa are a profoundly conservative community and were therefore glad to be left alone to pursue their own traditional ways and maintain their cultures. Another reason why the colonial system was acceptable was that by defining areas of occupation and activity on a racial basis, it made it easier for the Asian to identify his role, and as he was an immigrant, unsure of his rights and status, he was probably grateful to be spared the pains of transitions and tensions of racial conflict and competition. Though he knew that certain positions of eminence were closed to him, he was to some extent sheltered from competition from the African. Furthermore, while he could never hope to rise to the highest positions in the public services, there was nothing to prevent him from amassing a fortune in the commercial and industrial world and in private professional practice. Indeed a number of Asians during this period rose to levels of wealth and affluence they could never have hoped to attain in their country of origin.

The economic success of the Asian community in East Africa has been due to their possession of certain qualities essential for economic development. The early Asian settlers were imbued with quasi-Protestant ethics; they were remarkable for their strong commercial sense, capacity to work long hours, low propensity to consume, and passion for accumulation of capital. With increased prosperity, the new generations have relaxed their single-minded pursuit of wealth. Nevertheless, a substantial number of younger Asian businessmen possess in abundance many of the qualities that enabled their forefathers to amass large fortunes. The qualities noted above, while vitally important for economic development, are essentially 'unheroic' and are not likely to endear their possessors to other communities. Asians have had more than their share of criticism from Europeans in the past and increasingly from Africans. Before we turn to this aspect of the problem, let us examine in brief the circumstances under which Asians (particularly the bulk of the forebears of the existing Indian expatriates) migrated to the Eastern littoral of Africa and proceeded thence towards the interior of the continent.

The Asian community has played a remarkable role in Kenya's history. By their perseverance, efficiency and good conduct, Indian traders and settlers gained the confidence and respect of the native population while opening up the interior of Kenya. Sir John Krik in his evidence before the Sanderson Committee (appointed by the Colonial Office in 1909) stated : "But for the Indians we should not be there now. It was entirely through being in possession of the influence of these Indian merchants that we were enabled to build up the influence that eventually resulted in our position".

Though British capital and engineering skill were engaged in the building of the Kenya-Uganda Railway, which opened up the

interior for fuller development, the construction of the railway was made possible only by Indian organisation, enterprise and labour. There is no exaggeration in saying that the British could not have administered the colony without the helping hand of Indians who worked not only as traders, but also as skilled labourers, garage owners, contractors, lawyers, post-office clerks, linotypists and railway officers. Above all they filled the middle section of the civil service and bureaucracy. The Indian community in Kenya played a significant role in the agricultural life of the country. African farmers adopted Asian techniques and methods. A substantial contribution was made by Asians to the agricultural economy of the country, notably in the sugar sector of the plantation industry.

It was Asians again who introduced trade where it had not existed before. Even the East African Royal Commission of 1953-55 acknowledged this in the following words: "Indeed, the remarkable tenacity and courage of Indian traders had been mainly responsible for stimulating the wants of the indigenous peoples, even in the remotest areas, by opening to them a shop window on the modern world and for collecting for sale elsewhere what small surpluses were available for disposal".

There is hardly a town in Kenya that is without a lively, colourful line of Indian shops. Cities like Nairobi and Mombasa look like Indian commercial centres. In big cities as well as small townships we find Indian 'dukas' (shops) whose owners have been instrumental in introducing the products and wares of Asia and Europe to the African in the remotest corners of Kenya and neighbouring countries of Tanzania and Uganda.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that the Indian community in Kenya and elsewhere in East Africa, by protesting against the discriminatory policies of the white

settlers, helped in rousing African consciousness. Indians had fought against racial discrimination, reservation of the Highlands for European settlers and franchise restrictions. All these resulted in creating political consciousness among East Africans.

The relations between Indians and Africans were cordial and smooth till 1965. But thereafter a process of deterioration started. There were various factors responsible for this state of affairs.

The first factor is African nationalism. Uhuru (Freedom) is the new light influencing the relations of Africans with the immigrant races. The Africans of Kenya now want to be addressed as 'bwana' (boss). We find Mr. Kenyatta saying: "Our time has come to be called 'bwana'. I want Europeans, Asians and Arabs to learn to call Africans 'bwana' (The Daily Telegraph, 29th January 1962.)

Thirdly, some political leaders in Kenya are anti-Indian in their outlook. Their statements in the Press and speeches at public meetings tend to create acrimony. They proclaim that Asians are holding clerical and certain jobs that could be filled by Africans and that this is holding up African advancement. A complicating factor in this situation is the attitude of Europeans, some of whom have been making a concentrated effort to cause a split between Indians and Africans. The reason perhaps is that by creating such a rupture they want to divert the attention of the Africans away from themselves and to escape the wrath of rising nationalism.

Prospects

It is necessary to know something of the developments in the past if the present is to make sense, but for the immigrants living in East Africa today it is the immediate future which matters most. Will they have a place of security and respect in these countries in

the post-independence era? Or will there be a slow squeezing out of their rights and resources until this Asian community is driven out by poverty and desperation? Is the presence of the immigrants essential for the area's prosperity and progress in the immediate future? These are questions on the answers to which hangs the destiny of these communities.

Let us take the last question first and try to answer it. The economic stability of these countries is closely linked with the stability and security of the immigrant Asian community. We find that at present there is a crisis of confidence. It is imperative for the local political leaders to pacify the fears and the sense of insecurity experienced by these expatriates. Otherwise there is a danger of Asian capital fleeing the country. If this happens there will not be many people wanting to buy the farms and land values will almost cease to have any meaning. But, on the other hand, if the immigrants are assured of security, they, by their experience and skill, can really play an important role in the development of this region by sharing the burden of reconstruction.

The answers to the first and second questions depend to a great extent on the conduct of the immigrants themselves. They should not prove themselves to be obstacles in the path of African aspirations. While warning the Europeans in a public speech on 9th March, 1960, Mr. Tom Mboya said: "Unless they are responsive to the wishes, aspirations, thoughts and feelings of our people they are making it impossible for us to generate that atmosphere". (The Times, 10th March, 1960).

As regards the problem of Asians completely identifying themselves with Africans in East Africa, Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's Minister of External Affairs, admitted in the Indian Parliament that there were some ap-

prehensions on the part of Indian settlers in East Africa, "as anywhere during transition, but we hope that most of the people of Indian origin will become nationals of the countries they are living in". According to Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal (India's Ambassador to France) who represented India at the celebrations marking Kenya's becoming a republic, African leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania want Indians to remain in East Africa and are desirous of greater economic and technical co-operation with India. Mr. Dayal who also visited Uganda and Tanzania, said in Nairobi that the first impact of independence anywhere in the world was a degree of uncertainty. He proceeded to say "I think that that period has now ended in East Africa". Africans had understandable aspirations, but they could be reconciled with the interest of Indians in African countries. There were new opportunities in East Africa and Indians, who were enterprising, can make their contributions to its economic development. Mr. Kenyatta expressed the hope that the Indians instead of standing aloof would identify themselves with Africans.

There is now wide recognition of sympathy for racial injustices and humiliations suffered by Africans during the colonial period. But it is usually forgotten that Asians were often subjected to similar humiliations. The fact that the Asians' protests were not louder was at least partly due to their recognition that they were unable to exert any significant influence on the state of affairs in East Africa. Whatever the reasons, the lack of active, large-scale Asian opposition to the colonial system has been regarded by many African leaders as an instance of Asian complicity with the imperialists.

Against this background of a wide measure of acceptance by the Asian community of the colonial system, it is not surprising that the advent of independence with its promise (or threat?) of fundamental changes in the

structure of society should arouse feelings of insecurity among large numbers of Asians. The new governments of East Africa are committed to a rapid and substantial enlargement of the economic and social role of Africans. This will involve important changes in the traditional allocations of functions and status between the three races. It would appear that in working towards these objectives the East African governments are not going to be significantly concerned with the consequences for Asians. It is up to the Asians to seek their salvation and to work out for themselves their place in an increasingly fluid and changing society.

One thing is certain: if Asians desire to play a vital and progressive role in the new societies of East Africa, they will have to accept radical, at times painful, changes in their present positions, attitudes and behaviour. For visualizing the nature and extent of the future role of Asians in East Africa it is of prime importance to analyse the consequences for the Asian community of current and likely future trends in the political, economic and social policies of the East African governments and to discuss Asian response. Let us begin with the analysis of economic problems and prospects, because the entire future of the Asian community must ultimately be determined by its economic fortunes.

Before discussing the role of Asians in the East African economy, we should examine the problem posed by the white immigrants and subsequent policy of colonisation followed by them. The consequences resulting from this policy have to a large extent determined the position of Asians vis-a-vis the indigenous Africans.

The Africans and the white immigrants:

We know from history that just as in other countries of the world, in Kenya too the British came with their fantastic notions of

the superiority of their race, culture and religion. They exploited the Africans politically, economically and culturally. The present antagonism is the fruit of the tree of imperialism, the seed of which was sown some 80 years ago and nourished and watered during the last 7 decades or so.

It is true that one cannot ignore the good results which ensued from the presence of the British in Kenya but one cannot overlook the fact that these came as by-products. The civilising influence of the west woke up the Africans from their slumber, educated them and made them conscious of their political and national destiny. From this came the urge for freedom and liberty. In the words of an African historian, "The struggle is now between the dominator and the dominated. What is involved is not whiteness or blackness, but the determined desire to dominate and the equally determined desire to throw off the yoke of domination."

Another factor which has strained the relations between these two races in Kenya is land. Land has been the curse of Kenya ever since Delamere's first acquisition. The whites always tried in one way or another to get the best land and this the Africans naturally resented. In 16 months (1903-4) 220,000 Highland acres were transferred to 234 individual Europeans and huge tracts, blocks of 3,00,000 acres or more, went to European syndicates. With the passage of time more and more of the Highland tracts came into the ownership of white settlers. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 empowered the Governor to veto land transactions between races, which in practice closed the door to any Indian's access to the Highland area. General Northey, British Governor, seemed to share the view of the white settlers that Kenya was destined to become a self-governing territory in the hands of its tiny white minority. The monopoly of Highland area by the white settlers is one of the main factors

which have adversely affected the economic life of the Africans.

The dramatic resurgence of self-confidence and the urge for self-expression so prominent today in the countries of East Africa may appear to outsiders as something astounding.

It is but natural that the Africans of Kenya should be getting very sensitive about their rights and privileges and should be showing concern about the immigrant races. This animosity, this friction between the natives of Kenya and the immigrants (some of whom have elected to become full-fledged Kenyans after independence, shedding their immigration status of the colonial days) was partly due to misunderstandings on the part of Africans (created and accentuated mostly by the British imperialist colonial power) and partly due to the ignorance of emergent African sentiments on the part of the immigrants of Asian origin.

How foreigners reached Kenya

Though several of its coastal cities were known to the outside world for hundreds of years much of the interior of Kenya was unknown to the outside world except to some Arab traders, slave raiders and a few Indian adventurers, until the mid-19th century when Kenya was invaded by explorers, Christian missionaries and imperialists. The history of the white settlement in Kenya is a chequered one. First came explorers like Burton, Speke, Grant and Stanley; then groups of missionaries poured in, followed by traders. With the passage of time traders acquired the complexion of imperialists. There is a striking analogy between the history of British rule in India and British expansion in Kenya and other parts of East Africa. As in India, so in Kenya, the British started with commerce. The Imperial British East Africa Company reminds us of the British East India Company with its policies, criteria and implications. The only remarkable difference is that in

East Africa, unlike in India, they took a comparatively short time in changing over from commerce to politics. The Imperial British East Africa Company was formed in 1888 and it was on June 15, 1895 that Kenya was declared a British protectorate. This change from commerce to politics and from commercial to political destiny has been the subject of a good deal of speculation among historians. Some hold the view that the British acquired these vast territorial powers in a "fit of absentmindedness". Others say that the motive was humanitarian. Still others call it utilitarian. The plea of "absent-mindedness" is nothing but a fanciful idea. It is difficult to believe that European expansion in Kenya and other countries in East Africa was without intention and motive. There was indeed a purposeful and concentrated effort behind the change from commerce to politics. Again, though it is true that the charter of the Imperial British East Africa Company contained a declaration for abolition of slave trade, it will be improper and incorrect to support this imperialist intrusion by the plea of humanitarianism. The real factors which influenced the growth and expansion of the political powers of the British in Kenya and other parts of East Africa were commercial and political, inspired by the logic of imperialism. The world situation in the last 2 decades of the 19th Century did have an effect on the destiny of Kenya. An ambitious and exuberant Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II was an important factor in influencing British colonial policy. It will not be untrue to say that the German ambitions in Africa provoked the British to strike the first blow.

Thus Kenya came into the grip of colonialism with little opposition. It is not necessary here to go into a detailed examination of the various facets of British colonialism in Kenya, which had hardly passed the half-century mark when it became redundant.

In the beginning the Imperial East Africa

Company authorities generally supported the settlement of Asians. Lugard was convinced that the indigenous tribes in Kenya would readily copy agricultural techniques, adopt Asian implements, irrigation and manuring methods. Fitzgerald the agronomist who undertook a survey of the coast for the Company in 1891, recommended the grant of free passages to Indian peasant farmers prepared to take up land in that area. It was felt by the Company that Indian immigration would be advantageous for Kenya's development. The question of recruitment of labour for the Kenya-Uganda Railway came up in 1890. The Company administration wanted Indian labour for the project which was to play a very important role in Kenya's future development. Attempts had been made to recruit workmen from England as well as to procure local Africans, but such attempts did not succeed. From the correspondence between the Agents of the Imperial British East Africa Company and the Government of India, it is clear that the Indian administration was being persuaded to allow Indian emigration for the project. Here is a specimen from the correspondence :

"You are aware that a large number of natives of India already reside in British East Africa, for the advantage in the way of good government and kind treatment under the Company's administration, combined with the fine soil and good climate of the country, are attracting new settlers from British India."

(Letter No. 406 dated 20th August 1890, from M/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company, Agents, British East Africa Company, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.)

The Government of India was hesitant to relax Section 105 of the Indian Emigration Act XXI of 1883, which penalised the inducement of Indians, whether under contract or not, to work outside India. A request was made by the British government to the Indian government in 1895 for the emigration of

Indian labourers to work on the Kenya-Uganda Railway. The Governor-General thereupon removed all restrictions imposed under the Land Act.

An agreement was prepared by one Mr. Johns and approved by the Government of India on the basis of which the first batch of labourers left India in January 1896 for work on the Kenya-Uganda Railway. When construction was completed in 1903 about 6,724 Indians settled down in East Africa as agriculturists, artisans and traders, and the rest either returned to India or died. The British government continued its policy of encouraging Asian immigration but local authorities (like Sir Charles Elliot, the first Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate) restricted Asian settlement to areas considered unsuitable for Europeans. A committee, which was set up under John Ainsworth in 1905 to promote Asian immigration, sat about the same time as the Land Committee under Lord Delamere. The Land Board of the Protectorate recommended the reservation of the Highlands for white settlement. The Asian community did not have any representation on the committee. The findings of the committee were given official form by Lord Elgin's statements the following year despite a mass protest at Mombasa which demanded equal opportunities for Asians.

Thus the Europeans, who were anxious for Indian emigration to Kenya and other parts of East Africa in the beginning because they wanted Indian help, suddenly turned to evolve a policy of discrimination. There were other measures which reflected this policy of discrimination against the Indian community. The levying of prohibitive immigration and repatriation fee was nothing but a device to check Indian immigration. The Kenya Immigration Restriction Ordinance (Amending) Act of 1938 raised the amount of the security deposit from £ 50 to £ 500. Further, it armed minor police officials with arbitrary powers

in dealing with Indians. Discrimination against Asians continued in various garbs in the political, social and economic spheres.

In 1960 the elected members of Kenya's Legislative Council comprised 14 Europeans, 14 Africans, 6 Asians and 2 Arabs. The population figures for this year (according to the Statesman, 30th January 1960) were as follows :

Africans	Asians	Europeans	Arabs	Others
6,500,000	169,000	66,000	37,000	6,000

There were, for instance, separate residential areas for the different communities, separate schools, hospitals, maternity homes, clubs; on the political level, the institution of separate electoral communal representation stimulated racial political parties and made racial interests inevitable as political issues. On the economic level, the compartmentalisation was reinforced by a racial salary structure in the public and, imitatively, in the private sector: by the exclusion of non-whites from the 'White Highlands' of Kenya and restrictions

on Asians on land ownership and cultivation specially in Kenya and Uganda; by the existence of African reserves, and wide disparities in the quality and number of social and economic services provided by the governments for different races. The result of all these policies was to preserve and strengthen the political, economic and social dominance of Europeans in East Africa.

A few words about the interchange of cultures in East Africa today will not be out of place here. Asians have their own cultural centres in important East African towns such as Nairobi, Dar-es-salaam, Mombasa, Kampala and Jinja. At smaller places such as Lugazi and Kakira (where because of the development of Industry by Indian merchants there are concentrations of Asian communities) art academies with an Indian setting have flourished in the milieu of African environment. Such activity tends to promote interracial concord resulting from a free exchange of different cultures.

(To be continued)

THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN THE SHAHABAD DISTRICT (BIHAR) —A CASE STUDY

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At the time of the decennial settlement (which was later on declared permanent) in 1788 A.D., the gross jama (Governmental rental) of the district of Shahabad was rupees 10,37,836-7-10,3. This also included non-land taxes,¹ which amounted to rupees 61,055-12-5. And so, the net land revenue was rupees 9,76,780-11-5,3.²

When the Permanent Settlement was introduced in 1793, the revenue fixed in the decennial settlement of 1788, was accepted as the State demand in perpetuity. However, the problem was with whom to enter into the new settlement. Obviously, the first choice was to confirm those with whom the Government had already agreements consequent upon the decennial settlement. In such cases, the person concerned was well known and so no security was asked for nor any required. However, it was not possible to find such incumbents in all cases. Therefore, new persons had to be found. They were required to furnish pledges to the Government. But the guiding principle was reliability, and security was waived aside in many cases. Over certain tracts, during the decennial settlement, the Government had farmed the taxes collectively to a number of persons (Sajhiya). The Government called these proprietors and in case they were unable to come, they were to send their nominees. The Government entered into agreement in perpetuity with these proprietors or their nominees. But there were instances when the Government found it inconvenient to execute new deeds with the

existing tax farmers. They overcame this difficulty by fixing a percent of the revenue income as remuneration of the ex-tax-farmer. This was called *Malikana*. But where necessary the Government entered into agreement with peasants as well, conferring upon them the rights and privileges of the Zamindars.³

One of the important personages with whom Permanent Settlement in the district was entered was Nurul Hasan Khan, who was an *amil*⁴ of Sarkar Arrah. His Zamindari was scattered over the greater parts of Sasaram and in certain parts of Arrah.⁵ Out of his total Zamindari only such lands were settled with Nurul Hasan Khan, which he had been possessing since a very long period and which had been entered in his name. There were lands which had been added to his Zamindari by the Company's Government to collect taxes on behalf of the State; some of these were settled with him and the rest with various farmers, or the entire were let in farm to peasants only. Before the proposed settlement Nurul Hasan Khan had received a number of villages in pargana Danwar. The settlement for the nine-tenth of those lands was made with farmers and the remaining with Nurul Hasan Khan. In pargana Bargawan the lands forming the talukas of Nurul Hasan Khan and yielding a revenue of Rupees 6,497 were given to seven persons on offering security for a year only. Pargana Dinara composing the Zamindari of Nurul Hasan Khan and bringing a revenue of Rupees 9,585 were let to twelve persons,

eight of whom gave security for a year only. On these lands Nurul Hasan Khan was allowed *malikana*. The settlement of Sarkar Arrah yielding a revenue of Rupees 5,69,001 was made with a number of proprietors. Out of the lands of Nurul Hasan Khan in Sarkar Arrah five villages in pargana Arrah accruing a rent of Rupees 3,601 were let to Gajraj Singh in farm, for which he offered security. The villages of Burranah and Curumpoorah (in pargana Bihia) paying a tax of rupees 175 and 150 respectively were farmed out to Unmaut Singh. Some other village in the same pargana yielding a revenue of rupees 51, was let to Sirdah Das, besides Bycantpur to Rauje Roop at an annual rent of rupees 9. Khundellak in pargana Danwar was let to Porunput Singh at the jama of rupees 48. In addition to these, thirty-two persons got engagement for the lands in pargana Arrah at a revenue of rupees 62,780-10-9 on offering securities. In parganas Bihia the lands which gave rupees 12,801 as annual rent were given in farm to ten persons, of whom only one person offered security. In pargana Danwar lands yielding a revenue of rupees 6,983-6 were let to twenty persons, of whom only four persons gave securities for a year only. Pargana Chainpur containing 1711 villages and paying a jama of rupees 2,85,593 were let to numerous proprietors excluding a part of it yielding a revenue of rupees 18,841, which remained in the possession of Hurry Mardan Singh, a Zamindar of the pargana. As a matter of fact the entire property of the pargana belonged to Hurry Mardan Singh, but he was dispossessed of the bulk of the same in consequence of a murder committed by him of one Najmud Ali Khan. These lands were given to a few influential persons. As these persons claimed a sort of proprietary right on these lands, no security was asked for. When they failed to discharge their revenue obligations for 1791-93 A.D., security was required from them. Besides, three unimportant places in Chainpur yielding a gross jama of about rupees 2,000 were

farmed out to three persons without any security.⁶

There were also many joint undivided (Sajhiya) estates in Chainpur and Sasaram. All the proprietors of these estates were called for to sign on the settlement deed and to suggest names for appointment of their managers to administer the Zamindaries, but all the proprietors did not turn up. As the proprietors were numerous and considerable time was required for this, the matter was not taken up.⁷

As regards the cases of disqualified landholders, mention may be made of two proprietors, namely, one at village Bhekon-Posah and the other the wife of Sheo Prasad Singh of village Botepah in pargana Sasaram. The former paid a revenue of rupees 33, while the latter gave rupees 140. Both the proprietors signed the settlement deeds through their Vakils.⁸

A taluka in pargana Chainpur assessed at rupees 8,278, held by a minor by name Dirgopal Singh, was not included in the settlement. The Company's Government decided that as Dirgopal Singh was quite incapable to farm lands on account of his being a minor, the taluka should be kept under a Court of Wards.⁹

Over and above, there were also four prominent Zamindaries of the district, which were included in the settlement, namely, the Dumraon Raj, the Buxar Raj and the Nokha Raj. Bikramajit Singh, the Raja of Dumraon, had defaulted in the discharge of his revenue obligations and therefore, at the proposed settlement the Government agreed to give him some allowance for his maintenance pending his final settlement.¹⁰ On producing certain mahajans as his surety, the Raja was restored to his Zamindari on the condition that he would clear off his arrears in a year by monthly instalments.¹¹ But in 1790-91

A.D. the Raja was again dispossessed of his Zamindari by the Company's Government on the allegation of having collected Sayer¹² duties, the collection of which had been prohibited by the Company's Government.¹³ Bikramjit Singh pleaded that he had not collected the alleged Sayer duties but said that his amlas might have collected the same without his knowledge.¹⁴ Even then he was not restored to his Zamindari. But it seems that the Government forgave him afterwards and in 1795-96 A.D. the Zamindari was settled in perpetuity with him.¹⁵

The Jagdishpur Zamindari was settled with Bhup Narain Singh,¹⁶ and Bhagat Singh got engagement for taluka Buxar in pargana Bhojpur for a term of ten years.¹⁷

Santan Singh and Jagannath Singh of the Nokha family, at the time of the introduction of the decennial settlement, advanced their claims over the *malikana* on the 874312 villages which were included in their father's Zamindari. They made a prayer to the Company to settle the villages with them.¹⁸ But the Government were reluctant to settle the entire villages to the two brothers, because they felt that their claim on these villages was based merely on the Sanad granted by the Patna Revenue Council which had given them twenty-nine villages in lieu of *malikana* for 874312 villages. The two brothers could produce no other proof except this Sanad to establish their claim over the villages. But the Government considered this Sanad as a grant by the Patna Revenue Council which had never received sanction from the Supreme Government.¹⁹ And so, twenty-nine villages only were settled with Santan Singh and Jagannath Singh and the rest were settled with other maliks.²⁰

Harbans Rai of the Tilouthu family also prayed to the Government for a ten year settlement.²¹ The settlement was, however, not made with him as the Company's Gov-

ernment thought that Harbans Rai held Haveli Rohtas as a mukrarrari²² tenure and not as a Zamindari.²³ All the same, Harbans Rai remained in possession of Haveli Rohtas as a mukrarraridar and after his death in 1803, it was continued to his widow and mother.²⁴

Lands were also settled under Talukdari system. The Belonja Raja possessed Taluka Kundal, consisting of 39½ villages, for which he paid 3300 rupees. His kinsman, Bhawani Singh, possessed Taluka Bandu, consisting of 12 villages, for which he paid 750 rupees.²⁵

Thus the English East India Company stabilised revenues of the district by making settlement permanently with a variety of persons, amils, zamindars, mukrarraridars, village-maliks, farmers and talukdars depending upon the special circumstances. The jamas which had hitherto been fluctuating were fixed and the Company's Government could now get a clear picture of the revenues of the district. The assessment included land tax only. If the right to collect tax was conferred upon those already discharging that function, no security was required. In case the person concerned was new to the job, he had to pledge a security. The settlement for the joint undivided (Sajhiya) estates was made with the managers, appointed by each possessor of that particular tract of land. *Malikana* was fixed for those persons who had been previously collecting taxes on behalf of the State, but for some reason or other could not be given any assignment at the time of the settlement. The obligations of the new appointees were spelled out and the rights in a written agreement given by the Company. The proprietors (excepting of course a few) with whom the settlement in perpetuity was made, now became the supporters of the Company's Government and assisted in the maintenance of the British Raj in India. Thus the Permanent Settlement had not only economic importance but political significance as well.

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 2. Commissioner at Bihar to Board of Revenue, Oct. 7, 1793.
 3. Commissioner at Bihar to Collector of Shahabad, Oct. 7, 1793.
 4. An amil is a Government Servant in charge of the collection of revenue of a particular area.
 5. The two portions in which the present Shahabad district was then divided.
 6. Proceeding of the Board of Revenue, Nov. 1, 1793, Vol. 167, No. 50.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Governor-General in Council to Board of Revenue, July 17, 1789; B. R., July 30, 1789, Vol. 73, No. 4.
 11. W. A. Brooke to Board of Revenue, Sept. 20, 1790.
 12. Hobson-Jobson, p. 604, The Sayer was applied to a variety of inland imposts, but especially to local and arbitrary charges levied by Zamindars and other individuals with a show of authority, on all goods passing through their estates by land or water or sold at markets (Bazars, hauts and gunges) established by them.
 13. B. R. Jan. 27, 1792, Vol. 127, No. 8.
 14. B. R., Nov. 1, 1793, Vol. 167, No. 50.
 15. Land Revenue Settlement of Shahabad, 1921, p. 14.
 16. B.R., Nov. 8, 1790, Vol. 103, No. 5.
 17. Collector of Shahabad to Board of Revenue, Sept. 30, 1793.
 18. W. A. Brooke to Board of Revenue, Sept. 29, 1789.
 19. Governor-General in Council to Board of Revenue, Nov. 25, 1789.
 20. Governor-General in Council to Board of Revenue, Oct. 20, 1790.
 21. B.R., Aug. 3, 1789, Vol. 74, Nos. 43-45.
 22. Mukrarrari is a fixed tenure in perpetuity. The occupant of the farm paid a fixed and permanent rate of rent. A Zamindar held a tract of land, immediately of Government, on condition of paying the rent for it.
 23. B.R., Nov. 8, 1790, Vol. 103, No. 5.
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THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER UNDER THE LATER MUGHALS

(1707-1759 A.D.)

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A Problem

From times immemorial, foreigners entered India through the north-western passage leading into areas which afforded convenient bases for an eventual conquest of the fertile plains. Owing to the peculiar configuration of mountain ranges in this region, an effective defence of this entrance was possible only by a complete military control of the area extending from Kabul, via Ghazni to Qandahar, the so called "*Scientific Frontier*" of India,¹ commanding as it does, the approaches to the fertile valleys of the Panjab rivers. The more southern entrances through the Bolan and Lala Bela regions lead to the Indian desert, "India's Second Line of Defence."² The control of the Kabul-Ghazni-Qandahar line flanked by the Hindu-kush, is thus not only essential from the point of view of military strategy, but, in an age when the alien conquerors of India were dependent for reinforcement on Central Asia, for political considerations also. Another aspect of this frontier problem was the control of the ever turbulent hill-tribes, inhabiting the wide mountainous belt of land extending from Kashmir to the sea coast through which all the principal North-West Frontier passes run.³

Under the Great Mughals —

(1526-1707 A.D.)

Afghanistan had been a precarious possession and a source of weakness to the succes-

sors of Babar, but they had succeeded in occupying the country and keeping the passes open from India. The earlier Mughal Emperors had repeatedly visited Kabul, and protected the North-Western frontier by establishing strongholds with seasoned soldiers at all the strategic points of penetration, stated above, of invaders into India. But during the long reign of Aurangzeb the imperial authority was seriously imperilled. Firstly, Aurangzeb concentrated almost his full power and attention towards south for his last twenty-five years of life. Secondly, the formidable rebellions, first of the Yusufzais of Peshawar in 1667 A.D., and that of the Afridis of Khyber in 1672 A.D., were aggravated by a rising of the Pathan population along with entire North-Western frontiers against the Mughal emperors of Delhi.

The resources of the whole Mughal empire had to be concentrated under the Emperor's command against the tribesmen in person. After only a modified success Aurangzeb returned from the frontier where he had then spent two years, and a sort of peace was restored by profuse bribery to the Afghans of the borders, in 1676 A.D.

Next year Amir Khan⁴ was appointed governor of Kabul and he held the post for twenty-one years with conspicuous ability and success. Aurangzeb ascribed this viceroy's administrative triumph to his tactful dealings,

practical skill, policy of keeping the hillmen usefully employed by enlisting them in the imperial army, and his judicious and economical management of the treasury, which enabled him to pay regular subsidies to the clansmen living near the North-West frontier passes.⁵

When Amir Khan died in 1698 A.D. he was followed by no worthy successor. After a short lull, trouble began to revive. But Shah Alam, who governed the province from 1699 to his father's death in 1707 A.D. kept order fairly well. He had a large and efficient army, and used to move about the country actively, passing the winter at Peshawar,⁶ and the summer at Kabul.⁷ But he was forced to continue the policy of bribing the Afghans to maintain peace and order.

In 1709-1710 A.D. Nasir Khan, formerly 'faujdar' of Jamrud, was appointed the governor of Kabul, and he continued to hold that post till his death, about 1719 A.D. when his son, also entitled Nasir Khan, succeeded him and was later confirmed in his office by Muhammad Shah, in 1720 A.D.⁸

But Nasir, the second, was a simple-minded and indolent man. His chief business was hunting, and when not engaged in it he spent his time in prayer.⁹ Thus, the peace of the country was left to take care of itself, and the roads became unsafe. His patron at Court was Roshan-ud-Daulah, a favourite of the Emperor, and the imperial grant for payments to keep the passes open was sent to Nasir Khan through the hands of that noble.

Roshan-ud-Daulah's rival, Khan Dauran accused him of embezzling the money, and induced the Emperor to stop that payment as useless. Nasir Khan's appeals were disregarded. About 1730 A.D. Roshan-ud-Daulah himself fell out of favour and was dismissed. The result was that things in Afghanistan were left to drift from bad to worse.

The author of the *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Ghulam Hussain Khan, a contemporary Muslim historian wrote, "Neither the Subedhar nor the Amir-ul-umara (at Court) kept himself informed about the roads and passes of the country. No guards remained on the roads, Owing to the weakness of the Government, the local officers lost all the fear of being called to account. None cared for any one else, none feared, none sought instructions from any.¹⁰ Everywhere every one did whatever he liked. Any one who wished could come and go; the Emperor and his nobles never heard of it. They never inquired why no news letter was coming to Court from any province or outpost."¹¹

When we contrast this negligence and slothfulness of Muhammad Shah with the sleepless vigilance¹² of Aurangzeb in respect of the North-West frontier, we can realize the depth of inefficiency to which the Mughal administration had fallen on the eve of Nadir Shah's invasion.

The Governor of Kabul had sent repeated applications to the Emperor for money to pay his troops; but nobody paid any heed to them, as the faction opposed to him was now in power at Court and the Emperor never exercised his own judgment or personally looked into any business. The soldiers posted in the province starved as their salary for five years was in arrears. Ill-fed, ill-equipped, ill-armed through poverty, they pressed the governor to pay them at least one year's dues out of the five, so that they might satisfy their creditors to some extent and had a little left over for the expenses of marching.

Nasir Khan used to reassure them by saying "Friends! why this anxiety? I have written to the Emperor and also to my agent at Court, and the money is sure to come tomorrow if not today." When his agent presented the application to Khan Dauran the Amir-ul-Umara and described the alarming

situation in Afghanistan, that noble replied in derision; "Do you think that I am a petty simpleton that I shall be impressed by such a tale as yours? Our houses are built on the plain; we do not fear anything except what we can see with our own eyes. Your houses stand on lofty hills, and therefore, you have probably sighted Mongol and Qizilbash armies from the roofs of your houses ! Reply to your master that we are writing for money to the Governor of Bengal; and when the Bengal revenue arrives after the rainy season, the money due will be quickly sent to Kabul".¹³ If the Afghans had been set to guard the frontier with their whole hearts and customary bravery, they could have stopped the advance of the Persian army long enough to enable re-inforcements to reach them from Delhi, and then the capital would not have been sacked.

Those people of Delhi who bore testimony to the defenceless condition of Afghanistan, were sneered at as fools. Khan Dauran's friends even suggested that the deputation of Kabul citizens had been stage-managed by the Wazir and the Nizam,¹⁴ in order to discredit Khan Dauran and induce the Mughal Emperor to transfer his confidence to the former party.¹⁵

Equally neglected and defenceless was the next gateway of India, the province of the Punjab. Zakariya Khan was the governor of Lahore and Multan.¹⁶ His family had come from Ahrar in Central Asia, and, therefore, he was regarded as "a strong pillar of the Turani party."¹⁷ His mother was a sister of the later Wazir Muhammad Amin Khan's wife, and he naturally excited the bitter opposition of the Hindustani party under Khan Dauran. An astonishing example of this party rancour is supplied by the historian Shakir Khan, who asserts that Zakariya Khan at the instigation of the Nizam and Saadat Khan, who wanted to

overthrow Khan Dauran, disloyally admitted Nadir Shah into Lahore."

Zakariya Khan was a brave and active soldier and a good administrator; he gave peace and prosperity to the province in his charge by repeated campaigns against rebels and robbers.¹⁸ But the Hindustani party who possessed the Emperor's ears, opposed all his applications to Court, misrepresented his character and motives and prevented money and troops from being sent to him when Nadir Shah's invasion was imminent.

Thus in Muhammad Shah's hour of supreme need, factious jealousy and foolish distrust prevented any real attempt being made to repel the invader from the frontier; or even to check him there long enough to enable defensive preparations to be completed at Delhi and the army of the Indian empire marshalled in the Panjab. The "Gateways of India" fell into Nadir Shah's hands at the first touch, and yet the Mughal Emperor and his advisers delayed their own preparations for defence in the vain hope of the enemy not being able to force the passes of Afghanistan and the rivers of the north-western frontier of India when the storm burst on the Mughal Empire after the first quarter of the 18th century.

After Nadir Shah's Return

Nadir Shah's occupation of Delhi and massacre of its people carried men's memories three hundred and forty years back to a similar calamity at the hands of Timur.¹⁹ But there was a great difference between the results of these two foreign invasions. Timur left the State of Delhi as he had found it, impoverished no doubt, but without any dismemberment. Nadir Shah, on the other hand, annexed the trans-Indus provinces and the whole of Afghanistan, and thus planted a strong foreign power constantly impinging on the western frontier. Timur's destructive work and the threat of further invasion from

his country ended with his life. But Ahmad Shah Abdali and his dynasty continued Nadir Shah's work in India as the heir to his Empire. With the Khyber Pass and the Peshawar district in foreign hands, the Punjab became a starting point for fresh expeditions against Delhi.²⁰

Not only were Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier province ceded as a result of Nadir Shah's invasion, but the Punjab too was soon afterwards lost. Throughout the second half of the 18th century, Ahmad Shah Abdali and his descendants who ruled over Kabul and Lahore, constantly threatened the peace of Delhi and even the eastern provinces of the Mughal Empire. Their least movements, their slightest public utterances were reported to Delhi and Lucknow and sent a thrill of fear through the Indian Courts.²¹

The Punjab, as the defensive barrier of India proper on the west, passed out of the hands of the ruler of Delhi even before Ahmad Shah Abdali annexed it. Before the coming of Nadir Shah, this province had attained peace and prosperity as a result of Farrukh-Siyyar's successful extinction of Banda Bahadur and his followers, and later on the vigorous campaigns of Zakariya Khan against predatory local chiefs and rebels. He had also added to the wealth and beauty of the cities, as Anandra, enthusiastically described. But Nadir's invasion undid all these.

The country was first sacked by the Persian soldiers and then by the lawless natives. Everywhere robbery and murder took place; gangs of robbers closed the roads to trade and peaceful traffic; every one fought every one else. Utter desolation and disorder seized the province. The North-West frontier during the period 1739-1759 A.D., presented an awful picture of constant confusion and anarchy. The viceroys were sunk in sloth and sensuality. There was no fear of the inter-

ference of the Central Government which was in a more distressed state. There was no check on misrule. The fountains of justice were contaminated. The state revenues were seldom collected. "Revenue administration there was none; the cultivator followed the plough with a sword in his hand, the collector came at the head of a regiment: and if he fared well, another soon followed him to pick up the crumbs."²²

The Sikhs began to assert themselves in ever-increasing strength until, half-a-century later, they gained possession of the entire province. Their common grievances, common sufferings, common faith and common purpose had created feelings of brotherhood and love among the members of the Khalsa. From the end of Muhammad Shah's reign they became an ever-present thorn in the side of the Empire. In the second half of the 18th century they used to make almost annual raids eastwards to the environs of Delhi, plundering, burning, massacring and destroying all traces of cultivation and habitation with ferocious cruelty. Sirhind, Saharanpur, Meerut, Shahdra and even Hardwar suffered from their ravages. Peace, prosperity and industry disappeared from the region north and west of the Mughal capital.

Ahmad Shah Durrani's repeated invasions brought further chaos to the Panjab province and added to the perplexities of the Delhi kingdom. In the disintegration of the authority of the Mughal Government, the Sikhs had the opportunity to extend their influence and assume power as successors to the Muslim rule in Northern India. By their stern and obstinate opposition to the Durrani and constant harassment of his armies and his vice-regents in that part of the country, they had earned the wrath of the Afghan ruler who came out more than once pledged to exacting vengeance and scourging the entire sect. But this extirpating policy of the Durrani emboldened the Sikhs all the more to uproot the Muslim rule from the Panjab.

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 4. *History of Aurangzeb*, Vol. III, Jadunath Sarkar, p. 243. *Studies in Mughal India*, Jadunath Sarkar, pp. 111-117.
 5. He was surnamed Mir Miran, the son of Khalilullah Khan Yezdi, a noble man of high rank in the time of the emperor Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb and a great favourite of the latter. On Aurangzeb's death the emperor had conferred the title of Mir Miran on his son. (*Oriental Biographical Dictionary* — T. W. Beale, p. 48).
 6. Peshawar was included in Afghanistan at that time.
 7. Generally known as Bamian.
 8. This second Nasir Khan's mother was of the Afghan race and he was expected to succeed easily in ruling the province and keeping the passes open. (*Maasir-ul-umara* — Vol. III, Shah Nawaz Khan, p. 833).
 9. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol. I, Ghulam Hussain Khan, p. 93.
 10. Any higher authority.
 11. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol. I, Ghulam Hussain Khan, p. 93.
 12. *Anecdotes of Aurangzeb*, Jadunath Sarkar, pp. 49-52.
 13. *Tazkirat-Anam-Mukhlis*, F. 137.
 14. The leaders of the Turani faction.
 15. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol. I, Ghulam Hussain Khan, p. 94.
 16. Son of Abdus-Samad Khan, Daler Jang.
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 19. Deserted sites all along the old main roads still tell how even the strongest villagers had to abandon the spot where their fathers had lived for centuries and make to themselves new homes on sites less patent to the eyes of marauding bands (*Karnal District Gazetteer*, pp. 35-36).
 20. "Deserted sites all along the old main road still tell how even the strongest villages had to abandon the spot where their fathers had lived for centuries and make to themselves new homes on sites less patent to the eyes of marauding bands" (*Karnal Distt : Gazetteer*, pp. 35-36).
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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S WRITINGS ON THE INDIAN LIBERALS

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I

Nationalists who appear to have stood in the way of their country's freedom are not kindly remembered by their countrymen. This has been the fate of 'moderates' in various revolutionary upheavals. The moderate nationalist may be as sincere a patriot as the militant nationalist, but his hesitancy to adopt extreme courses of action generates suspicion and rejection on the part of his more revolutionary-minded countrymen. As political affairs become polarized into extremes of reaction and revolution, moderation may lose any effective role for the time being, however useful it may be in more peaceful circumstances. Yet in any revolutionary era, political responses range from more moderate to more extreme and some men are destined to be the moderates of their times and hazard the loss of influence and reputation. This happened to the Indian Liberals during the Gandhian era in India's struggle for freedom: V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar, Tej Bahadur Sapru and C. Y. Chintamani. One of their bitter critics was Jawaharlal Nehru. This paper seeks to examine his criticisms against the Liberals in general, and V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, in particular, as expressed in his writings, with special reference to *An Autobiography* (referred to as JNA in the footnotes) published in the year 1936.

II

The terms, 'Liberal' and 'Liberalism in

India', cannot be defined precisely, for most concepts in social sciences do not lend themselves to the same precision in definition as concepts in the physical sciences. Only approximate definitions can be given. Subject to this limitation, 'Liberalism in India' may be defined as the political philosophy which stood for the attainment by India of democratic self-government or Dominion Status, for equality of status with the British Dominions and Britain herself, for constitutional methods to attain the goal, as opposed to direct action, violent or non-violent, and above all, for retaining India's connection with Britain. Thus defined, the Liberal tradition in modern India may be said to have started with Raja Ram Mohan Roy. It was continued by Dadabhai Naoroji, Surendranath Bannerjea, Dinshaw Wacha, Pherozshah Mehta, Gopalakrishna Gokhale and Krishnaswamy Aiyar, who were all referred to as 'Moderates' from about 1890 to 1919. After the break with the Indian National Congress on the advent of Gandhi that year, the 'Moderates' came to be called as 'Liberals'. The Liberals were genuine nationalists who openly pursued India's emancipation from British rule and resented the more galling indignities of British imperialism. They preferred gradual constitutional reforms to revolutionary methods as the means of achieving independence. They attempted to secure constitutional reform by cooperating with British authority rather than defying it. They aimed at parliamentary democracy, including not only an institutional structure, but a system of values which emphasised the achievement of national welfare through negotiation.

and compromise, among competing public interests.

III

Some are makers of history; others are writers of history. Jawaharlal not only made history but what is more important for us, he contributed, in his own way, to historical writing. His triple works, "The Discovery of India", "Glimpses of World History" and "An Autobiography" are pieces of historical writing which entitle Nehru to a place among historians. In his *Autobiography*, first published in 1936, Nehru emerges as a man imbued with a historical perspective of men and events in depicting India's struggle for freedom and as an author of remarkable power. More than telling us about himself, his object in writing this book seems to be to set out the salient features of India's struggle for freedom. Indeed, it may well be considered as a piece of historical writing on the Indian National Movement, and is an indispensable work for those who want to understand contemporary India.

The *Autobiography* opens with an account of the Nehrus from Kashmir, Jawaharlal's somewhat solitary life during his childhood, his being for sometime brought up under the care of English governesses and his admiration for the English language and the various Hindu festivals which always kept him in high spirits. The book has a number of exquisite pen portraits of persons most of whom fought for India's freedom, like Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, C. R. Das, Muhammad Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Bhagat Singh. These leaders and a host of others spring to life through these pages, and live before us in flesh and blood. Among the pen-portraits, the best one is that of Gandhi. To Nehru, Gandhi is 'the quintessence of the conscious and sub-conscious will' of the peasant masses of India; 'he is the idealized personification

of those vast millions.' Nehru says that Gandhi though, "a little man of poor physique had something of steel in him, something rock-like which did not yield to physical powers, however great they might be. And inspite of his unimpressive features, his loin-cloth and bare body, there was a royalty and kingliness in him which compelled a willing obeisance from others. Consciously and deliberately meek and humble, yet he was full of power and authority, and he knew it, and at times he was imperious enough, issuing commands which had to be obeyed. His calm deep eyes would hold one and gently probe into the depths, his voice clear and limpid, would purr its way into the heart and evoke an emotional response".¹

Although Nehru admired the magnetic personality of Gandhi, he was not blind to some of his weaknesses. There were certain fundamental points of difference between these two leaders and in some places in the *Autobiography*, Jawaharlal has frankly referred to them.

IV

This balanced judgment of a leader like Gandhi by Nehru is absent when the latter writes about the Indian Liberals. He displays bitterness and prejudice in criticising the Indian Liberals—his main target of attack is V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, "the most eminent of the Liberal leaders." We shall first examine Jawaharlal's general criticisms against the Liberals, and then consider his specific charges against Srinivasa Sastri.

The Liberal's acceptance of a steady evolutionary process of political development was, according to Jawaharlal, a clever adoption of the line of least resistance. Criticising their theory of 'creative minority', Nehru remarks in pungent words that, "it is not easy for the upper class drawing room to understand the humble cottage or the mud

hut".² According to Nehru, the Liberals had "failed to gauge the depth of the seething spirit among the common men and had alienated themselves from them." He writes: "But moderation, however admirable it might be, is not a bright and scintillating virtue. It produces dullness and so the Indian Liberals have unhappily become a 'Dull Brigade; sombre and serious in their looks, dull in their writing and conversation, and lacking in humour'.³

It must be pointed out in justification of the Liberal standpoint that far from being selfish, the Liberals thought of themselves as at once the representatives and tutors of the Indian people at large. They refused to countenance revolutionary ideas or attitudes, considering these to be inimical to the constitutional and legal values which they were attempting to inculcate in the Indian people. Committed to rational statesmanship as they saw it, they rejected revolution, particularly on a mass basis, because it threatened to arouse forces and attitudes which were irrational and destructive. As an essential corollary they believed that revolution would not be necessary to achieve India's independence.

The Liberals were no mere doctrinaires. They never adopted a heroic pose by making a stand on the rock of abstract principle. The doctrines of national sovereignty and self-determination appealed to them as nationalists, but as practical politicians, they never allowed these doctrines to get the better of their judgment. Constitutionalists by temperament and mostly lawyers by profession and training, they frankly recognised the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament. Anxious to achieve the objective of Indian freedom with the consent and cooperation of the British, they were always careful not to alienate their sympathies or hurt their *amour propre*. They had no illusions about the manner in which Parliament fulfilled its responsibilities towards India through the Secretary of State.

British parliamentary sovereignty was in practice, they often bitterly complained, the sovereignty of half a dozen men in England and half a dozen men in India. Nor is it difficult to find in their writings and speeches frequent references to freedom being the birthright of all men and the right of every people to determine the constitution best suited to them. But as realists, the Liberals never directly or openly challenged the ultimate sovereign authority of Parliament in Indian affairs.

Not understanding the pragmatic approach of the Indian Liberals, Nehru casts a slur on their patriotism in the following words: "For them (Liberals) Swaraj means that everything continues as before, only with a darker shade. They can only conceive of a future in which they, or people like them, will play the principal role and take the place of the English high officials in which there are the same types of services, government departments, legislatures, trade, industry — with I.C.S. at their jobs, the princes in their palaces, occasionally appearing in fancy dress or carnival attire with all their jewels glittering to impress their subjects; the landlords claiming special protection and meanwhile harassing their tenants; the money-lender, with his money-bags, harassing both zamindar and tenant; the lawyer with his fees; and God in His heaven".⁴

V

We may now consider some specific criticisms of Nehru against Srinivasa Sastri. Nehru felt 'considerable disappointment and resentment' that the great Liberal of the South was silent when Annie Besant and her colleagues were interned and formed the growing conviction that Sastri was not a man of action and a crisis did not suit his genius.⁵ The accusation that Sastri was silent, if not a consenting party to Besant's internment, is as unfair as the accusation that Gokhale was a

party to the prosecution of Tilak. Another great Liberal of the South, P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar, in fact, opposed the Madras Governor, Lord Pentland's proposal to intern Besant, at a meeting of the Governor's Executive Council. He wrote a minute of dissent on the internment which was overruled by Lord Pentland.⁶

A major contribution made by Srinivasa Sastri during the Gandhian period of India's nationalist history, relates to the status of Indians settled in South Africa and Kenya.

Srinivasa Sastri attended the Imperial Conference held in London in June 1921 and championed the cause of the oppressed Indians. It was mainly due to him that the Conference passed the following resolution moved by him :

- "The representatives of India while expressing their appreciation of the acceptance of the resolution above, feel bound to place on record their profound concern at the position of Indians in South Africa and their hope that by negotiation between the Governments of India and South Africa, some way can be found, as soon as may be, to reach a more satisfactory position".⁷

It was a great service that Sastri rendered for the improvement of the status of his countrymen settled overseas. Appreciating this, Edwin S. Montagu wrote to Sastri on 8 March 1922 :

"You have acquired for India a new appreciation in the Councils of the world. I wish your countrymen would learn that hate begets bitterness, that the English want to serve India and that a real and dignified cooperation does not mean abandonment, or even the postponing but rather the acceleration of nationalist aspirations and must meet —

and does meet — with response from my fellow countrymen. The best luck attend you in the life that you have dedicated to the service of your country".

On the other hand, Jawaharlal Nehru was annoyed that Sastri went to London as an 'imperial envoy' in order to publicly glory "in the pomp and power of the Empire, although that Empire might treat our countrymen as a doormat and its dominions keep our countrymen as helots or refuse them all admittance".⁸

Again, Nehru is critical of Srinivasa Sastri's support to the White Paper issued by the Government of India in 1933. In calling upon his countrymen to work the reform proposals, Sastri had said at the meeting of the National Liberal Federation of India in Calcutta in April 1933 that "if we have wisdom, experience, moderation, power of persuasion, quiet influence and real-efficiency — if we have these virtues, this is the time to display them in the fullest strength."¹⁰

To this, "a worm may turn, but not the Indian people, if they followed Mr. Sastri's advice", is the comment of Nehru. Nehru came to this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that in several speeches and articles, Srinivasa Sastri had explained that the British proposals could not be effectively boycotted because there were a number of minorities who were willing to cooperate and they were likely to govern the country, with British help, in the interests of themselves and sacrifice the general interests and that the last position would consequently be worse than the first. Sastri repeatedly maintained that if he advocated cooperation, it was not out of tenderness for the British but out of solicitude for India.

Nehru was angry with Sastri on reading a press summary of a speech in 1933 in which

Sastri was reported to have pointed out the danger, if British power was suddenly withdrawn, of political movements being marked by acute hatred, persecutions and oppression of one party by another. To judge by the events of 1947, when the Mountbatten Plan of revolutionary withdrawal of British rule on a pre-determined date superseded the Wavell Plan of evolutionary and gradual transfer of power, even Nehru would have had to agree with Sastri's cautious foresight. Gandhi who had great reverence for Sastri inspite of political differences,¹² witnessing the terrible killings in the aftermath of partition in December 1947, confessed :

"My eyes have now been opened. I see that what we practised during the fight with the British under the name of non-violence was not really non-violence."¹³

In fact, Gandhi himself was uneasy about Nehru's criticisms of Sastri. He proposed to write to Nehru suggesting his sending a copy of the *Autobiography* to Srinivasa Sastri. But the latter discouraged the move.¹⁴ Sastri wrote to Mahadev Desai, the Private Secretary to Gandhi, on 11 June 1936 thus :

I endorse and applaud your sentiment : 'There is nothing in the world equal to an understanding of those from whom you differ'. It is beautifully put. Your

good offices and those of the Mahatma are always available in this sphere. May I say I am grateful for the effort which, as you state in your letter, has already been made. But for this purpose, it is not necessary that Mr. Nehru should be induced to give me a copy of his book. He would not hesitate to act on the Mahatma's suggestion. But in the corner of his mind the thought might occur : 'Why am I asked to do this?'... I won't labour it any more. My request still is that you forbear to write.¹⁵

Srinivasa Sastri refrained from replying to Nehru's criticisms and preferred to put up with them silently. It may be that Nehru's harsh criticism of Sastri was due primarily to his lack of acquaintance with that great Liberal and to the fact that much of his knowledge was based on press summaries which he read in jail when he wrote the *Autobiography*. Nehru, however, did not make any effort subsequently to understand the real character of V. S. Srinivasa Sastri in order to revise his opinions in the later editions of the work. Nehru's criticisms of the Indian Liberals in general, and Srinivasa Sastri in particular, are consistently unfair and grossly unjust. They are marked by bias and appear as a flaw in an otherwise good Gandhi, on 11 June 1936 thus :

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3. *ibid.*, p. 411.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 417-418.
5. *ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
6. K. A. Nilkanta Sastri, *A Great Liberal : Speeches and Writings of Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar*, (Madras, 1965) Preface, P. XIII.
7. *The Hindu*, 9 July 1921, p. 4.
8. Montagu to Sastri, 8 March 1922, cited in T. N. Jagadisan, *Letters of the Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri*, (Bombay, 1963) p. 110.
9. JNA, p. 125.
10. *ibid.*, p. 389.
11. *ibid.*
12. A. Appadorai, 'Great Liberal who was Mahatma's Counsellor' *The Sunday Standard*, 24 Sept. 1967, p. 3.
13. *ibid.*
14. P. Kodanda Rao, *The Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri : A Political Biography*, (Asia Publishing House, Bombay 1963) p. 378.
15. Srinivasa Sastri to Mahadev Desai, 11 June 1936, in Jagadisan, n. 8, p. 287.

SHIVAJI'S ESCAPE FROM AGRA

DR. B. D. SHARMA

(*Bikaner, Rajasthan*)

Mirza Raja Jai Singh compelled Shivaji to come to terms by his prudent strategy and well-planned military campaigns, while Shaista Khan and Maharaja Jaswant Singh suffered ignominious defeat at his hands. The Haft Anjuman of Udai Raj, the private secretary of the Mirza Raja, gives the details of the prolonged negotiation which the Jaipur Ruler had to carry on with his suspecting master Emperor Aurangzeb on the one hand and Shivaji on the other culminating in the Treaty of Purandar (1665). A copy of the original treaty is still preserved in the Central Archives at Bikaner.

Mirza Raja's policy was aimed at utilizing Shivaji's valuable services for the expansion of the Mughal Empire in the South. He, therefore, convinced Shivaji to visit Agra where he would be duly honoured by the Mughal Emperor. Shivaji, accordingly, proceeded to the north and on 11th May 1666¹ he reached Agra where Kanwar Ram Singh accorded him a warm reception. But Shivaji lost his temper during his audience with the Emperor and was consequently placed under Ram Singh's vigilance. Suspicious as the Emperor was, Aurangzeb had a bond of security executed by Ram Singh against Shivaji's undesirable activities. In spite of this, Shivaji was determined to plan for his escape. He heavily bribed the Mughal officers and ultimately made good his escape through the device of a basketful of sweets² which were distributed among the poor by the ailing Shivaji.

Sir J. N. Sarkar, the doyen of Indian histo-

rians, was the first to sift the records of Jaipur Archives in 1939 for his 'House of Shivaji' in order to give out the complete narration of Shivaji's famous escape from the Agra prison based entirely on Persian and Rajasthani sources. Professor Sarkar has referred to Ballu Sah's letters to Dewan Kalyan Das of Amber from Agra dated 18th August, 1666. Shivaji returned to Rajgarh on 12th September, 1666. He thus took only twenty five days to complete his return journey. Sir J. N. Sarkar held the view that Shivaji travelled by the obscure Deccan path through Gondwana and deliberately avoided the better known but carefully watched royal highway through Dholpur, Narwar and Akbarpur or Handia (on the Narmada) at the cost of his delicate health.³ He discarded as pure fiction the story as told by Khafi Khan and others about Shivaji's romantic adventures through Allahabad, Benares, Gaya and Jagannath Puri. The rigid time-limit of 25 days by a rather bow shaped route barred out all these anecdotes as impossible.

Dr. M. L. Sharma, the celebrated historian of Rajasthan, delivered his Government College Kota Golden Jubilee lecture entitled "How Jaipur helped Shivaji to escape" on 20th February 1961 fully endorsing Sir J. N. Sarkar's account. Dr. A. L. Srivastava, the leading historian of Medieval India, gave a speech at Maharani Sudarshana College, Bikaner on August 12, 1967 furnishing details of Shivaji's escape through the stratagem of the fruit baskets. But one Sunday Edition-Magazine section of the 'Veer Arjun'

of Delhi carried an article that Shivaji escaped by showing a forged Farman of the Emperor to the guards on duty. The writer quoted Dr. G. R. Parihar's "Marwar and the Marathas". On searching through the Central Archives at Bikaner it was found that the document concerned was not a Farman allegedly issued by the Emperor but it was merely a dastak on account of which Shivaji's escort

and officers on their return journey crossed the Narwar pass.⁴ It is quite evident that the 'Dastak' above referred to was not for Shivaji. Dr. G. R. Parihar's inference goes contrary to Sir J. N. Sarkar, Dr. M. L. Sharma and Dr. A. L. Srivastava. Shivaji did escape from Agra through the stratagem of fruit baskets and not by a forged Farman.

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 2. Letter of Parkal Dass to Megh Raj, Agra, 3rd September, 1666 quoted by Sarkar in the House of
 3. Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 152.
 4. Ibid p. 165.
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A NOTE ON E. S. MONTAGU COLLECTION (1917-22)

(Acquired in Microfilm from the India Office Library, London,
by the National Archives of India)

B. M. SANKHDHER

(National Archives of India, New Delhi)

Increasing momentum of political agitation, after the Moderate-Extremist rapprochement in 1915 under the leadership of Mrs. Annie Besant and the Lucknow Pact of 1916, made the British Government realise the need for a political promise. Discontent of the Indian Muslims over affairs in Turkey, and the consequent arrest of Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, paved the way for a closer association between the Congress and the Muslim League for the realization of self-government for India. How best to silence the political commotion without any concrete disadvantage to the Government was a challenging problem before the British statesmanship. The challenge was accepted and the problem solved by the successor of Sir Austin Chamberlain, E. S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India. The August Declaration of 1917, a unique product of Montagu's mind, was a masterpiece of ambiguity and hollowness. It said : "The policy of His Majesty's Government with which the Government of India are in complete accord is that of increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."

In pursuance of the declaration, Montagu visited India in November 1917 to discuss with Lord Chelmsford the steps towards the implementation of the promises. The Govern-

ment of India Act of 1919 was the outcome of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme of Indian reforms. But the introduction of these reforms in an atmosphere surcharged with intense political agitation due to Jallianwala Bagh massacre, produced an adverse effect on the people. Under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, the Congress acquired immense influence and thousands and thousands of men and women offered themselves to fight the British Imperialism.

The study of the emergence of Mahatma Gandhi on the political scene and the mass movements under his leadership are themes of tremendous significance for a historian. Equally interesting is the analysis of the British mind and its endeavour to perpetuate its imperialist hold over this sub-continent. The private papers of E. S. Montagu, acquired in microfilm by the National Archives of India, New Delhi, from the India Office Library, London, therefore, have an importance of their own. These contain not merely a detailed discussion of Montagu-Chelmsford scheme of reforms, but also an invaluable insight into the cross-currents of Indian politics during those times. The Khilafat question and Ali Brothers; O' Dwyer and the Punjab disturbances; Hunter Committee Report; Indianisation of the Indian army; Duke of Connaught's visit to India; Moplah Disturbances; the Press Act; Home Rule League and Mrs. Annie Besant; the Rowlatt Act; Proportional Representation for the Mus-

lims; Lord Hardinge and the Delhi Outrage — all have been treated at length in E. S. Montagu's correspondence with Lord Chelmsford, Lord Reading and others. The period covered by these papers is 1917 to 1922.

Besides these, it is interesting to come across a discussion on Cow-slaughter in Muslim States in India; Rabindranath Tagore and the establishment of an International University; Chamber of Princes; Bal Gangadhar Tilak's visit to England; Brahmin-Non-Brahmin controversy; and E. S. Montagu's visit to different places in India. The names of Indian leaders and their views occur fre-

quently on the pages of this private collection. C. R. Das, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Lala Lajpatrai, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, C. F. Andrews, Srinivasa Sastri, Surendranath Banerjee, and Mrs. Annie Besant are the central themes of debate between the Secretary of State for India and the Indian Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford and later on, Lord Reading.

There cannot be any doubt that the collection would prove of immense historical value to the scholars working on various aspects of India's struggle for freedom.

BOOK REVIEWS

Who were the Shudras? by B. R. AMBEDKAR with a foreword by Jagjivan Ram, Thackers (Reprint); Bombay, 1970, pp241; appendices, maps and index; Price Rs 25.00.

The book under review embodies a novel theory about the origin of the Shudras with a rational analysis of the reasons for their degradation to the fourth Varna. It contains twelve chapters, - Chapter I. The Riddle of the Shudras; Chapter II. The Brahmanic theory of the origin of the Shudras; Chapter IV Shudras versus Aryans; Chapter VI. Shudras and Dasas; Chapter VII. The Shudras were Kshatriyas; Chapter VIII, The Number of Varnas, three or four?; Chapter IX Brahmins versus Shudras; Chapter X The Degradation of the Shudras; Chapter XI The Story of Reconciliation; Chapter XII The Theory in the Crucible.

The main contention of the author is that the Shudras belonged to the Kshatriyas of the solar race in Indo-Aryan society and not to a non-Aryan aboriginal race, not Dasas and Dashyus who, according to the Western theory, were conquered and enslaved by the Aryans and relegated to the fourth Varna. 'That the Dasas and Dashyus were the same as the Shudras.' Dr. Ambedkar observes, 'is a pure figment of imagination' (p 111). The Shudras originally formed part of the second varna, viz, Kshatriya, but were subsequently degraded to the fourth order as a result of the prolonged and violent conflict with the Brahmins, numerous cases of which have been cited and commented upon. In formulating the above theory, Dr. Ambedkar relies principally on Verses 38-40 of Chapter 60 of the Shanti Parvan of the Mahabharata and the expression 'Shudra Paijavana Namō'

and its variant readings. In olden days a Shudra Paijavana by name performed sacrifices and the Brahmins performed sacrifices for him and accepted Dakshina from him. Thus, the Shudras were Aryans (non-Vedic Aryans?) with right to sacrifice, right to study the Vedas and right to Upanayana. It is true that the notion that there were four original castes is false, and that Purushasukta hymn (90th) in the tenth mandala of Rigveda seeks to explain the cosmogony and not the origin of four castes. The hymn itself may again be taken as a later interpolation on the basis of its character, contents, diction and language. The rigid system of castes probably took shape in the period represented by the later Vedic texts and Sutras. With patience and ingenuity and a fine legal brain, the author has, however, ransacked the entire Brahmanic literature (in English translation) to establish his grand thesis and has been convinced that the Brahmanic speculations have in them 'neither history nor sense' (p28).

Written in a clear and forceful language, the book is compulsively readable. The get-up and printing of the book are quite good and its price moderate. Four maps showing,— (1) the distribution of the people of India according to Cephalic index, (2) the maximum expansion of Alpines, (3) expansion of the pre-Teutonic Nordics, and (4) expansion of the Teutonic Nordics and Slavic Alpines,—and appendices on the references to the words, Arya, Dasa and Varna, are extremely helpful.

While the validity of this startling thesis remains yet to be tested by scholars who once worked or are working on the sub-

ject and their verdict announced, we must heartily congratulate the author for his profound scholarship and humanistic appeal as the leader of India's untouchables, and specially for the fact that the book is 'rich in fresh insights and new visions'.

B. K. MAJUMDAR

Pasupata Sutram with Panchartha-Bhasya of Kaundinya by DR. HARIPADA CHAKRABORTI, M.A., PH.D., Academic Publishers, Calcutta, 1970, pp 193 + appendices. Price Rs. 20/-.

The book under review is an English translation of Pasupata Sutram (text) and its Bhasya by Kaundinya. In a scholarly introduction the author ably traces the evolution of the Siva cult or more properly, the Rudra-Siva cult, and also the origin of its offshoot, the Pasupata School. The language of the text as also of the commentary is difficult with many archaic expressions here and there, but these difficulties have been got over and clarity attained.

Lakulisa, said to be the 28th of the last incarnation of Siva, was the founder of the Pasupata School. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar has placed the first teacher of the system in about 2nd century B.C. Kaundinya, the commentator flourished, according to some authorities, between the 4th and the 6th century A.D., i.e., in the Gupta period.

As to the doctrine, ritual and philosophy of Pasupatism as reflected in the text and the bhasya, they can be best studied from the five categories (Panchartha) which are as follows :—

(1) Karja (Effect), (2) Karana (Cause which is Pasupati alone), (3) Yoga (Meditation on Pasupati), (4) Vidhi (Behaviour or Practice), and (5) Duhkhanta (End of sorrows). Emancipation is considered the ultimate object of Sadhana.

The author finds 'The influence of Pasupatism from the earliest period to the period of Sankar and some of his commentators. The Pasupatas gained prominence in the 7th century A.D. as evidenced by Chwang, Bana and Bhavabhuti' (page 15). The side topics like Linga-worship and the Pasupatas, further notes on the Pasupata system and some other Saiva sects discussed in the appendices are interesting. There is no doubt that the book will be of great help to scholars interested in ancient India's religious system and cultural history. We offer our heartiest congratulations to the translator for his immense labour and sound scholarship. The book is neatly got up and we wish its wide publicity.

B. K. MAJUMDAR

The Sikh Gurus and the Sikh Society by NIHARRANJAN RAY : Punjabi University, Patiala, 1970.

The book consists of a course of three lectures which the author delivered at the Punjabi University, Patiala, in commemoration of the Quincentennial of the birth of Guru Nanak in 1969; and it has two appendices, the first being the paper he read at an international seminar at the same University some time later, while the second, the address he gave to introduce a seminar on Guru Gobind Singh.

Of the three lectures, the first is devoted "to the general social milieu in northern India, especially in the Panjab", in the time of the ten Sikh Gurus. It starts with an explanation as to how the geographical situation of the Panjab made it to bear the brunt of the frontal challenge of all the peoples who entered or invaded India from across its north-western borders so as to convert it into a great laboratory where different cultures and ethnic types got fused, and where therefore the *jati* and Brahmanical hold could

establish themselves, but only less rigorously. It talks of the invasions of the Muslim Turks which made the upper levels of the Hindu society, mainly the Brahmans, to withdraw themselves within their shells; which disturbed the commercial and trading classes, which however soon gained their own; which made it possible for the alien Muslims to seek co-operation and help only from relatively lower order of society whose dialects and spoken languages therefore gained recognition, while Sanskrit became "the water of the closed well"; and which acclimatized in India the early classical Sufism and led to its further development. With the consolidation of the Mughal empire emerged the Hindu *zamindars* who were zealous guardians and patrons of Brahmanism, whose revivalism therefore took place accompanied by the revivalism of the Sanskrit learning and *jati*-ridden and ritualistic society which blunted the edges of the Bhakti movement that had originated as a protest against all this and in response to the Islamic challenges in India. The Sikh Gurus escaped this revivalist influence, but not all — particularly the later ones — completely, as it is revealed by Guru Gobind Singh's sending of "a group of his *sishtyas* or Sikhs to Varanasi to acquire the knowledge of Hindu Brahmanical philosophy" (p. 29), and other such measures. "It was not until the reform movements of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth that this process was reversed and the original attitude and approaches restored" (pp. 30-31). Another reason why the *jati*-less society conceived by Guru Nanak could not escape the "inexorable operation of the Hindu Brahmanical *jati* hierarchy," was the failure of the Sikh Gurus to initiate any change "in the productive system of the social organisation" (p. 35) which was its main prop. The lecture concludes with the explanation as to how the Sikh community was transformed from its early purely religious character into a well-organised militant socio-religious organisation having its standing army, economically

self-sufficient, with a series of its own newly founded towns and cities, and having "a *Padshah* who was at once the temporal and spiritual ruler" in the form of their Guru from Guru Arjan onwards. This transformation was the result, as probably also the cause, of the policy of persecutions started by the successors of Akbar, the great Mughal Emperor.

In the preface the author claims that though his lectures and appendices do not aim at bringing to view original material or any unknown factual data, "they are frankly interpretative". In the first lecture, however, one does not come across any fresh interpretation of facts, except that the expression and style belong to him. Much that is discussed here, is available rather in greater details in works such as *The Transformation of Sikhism*, by Gokul Chand Narang.

The second lecture which purports to deal with "the social message that emerged out of the teachings of Guru Nanak and the continuity he wanted to impart to that message by the formal appointment of a successor" to himself, thus, instead of merely saying that Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion, himself was a product of the Bhakti movement, as most of the existing works on the subject do, makes a slightly wider sweep by saying that he belonged to the *Sant* tradition which was "a creative synthesis of the Nathpanthi tradition on the one hand and the Bhakti and Sufi traditions on the other" (p. 57), and makes a brief reference to the fact that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries much of the socio-religious life of northern India including that of the Panjab, was surcharged with the spirit and ideas of non-Brahmanical protestant and non-conformist cults and sects of which the Nathpanthi was one. For the rest of it, the author only explains how the other saints of the *Sant* tradition and Guru Nanak had beliefs and ideas common among them, but that the

latter "not only gathered together all the floating traditions of his time but also drew unto himself older, greater and more persistent traditions, and further, that he not only organised them all and gave them a systematised form but also put them into a meaningful mould", by appointing unlike other saints of his order, a successor to carry on his work after he was no more. The successors of Guru Nanak took certain more steps towards this direction, the most significant of them being the compilation of the *Adi Granth* by Guru Arjan which became the eternal Guru to the Sikhs after their last Guru, Guru Gobind Singh, in a physical body left this mortal world.

The third lecture enlarges on this theme yet further, and by referring to Guru Gobind Singh's organisation of the Khalsa and other such developments, the author tries to establish as to how Guru Nanak's mission of a unified and integrated society distinct in appearance and behaviour pattern from that of both the Hindus and Muslims was realised. Towards the end of this lecture he attempts a speculative answer to the question as to why the Sikh faith could not extend beyond the limits of the land of the five rivers, by saying, as already mentioned, that the Sikh Gurus made no attempt to disturb or transform the *jati* productive system of the Hindus, and that is why despite their criticism and protestations against Hindu social beliefs, they like Buddhists, Jains and others of the same type, could not remain entirely distinct and make an impact on the rest of India.

The concept of *Sahaj* in Guru Nanak's theology and its antecedents, as discussed in Appendix one, seems more interesting. *Sahaj*, which, according to the author, is the ultimate goal of the Sikh system of thought, is a state where individual self or *atma* comple-

tely blends itself with the Universal Self or *Parmatma*; a state which is recognised by Guru Nanak as that of *anahad sabad*, an unstruck sound — where all mental vibrations and thoughts, good or bad, come to an end; and where there is complete peace, tranquility, wonderment and bliss. The concept of *Sahaj* existed among the Nathpanthis, Sahajiva Vaishnavas etc., according to whom it was the state of "a complete and absolute union of the *niratma* imagined as the female principle and the *bodhicitta* imagined as the male principle, or of *Sunyata* as the male principle and *Karuna* as the female principle, in Brahmanical terminology, of *Prakriti* and *Purusha*. Logically it followed that in ordinary human and temporal terms the concrete image of such union would be one of *mithuna*, that is, of complete physical union of man and woman" (p. 54), practical indulgence into which, though on religious grounds, brought about degeneration which befell the Nathpanthis and others who believed in it. Guru Nanak, according to the author, borrowed this concept from them, but eliminated all references to *Mithuna* and other such terms which had proved harmful to the society.

Appendix two is nothing but a general and brief survey of the whole Sikh history from Guru Nanak to Ranjit Singh and thereafter.

The whole account is supposed to be interpretative, yet the most important facts of the Sikh thought and system which need interpretation seem to have completely eluded the author. One such which has constantly dogged the thinkers in the field for instance is the apparent difference between the concept of the Sikh Gurus and their practice. Conceptionlessness, where there are no mental vibrations and thoughts, positive or negative, evil or good, or *Sahaj* which is the goal of the Sikh Gurus, cannot be achieved

through conceptions, thoughts or discipline on which the whole mission of Guru Nanak for a "unified and integrated society" was based. This is a goal which can be attained only after transcending the mind, which is thought. Mind cannot plan its own transcendence, because the more it thinks, the more it strengthens its centre of existence instead of annihilating it. If this is so, can one say with any logic that the Sikh Gurus' aim was *Sahaj*, and that they had a social mission also? The two are completely contradictory things.

When one aims at *Sahaj*, one cannot have a philosophy. A *Jiwanmukta* who has attained this state cannot give any definite path or ideas for others to follow. Whatever idea would seem to be coming from his mouth at one moment, would stand contradicted the very next. This probably explains the well known cross-currents of philosophy in the *Adi Granth* from which the best Sikh thinkers have only shied away in despair, little realising that such contradictions of ideas exist at innumerable places in the *Upanishads*, the best Hindu literature, and this is what God is, a formless, colourless Being who is beyond all conceptions, thoughts or ideas.

The question in plain words is, did the Sikh Gurus have a mission, or it was unnecessarily attached to them by their followers and later writers who studied their way of life which actually was a spontaneous reaction to the existing problems, but which they thought was based on definite conceptuality?

The author's interpretation of the concept of Guru in the Sikh system of thought (pp. 63-64, 97-99) is confusing. Guru Nanak's concept in this regard (*Adi Granth*, *Rag Asa*, M.I.) and that of his successors (for instance that of Guru Ram Das, see M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vol. II, p. 339), is entirely the same. Guru of the Sikh religion is God himself, or in other words it is a state of *Sahaj* where all condi-

tioned thoughts and ideas are replaced by spontaneity which to each one comes from within and cannot be transmitted from one to the other, a successor, as the author believes (p. 64).

There are several other references in the book which need further clarification. For instance those with regard to Kabir (pp. 125, 129, 133-34) where he has been shown inferior to Guru Nanak and depicted as the one who lost no opportunity of denegrating women seem clearly to be in contrast with the Sikh belief that Guru Arjan rejected the composition of one Chhaju while compiling the *Adi Granth*, because it was blasphemous of the female sex (see Macauliffe, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 62).

G. S. CHHABRA

Guru Nanak: Compiled and Edited by SARJIT SINGH BAL, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1969, pp. XIV + 168, Rs. 15.

The 500 Birth Anniversary of Guru Nanak celebrated in India in 1969 has yielded numerous historical writings on the life and teachings of Nanak. The works produced and published on such celebrations are mostly biographical or documentary, and are usually eulogistic.

The present work under review, to quote the Panjab University Vice-Chancellor who has written a Foreword to it, is one of the 'nine standard and scholarly books' sponsored by the Panjab University as a 'respectful homage to Guru Nanak'. This book comprises an introduction with a short biographical sketch of Nanak and 'not easily available' extracts from twelve Muslim and Christian writers whom Dr. Bal has called Non-Sikhs on his title cover. None of these twelve writers was Nanak's contemporary. The extracts from their books written between the

middle of the seventeenth and the early part of the twentieth century make an interesting reading, while showing Nanak's love of humanity, his generosity, his firm faith in monotheism, his simple and straightforward teachings, his candour and catholic outlook. A certain pruning of some of the material was probably needed in these extracts for eliminating repetitions; the story of Nanak's magnanimity when he distributed his provisions to the hungry and poor is repeated on pp. 40, 62-3 and 147-8. Similarly, a reader is bound to encounter the same type of material on the principal events of Nanak's life several times.

It seems that Dr. Bal's intention is to give us handy material on Nanak by Muslim and Christian writers. In historical parlance a Christian denotes a missionary imbued with the idea of converting 'natives' into Christians. A missionary of the early 19th century India shared with the Utilitarian, his hostility towards the traditional Hindu religion. John Malcolm whom Dr. Bal has included in this book does not really fall into the category of authentic Christians although William Ward was an enthusiastic Christian, as pointed out by Dr. Bal. Malcolm distrusted the missionary ardour, and like his contemporaries, Sir Thomas Munro and Mountstuart Elphinstone, respected the traditional institutions of Hindu society. Dr. Bal has been quite honest enough to say that 'Dr. Earnest Trump's remarks or passages that may have wounded the Sikh susceptibilities when it was published have been omitted. The omissions have been indicated with dots', (p. 110). This provides a clue to Dr. Bal's writing history with a purpose, to compiling material which presents his subject of study in a most favourable light. History is an austere discipline, has no darlings and allows even the dice loaded against itself. It seems that the motive force behind this compilation has been

to make accessible to our graduate students and general readers of history an 'authentic' material on Nanak by some competent Western and Muslim writers, who, being outsiders and scholars, had the possibilities of seeing Nanak with a certain detachment.

V. N. DATTA

Life of Guru Nanak by Dr. S. S. BAL : Publication Bureau, Panjab University, Chandigarh. 1969. Price Rs. 20/-.

The book under review is an authentic and documented study and deserves a serious consideration at the hands of all students of Sikh history. This book is certainly an improvement on the Life of Guru Nanak by earlier authors. In a book comprising 283 pages, the author has given a graphic and critical account of the birth of the Guru, detailed the problems faced by the father of the Prophet child to bring the latter to a normal life, brought out the significance of the Guru settling down to a service at Sultanpur, and depicted the acute inner struggle resulting in his communion with the Almighty. The author has also detailed the way the inspired Guru went about bringing both Hindus and Muslims to the right path with his ecstatic songs. He ends the biography with Guru Nanak settling down at Kartarpur, preaching a new way of life which combined the devotion to Him with worldly duties. The Life of Guru Nanak is a brilliant account of the way the Guru challenged all formalism both in and out of India, reaching its consummation in the foundations of the Sikh Church.

The author has authenticated his account with almost all the available sources and has quoted extensively from the Guru's sayings in the Adi Granth. That makes the account of the Life of the Guru very convincing.

BAKHSISH SINGH NIJJAR

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EDITORIAL

Indian Council of Historical Studies :

We understand that the Ministry of Education, Government of India, is considering a proposal to set up a large all-India body, on the lines of the CSIR and the ICSSR, to encourage historical studies. The proposal is most welcome if the intention be to set up a fund-granting agency to help the numerous institutions, some of an all-India character and some regional, which are engaged in promoting historical studies in the country and also to co-ordinate the activities of the various organisations. So far history has been a neglected subject, not receiving the patronage of any large governmental agency. Surprisingly, when the ICSSR was established a few years ago, history was scrupulously left out of its purview, for reasons best known to those who sponsored the body. We had, in an earlier issue, pointed out the irrationality of the exclusion of history from the scope of Social Science. We understand, however, that very recently the ICSSR has relented and agreed to include history in its field of interest. But in view of the fact that there is not a single historian in the governing body of the ICSSR it is too early yet to say how far the recent change of policy of the ICSSR will prove helpful to the development of historical studies.

If funds are available, historians will certainly welcome the proposal to set up a separate Council of Historical Studies. There will, no doubt, be some who would question the wisdom and social justice of the Government spending so much money on higher education, through the U.G.C., the CSIR, the ICSSR, the ICCR and the rest, while money is not available for free and compulsory primary education even after twentyfive years of independence. It is just in keeping with the policy of the administration to be more sensitive to the interests of the middle class than to those of the poor, despite what our politicians and administrators say to the contrary.

While welcoming the proposal of a separate Council of Historical Studies we have to suggest that it must not be on the usual lines of similar governmental agencies. We had commented in an earlier issue on the line of thinking in Government circles, that whatever is worth doing must be done by Government-sponsored and Government-controlled agencies and that non-official academic institutions do not have much claim on public funds. That is why most of the all-India Government agencies do not function as fund-granting agencies in the real sense

but as super-institutions duplicating the work done by the numerous non-official institutions in the country, — holding seminars and conferences, bringing out publications, undertaking research projects etc. The result is an unfair competition between the giant Government-sponsored bodies in New Delhi and the smaller non-official institutions scattered all over the country and doing very much the same type of work, and that in many cases in a better way and at a lesser cost to the nation.

It is high time that an impartial evaluation committee be set up to assess the relative contributions of the Government-managed super-bodies and the smaller non-official institutions in the field of cultural activities and higher research. Such an investigation will reveal most clearly the poor performance of the Government-managed super-bodies (and that at an incredibly higher cost to the nation) than that of the non-official organisations working quietly in different parts of the country, with extremely limited funds and relying mostly on the initiative, enterprise and sacrifice of scholars who love their subjects and want to contribute to their advancement in their own humble way. It cannot be denied that it is this spirit of non-official initiative and enterprise which has been largely responsible for the progress in higher studies and research in this country. Even in the post-independence period when the Government has entered the field in a big way, this private initiative and enterprise is still the greatest national asset.

If it is seriously contemplated to set up a Council of Historical Studies, we have a few concrete suggestions to offer. It should be in the nature of a fund-distributing agency and should not undertake any direct academic activity except in those fields where no other institution is working. It must be clearly laid down that the objective of this body is not to enter into a competition with the non-

official institutions or to duplicate their work, but rather to help them with necessary funds (and advice and guidance when needed) and to enable them to do their work better in their respective areas. Besides this fundamental objective, the Council of Historical Studies may also assess the work of the different institutions, compile periodical reports on an all-India level on the progress made, co-ordinate the activities of the various bodies and offer suggestions and technical help where necessary. The whole idea is that the actual work is to be left to those institutions all over the country which are now doing it and also to similar institutions that may come into existence in future, and the Council of Historical Studies is to be there just to give them financial assistance and needed advice and guidance.

If the Council of Historical Studies is set up on these lines, it will avoid having a top-heavy administrative structure so common among similar institutions in New Delhi, and which eats away a substantial part of the funds allotted by the State. In the composition of the governing body the official bloc should be kept as small as possible and greater representation should be given to the non-official institutions in the country. Among these non-official institutions, those which are of an all-India character, with sustained activities throughout the year, must be given permanent representation. The other institutions, of a regional character, should also have representation on State-basis. Besides these institutions, some eminent historians should also be associated with the governing body of the Council. We do not know whether these suggestions will appeal to those who are now considering the proposal, but we feel it our duty to offer them in the interest of historical studies in the country.

Discussion Meetings :

Since the publication of our last issue two Discussion Meetings were held, one in Janu-

ary and another in February. At the first meeting, Dr. Surojit Sinha, Joint Director, Anthropological Survey of India, spoke on *Tribes and Indian Culture*. It was a very illuminating talk on tribal people scattered in different parts of the country, the gradual penetration of Indian cultural influences among them and the process of their assimilation to an advanced cultural pattern. Dr. Sinha illustrated this process with analogies and comparisons with the development of tribal peoples in other parts of the world. At the second meeting, Dr. J. N. Sarkar, Professor of History, Jadavpur University, spoke on *Guerrilla Warfare in Medieval India*. He gave an exposition of the modern principles and techniques of guerrilla warfare and then described how far they could be discerned in the guerrilla activities in medieval India. He illustrated it with numerous examples of guerrilla warfare in medieval India.

Publication :

Our latest publication, *The Sino-Indian Border Question : A Historical Review*, came out in December 1971. It is a collection of papers read at the Fifth Annual Conference of the Institute held at Patiala in December 1967. The Volume consists of two papers on frontier problems in general, one long paper on the history of the Himalayan States, three papers on the Western, Central and Eastern Sectors of the Sino-Indian border, and finally, one paper on the role of Tibet in Sino-Indian relations. It is to be hoped that these seven papers put together will provide a fairly comprehensive historical background to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The sudden hotting up of relations between the two Asian giants, India and China, about the middle of the present century has naturally attracted the attention of historians, journalists and publicists. As a result many books have been written on the subject during the last one decade by Indians as well as foreigners. But practically all of them take a

very narrow view and concentrate on events from 1950 to 1962, with brief historical backgrounds going back to the last decade of the 19th century. Starting with such a limited perspective, they naturally came to conclusions which are not borne out by nearly two thousand years of history. It is because of this overconcentration on the recent past that some foreign writers like Alastair Lamb or Neville Maxwell have been led to give a ridiculously distorted view of history.

The purpose of the present volume is to correct the perspective of viewing the border problem, by delving deep into the past history of the entire Himalayan region from the NEFA to Ladakh. It will rectify many of the mis-conceptions based on inadequate historical knowledge and undue concentration on the events of the last seventy or eighty years, and will bring out in clearer perspective India's relations with the region and the hollowness of Chinese claims which some of the Western writers blindly accept as substantially valid. In the present volume an attempt is made to lay before the readers the full history of the Himalayan belt from the days of remote antiquity to the middle of the present century in order to enable them to understand the border problem as it evolved from time to time. Those who attach importance to history as the essential background to present day issues will, it is hoped, find this volume to be extremely useful, indeed the first of its kind, in understanding the Sino-Indian border question as it developed from 1950 to 1962.

Dictionary of National Biography :

As reported already in our earlier issue, Volume I of the Dictionary of National Biography, covering about 350 biographical sketches, from 'A' to 'D', had been sent to press in January. The printing work has been entrusted to one of the best presses in India, Sree Saraswaty Press, Calcutta; and every care is being taken to ensure quality produc-

tion as regards paper, printing, binding and general get-up. We hope to bring it up to the best international standard for publications of this kind. Volume I is expected to be out by the end of May. The other three Volumes will also be out in August and November 1972 and February 1973. Each Volume will be of 600 pages (approximately), the size of the page being 24×18 cm (Double-Crown), with two columns per page.

The full set of the DNB (4 Volumes) has been priced at Rs. 400/- in India; and U.S. \$ 80, or its equivalent in any other currency, in foreign countries. Postage will be charged extra. It has been decided also to receive a limited number of pre-publication orders at reduced prices — Rs. 250/- in India; and U.S. \$ 60, or its equivalent in any other currency, in foreign countries. Postage will be charged extra. We shall not accept more than

200 pre-publication orders. Those who want to avail themselves of the pre-publication price are to send their orders by 15th May 1972, with a remittance of the full amount. The amount is to be sent either by M.O. or a cheque or a draft on a Calcutta Bank. For outstation cheques the usual Bank collection charge is to be added. Since the number of pre-publication orders to be accepted is very small, those who want to place orders should better do so as early as possible.

We are really happy that the monumental project we had undertaken nearly nine years ago has been completed at last and all the four Volumes will be out within a year from now. It will be a fitting homage, on the occasion of the completion of 25 years of independence, to those illustrious men and women who created modern India.

THE SIMLA DEPUTATION, 1906

T. R. SAREEN

(National Archives of India, New Delhi)

During the British rule in India, the Hindu politicians always held the view that the British adopted the policy of "divide and rule" in India, whereby the Hindu and Muslim communities were pushed further apart. This criticism of the Hindus became more vocal when in October 1906, Lord Minto, by recognising that in any system of representation the Mohammedan community should be represented as a community, was able to create that sharp line by which it became easier for the British rulers to divide the Muslims from the Hindus in the subsequent politico-constitutional development in the country.¹ On the other hand, the Muslims had always maintained that it was the Hindu cry of nationalism which threatened their very existence as a community and it was in order to safeguard their interest that they approached Lord Minto. However, the Simla Deputation Papers, which are now available at Aligarh University, support the Hindu view.

On his arrival in India in 1905, Minto had found the political atmosphere most disturbing. There was not only a boycott against British goods but violence against British officials was quite rampant. The Indian National Congress was considered to be carrying on a disloyal movement and Morley had informed Minto that a new spirit is growing and spreading over India. "You cannot go on governing in the same spirit. You have got to deal with the Congress party and Congress principles whatever you may think of them. Be sure that before long the

Mohammedans will throw in their lot with the Congressmen against you".²

Minto faced with this situation began to search for a counterpoise to the Congress. The opportunity arose when Morley indicated in his budget speech in July, 1906, a desire to reform the Legislative Councils. Minto by encouraging the Muslims in their claims for representation started the process of "setting communities against communities,"³ which was accomplished through the Simla Deputation.

In the Simla Deputation, three persons played a very prominent part. They were W. A. J. Archbold, the Principal of the Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh; Dunlop Smith, the Private-Secretary to the Viceroy, who encouraged and assisted Archbold and Minto. Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the Honorary Secretary of the Anglo-Oriental College, who figures prominently in the Simla Deputation, actually played the role which was assigned to him by Archbold. This can now be determined on the basis of the Simla Deputation Papers.⁴

During the summer of 1906, Archbold and Dunlop Smith who were both in Simla had discussed the political awakening of the Muslims and the former had even asked Dunlop Smith if "H.E. would receive a deputation from Mussalmans to push their claims for representation on the Councils of the Government of India and the Local Governments."⁵ The proposal received a ready response from

Minto and Dunlop Smith. Whether Archbold had discussed the above question of Muslim Deputation after having consulted the Muslims or on his own accord as an unofficial representative of that community, it is not possible to say, but immediately after these talks, he received a letter from Mohsin-ul-Mulk conveying to him the effect of Morley's budget speech on the Mohammedans and asking "if it would be advisable to submit a memorial from the Mohammedans to the Viceroy and to request His Excellency's permission for a deputation to wait on His Excellency to submit the views of the Mohammedans on the matter".⁶

After having received the above letter which was duly placed before the Viceroy, Archbold moved with his scheme of the deputation and informed Dunlop Smith that he had written to Mohsin-ul-Mulk telling him to do nothing until he had heard from this side.⁷ On August 10, Archbold wrote to Mohsin-ul-Mulk regarding the manner, in which he was to proceed with the arrangement of the deputation and it is this letter which throws so much light on the Simla Deputation, Archbold wrote :

"I explained the position to Colonel Dunlop Smith. I assured him that I was certain that any address that the suggested deputation might present would contain nothing that was in any way disloyal and that I was also certain that the Mohammedans had no wish whatsoever to do anything that would cause difficulty to the Government. Colonel Dunlop Smith now writes to me to say that H.E. the Viceroy has decided to receive the deputation of Mohammedans, if it is offered and he asks me to say that a formal application must be sent in. He adds that a copy of the address which is to be presented must be sent to him, in the usual way, sometime before the date of reception of the Deputation — at least ten days if possible." He further explained, "Now the following ques-

tions arise out at once:—(1) The sending of the formal application. I think that it would suffice if this were signed by a few representative Mohammedans from various parts of India, the application stating that those who signed, though they had not been elected, felt sure that they were representing the wishes of their community in making the request. The formal application should be enclosed for signature and return, and the whole sent at once". Regarding the persons who were to compose the deputation, Archbold wrote :

"The great thing is to make the Deputation as representative as possible. Now we have:—

- (a) Eastern Bengal and Assam
- (b) Bengal
- (c) The United Provinces
- (d) The Punjab
- (e) The Frontier Provinces
- (f) The Central Provinces
- (g) Bombay
- (h) Madras
- (i) The Native States".

Then Archbold mentioned the points which were to be incorporated in the address — "This is a matter which can be best discussed in a Committee, but as time is short, some outline or draft must be prepared at once; additions can be made later. It would contain doubtless :—A general profession of loyalty and a statement that the history of the Mohammedan in the past justifies confidence in their conduct in future. An expression of gratitude that important steps in the direction of self-government are contemplated, steps which are but a continuation of the settled policy under which so many offices under the Government have gradually been thrown open to Indians. A statement of fear lest by the adoption of any general system of election, the interest of Mohammedans who are numerically in many districts in a minority should suffer. The impression of hope that by the adoption of some system of nomination

or of the representation of interests as determined by religious beliefs, the proper weight should be given to the opinion of Mohammedans."

Archbold was frank enough to point out to Mohsin-ul-Mulk in the last paragraph of the letter that — "All this is, however, for you to tell me rather than for me to tell you. You know where the shoe pinches. In this whole transaction, I wish to keep myself in the background. The movement must be yours. But you know how thoroughly I have the interest of the Mohammedans at heart and I shall be delighted in every way in my power to help. But please remember, my dear Nawab Sahib, that if an effective and powerful movement is to be created in so short a time, we must take very prompt action."⁸ This letter along with the subsequent correspondence which passed between Archbold, Dunlop Smith and Mohsin-ul Mulk leaves no doubt that it was Archbold who was the originator of the idea of Muslim deputation and Mohsin-ul Mulk simply acted according to the instructions sent by the former from time to time. However, writers like Syed Razi Wasti who could not trace the above letter still hold the view that "Archbold was acting on behalf of and under instruction from Mohsin-ul-Mulk."⁹

Immediately after receiving the above letter, Mohsin-ul-Mulk telegraphed Archbold "to send draft formal application at once."¹⁰

In order to safeguard his own position Archbold sent the draft of the application which he had prepared on 14th August to Mohsin-ul-Mulk with the request 'to alter anything if necessary'.¹¹ In the application the Mohammedans assured the Viceroy that even in the past "in spite of some temptation", they had kept studiously aloof from all forms of political agitation and were very anxious not to depart from that tradition.

On 20th August Archbold informed Dunlop Smith that he had drawn up the 'Formal Request' for the Mohammedans and they were at this time busy getting it signed, and wrote further that "We are all very anxious that the Mohammedans should not put themselves in the wrong, it is just what their enemies would like. As you know, they are rather backward in the arts of political agitation and the danger is they go wrong through ignorance I am very glad that they have restrained themselves."¹²

As instructed by Archbold, Mohsin-ul-Mulk proceeded with the task of getting the draft application signed by the representative Mohammedans from all over India.

By the first week of September, the Draft was signed by one thousand, one hundred and eighty three persons¹³ and was submitted to the Viceroy on 6th September, 1906. No change was made in the original which had been sent by Archbold.

After receiving the official acceptance, the Muslim representatives under the guidance of Mohsin-ul-Mulk prepared the draft of the address, and it was finalized by them at a meeting at Lucknow on 16th September. The draft memorial had been prepared exactly according to the instructions sent by Archbold in his letter of 10th August, 1906. After its approval by the Muslim representatives at Lucknow the copy of the address was sent to Archbold at Simla. Archbold suggested certain changes in the draft memorial with a view to "avoid all possibility of criticism; not so much on the part of the officials as on the part of the Congress people."¹⁴

The changes were duly accepted by the Muslim representatives and it was again sent back to Archbold with authority to make any "alteration in memorial not affecting its principle", if the Government wished.¹⁵

It appears from Dunlop Smith's diary that the contents of the Address were known to him even as early as the first week of September as he writes on 9th September, 1906 : "The deputation will be received just before we leave on the autumn tour. It will be a most representative address as they have consulted Patna, Hyderabad, Bombay, Dacca and the Punjab. All today I have been at some notes for H.E.'s reply".¹⁰

The Viceroy received the deputation on 1 October 1906 and in his reply assured the Mohammedans that "in any system of representation, whether it affects a Municipality, a District Board, or a Legislative Council in which it is proposed to introduce an increase on electoral organisation, the Mohammedan community should be represented

as a community. I am entirely in accord with you".

Thus there can be no doubt that the Muslim Deputation which met the Viceroy Lord Minto on 1 October 1906 was engineered by Archbold and encouraged by Dunlop Smith, while Lord Minto by his "clear and sympathetic recognition of the rights of the Muhammadans of India as a distinct community" put them in a privileged position. In this way the Government of India succeeded in winning over the Muslims to their side and thereby created a strong counterpoise to the Congress aims. The Simla Deputation marks the triumph of the policy of "Divide and Rule" followed by the British Government in India.

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12. Archbold to Dunlop Smith, 20 August 1906. Martin Gilbert, *Servants of India*, (London, 1966), p. 52.
13. See the Printed copy of the Draft application with the statement of signatories according to their rank and occupation and the original — Simla Deputation Papers.
14. S.D.P. Archbold to Mohsin-ul-Mulk, 19 September 1906.
15. S.D.P. Telegram from Abdul-Fazl-Rehman to Mohsin-ul-Mulk, 20 September 1906.
16. Martin Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 54. Wasti, however, tries to establish that up to 19 September, 1906. Minto had no knowledge about the contents of the address. See Syed Razi Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 69-70.

THE MARATHAS AND THE PINDARIS : A STUDY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP *

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The paper outlines the relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris — a relationship that did not follow the pattern of a conventional contact between two powers. In the political and diplomatic plane contact and adjustment are possible only between two settled, territorial powers. The relationship between settled governments may be based either on treaties or on convention and even custom as a result of a longstanding contact, political or otherwise. There may also be an idea of a give-and-take between the contracting parties and even a promise of mutual help when occasion demands. These conventional norms of political and diplomatic contact cannot, however, be super-imposed on the relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris. We will be utterly disappointed and confused if we try to apply the modern ideas of relationship between two states or powers in the case of contact under study. The pattern of contact in this case has a peculiar historical perspective the like of which cannot be seen elsewhere. At the outset we have to keep in mind that the 18th century was an era of predatory politics when relationship was not always guided by usual norms. On the one hand the Marathas were a settled territorial power with an organised civil administration and economy of their own. Their ambition was political but the means to fulfil it led them to take recourse to adjustment even with an organised band of freebooters. The Pindaris, on the other

hand, were not a settled, territorial power, and had no avowed political objective. They were in fact a band of lawless marauders of all races, castes and religions, but bound by one common tie, i.e., loot and plunder.¹ It must be said to their credit that they had introduced a new element of complication in the political life of India in the 18th and in the first quarter of the 19th century.

The relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris may be divided in three distinct phases : (1) The first phase continued from their coming into existence in the late 17th century to the battle of Panipat. During this phase we find an employer-employee relationship between the two, and the Pindaris were completely subservient to their Maratha masters. (2) The period between 1761 and 1800 witnessed a gradual ascendancy of the Pindari power and a formal recognition of their strength by the Maratha leaders. It was also an era of mutual exploitation of the strength of each other. (3) The third phase from 1801 to 1818 was a period of confusion in their relationship. There took place, during this time, an acute intra-Pindari trouble which was but a symptom of tension among Maratha leaders themselves. This phase also witnessed a mounting pressure of the English under the impact of which the Pindari-Maratha contact cracked.

It is a matter of great controversy when exactly the Pindaris came into existence and

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established contacts with the Marathas. Surendra Nath Sen, the great historian of the Marathas, could not point any exact date. It is true that there was an age-old tradition of employing robbers during wars or raids on enemy territories. All the Muslim kingdoms in the Deccan had armed retainers like the Pindaris. But it would be erroneous to state that all these kingdoms employed Pindaris, because the very name did not come into existence at that time.² Manucci observed that the Mughal rulers also employed plundering hordes who were known as Bedaras. He said "Prince Shah Alam, when he was within the territories of Shivaji, near Goa, had in his army seven thousand such." Contrary to a view that the Pindaris arose from the Bedaras, it must be noted that they were not identical though there was a close resemblance between the two. In his translation of Manucci, Irvine made this point clear. S. N. Sen, however, tried to strike a balance when he wrote, "It may not therefore be altogether unreasonable, though the objections of so great an authority as Irvine cannot be lightly rejected, to suppose that the Pindaris of the Peshwa army had their prototypes in the Bedaris who followed the Mughal forces"⁴. This observation of Sen does not clear the point of controversy as to when the Pindaris came into contact with the Marathas. According to Tod, the Pindaris first came into contact with the Marathas during the time of Shivaji's father.⁵ Tod states that one Nusroo was in the services of the father of Shivaji and he was the founder of the Pindari system. The descendants of this Nusroo became the leaders of the Pindaris under the Marathas.⁶ Sardesai is also not clear on the point. He writes : "At one time they (Pindaris) were a convenient ingredient of the system of warfare developed by the Marathas. In that system ever since the days of Shivaji and Santaji Ghorpade, there had always been a class of unpaid auxiliaries attached to each chief's fighting quota, whose duty it was to step in the moment

the battle ended and finish the enemy by seizing his property and camp equipage and destroying his power of recovery".⁷ It is true that these "unpaid auxiliaries" mentioned by Sardesai very much resembled the later Pindaris. If we read Sardesai very carefully we cannot conclude with justice, as has been done by M. P. Roy in his thesis,⁸ that Shivaji and Ghorpade first established relationship with the Pindaris. Even Grant Duff maintains the distinction between the "Unpaid auxiliaries" and Pindaris. S. N. Sen is clear on this point when he wrote, "from the account available in the Maratha Chronicles it does not appear that Shivaji ever employed these marauders like his Mughal adversaries did". Thus Biswanath Ghosh did not approximate to the truth when he observed that "these 'unpaid auxiliaries' were no others but the fore-fathers of the Pindaris of the nineteenth century".⁹ It may be safely said that the coming into existence of the Pindaris may roughly be traced to the time when the Mughal imperialism came into clash with the nascent Maratha nationalism. They may be said to have been born in the anarchy and confusion of the late 17th century.

There is a general agreement that the relationship between the Pindaris and the Marathas was first established in the last decade of the 17th century. If we accept Ferishta, the Pindaris fought against Zulfikar Khan and other generals of Aurangzeb; and a definite mention of the Pindaris may be traced to the year 1689 at the time of the siege of Bijapur. During the rule of the Peshwas the relationship was cemented and the Pindaris became a part of the Maratha military system. Their services were profitably utilised by all the Peshwas till 1761. In the opinion of Sydenham there was little to distinguish between the predatory habits of the Maratha army and the activities of the Pindaris.¹⁰ As the Marathas gradually became a settled territorial power, their military system also became organised and regular

and the role of the Pindaris became well defined. The Pashwa's cavalry had four classes—(1) the Khasi-paga, (2) the Silehdars, (3) the Ekandas and (4) the Pindaris. This was the net outcome of the transformation of the Maratha military system. There is some element of truth in the observations of Sydenham: "The Maratha troops of those days (pre-Peshwa period) were what the Pindaris are now, plundering hordes, not maintaining allegiance to any one sovereign, though sometimes subservient to those whose protection it might be their immediate interest to court. In the progress of the dominion of the Marathas and their subjection to fixed systems of Government their armies would naturally be modelled on a more regular form, though their predatory habits which had so essentially contributed to the formation and advancement of their power would not be entirely relinquished, and the rest of their forces probably consisted of professed Pindaris who were maintained at a small expense and were very useful auxiliaries in harassing an enemy, attacking his convoy, carrying off his cattle, sacking his villages, collecting grain and other provisions, and in short performing all the predatory duties of a Maratha army. Their own interests must have been the only tie by which a military class of such licentious habits could have been attached to their employers, and it may be reasonably concluded that they would avail themselves of every favourable opportunity, which the weakness of their Government might afford them, to act independently and to appropriate to themselves the fruits of their spoils returning to obedience when compelled by force or by internal disunion to submit to control." The latter part of Sydenham's observations holds good during the period following the battle of Panipat, 1761.

The relationship in this period was marked by mutual gain. The Pindaris did not get a regular pay like soldiers, but they had always

a fixed share in the booty.¹¹ Moreover, they often got assignment of land and revenue for their subsistence. Useless as fighters, the Pindaris were employed by the Maratha masters for provisions and monetary gain. Sardesai has rightly observed that they had become "a convenient ingredient of the system of warfare developed by the Marathas".¹² They were actually authorised plunderers and became a source of income to the Maratha generals. To the state they surrendered 25% of the booty, and to their generals they had to pay a *Palpatti* or tent-tax at the rate of 3 rupees per tent. Actually, the practice of employing the Pindaris became so lucrative a business during the time of first Madhav Rao that a check had to be imposed, and the number of Pindaris attached to each general was strictly limited.¹³ In the Peshwa's Diaries, Vol. IX we have also a reference how Trimbak Rao Dhamdhare was authorised to retain in his camp 50 Pindari families who paid *palpatti* at the fixed rate.

It is no wonder that the Pindaris also would be increasingly enthused to serve the Marathas and earn a fortune which was beyond the capacity for a 19th century soldier. They sought every opportunity to fall upon their enemy like a veritable avalanche. Thus when Nazzar Ali Khan was appointed by Aurangzeb towards the end of his rule to occupy Khandesh, he was harassed on his way by bands of free-booters who are identified as Pindaris.¹⁴ When the great Maratha push to the north began during the period of Baji Rao, they found a new opening for them.¹⁵ The Pindaris gave their Maratha masters invaluable services in the sloop over Malwa and Rajput states. They overran Malwa in 1722 and were further encouraged by the Peshwa in 1725 in which year deeds were granted by Baji Rao authorising Holkar, Sindhia and Pawar of Dhar to levy *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* in Malwa. Half of the money thus collected could be utilised by them for maintaining their troops.¹⁶ The

Kapad Dwara records of Jaipur are full of reports about the confusion and terror created by the armies of Holkar and the Pindaris. In 1730 Malwa was again ravaged by them. The Farman of the Mughal Emperor issued on 19th January, 1725 urging Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh to suppress them did not bring about any tangible change.¹⁷ *Mutfarriq Ahalkaran* series of Jaipur records show that imperial *Abkams* were issued urging all local rulers to rally under the banner of Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh in the suppression of the 'Dakshini-Mufsid'. Curiously enough, some local Fauzdars and Zemindars made no attempt to arrest the *mufsid*s in their territories and even opposed the armies against them.¹⁸ They even gave shelter to these invaders and as a result repeated orders were issued to them, without much effect, for helping the Maharaja's *naib* in suppressing them.¹⁹ All these attempts to check the Pindaris failed in the long run and *Khatoot Ahalkaran* series of Jaipur records narrate how they helped the Marathas in reaping a rich booty. Once rooted in Malwa it was easy for the Pindaris to carry on devastating raids all over Rajputana on behalf of their masters. In the mid-eighteenth century the Pindari-Maratha collaboration was remarkable. At that time the name of Dost Muhammad was frequently referred to, and one such reference may be found in a letter to Dattaji Sindhia in 1753.²⁰ The first phase in the relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris saw its climax in 1761, when the freebooters accompanied Sadashiv Rao Bhao to the battlefield of Panipat. Till that time, the Pindaris were only an effective and vigorous part of the Maratha army, but, as S. N. Sen has pointed out, "they were by no means the peculiar product of the Maratha method of warfare."²¹ It is sometimes remarked that "the great Maratha chiefs had learned to live as princes rather than as predatory leaders; but their original habits of lawlessness were being followed by a new set of freebooters, known as the Pindaris".²² This view is some-

what akin to that of Sydenham which cannot be accepted without a grain of salt. The Marathas cannot be properly said to be the precursors of the Pindaris. Moreover, Maratha insurgency of Shivaji's time cannot be, without injustice, equated with lawlessness. But the fact remains that the Pindari-Maratha relationship was dictated by a sense of expediency. As they stood in the mid-eighteenth century, they represented in one sense "the debris of the Mughal empire".²³ They actually acted as a sort of "roving cavalry that accompanied the Peshwa's armies in the expedition rendering them such service as the Cossacks performed for the armies of Russia".²⁴ However, it should be borne in mind that in their initial stage of growth the strength of the Pindaris was regulated by their Maratha masters.²⁵ As an appendage to the Maratha army they were completely under the thumb of their generals. But this fact does not justify the observations of Sardesai that "the profuse British accounts suffer from a natural bias created by the last years of their activities perpetuating the impression that the Pindaris were the enemies of society and such loathsome pests as deserved to be exterminated".²⁶ They were undoubtedly loathsome even before 1761. The only difference was that the terror and devastation created by them were organised and directed according to the plans of their masters.

The period following the holocaust of 1761 witnessed a radical change in the pattern of relationship between the two. The third battle of Panipat proved to be a turning-point in the career of the Pindaris themselves. With the weakening of the Maratha power after Panipat, the Pindaris found an opportunity to pursue an independent course of action. Gradually they could flout any authority if they liked and soon assumed the shape of a rapacious banditti. As a modern researcher has rightly observed, "the rise of the Pindaris to power was inversely pro-

portionate to the decline of the Maratha power".²⁷ A direct outcome of the shock of Panipat was the decline of the central authority of the Peshwa. It was followed by the gradual rise of the Maratha leaders like Sindhia and Holkar who were practically independent of the central authority at Poona. The new power-alignment among the Marathas also brought a vital change in their attitude towards their Pindari collaborators. Sardesai has rightly remarked: "So long as the Maratha State worked as an organized unit, controlled by a competent chief, these predatory bands, unmatched in their long and swift marches and having their assigned duties, followed their regular avocation and were considered quite helpful and not obnoxious".²⁸

In the wake of the new power-alignment among the Marathas, there came another change in the relationship with the Pindaris in the shape of their regrouping according to allegiance they owed. Though the Pindaris used to serve, prior to 1761, almost all the leading Maratha generals, by the nineties of the 18th century they were regrouped under two broad heads — Sindhiasahi and Holkarshahi. This regrouping was not a sudden development, neither was it a natural phenomenon. Perhaps, it was a part of the settled policy of the Peshwa to push the Pindaris more and more under Sindhia and Holkar. Baji Rao first employed the Pindaris in his northern campaigns, and they remained in central and northern India even after the Peshwa diverted his ambition from the north to the south. Grant Duff observed, "it probably was an object of the great man's policy to draw them out of the Maratha country. It is certain that he left his Pindarees in Malwa with his officers Sindhia and Holkar, that they always attended their armies when they invaded the

Mughal provinces. . . ."²⁹ It is not, however, clearly known what prompted the Peshwa to push the Pindaris from the Deccan. It may be conjectured that the Peshwa was busy in acquiring new strength and setting the house in order. He perhaps did not think it desirable that the Pindaris in large numbers should remain in the Deccan as they could be easily utilised by Sindhia and Holkar in the struggle for supremacy. But it would be wrong to suppose that the Pindaris were never again employed by the Peshwa. During the First Anglo-Maratha War their services were utilised. The Minister of Peshwa, Parashuram Bhao sent 4000 Pindaris to reinforce the Maratha columns fighting at Talegaon.³⁰ In the battle of Kharda in 1795 also they took his side and let loose an attack on the provisions of the Nizam's armies.³¹ On the whole, however, the Pindaris were commonly considered to be divided into two broad groups, one owing allegiance to Sindhia and the other to Holkar. Jenkins has rightly observed that these divisions were merely nominal.³²

The first recognition of the strength of the Pindaris may be found when the Peshwa granted a jagir on the Nerbudda at Kanonga to Gazi-ud-din Khan as a reward for his assistance in the Peshwa's campaigns in Hindustan in 1735.³³ This jagir was inherited by his descendants. In the second half of the 18th century grant of land became very common and both Sindhia and Holkar wanted to attract the Pindari leaders to their respective ranks.^{33A} In 1794 a large body of Pindaris under Hiru and Buran had been settled by Sindhia by assignments of land near the banks of the Nerbudda. Thereafter, both Sindhia and Holkar gave liberal assignments of land to the prominent Pindari leaders with a view to extending nominal authority over them and enlisting their support in their political designs. It would be wrong to conclude that

the assignments of land were reflective of any deep attachment between the two. There was nothing sacred in the relationship, it was neither sacrosanct on both sides. It was actually a barter deal. On the one hand the Pindaris needed a formal protection against chastisement by other powers and some place to rest their heads. On the other, the Marathas calculated certain benefits from their relationship with the Pindaris. *Firstly*, the Pindari hordes could still bring wealth to the Maratha leaders, especially from the Rajput States. *Secondly*, they could still be utilised as an addition to the strength of the Maratha leaders in the hour of need without the charge of any regular pay or establishment. *Thirdly*, such assignments could be an effective safeguard against depredations in their own lands. It is an irony that towards the end of the 18th century, the Pindaris did not even spare the Maratha States. It is said that Hiru and Buran to whom grants of land had been made by Mahadji, were later put to death for their aggressions on the territories of Sindhia⁸⁴. *Fourthly*, in the inter-State rivalries the Pindaris could be utilised as a pawn in the political chessboard. But it was not then realised that the ruination of one chief in collaboration with the marauders virtually encouraged them to play the same game against the other party when occasion arose. *Lastly*, they could be used as a weapon to harass the English who were becoming menacing from the point of view of the Marathas. But it would be wrong to suppose that the sole motive of the Marathas in employing them was to utilise their services against the English only as thought by contemporary English authorities.

The exact strength of the Sindhiashahi and Holkarshahi Pindaris cannot be stated. Different accounts are available regarding their respective numbers. Moreover, the number of Pindaris attached to both was not constant. It varied from time to time as a result of wars and internal tension. Jenkins gave the follow-

ing figures of Sindhiashahi and Holkarshahi Pindaris in 1811⁸⁵ :

SINDHIASHAHI

<i>Leaders</i>	<i>Horse</i>	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Guns</i>
Chitu	7925	1000	4
Dost Muhammad	2430	400	8
Karim Khan	3500	5150	15
Kader Bux	4750	—	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	18605	6550	27
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

HOLKARSHAHI

<i>Leaders</i>	<i>Horse</i>	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Guns</i>
Tukku	2000	800	5
Imam Bux	2000	1000	2
Sahib Khan & Bahadur Khan	1060	—	—
Kadir Baksh	2150	800	4
Nathu Buchika	750	—	—
Bappu	150	—	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	8110	2600	11
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

Grand Total :—26715 horse, 9150 infantry and 38 guns.

This was just a rough estimate and even the Maratha leaders could not give the actual number of their Pindari followers. Neither was it possible to give a true return as the Pindaris often changed sides. For example, when Karim Khan had a tussle with Sindhia, he left his ranks and joined hands with Holkar's lieutenant Amir Khan, the Pathan leader; but Karim's son Namdar Khan remained with Sindhia along with his followers. The extension of the British dominions was also responsible for the fluctuation in the number of the Pindaris. As a result of Wellesley's Subsidiary Alliance with native powers, numerous native cavalries who could no longer be usefully employed, joined the ranks of the

Pindari leaders. "Their numbers grew as one Indian State after another passed under British protection and dispensed with its troops."³⁸

It is evident that towards the end of the 18th century, the Pindaris went out of the control even of Sindhia and Holkar. Sometimes they deserted their masters and at other times returned to their obedience as occasion demanded.³⁷ The lack of Maratha control was clearly demonstrated in the Pindari activities in Rajasthan. The First Anglo-Maratha War and the internal conflict following the death of Peshwa Madhavrao II in 1795 created a favourable opportunity for the Pindaris to flout the authority of their masters. They availed themselves of the opportunity which the weaknesses of Sindhia and Holkar's governments afforded them. It is debatable whether the Marathas were short-sighted in their policy towards the Pindaris. There cannot be any fair comparison between the character of pre-Panipat, and post-Panipat periods. The context of Maratha politics changed so rapidly that perhaps the Maratha leaders themselves could not foresee the outcome. But the fact remains that "if initially the Pindaris had been jackals to the Maratha tigers, feeding at their kill, later when the tigers turned upon one another, the jackals were to crack even Maratha bones."³⁸ Grant Duff has, however, given an explanation to this. In his words, "when the Marathas ceased to spread themselves, the Pindharees, who had attended their armies, were obliged to plunder the territories of their former protectors for subsistence...."³⁹

The relationship between the Pindaris and the Marathas during 1801-1818 became an exceedingly complex phenomenon when there was a wide gulf between appearance and reality. Several factors complicated the contact between the two during the period. *Firstly*, there was the complete loss of cohesion among the Marathas. The Peshwa, Sin-

dhia, Bhonsla and Holkar, all acted at cross purposes. Their mutual jealousy and rivalry degenerated into a fight for mutual annihilation since the death of Nana Fadnavis. The desultory warfare between Sindhia and Holkar started in 1801 in which the Pindaris took sides as they liked, much to their own advantage. The period of unrest thus created came to be known to the inhabitants of Central India as *Gardi-ka-Wakt* which reduced the country to the last state of misery and distress.⁴⁰ *Secondly*, the rise of Amir Khan as a powerful element in Central Indian politics was significant. Amir Khan, the Pathan chief, was a close associate of Jaswant Rao Holkar and handled the Pindaris with utmost dexterity. Amir Khan has often been characterised as a Pindari. Many scholars, old and new, are rather confused on this point. Though an examination of the character of Amir Khan is out of place here, the present writer asserts that he was never a Pindari himself. He directed the Pindaris on many occasions, no doubt, but he was not a part of the Pindari system. There are numerous evidences to prove this contention. The English did not take him to be a Pindari in the real sense of the term. In his Minute of 16th April, 1816, Edmonstone, a prominent member of the Council, drew a distinction between the "Organised troops" of the Pathan leader and the Pindaris. Lord Hastings did not also identify Amir Khan with the Pindaris. Whatever that may be, Amir Khan was a close collaborator of the Pindaris. He often acted as a go-between in a triangle of Pindaris-Marathas-Rajputs. He commanded such a respect that both the Marathas and the Rajputs resorted to him regarding trouble with the Pindari leaders. *Thirdly*, the gradual rise of the English power since the Treaty of Salbai, 1782, introduced a new element in Indian diplomacy. The English grip was tightened since the treaty of Bassein, 31st December, 1802. For the time being the Peshwa was removed from the scene of conflict, but the Pindari-Holkar-Sindhia-English

quadrangular diplomacy became much complicated. These developments were taking place at a time when British Imperialism was on the offensive vis-a-vis Indian native powers. They were shrewd enough to take advantage of the mutual jealousy and distrust between Holkar and Sindhia. They also tried to sharpen the conflict between the Pindaris and the Marathas and that between the leaders themselves as evident from the following two letters (translated) which may be found in the private collections of the prince concerned :

- (1) From — Amir Khan
 To — Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur
 Dated — Falgun, Sudi 10,
 V.S. 1864 (1808?)

Your Highness will be surprised to learn that it was due to the instigation which the Pindaris received from the officers of the Company Bahadur that they betrayed their Maratha masters and plundered the territories of the Rajput rulers. At times the British even gave financial assistance to the Pindaris for getting princely territories ravaged. Prior to their contact with the British, they were neither freebooters nor dishonest.

- (2) From — Nazar Mohan Ram
 To — Maharaja Surat Singh of Bikaner
 Dated — Kartik, Sudi 6,
 V.S. — 1875 (?)

Your Highness should always be on your guard against the intrigues of the British. They fomented strife amidst the various Pindari Sardars and those who agreed to betray the cause of the Pindari Union were given jagirs and hard cash amounting to several thousands. Those who did not agree to betray the cause of their unity were hunted like wild beasts and hanged. A band of 30,000 Pindaris

was put to death by the British in the most merciless manner.

Needless to say, there are many obvious inaccuracies in the above extracts, but the point of English instigation finds expression in two different letters written to different Princes. The association of Amir Khan with the Pindaris naturally excites our suspicion about the correctness of his statement. There is no sufficient historical evidence to prove beyond doubt that the English instigated the Pindaris. At the same time the point cannot be summarily dismissed as a myth. It is not unlikely that the English would try to take advantage of the rift in the enemy camp. It might not be the official policy of the English to instigate the Pindaris against the Marathas. But it would have been possible that the English officers at the Residencies did it as a matter of political expediency. Moreover, there is such a hint in a Secret General letter from the Court of Directors, dated 5th September, 1816. The Directors wrote : "22. If instead of declaring a general war against all predatory associations you avail yourselves of the advantage to be derived from the discordant elements of which they are composed and of the dissensions which prevail among their leaders, it appears to us not unreasonable to expect that any project for uniting all the freebooters against you under the banners of the Maratha chiefs may be defeated, but that you may from time to time obtain a partial cooperation from one or other of those chiefs according to the degree in which the peculiar interests of each may be affected by any incursions of the Pindaris, and that you may even derive from some of the Pindari leaders themselves occasional aid against such of their associates as they appear to regard as rivals". In view of the above instructions the English can, at best, be given a 'benefit of doubt'.

Constant in-fighting was going on among the Pindaris owing allegiance to different

Maratha leaders. But at times they incurred the displeasure of their Maratha master and had to face a double fire. A glaring example of how the Pindaris were not sincerely attached to any single leader is that of Karim Khan. Karim at first served Sindhia along with Chitu. During the Holkar-Sindhia war in 1801, Karim and Chitu took the field on the side of Sindhia and inflicted a defeat on the brigades of Jaswant Rao at Indore and compelled them to retire to Samurghat.⁴¹ But after some time, he joined Holkar with whom he remained for some years. Thereafter he entered the services of Hayat Mohammad Khan, Nawab of Bhopal. Karim again came back to Sindhia who gave him in 1803 the 'Panj Mahals' in jagir and conferred upon him the title of Nawab with a view to conciliating him. But the insolent attitude of Karim together with his devastation of some of Sindhia's territories earned the displeasure of the Maratha leader. Karim also became engaged in an open war with Chitu in 1806.⁴² Chitu was defeated and he fled to Sindhia's camp. Karim negotiated with Holkar for assistance and was perhaps tempted to reap a benefit from Holkar's continued rivalry with Sindhia. Sindhia invited Karim on the plea of a settlement and imprisoned him as soon as he came. Karim was interned at the Gwalior fort till 1811. After his release he openly defied the authority of Sindhia and asserted that "he was a robber and that all countries were his".⁴³ He was again interned by Amir Khan, though he was earlier released by Zalim Singh by paying a ransom of 6 lakhs of rupees. Perhaps Amir Khan did this on the remonstrances and threats of Sindhia.⁴⁴

As the diplomatic pressure by the English mounted, both the Maratha leaders and the Pindaris tried to patch up. That game was still more difficult because of the skilful manoeuvring of the English. It is interesting to note that the Pindaris opened negotiations with the English, the Peshwa and Sindhia almost at the same time. Chitu and

Namdar Khan requested the English for shelter and showed their eagerness to enter the services of the Company.⁴⁵ But the Company's government refused to accede to their request.⁴⁶ Almost the same request was made to the Peshwa along with a veiled threat. Chitu wrote to Hindu Rao in 1816: "I am ignorant whether all this (advance of the English) is known to the presence, but let the Sarkar consider well, when we shall be no more how will the Nagpur man and the Peshwa Bahadur escape? We are not without remedy, let His Highness's commands be made known to us that we may obey them. Hitherto we have never disobeyed orders or acted treacherously towards the Sarkar. We now request that some arrangements or negotiations may be entered into with the English and that they may be communicated to your servants, it will then be seen that our conduct will be likewise. One thing gives me uneasiness, the Pindaris are a lawless tribe and will lay every country waste; they regard your Highness as their refuge and protector, and for that reason I earnestly represent that if there is any delay in an answer to this, your servants will be ruined, and the greater despatch is used in sending us your commands, the more it will be to our advantage".⁴⁷ The Peshwa suspected intrigues by Sindhia and came into touch with the English through the Resident at Poona. The English pressurised him not to give any shelter to the Pindaris.

Under the shadow of a danger of an English attack, Sindhia tried his best to improve his relationship with the Pindaris. While he was giving all assurances of cooperation to the English through the Resident at Gwalior, he was trying secretly to conciliate the Pindaris. He succeeded in this game at the end. Jean Baptiste, who had been sent earlier to chastise the Pindaris, terminated his operations against them by conclusion of written engagements. Under these stipulations the Pindaris agreed to abstain from plunder, to keep a body of horse with the Maharaja's


army, and to receive grants of territory.⁴⁸ Karim's son Namdar Khan and Chitu were conciliated and they agreed to help Sindhia. They assured to obey him in everything and wanted his instructions how to act in the present critical situation.⁴⁹ But Karim was not reconcilable. Even at the beginning of 1817 when a war against them was in the offing, they were quarrelling among themselves and Karim was ready to take a revenge against Chitu. The secret honey-mooning of Sindhia received a bad jolt when the English tried to commit him on one side or the other and gave him a good piece of their mind in plain terms. Lord Hastings had not the slightest doubt about the duplicity of Sindhia.⁵⁰ In October, 1817, Sindhia was categorically told that he must not give shelter to the Pindaris. Not only that, he was required to employ his troops against the Pindaris in such a manner as desired by the English.⁵¹ The diplomatic offensive launched by the English was thorough and the Pindaris were practically left in the lurch by their former protectors. Sindhia made a futile last ditch attempt to

conceal Wasil Mohammad, one of the prominent Pindari leaders. John Adam, Secretary to the Governor-General, rightly remarked in his letter to Captain Stewart, Acting Resident with Sindhia, on 1st June, 1818; "The public manifestation involved in the surrender of Wasil Mohammad marks the complete abandonment by Sindhia of the cause of the Pindaris.".⁵²

The relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris was actually a sordid tale of mutual exploitation of each other's services for narrow ends. The contact started with a definitive purpose but it was lost in cross purposes after the Maratha debacle in 1761. The freebooters were thereafter utilised for a political end; but the nefarious game ended in confusion resulting in unprecedented misery and torture for the common man. In essence the contact between the two reflected the trend of the predatory system of politics in the Indian subcontinent during the 17th and 18th centuries.

APPENDIX A

Genealogy of a Branch of the Pindaris



APPENDIX B

General Statement of the Jagheers held
by the Pindaries at the end of 1811.
[Progs : Foreign (Secret) No. 2 of
21st June, 1814]
Sindia Shahee

Cheetoo, and the Runjunes, have Districts
to the amount of four Lacks, and Sixty
Two Thousand as detailed below :

From Sindia		Rs.
Sutwas and a few other villages	...	7,000
Arone	...	1,00,000
Madhoneah	...	1,00,000
Total from Sindia		2,07,000
From the Nabob of Bhopal		
Seepaner	...	10,000
From Holkar		
Fytha	...	10,000
Turanah	...	10,000
From the Bhooslah		
Singapore Barrah & ca. & ca.	...	2,25,000
Total of the Jagheers held by Cheetoo		4,62,000

and Dost Mohamed has Districts to the
annual value of one Lack and Ninety
five thousand Rupees as detailed below :

From Sindia		
Bagroda	...	15,000
Dhunanood	...	80,000
Total from Sindia		95,000

From the Bhooslah		
Jytree	...	40,000

Chhatoor Codapoor Byngunge
& ca. Talooka Bairee ... 60,000

Total from the Bhooslah 1,00,000
Total of the Jagheers held by
Dost Mohamed ... 1,95,000

3rd Kurreem Khan has Country to the
Annual value of thirteen Lacks of
Rupees as detailed below :

From the Nabob of Bhopal

	Rs.
Kurreenghur	60,000
Wuljamool	12,000
Khokia	60,000
Kurrungaon	12,000
<hr/>	
Total from the Nabob of Bhopal	1,44,000

From Sindia

Kyrah	...	50,000
Sytal Barree	...	1,25,000
Baurassa	...	75,000
Other places not specified	...	4,06,000
		<hr/>
Total from Sindia	...	6,56,000

From Holkar

Shahjehanpore, Shujawalpore, Sarungpore	5,00,000
Total of the Lands held by Kurreem	13,00,000

Abstract

Chetoo and the Runjurs hold Lands, to the amount of Rupees	4,62,000
Dost Mahommed	1,95,000
Kurreem Khan	13,00,000
Grand Total of the Reve- nues of the <i>Sindia Shahee</i>	19,57,000

Holkar Shahee

Holkar's Pindaries hold Country from
Holkar alone, but this account does not men-

tion the value. The names of the Chiefs and the Lands they hold are as follows; Tukko Jemadar holds Kunnode—Imam Buksh holds Kurrungaon and Neemawur—Sahib Khaun and Buhadoor Khan hold Goonds and

Ehlehra—another Sahib Khaun holds the Pergunnah of Ambah in Khandish granted this year—and Nuthoo Buckerka holds Ehhola Khathpore.

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A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF INDIANS IN EAST AFRICA

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(PART II)

Historically, the most important contribution of Asians to the East African economies has been the extension of the monetary economy into the subsistence areas — a prerequisite for any economic development. A whole array of early explorers, administrators and missionaries testify to the indispensability of Asian traders and artisans in the opening up and development of the interior. Their function was essentially the introduction of attractive imported consumer goods to large sections of the rural population throughout East Africa, thereby stimulating their desire for money incomes. Until recent times Asian traders also acted as the main outlets for produce of indigenous rural economies. Asian dominance in the distributive sector of the economy laid them open to charges of exploitation which will be discussed later. Here it is important to emphasise that the Asians continue to perform the old but vital function of introducing and extending the money economy in such areas.

Since the Asian 'dukawalla' or shopkeeper is still a characteristic feature of township and small urban centres throughout the East Africa, it is necessary to say something about him. To a typical 'dukawalla' living in a remote township, life offers few excitements. It is hard work with little compensation. The working day is long, usually starting at 7 a.m. and continuing late into the evening. The shopkeeper, who generally lives in a small brick house adjoining the shop, will

typically be helped in his chores by his relatives; but he may barely manage to save enough for his children's education or for his daughter's dowry. Life in the township offers few amenities; there is very little by way of organised recreation and entertainment. The tedium of enforced leisure may partly and occasionally be relieved by social calls on the few Indian families in the neighbourhood. But in general there is little colour or variety in the daily routine.

However, contrary to some popular myths held abroad, not all Asians in East Africa are dukawallas living in remote parts of the country. Today their main economic contribution is the supply of high — and middle — level manpower and capital. This combination of capital and technical know-how in one section of the population is a great potential asset to the economy. Unfortunately, we do not have adequate data to assess quantitatively this crucial contribution to the total stock of capital and skilled manpower. According to Guy Hunter's estimates, in mid-1961 there were 67,500 skilled persons in East Africa, divided into two categories: the first consisted of just over 18,000 professional men of graduate or equivalent level, senior administrators, and senior managers in commerce and industry, and the second covered about 49,500 in the next layer of skilled manpower, including technicians and sub-professional grades (for example, the second echelon in agricultural extension

work), executive grades in the civil service, middle management in industry and commerce, and teachers with secondary education but without a university-degree. Hunter's estimates show that Asians provided a little less than 40 per cent of the people in category I and about 50 per cent of those in category II, in the whole of East Africa.

We have no information on the occupational distribution by race of high—and middle—level manpower in East Africa. But a few sample surveys and general observations suggest that in category I the Asian contribution is especially large in medicine, law, engineering, pharmacy, accountancy, and business management generally. In category II, Asians provide most of the skilled, manual personnel such as mechanics, electricians, tailors, carpenters, salesmen and supervisors. A large proportion of persons in category I consists of European expatriates, whose numbers may be expected to decline rather sharply in future. Thus the limited flow of African trained manpower will be needed not only to provide for the needs of the expanding economy but also make good the expected loss of European expatriate manpower. It is, therefore, clear that a simultaneous withdrawal of Asian skilled manpower from the country could deal a crippling blow to the economy and act as a serious constraint on the development potential of East Africa.

Asians have made an equally important contribution in the form of savings and capital for the expansion of the economy. It is true that when the Asians originally immigrated to East Africa they brought relatively little capital with them; but it is also true that the savings made by them could have been used to increase their consumption rather than accumulate capital. A high proportion of this capital was originally generated in commerce, but it has since been invested in most sectors of the economy, especially in the manufacturing and construction industries. Again, it is

not possible to quantify the share of Asians in the national stock of capital, but a rough idea of their contribution to economic growth may be obtained by mentioning the main economic activities in which they have been pioneer entrepreneurs. In Uganda, cotton ginning and coffee curing were long a complete Asian monopoly, though in the last decade or so African co-operatives have greatly increased their share. At the moment all the sugar produced in Uganda is grown in the plantations of two Asians, who are also the leading industrialists in East Africa; the growing steel complex in Jinja owed its inception to one of them. Likewise, the timber and saw mill industries were originally developed in Uganda on the initiative of Asian businessmen. In Tanganyika many of the larger sisal and other plantations are owned by Asians; while in Kenya, they have contributed greatly to industrial expansion in the post-war period. It is in fact difficult to think of any significant sector in the East African economies where Asian capital, entrepreneurial ability and skills have not made an appreciable contribution.

For long Asians had a virtual monopoly of wholesale and retail trade and the marketing of minor cash crops especially in Uganda and Tanganyika. Their dominance in the distributive sector of the economy exposed them to widespread criticism for alleged dishonest practices and to charges of exploitation. It is difficult to define the latter term precisely; in most cases it is undoubtedly used as a term of abuse without referring to any specific practices. To the extent that it is not used simply as a term of abuse, it may be expected to refer to a variety of sharp practices from which Asian businessmen, like the businessmen of other races, cannot claim entire freedom. These may include the problems of short weight, misleading information, overcharging or a number of other ways by which customers feel themselves cheated. But in a majority of cases criticism is levelled

against the wide-spread practice of bargaining in Asian shops.

Any system of bargaining must inevitably lead to the charging of different prices to different customers, and thereby to complaints of exploitation and racial discrimination. It is perhaps also true that many Asian traders have shown themselves more interested in quick profits rather than in steady, long-term gains, and have not hesitated to exploit temporary scarcities to make windfall gains. All these malpractices have served only to promote ill-will and distrust between the customer and the trader. It will be noticed that none of these practices are peculiar to Asian traders in East Africa; and indeed they are the stock-in-trade of businessmen all over the world, especially in underdeveloped countries. But in East Africa because of the dominance of Asians in wholesale and retail trade, criticism of such practices is often couched in racial terms.

At another level, Asians are sometimes accused of holding back the progress and participation of Africans in the economy of the country. It is undeniably true that the presence of a large, economically sophisticated community has had the effect of retarding African participation in the commercial sectors of the economy. But to argue from this that the absence of the Asian community would have resulted in generally high level of incomes for Africans is to commit an error in elementary economics. In the preceding section, it was shown that the Asians have made a vital contribution to economic development. It is difficult to believe that East Africa would have developed to anything like its present level without the full and active economic participation of Asians.

The above criticism can be reinterpreted to imply that Asian business firms have not consciously aided Africanisation. There is undoubtedly much truth in this charge.

Asians have for the most part been solely concerned with their own salvation; in the past they have spared relatively little energy for the economic advancement of Africans. The skills and training which Africans have acquired from Asian business firms have been the by-product of their employment with the latter rather than the result of a conscious attempt to promote the economic position of Africans. Having said this, it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. Most of the Asian firms are small, essentially family concerns. In many cases the employment of Africans in 'responsible' positions would have meant a loss of jobs for some members of the family — something very few Asians are prepared to accept. However, their old attitudes and habits are gradually breaking down in the face of pressure from African leaders. Some Asians have started business in partnership with Africans. Many of the larger commercial and industrial firms have initiated policies of Africanisation. Towards the end of 1964, the (Asian) Dar-es-salaam Merchants Chamber announced a comprehensive scheme to accelerate the participation of Africans in the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy through loans, partnerships, and training in commercial techniques. Despite these recent moves, one cannot help feeling that the Asian response to the need to increase the share of Africans in wholesale and retail trade has not been sufficiently swift or thorough-going.

In recent years the Asian community has been widely criticised for exporting capital. The imminence of independence in East African countries, accompanied as it was by widespread fears of a breakdown of law and order in Kenya and Uganda led to a crisis of confidence among the immigrant communities, resulting in a fall in domestic investment and a large outflow of capital abroad. With the attainment of independence and the return of confidence, there has been a slight reversal of the above trends, but there are

still many individual Asians and Europeans who continue to transfer abroad part of their current income. The response of the immigrant communities to conditions of uncertainty and fear of exchange control has been similar to that of the affluent classes all over the world.

There is little doubt that independence has progressively meant large shifts of incomes and assets from non-Africans to Africans. This has already been foreshadowed in the policy declarations of the ruling parties in the three countries. The recently published development plans of Kenya and Tanganyika attempted to translate these policies into concrete projects. Before we consider them in detail, it is necessary to point out that the achievement of high rates of economic growth in East Africa could greatly ease the economic problems of the Asian community, while a stagnant economy could have serious effects on their economic prospects. Their actions and attitudes could be a vital determinant of the rate of growth. Asian businessmen and industrialists are responsible for a significant proportion of total investment; if they do not pursue expansionist policies, the efforts of the East African governments to accelerate the rate of economic growth will be largely frustrated, thereby seriously augmenting the economic problems of the Asian community.

A very high proportion of the Asian labour force in East Africa, amounting to between 60 to 70 per cent, derive their livelihood from commerce or from employment in the public sector. Here the economic prospects for Asians appear rather gloomy. An accelerated programme of Africanisation in the civil services has already gone some way in redressing the past racial imbalances. It is likely to be pursued rigorously for some years to come. But Africanisation by definition leaves little scope for either the recruitment or the promotion of Asians. Different cate-

gories of Asian employees are affected differently; the most numerous category consisting of clerks, typists and other holding junior posts have been hit the hardest by programmes of Africanisation. Those in the teaching profession, particularly in the secondary schools have relatively little difficulty in continuing in their jobs over the next few years. With regard to other graduates and persons with professional qualifications such as accountants, doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, dentists and so on, the prospects for employment in the public services depend entirely on the official attitude of the new governing class.

There is little doubt that for many years to come there is likely to be an acute shortage of skilled and educated manpower in both the public and the private sectors. But this does not mean that the Asians will automatically be assured of jobs. The new i.e. free East African governments have until now shown little enthusiasm for employing Asians, even where Africans with the requisite qualifications are not forthcoming. This has undoubtedly resulted in an outflow of educated Asian manpower to countries like Canada, the U.K., India and Pakistan. An intensification of this trend could be a severe setback to solve the manpower crisis.

For many years to come there will be ample economic opportunities for professional persons; this is especially true of professions for which Africans have hitherto shown little inclination, such as engineering, accountancy, architecture or pharmacy. But persons with such qualifications will always command an international market, and the lack of openings in East Africa need not spell economic disaster for them. In any case, they have always constituted a tiny minority of the total Asian working population.

In the private sector, many of the leading expatriate firms are pursuing a policy of

Africanisation at all levels, and are therefore reluctant to take on new Asian employees. It is unlikely that the Asian predominance in wholesale and retail trade will last for long. One of the aims of the development plans drawn up in the three East African countries is to increase rapidly and substantially the share of Africans in commerce.

This is perhaps stated most clearly in Tanganyika's Five Year Plan, which specifies that the co-operative movement should expand to secure 10 per cent of the total turnover of wholesale trade by 1970; the target for retail trade is 10 per cent by 1970, and in the long run some 30 to 40 per cent of the total volume. The Tanzania government has worked out a comprehensive scheme to implement these targets; and it also plans to place the marketing of all crops in the hands of co-operative societies or of African farmers. This would deprive Asian dukawallas of a valuable source of income. Similarly the Kenya Development Plan puts forward various proposals to enhance the share of Africans in commerce and industry; the most important of these is the decision to establish a chain of People's Shops managed by the National Trading Company, which has been formed under the aegis of Kenya Industrial Development Corporation. In Uganda too, plans are afoot to help African traders through loans, subsidised rents, training programmes and so on.

All these measures, if successful, would imply an absolute reduction in the turnover of wholesale and retail trade handled by Asian businessmen. Thus the commercial sector is unlikely to absorb the increase in Asian labour force.

The pressure of African competition is already beginning to make itself felt among small retail stores, especially in villages and other small centres, and has resulted in a drift of Asian traders to the town and cities.

In Tanganyika the big increase in the number of African shops took place in the last 10 or 15 years. In 1961 there were, 36,157 African retailers licensed. Very few of these African shops are in towns or trading centres; almost all are situated in the interior. In 1961 there were 10,090 non-African retail businesses, and 3,921 wholesalers, of whom the great majority were Asians, with a small number of Europeans; though the Asian traders are less numerous than the Africans, they handle, even at the retail level, much the greater part of the business.

The indications are that this pressure will be further intensified and in a few years' time the erstwhile ubiquitous dukawalla may cease to be a part of the landscape in small urban centres. It is only the large import; wholesale and retail business owned by Asians which will continue to have a future in East Africa.

This leaves us with the industrial and agricultural sectors as possible openings for the increasing Asian labour force. Undoubtedly, a rapid growth of the manufacturing and construction industries could ease their unemployment problem. But here again, the resultant demand for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs would be largely satisfied by the existing African labour supply, while only a few Asians may expect to be employed in managerial and executive posts. Is there any considerable scope in agriculture? Although Asians were prevented by legislation from acquiring and cultivating land in the past, the reasons for discrimination no longer apply. Agriculture might therefore be thought of as a possible solution of the 'Asian problem'; however, for a variety of reasons, this seems most unlikely, even if such policies were adopted. The question of land arouses the deepest emotions among Africans and any suggestion of alienating land for Asian settlement would run into bitter opposition. Quite apart from that, Kenya has no substantial unutilised land capable of cultivation.

Even if the other two governments (those of Uganda and Tanzania) were to encourage Asian settlement, it is doubtful whether many capable and enterprising Asians would take kindly to agricultural life. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the governments would be prepared to inject large sums of capital and technical know-how to make these schemes viable. It does not, therefore, seem to us that agriculture is likely to employ any substantial number of Asians.

The above analysis does not hold out hopes of a bright economic future for Asians in East Africa; to that extent it confirms the current widespread pessimism among the Asian community. Economic difficulties will perhaps manifest themselves in growing unemployment, pressures on average earnings, increasing economic competition from Africans, and generally a gradual erosion of the many privileges which Asians have enjoyed in the past. But all this will have the effect

of closing the economic gap between Asians and Africans and thus may contribute to racial harmony in East Africa. Furthermore, for some years to come there may be a substantial net emigration of Asians from East Africa to India, Pakistan and the U.K. The emigrants will consist for the most part of retired civil servants and businessmen, of the unemployed and of those with little prospects for employment, and finally of those with high educational qualifications in search of better economic opportunities, just as their fathers were a generation ago.

Some of the Asian economic problems will therefore be exported in this way. For those who choose to stay on, their most enduring guarantee must lie in their complete acceptance as East Africans. To this process of acceptance, they can make a powerful contribution by a genuine commitment to the ideals and aspirations of an independent East Africa.

INDIA TRADE UNDER THE DANISH FLAG : 1772-1808

A Review Article*

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This is a study of India Trade under the Danish Flag over a period usually regarded as the golden age of Denmark's trade with India and China. The story begins in 1772 with the termination of "the India monopoly" of the Danish Asiatic Company enjoyed by it since its formation in 1732, and ends in 1808 with the British occupation of the Danish settlements in India almost immediately after the commencement of the 1807-1814 war between Britain and Denmark. The entire period is broken up into five sub-periods, and in each of these the activities of the Asiatic Company and Danish private traders are separately analysed.

The broad determinants of the mode of financing, scale, and axis of India trade under the Danish flag over this period which the study brings out in clear relief were :—

- (i) the gradual emergence of a British India through a phase of Indian history marked by frequent wars, political instability and disintegration;
- (ii) the growth of India-based private British commercial interests

('Anglo-Indian'), and the struggle between the private British and Anglo-Indian commercial interests on the one hand, and the English East India Company on the other, over the 'opening of the India Trade';

- (iii) the tussle for power between the European nations, culminating in protracted wars; and towards the close of the period,
- (iv) the replacement, on the European market, of Indian textiles by European textiles.

The two main Danish settlements in India were at Tranquebar, 150 miles south of Madras on the Coromandel coast, and Serampore, near Calcutta. Besides, the Company had set up factories at Calicut and Colachel on the Malabar coast, and at Balasore, Patna and Porto Novo. Danish trading activity on the Malabar coast was only 'sporadic', and the stations at Patna and Balasore remained commercially insignificant except for a brief phase.

The author classifies the goods imported into India by the Asiatic Company into six main groups; metals, marine stores, munitions, wines and spirits, silver and miscellaneous, the last forming only a small part of

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the total value. "Very little was of Danish origin". In the first group, for instance, copper came mainly from Sweden, iron from Norway and Sweden, lead from England; again, in the second group, anchors, timber, pitch and tar came from Norway and the Baltic countries, canvas, rope and cordage from Sweden and Russia.

The composition of the cargo varied. The decline in the relative importance of the European cargo (exclusive of silver) in financing the purchase of Indian goods is, however, noticeable. This was, no doubt, caused partly by the rapid decline in the import of munitions after 1780. In India, the chief market for munitions was in the Southern region, and as the Asiatic Company began to concentrate its activities more and more in Bengal, the decline set in, and imports of munitions were discontinued after 1790.

Like other European Companies, the Asiatic Company had found the proceeds of imports of European produce and manufacture inadequate to cover the purchases of goods in India, and relied on import of silver and loans raised in India to cover the difference. The absence of an attractive official channel for the remittance of the fortunes acquired by the employees of the English East India Company had placed at the disposal of private traders and trading Companies from other European countries a great amount of liquid funds for making purchases in India. The Asiatic Company sometimes found borrowing from this "Anglo-Indian remittance market" a profitable way of financing its exports from India, but was never dependent on it. Thus while there was even a ten year period (1776-1785) in which the Company had stopped importing silver, relying exclusively on the remittance market to cover the difference between exports and imports, it had no difficulty in resuming the import of silver adequate to finance about 3/4ths of its

total purchases in India in the period from 1788 to 1807.

Among the items exported from India, textiles predominated, accounting for about 80% of the total value of the cargo in the period covered by the book. Other items like saltpetre, sugar, pepper, redwood, bamboos etc. found place mainly as packing material or ballast, though some of these were also attractive because of their commercial value.

The Indian branch of the Asiatic Company's trade was "always its problem child." The "modest profits in trade were swallowed up" by the expenses of administration in the settlements as long as this was the responsibility of the Company. The finances of the Company were considerably improved with the cession of the settlements to the Danish Crown after 1777, but other handicaps remained. The Danish settlements produced only a very insignificant part of their exports from India. The trade was dependent on production outside the Danish settlements. The textiles purchased on the Coromandel coast were classified by the Company into South and North goods, according to the location of the supplies. Textiles procured from 'the district round Tranquebar and those South and West of it' came under the first category, while those procured from the areas 'around Madras and further north' came under the second. Up to 1782, most of the textile piecegoods were South goods bought from Indian merchants, a small part being supplied by the English (in or outside the service of the East India Company) on the northern part of the coast. But with "the interruption in production and transport" caused by wars in Southern India, the Indian merchants were no longer able to supply the piecegoods, and the Asiatic Company gradually came to rely exclusively on the English suppliers in the northern part of the coast. "The Indian merchants appeared for the last time in the contracts for cloth in 1785-1786, and until the Asiatic Company abandoned its activities on the Coroman-

del coast, the servants of the English Company were the sole suppliers of north coast cloths". The continuity of trade on this basis was dependent on the effectiveness of the measures taken by the English Company to curb the private trading activities of its employees. With the tightening up of the English Company's internal administration, the Asiatic Company began to feel the pinch, and its ships had to be filled up with other types of cargo for want of piecegoods.

The Asiatic Company's activities began to be increasingly concentrated in Bengal, which in the early part of the period came second to Coromandel in importance. The movement had begun even before the switch from Tranquebar to Madras on the Coromandel coast. The concentration was, however, completed between 1793 and 1801, when 94% of the imported cargo was unloaded at Serampore, and 92% of the Indian cargo originated in Bengal.

In Bengal, the Asiatic company was not completely dependent on the English suppliers as it had become in Coromandel. The European element in the supply side was probably indispensable when remittance capital provided the finance as the Indian merchants could not accept bills drawn on Europe. But the Asiatic Company had stopped the import of silver altogether only for a period of ten years, and even though the climax of financing through remittance capital was reached after the resumption of import of silver, the bullion imports provided some room for manoeuvre. In the period of the Revolutionary War about 75% of the goods were being purchased from Indian suppliers. It is not quite clear whether all the Indian merchants mentioned were really independent traders or mere agents or *benam-dars* of Anglo-Indian principals, though the fact that Indian suppliers were willing to accept interest-free instalment payment in

India rather than bills on Europe suggests Indian enterprise.

The decline of the Asiatic Company in Bengal started with the increasing difficulty of selling the imported goods. Though the European cargo was auctioned at Serampore, they were re-exported, the main destination being Calcutta. The change in the policy of the English Company in regard to private British trade made it "unnecessary to maintain European enclaves" in British India for importing European goods. The factors of the Asiatic Company could feel "how a net of customs charges and malice" was tightening around the auctions at Serampore. The final blow was the decline in the European market for Indian textiles. In this sense it was the trade that undermined the finances of the Asiatic Company. The Company now "paid dearly for its concentration" on a single product. It had to seek new products from other sources and its India trade became insignificant.

Financially, the India trade had always been a source of trouble to the Asiatic Company. "Only during wars in Europe and in India would the Company's India trade pay and even war conditions did not ensure profitability in the long run". The Asiatic Company had been able to expand its scale of operations in India due to the conflict between the English Company and private British and Anglo-Indian commercial interests. The resolution of this conflict and the growth of British India were, in the final analysis, the decisive factors in the eclipse of the Asiatic Company from India, for these ruled out the possibility of reorganizing its India trade on a new viable basis.

The story of private trade is quite different. The trade of the Asiatic Company profited by the availability of remittance capital but could do without this mode of financing whenever necessary. Remittance capital was,

however, the foundation on which private India trade under the Danish flag rested. The author has made a distinction between direct and return trade expeditions, the former starting from Indian shores, the latter originating in and returning to Copenhagen. The direct expeditions almost always represented Anglo-Indian capital and enterprise, with a thin cover of Danish nationality in the form of the Danish flag, Danish officers of the ships (who had sometimes acquired Danish citizenship just to satisfy the requirements) and necessary shipping documents. The Danish service was useful not only because the expedition could thus steer clear of any infringement of the East India Company's rights, but also because Denmark maintained a position of neutrality during European wars which made ships under the Danish flag a safe vehicle for trade and remittance.

The capital and enterprise of the return expeditions was more varied in its composition, but close association with British and Anglo-Indian interests was essential. The ships of the return expeditions were fitted out by traders or trading firms in Copenhagen, but there was frequently a substantial element of non-Danish collaboration. The Danish role in the return expeditions was often nothing more than that of an agent for the British and Anglo-Indian interests in the background.

The return expeditions sometimes functioned primarily as agencies for carrying freight offered by Anglo-Indian interests, the cargo being consigned to Copenhagen firms or to the owners of the ships in Copenhagen. The return expeditions also obtained capital in the remittance market against bills drawn on Europe. The suppliers of capital in this market preferred to lend against bottomry bonds on the security of ship and cargo. Where Danish participation was real (i.e., not merely a cover of Danish nationality to hide the British or Anglo-Indian ori-

gin of the undertaking), the help of European and Anglo-Indian interests had to be sought to buy Indian goods.

The total value of "Anglo-Indian capital and goods transported to Europe aboard ships under the Danish flag" in the entire period has been estimated at 55 million Current Rupees. There were other channels for Anglo-Indian remittance and trade. But the Danish channel was, "except for a brief break in 1801-1802, in constant use throughout the first fifty years after 1757", while other channels "ceased to function from time to time". The channel was, doubtless, useful to the Anglo-Indian, but what was the gain reaped by Danish nationals? The direct gains took the form of freight receipts, various commissions, trading profits, and the fees paid to the State (in which the Asiatic Company had also a share) by all private expeditions under the Danish flag. The secondary gains comprised the generation of income in activities sustained by the use of this channel. The greatest beneficiaries was a small group of Copenhagen traders who could persuade the Danish Government to adopt whatever measures it considered necessary to maintain this lucrative business. In the summer of 1782 the Danish Government came to the rescue of the Copenhagen firms by extending loans on a liberal scale, thus restoring their credit in the European capitals which had become reluctant to accept Danish bills. The Copenhagen firms succeeded in persuading their Government to pass an ordinance in 1787 establishing priority of bottomry bonds among the creditors' claims (which brought the Danish law in line with that in other European countries) to counteract the damage caused to the entire Danish credit in India by the failure of an important Copenhagen figure to discharge his debt.

The Danish Government was well aware that the extent of Danish participation was frequently nominal, and "that merchant

houses in Copenhagen were often no more than agents of the foreign investors". But it was "a principle in Denmark's trading system to encourage and extend the East Indian trade by every means, and thus encourage not only the traders of the country, but also to draw foreign capital into the Danish East India trade, as much as might be possible". The East India trade was valued because "without risking much of the country's resources in this trade, (it) makes Copenhagen one of the most considerable markets for East Indian goods, where most of the buying and selling is on foreign account, of which the certain profits fall to the State and Danish subjects, besides the several receipts that always naturally flow from such transit trade". The transit trade was maintained by the Government requirement that ships under the Danish flag, irrespective of their real nationality, should discharge and sell their cargo at Copenhagen. But this traditional policy of the Government was altered in response to the demand of the Copenhagen traders during the Revolutionary War as the entire private Danish Asiatic trade was threatened by imports through Hamburg.

The continuation of private trade under the Danish flag, however, depended on the conflict between the East India Company and the private British and Anglo-Indian commercial interests rather than on the concessions which could be granted by the Danish Government. With the opening of private shipping between India and Britain, and the amendment of British customs legislation in the closing years of the eighteenth century, "the entire basis for clandestine British and Anglo-Indian trade was removed", and the foundation laid for realising "Dundas' great plan of leading India's exports to Europe into the Thames". Though clandestine British and Anglo-Indian trade had again come to the fore later for a short while due to a stiffer British policy towards private shipping, the

end was in sight. While the Asiatic Company's trade had undermined its finances, it was the drying up of finance that was primarily responsible for the "galloping decline" of private India trade under the Danish flag.

This bare summary fails to do justice to a very painstaking detective effort which seeks to penetrate the camouflage of the Danish flag for each expedition. The "unmaskings", as is obvious from the nature of the case, have often to rely on 'circumstantial evidence', but they are convincing. The author has offered a huge mass of evidence in support of his main theses that "important aspects of the Asiatic Company's Indian trade can be interpreted only in the light of special Anglo-Indian market conditions" and that "fluctuations in private India trade must be mainly explained as consequences of developments within" the "internal conflict of interest between the East India Company and the private financial activity of that Company's servants and the growing English and Anglo-Indian free trade interests" on which, "in all essentials", it was based. To one, who, like the reviewer, would receive his initiation into the mysteries of eighteenth century trade through this book, the wealth of detail — in the accounts of fortunes made and lost by Copenhagen traders and employees of the Asiatic Company, of the feverish, speculative activity during the climax of remittance financing, of 'the booms and bursts' in the Copenhagen market, the frantic bids to preserve access to the remittance market in order to maintain private India trade — would indeed be fascinating. The reviewer, however, feels that the wealth of information could have been utilized to throw some more light, or at least, risk some conjectures, on two related problems — the division of risks and spoils between the British and Anglo-Indians on the one hand, and the Danes on the other, and the relative profitability of the alternative channels of remittance and illicit trade from India. The structure of the remittance

market can best be described as being marked by competition among the few on both sides, without any evidence of collusive behaviour. The sensitivity of the supply side to any change in the underlying conditions is striking. There was probably an equilibrating process at work, but the system was subject to so many shocks that it is difficult to say how far the actual rates of profitability moved in step. One also forms the impression that the suppliers had, on the whole, much greater staying power which they used to full advantage. The dependence of private Danish trade on Anglo-Indian suppliers was also a lever effectively employed to squeeze the margin of Danish participants.

In an appendix, the author has presented certain estimates of gross and net profit of the Asiatic Company's 'return cargo' based on the results of auctions in Copenhagen. The estimates, as the author himself concedes, must be taken with some reserve. He has in mind the hardly justifiable method of calculating the transport and allied costs at a flat rate of 25% of the purchase price, irrespective of the value of the cargo. The separate calculation of the profitability of the return cargo is a dubious procedure. The basic limitation is, however, absence of information about the accounting methods of the Asiatic Company which precludes any definite statement about profit rates.

SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN PRE-MUTINY OUDH

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Agriculture :

The country was predominantly agricultural. The soil was fertile, and water available in almost all quarters for irrigation from the rivers and rivulets that coursed through the country from the Himalayas towards the Ganges. The peasantry understood tillage well and was capable of hard work. In fact, there was hardly an acre of land unfit for good cultivation. But the state of agriculture was not as it should have been under these conditions.¹ The principal crops raised in Oudh were rice, wheat, gram, pulses, oil-seeds, maize, millets, barley, poppy, sugar-cane and cotton but the yield per acre of each had greatly diminished,² the decline having commenced from Nawab Asaf-ud-Doula's reign (1775-1797). Under Shuja-ud-Doula Oudh was a surplus province in regard to agricultural production wearing an aspect of affluence beyond what prevailed in Bengal.^{2a} During the famine of 1770 Oudh supplied huge quantities of grain to the Company's Government in Bengal enabling it to carry on.³ The fall in the volume of agricultural production, a subsequent event in the annals of rural Oudh, is accounted for not only by "the ill-contrived and worse administered revenue system" of the country under Shuja-ud-Doula's successors but also by the diminution of its annual supply of rainfall—the result of ruthless destruction of the north-western forests without any thought to artificial planting.⁴

A striking feature of the agrarian life in

Oudh was that caste-prejudice determined cultivation of crops. What is implied is that certain crops could be raised by certain castes only. The Caste Hindu agriculturists did not cultivate poppy which engaged solely such low castes as Koeris, Kachis or Murais. The result was localisation of poppy-cultivation in the neighbourhood of Fyzabad where such castes were in a majority. Generally speaking, vast areas of land were under poppy-cultivation on the left bank of the Gomati but on the right bank only a bigha or two were sown with poppy in each village. The produce was partly consumed on the spot but chiefly sent to Lucknow, Fyzabad and Benares by retailers on bullocks in April and May, and on boats in June and July, though there was always the risk of its being plundered.⁵ For similar reasons potato-cultivation was not common in Oudh. It was grown only in the vicinity of Kanpur, Lucknow and Fyzabad by a few Kanjars for their own consumption and also for sale in the nearest British Cantonments. In the interior of Oudh potato and turnip were either unknown or, where known, their use was prohibited by the caste-prejudice of the people, particularly of the Brahmins and the Bachgoti Rajput zamindars.⁶

Sugar-cane was grown in small patches here and there between the river Sai and the Ganges but sugar was not manufactured in the south-western part of the country. Some amount of sugar was made at Rampur near Madanpur and at some other places near Fyzabad in the eastern districts of Oudh.⁷ Cotton fields were a familiar sight every-

where in Oudh and the crop was abundantly grown on the highlands along the Sai. Oudh cotton was worked up chiefly at Tanda, only a fraction of it being sent to the manufactories of Mau. Cleaned cotton sold at Rs. 10/- or Rs. 12/- per maund at Salon, and at Rs. 11/-, Rs. 12/- or Rs. 13/- per maund at Banswara. It appears that the bulk of raw cotton grown in Oudh in the early years of the 19th century was short of its requirements and this was why "huge quantity of cotton was brought on men's heads from the westward through the Cantonment of Sultanpur" three quarters of which came from Bundelkhand and the Doab.⁸ The Deccan cotton seems not to have formed an article of import to Oudh. The cotton sent from Jalaun, Hydernagar, Amravati, Nagpur and some other places in the Deccan to the Company's dominions only passed through Oudh paying a duty of 5 per cent to the Nawab "on the fixed valuation of six rupees per maund of ninety-six sicca weight to the seer".

The agricultural implements were crude and simple. They and the prices at which they were available in the thirties of the 19th century are given below :

<i>Implements</i>	<i>Prices</i>
A plough	2 annas
An iron plough-share	8 "
A narrow hoe	8 "
A broad hoe	Re. 1/-
A plank for smoothening the ground	2 annas
A yoke for the plough	2 "
A leathern bag for drawing water	Rs. 1/8/-
A rope 25 or 30 cubits in length for drawing water from well	12 annas
A basket made of split bamboos for raising water from tanks	2 pices

Unlike in some other parts of India in those

days the peasantry in Oudh was not prejudiced against introduction and use of new agricultural implements but what prevented the use of such implements was their high prices.¹⁰ As for manuring the fields the agriculturists of Oudh had no knowledge of deep ploughing and scientific compost. The usual practice was to manure the fields in the month of June with horse or cow-dung and with the refuse of village households. But fields intended for wheat, barley and rice were manured in the same manner in November also. Familiar with the advantages accruing from the rotation of crops the tillers of the soil practised two rotations — one for high lands and another for low lands. High lands were cultivated with barley or wheat from the middle of October to the end of March and were allowed to remain fallow till the end of June when they were sown with Kodo and Arhar. These were harvested in March, fields lying fallow from then to the middle of October, to be re-sown with barley or wheat. For low lands the rotation practised was as follows :

- (a) rice from the middle of June to the end of September;
- (b) gram or linseed from the end of September to the end of March;
- (c) fallow from then to the middle of June, and rice again.¹¹

As regards rice-cultivation both the methods — transplantation and broadcasting — were in use.

The Siul, Dhak (Palas) and other forests on which the villagers depended so much for grazing their horned cattle had been felled in order to meet the demand for fuel. The supply of fodder had diminished and the country's livestock had degenerated physically and numerically. In the south-western districts of Oudh the population increased

nearly ten times roughly between the years 1780 and 1830 but persons who once owned one hundred oxen and fifty buffaloes had about the year 1837 only four or five. The almost universal practice of seizing and carrying off cattle when their owners became defaulters of revenue was also responsible for this. The result was a sharp fall in the production of Ghee, the price of which rose up from 20 seers a rupee to $1\frac{1}{2}$ seers.¹² Moreover, oxen and buffaloes in Oudh were "the only animals employed in agricultural labour". Their numerical deficiency caused hardship to the agricultural families and it was not unusual to see at the time of irrigation men and women working at the well-rope instead of cattle. It was only along the river Sai and near Fyzabad that there was some supply of fodder and the state of livestock there was better than in other districts. Possibly the bullocks reared in this part of the country were exported, among other places to Jaunpur where they sold at from Rs. 10/- to Rs. 20/- a pair. Buyers of bullocks came to Oudh from Bundelkhand also. The Oudhians reared more female buffaloes than male ones for the sake of milk. During the period from December to June when grass was scarce in parched fields they were fed with cotton-seeds softened in cold water — a nutritious and milk-giving article of fodder.¹³ Sheep and goats were bred in large numbers to cater to the needs of the surrounding provinces.¹⁴

Industrial Production:

The industries were on small scales and the principal manufactures were salt, soda, glass, glass-bracelets,¹⁵ cotton-cloths, blankets, dyes, paper, opium, saltpetre, gunpowder and arms. Salt, soda and saltpetre were abundant in the country's soil.

Salt was manufactured either by evaporating the water taken from saline wells numerous on the bank of the river Sai or by "lixiviation of earth containing both salt and

saltpetre, and subsequent separation of these two ingredients". Ateha, Behta and Pratapgarh were the chief salt manufacturing centres, where the Nunias paid an annual sum of Rs. 50/- to the zamindars for saline wells dug by them. Salt of inferior quality (i.e., salt containing moisture) was purchased only for the sheep at the rate of 3 maunds a rupee while that of superior variety was sold on the spot at 2 maunds a rupee. Salt of very fine quality when brought to Sultanpur fetched a value of one rupee a maund, whence it was carried off by merchants to Naiya Gunj Chihat (8 miles east of Lucknow), the principal salt market of those days.¹⁶

Coarser variety of cotton cloth used by the poor was woven in almost every village but those of very fine texture were manufactured at Tanda and Jayis. At Jayis were manufactured very fine pieces of cloth for turbans costing Rs. 18/- a piece which were marketed chiefly to Lucknow. Rae Bareilly, once noted for its *Adhota* (the same as Adhati in Bengal) was in decay and had lost much of its pristine pre-eminence in this respect. Blankets of grey and black colour and of coarse texture were made by the shepherds in all parts of the country and were worn "by all castes even by Brahmins when at their meals".¹⁷ Generally a blanket measuring 8'-4" in length and about 6' in breadth was available at 10 or 12 annas.¹⁸

Dyeing was a thriving art and was practised at all large towns but the best dyers between Kanauj and Gorakhpur dwelt at Shahzadpur noted for brilliance and durability of its dyes. Huge quantities of cotton cloth came from far off places to Shahzadpur for dyeing.¹⁹

Paper was manufactured at Bahraich and Lucknow but the product was much inferior to that imported from Kalpi.^{19a} Glass brace-

lets and bottles were made in the western part of the country where soda was in plenty.^{19b} Soda was collected "by scraping off the white efflorescence known by its alkaline taste" formed on the surface of the soil and "by subsequent lixiviation, decantation and evaporation".²⁰ Soap was manufactured from a special kind of soil called Reha in Oudh (Saji Mati in Bengal) "by the addition of lime, fat and linseed oil. . . ."²¹

Indigo of inferior quality was manufactured on a small scale near the British frontier and was commercially called "Oudh Indigo". Absence of Indigo Planters in the country's interior was a striking feature. At Sathini, five miles north-west of Daundia-khera, an Indigo factory had been erected by an European planter but fifteen years of toil could not make it a flourishing concern and it was abandoned.²²

Opium manufactured in Oudh was a potential source of public revenue but the product was of an inferior quality having been "thin, dark-coloured, fermented and not unfrequently adulterated".²³ This was because methods of poppy-cultivation and opium-manufacture were in the hands of the unenlightened common gardeners of Oudh. As opium-eaters were as common in Lucknow as in China,²⁴ a considerable part of Oudh opium must have been locally consumed but what remained was procured by the agencies established along the Oudh frontier by the Government of India.²⁵

Saltpetre had an extensive market in Oudh throughout the period under review, and the trade was so lucrative that in the days of Shuja-ud-Doula American traders clandestinely dealt in it having trespassed into his territories.²⁶ It was required in huge quantities by the Government for coercing the refractory zamindars and by the zamindars to defy the Government. The principal manu-

facturing centres of the same were at Banswara, Salon, Pratapgarh and Banaudha where it was farmed by Ijaradars who having stationed their agents there procured it at a fixed price. The article thus obtained at all seasons of the year was sent to Lucknow where it was used for making gunpowder. Agai (a place near Pratapgarh) was also a seat of saltpetre-manufacture but it was not farmed there, and was sold by the Nuniyas direct to the local zamindars in the form of Sora at Rs. 2/- or Rs. 3/- a maund. Having refined this article the zamindars employed "it in the local manufacture of gunpowder solely, none being sent to Lucknow".²⁷

As a result of long continued misrule and anarchy in Oudh arms of all descriptions were much in demand for protection of life and property. Manufacture of matchlocks, blunderbusses, swords, spears, bows and arrows gave employment to many and the chief seats of manufacture were Alipur, Dobhiyar, Pithla, Marsan, Rae-Bareli and Lucknow. Manufacture of firearms, cannon, muskets, bayonets, and shells by the Government seems to have been stopped in Oudh about 1849 A.D. which then formed items of export from the British territories.^{27a} But this was not the case in Oudh under Shuja-ud-Doula. His Ordnance factory at Fyzabad produced very fine pieces of cannon and field-carriages particularly after the battle of Buxar when at least for some time he had directed his resources towards increasing his military strength.²⁸ It may be mentioned here that the Engineer of the Ordnance factory at Fyzabad was a Frenchman with two Bengali gun-manufacturers who had "the direction in casting his guns" and who were considered more efficient than the local artificers.²⁹ Another industry which has not been evidenced but which in all probability existed is the manufacture of ice for the local people and the Europeans in Oudh to whom, as Hodges pointed out, the dust and heat in the dry season were intolerable.³⁰

Coinage and Currency:

The country's inland trade was subject to various impediments such as want of uniformity in weights and measures, diversity of coins and their debasement, absence of good roads and bridges, and insecure state of the riverways.

Copper coin called Madhushahi Pice weighing 270 grains was the unit of weight throughout Oudh. There were two weights — Pakka and Kachcha. The Pakka seer weighed 64 standard Madhushahi Pices while the Kachcha varied in weight from 19 to 40 pices in different parts of the country and was useless "except as a means of cheating foreigners such as Europeans and the Musalman Sipahis of the King".³¹ Between Salon and Manikpur the only weight in use in the thirties of the 19th century had its seer equivalent to 56 Madhushahi Pices. Another concomitant evil was that the dealers used one weight when purchasing from the producers and another while selling to the consumers.³²

As for silver coins, a great variety of them were current in Oudh in the late 18th century. They were Lucknow, Fyzabad, Malihabad, Dariabad, Kora, Farrukhabad, Etawa, Bareilly, Bungalow, Recavi, Hawely and Waziri Siccas sharply differing from one another in their intrinsic value.³³ This was because coinage of money was not the exclusive business of the Government. There were several mints in the country which were farmed by the Government at exorbitant rates. Re-farming of mints was also the practice. In the days of Asaf-ud-Doula Lucknow mint was in farm to Bhawani Singh at Rs. 22000/- who had re-farmed it to another person at Rs. 8000/- who again had sub-let it to a person for a further emolument of Rs. 8000/-. The farmer of the mint at Kora had re-farmed it at the most exorbitant rate causing much debasement of the coins.³⁴ The multiplicity of coins varying in their silver contents had given rise to a class of professionals called shroffs or money

changers who earned large sums "by their knowledge of the exchange which in India is in a state of constant fluctuation to the great injury of the poor and the industrious" (Hodges, p. 103). But the rate of exchange was fixed not so much by the intrinsic value of each variety of coins but by its being the currency of any particular place; as for example, Farrukhabad Rupee when in Lucknow was considered nearly 2 per cent worse than the Lucknow Sicca but the same when in Farrukhabad was adjudged 2 per cent better than the Lucknow currency. At Etawa it fell to its old standard and the local coinage "rose in value over the Oudh Sicca".³⁵ Some change is noticeable in this respect in the early 19th century when we find only four varieties of silver coins in circulation in Oudh, namely, the Lucknow Sicca, the Company's Sicca, the Farrukhabad Sicca and the Shershashi Rupee. In point of silver contents the Lucknow Sicca was slightly superior to the Company's Sicca but " $\frac{1}{2}$ pice worse than the Farrukhabad rupee. . . .". The Shershashi rupee (coined at Fyzabad) was considered one pice inferior to the Company's rupee. All coins when lighter than their standard weight and all rupees of previous reigns even when of full weight bore discount. Thus, King Ghazi-ud-Din Haider's (1814-1827) Sicca passed at a discount of 7 Damries and that coined in Saadat Ali Khan's regime (1798-1814) at a discount of 6 Dams³⁶ in the thirties of the 19th century.³⁰

Transport:

In a country like Oudh intersected by rivers, torrents and ravines there were neither metalled roads nor an adequate number of bridges. The only one in existence linking Lucknow and Kanpur was a military road "so awfully bad" that travellers moving in carriages were "most uncomfortably shaken" and covered with dust.³⁷ Across the river Sai there was not a single bridge. There were only two bridges in Oudh in the early 19th century — one at Mohaun on the Lucknow-

Kanpur Road and another south of Tanda. A third bridge was under reconstruction across the river Tons at Shah Gunj by the local zamindar for his personal convenience.³⁸ The paucity of means of communication was a result of the Government's apathy towards promotion of trade and works of public utility which had been left solely to private enterprise.³⁹

The Ganges, the Gogra, the Sai and the Gomati were all navigable "throughout their respective courses within the Oudh territory"⁴⁰, but owing to turbulence of the zamindars and unauthorized taxes levied by them on merchant boats plying the rivers (in direct violation of the treaty of 1788), the last three had been abandoned as means of transport. Even on the Ganges few boatmen frequented the Oudh bank for fear of being plundered. Hackeries were therefore the dependable means of transport specially in Banswara and Sultanpur districts. But where they were not available as in Salon and at places inland from Medini Gunj, commercial traffic was not carried farther than 8 miles and everything was conveyed on bullocks and buffaloes. Articles imported from Benares were not sent direct to Lucknow but through "the safer though circuitous route of Allahabad and Kanpur".⁴¹ The obstacles thus put to the country's internal trade had led to the decay of almost all useful arts and crafts "except the indispensable occupations of the agriculturist and weaver" and the plough outnumbered the loom in proportion of a hundred to one.⁴²

Banking:

Although there was not an efficient system of Police and crimes were often committed with impunity, there seems to have been not much outflow of capital from the country.⁴³ It is true that Rae Bareilly had about A.D. 1837 only three or four bankers with a capital not exceeding Rs. 20,000/-; others having migrated to such safer places

as Lucknow, Kanpur, Farrukhabad and Benares; but in other districts the number of bankers was not small. In the district of Banswara there were nearly two hundred bankers possessed of large capitals, and in Fyzabad district each village had a banker. At Medini Gunj in the southern part of Oudh dwelt some of the wealthiest and most enterprising banker-cum-merchants who had their agents at Calcutta, Mirzapur and other commercial towns. The Oudh bankers were also dealers in cotton, cloth, and grain. They financed trade as well as employed their capital in advancing loans to the needy zamindars.⁴⁴ The noticeable thing about Banking in Oudh was participation by the Brahmins who had been able to relax their caste rules regarding choice of professions to some extent. There were money-lenders, merchants and cultivators⁴⁵ among the Brahmins in Oudh, but the Rajputs were precluded "by the rules of their caste from touching scales and weights".⁴⁵

Trade and Commerce

Apart from the daily sale and purchase of commodities in every town and large village, and movement of the itinerant merchants from place to place with bullocks laden with grain, salt and jaggery, fairs connected or unconnected with religious festivals drew a large number of traders both indigenous and foreign from Nepal, Gorakhpur, Azamgarh, Jaunpur and Bundelkhand. The merchants from outside Oudh came in bodies of 250 or 300 well-armed men and did not enter the territory until they crossed the Ganges at Surajpur.⁴⁶

The articles imported into Oudh were matchlocks from Lahore, swords from Gujarat, Jodhpur and Sirohi, shields from Sylhet, horn-bows from the Doab, reeds from Calcutta, iron, lead, copper and brass from Sagaur, Nepal and Kumaun. Steeds much superior to the local breed came from the Punjab, Kabul and Bukhara, and ponies from

the sub-Himalayan region. Elephants were brought from Nepal, Tripura and Chittagong and Haryana bullocks from the Punjab. A few luxuries such as shawls from Kashmir and the Punjab, silks, satins and broad cloth from Mau, Benares and Britain, corals and pearls from Calcutta and Bundelkhand, guns and watches from England, and rock-salt from the Punjab (preferred by the Brahmins

to the common salt for fear of losing their caste) constituted important items of import.⁴⁷ Some other articles like betelnut, nutmegs, tobacco, tea, medicines, cutlery, clocks and large looking glasses were in demand. Whether these too were imported is not known, though evidence of an attempt to smuggle them from Bengal in 1768 is available.⁴⁸

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2. Outlines of the Topography and Statistics of the Southern Districts of Oudh, and of the Cantonment of Sultanpur-Oudh by Donald Butter (Published in 1839), pp. 56-57.
- 2a. Bengal Select Committee Procdgs, the 11th August, 1769, pp. 400-402.
3. Bengal Select Committee Procdgs, 1770, pp. 113-14, 116, 176, 267, 274-76. Also vide, Bengal Select Committee Procdgs, p. 163 for the cheapness of grain in Shuja-ud-Doula's territories.
4. Butter, p. 48.
5. Ibid, pp. 59-60.
6. Ibid, p. 70.
7. Ibid, p. 61.
8. Ibid, pp. 61-62.
9. Treaties, Engagements and Sanads by C.U. Aitchison, Vol. II, pp. 120-24.
10. Butter, p. 63.
11. Ibid, pp. 63-64.
12. Ibid, p. 64.
13. Ibid, pp. 65-66.
14. Ibid.
15. Sleeman, Vol. I, pp. 187-90.
16. Butter, pp. 72-74.
17. Ibid, p. 80.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
- 19a. Ibid, p. 81.
- 19b. Ibid.
20. Ibid, pp. 74-75.
21. Sleeman, Vol. I, pp. 191-92. According to Dr. Butter, soap was not manufactured in the southern districts of Oudh where animal fat was scarce.
22. Butter, p. 82.
23. Ibid, pp. 59-60.
24. A Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow by Rees quoted in Eighteen Fiftyseven by S. N. Sen, p. 178.
25. Butter, p. 59.
26. Bengal Select Committee Proceedings, 1768, p. 39.
27. Butter, pp. 76-77.
- 27a. Ibid, pp. 78-70. Also vide Sleeman, Vol. II, p. 9.
28. Bengal Select Committee Procdgs, 1768, p. 363.
29. Ibid, pp. 365-67.
30. Hodges. pp. 100-01.
32. Butter, pp. 82-83.
32. Foreign Secret Procdgs., the 1st February, 1776, pp. 327-29. We have a statistical account of this practice in the zamindary of Benares and Ghazipur in 1775-76. It may be mentioned here that the same commercial usage called Dhalta is continuing in the Birbhum district of West Bengal even today.
33. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 1., 26th August, 1776.
34. Ibid.
35. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 1, 29th July, 1776.
- 35a. One Damri was equal to three Dams. Twenty Damris made an Anna. Sixteen Annas were equal to one rupee. Vide, Butter, p. 83.
36. Butter, p. 84.
37. Up the Country by Emily Eden, Vol. I. p. 89.
38. Butter, p. 85.
39. Notes on the Caste, Tribe and Races inhabiting the Province of Avadh by P. Carnegy, pp. 73-75.
40. Essays on the Indian Army and Oude by Sir Henry Lawrence, p. 285.
41. Butter, p. 87.
42. Ibid., p. 85.
43. Payment of prodigious sums as subsidies to the Company's Government was no doubt a drain on the country's resources but it stopped with the cession of a part of Oudh to the Company in November, 1801. Thereafter money began to pour into Oudh through diverse channels which have been enumerated by Sleeman. A very important source of financial gain to the country was the existence of a number of places of pilgrimage which were visited by the Hindu pilgrims from outside whose expenditures on food and other necessary items "during their transit and residence" fructified in the pockets of the local people. Vide, A Journey Through the Kingdom of Oude in 1849-50 by Col. Sleeman, Vol. II, pp. 8-9.
44. Butter, p. 86.
- 44a. They did not cultivate the land with their own hands but employed the Ahirs and the Kurmis for tillage.
45. Ibid, pp. 86-87.
46. Ibid, pp. 88-90.
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48. Bengal Select Committee Proceedings, 1768, p. 319.

THE REGISTRAR IN THE EARLY BRITISH JUDICIARY OF BENGAL

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"Necessity compelled us to form some establishment of justice; we chose the best we could. . . ." — wrote Warren Hastings to Josias Dupre on 6 January 1773.¹ The establishment of British political authority in Bengal was inextricably associated with the question of law and order. So the British had to work for a judicial system on the British pattern so as to suit their administrative needs. The process, thus started, saw the emergence of new elements and personnel like the Registrar in the judiciary of this country.

The first Judicial Scheme of the Company on 15 August 1772 introduced the system of transmission of abstract registers by the judges of different Courts in Bengal. The system was maintained in practice, but nothing was done to appoint any special officer for the purpose.

The need of such an officer, however, found clear expression in an Act of Parliament passed in 1781. This Act was entitled "an Act for establishing certain Regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company as relates to the administration of justice in Bengal". The 11th clause of the Act laid down that the names of all Indians who, as employees of the East Company, were under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, were to be entered in books alphabetically disposed, distinguishing each district or districts in which they were employed.

An officer was obviously needed to take charge of the registers of persons mentioned in the above Act. This had been felt earlier by Impey, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who proposed several regulations which received the assent of the Governor-General and Council on 3 November 1780.² These regulations were subsequently incorporated with additions and amendments into a revised code adopted by the Governor-General and Council on 5 July 1781. In accordance with this code, a Registrar was appointed to each of the Provincial Courts. It was the Registrar's duty to summon all persons noted by the Act of Parliament and take down their names, residence and employment. He was to preserve two books for the purpose. This act of registration was thus to check the delinquencies of the Company's servants and of others who obstructed the flow of justice. The Registrar was also assigned an active rôle in the judicial procedure. In case of appeal from the Provincial Courts the judges of these Courts were to send copies of all proceedings, rules etc., duly attested by the Registrar or clerk of the Court, to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*. When a Decree had been passed in a cause in the Provincial *Dewani Adalat*, copies of papers concerning the cause were to be sent to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* only after an endorsement of the same by the Registrar. Any rule of practice, framed by the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, also was to be transmitted to the Supreme Council witnessed by the Judge and

signed by the Registrar of the Court concerned. In the absence of the Judge of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, the Registrar was empowered to make reasonable adjustments. The Registrar was to be appointed by the Judge of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* only with the assent of the Governor-General and Council. The Registrar of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* was empowered also to swear and examine the witnesses, take their depositions in writing and procure the same, to be signed by the respective witnesses and attest the same by his signature. The first Registrar to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* was William Johnson. He was appointed to the post in the Supreme Court with a salary of Sicca Rs. 1000/- per month.

The office of the Registrar was thus introduced in the judiciary of Bengal. The Governor-General's Minute on 2 March 1784 further clarified his duties.³ The 3rd clause laid down that the Registrar was to prepare a book containing copies of letters, applications etc. in the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*. The 4th clause enumerated that he was to report to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* monthly the receipt of abstract registers of the proceedings in mofussil Courts. According to the 5th clause, he was to report to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* all causes of appeal. The 8th clause laid down that the Registrar was to report to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* all the proceedings of mofussil *Dewani* Courts together with an abstract of the same against the Zemindars, Talukdars, Chowdries or landholders for contempt. The 9th clause directed the Registrar to record all additional regulations, orders or rules framed or approved by the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* and to transmit the same in cases concerning the mofussil Courts. According to the 13th clause, he was also to receive the deposits. The 14th clause laid down that he was to maintain an account of all sums of money, received from mofussil *Dewani* Courts or *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, on account of deposits and place the same every

six months before the Governor-General-in-Council. According to the 15th clause, he was to make the report, directed to be made previously by the Judge of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*.

The Judicial Scheme of 27 June, 1787 contained elaborate provisions on the institution of Registrar. The Registrar, like other Indian Officers in the Courts, was to take the following oath in open Court before the Judge; "I will truly and faithfully perform the office of Registrar of this Court, according to the best of my knowledge and ability and I will not receive, directly or indirectly, any present or Nuzzer, either in money or in effects of any kind, from any party in my cause or from any person whatsoever on account of any suit to be instituted. . . ." The Registrar was to assist the Judge in every mofussil *Dewani* Court by translating into Persian all the papers which the Judge required. The Judge was authorised to empower the Registrar to hear and receive evidence in any cause and to pass sentence in causes where the value contested did not exceed the sum of Rs. 200/-, or if the suit was for land, when the Government rent thereof would not exceed Rs. 200/- per annum when *malguzary* or *lakheraj*, where the annual produce did not exceed Rs. 20/- or if a *Aynna* paying a quit rent to Government, where such revenue would not exceed Rs. 10/- per annum. All such acts were to be performed in open court on extra days and such decrees were to be signed by the Registrar and countersigned by the Judge, as a mark of his approbation. The Registrars in mofussil Courts were to receive copies of rules and orders, framed by the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, mark such copies with the day of the month and file the same to be recorded. A separate book was to be maintained by the Registrar for this purpose.

The Registrar was thus allotted a definite role in the judicial procedure. In all cases where the defendant would refuse or neglect

to rejoin at the time appointed for that purpose, the Registrar of the Court would enter a rejoinder for him, and the cause would be proceeded with as if the defendant himself had rejoined. The Judges of the mofussil Courts were made liable to suspension for disobedience to the Registrar of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*. The Registrar of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* might also examine witnesses by order of the Court, who might proceed in the manner prescribed for the mofussil Courts.⁵

While the Registrars were thus appointed in the *Dewani* Courts, arrangements were also made for their appointment in the *Faujdari* Courts. On 3 December 1790 an officer with the designation of "Registrar to the Nizamat Adalat" was appointed to conduct executive business of the Adalat. On the submission of a case by the Court of Circuit, he was to consult with the Qazi and Mufti and place the case before the *Nizamat Adalat*. Each of the four Courts of Circuit also was to appoint a Registrar to conduct executive business of the *Adalat*.⁶ For the smooth course of prosecution in cases of murder, it was decided on 8 April 1791 that in case of the death or absence of the prosecutor, the Registrar to the Court of Circuit was to carry on the prosecution on behalf of the Government.⁷

The Registrars thus were allotted a definite role in the judiciary of Bengal and the Government had to consider their rate of remuneration. As early as 26 March 1782 the Supreme Council asked J. Duncan, Preparer of Reports, to prepare a general and uniform establishment of fees for the mofussil *Dewani Adalats*. The Judge of Bhagalpore, however, opposed any fee to the Registrar. The districts of Chittra, Bhagalpore, Rungpore and Islamabad were too poor and too thinly populated to bear the cost of high remuneration to the Registrars. Accordingly the Preparer

of Reports framed the following table of fees for the office of Registrar in District courts:⁸

The Registrar : For registering every petition or answer at the commencement of every suit and for the enrolment of every decree to be paid by the party in whose favour the same was made, where the

cause of action exceeded Rs. 20/- and not Rs. 50/- = 8 as.

In causes not exceeding Rs. 100/- = 10 as.

In causes exceeding Rs. 100/- and not exceeding Rs. 3000/- = an addition of 2 as. on each hundred.

In every cause exceeding Rs. 3000/-

= Rs. 5/-.

For every order, summons or process whatsoever to parties or witnesses where the cause of action exceeded Rs. 50/- and did not exceed Rs. 100/- = 2 as.

In causes not exceeding Rs. 500/- = 3 as.

In causes exceeding Rs. 500/- and not exceeding Rs. 3000/- = an addition of 1 anna on every five hundred rupees.

In every cause exceeding Rs. 3000/- = 10 as.

For making copies of every petition or answer of every exhibit and every deposition and of every deposition and of every paper rule, matter or proceeding, for entering and filing every security where required at the commencement of any suit or for appearance —

For registering every *Vakilautnamah* and for every search in the office where the cause of action exceeded Rs. 100/- and not Rs. 500/- = 2 as.

For registering . . . etc. in causes not exceeding Rs. 1000/- = 3 as.

For registering . . . etc. in causes exceeding Rs. 1000/- and not exceeding Rs. 3000/- = an addition of one anna on every Rs. 1000/-; and in every cause exceeding Rs. 3000/- = 8 as.

For registering every 'Durkquest' or petition of appeal = 2 as.

For serving or executing every order, summons or process whatsoever in causes appealed to levied from the party in whose favour the decree was made = 4 as.

Four annas out of every rupee received by the Registrar, by virtue of the foregoing fees, were to be paid to and divided among the Indian officers in proportion fixed at the discretion of the Judge of the Court.

The above table of fees was approved by the Supreme Council. The Courts at Rangpur, Islamabad and Chittra, however, were excluded from the table and no fees were allotted to the Registrar or Indian officers of these courts. For, the Supreme Council was of opinion that the Registrars of those courts, being at the same time assistants to the judges in their separate capacities of Collectors of the Revenue, their allowances must be made equal, if not superior, to those of any of the Registrars including the fees which they were to collect.⁹

Further additions were made to the above table of fees in causes of higher value.¹⁰ These additions also included fees to the Registrar.

The Registrar :

1. For registering every petition of Appeal or answer where the cause of action did not exceed Sicca Rs. 5000 = Rs. 5/-.
2. When it exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 10/-.
3. For registering any other petition = Rs. 2/-.
4. For every summons or process etc. to parties or witnesses in causes not exceeding Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 3/-.
5. The above exceeding Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 5/-.
6. For the enrolment of every decree to be

paid by the party in whose favour the same was made in cause of action not exceeding Sic. Rs. 5000 = Rs. 5/-.

7. Where the above exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 10/-.
8. For making copies of every petition, exhibit etc. where the cause of action did not exceed Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Re. 1/-.
9. Where the above exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 2/-.
10. For filing every security or for registering every *Vakilautnamah* etc. = Re. 1/-.
11. A fee of 10 per cent upon the Deposit fee was to be received on all original suits or appeals.

Assistants to the Registrar :

1. For calling every cause where the sum did not exceed Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Re. 1/-.
2. Where the above exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 2/-.
3. For every copy of pleading matter etc. six annas out of every rupee received by the Registrar.

The office of the Registrar thus became a part and parcel of the judicial system in Bengal. The Registrar not only continued to send abstract registers to the Supreme Council but occasionally also made suggestions on the administration of justice. Thus on 17 October 1792 J. Fombelle, the Registrar to the *Nizamat Adalat*, requested the Supreme Council to adopt a rule for all cases of Homicide.¹¹ On another occasion he proposed that the monthly transmission of the report of prisoners should be discontinued and the magistrates were to transmit such report to the Registrar to the *Nizamat Adalat* within twenty days after the Judges of the Courts of Circuit had completed the business of each circuit. A form was also framed for the purpose. This regulation was expected to save the time and trouble of the magistrate. This proposed regulation of Mr. Fombelle was accepted and approved by the Supreme Council.¹²

In consideration of the growing importance of the institution of the Registrar, the Code of 1793 laid down provisions on the same. Under Regulation XIII, a Registrar was appointed to every Court. He could try cases up to Rs. 200/- only.¹³ The Registrars were appointed from the junior branch of the European servants. Under Reg. VI of 1793, the salary of the Registrar to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* was fixed at Rs. 40,000 per year. His assistant was allotted a salary of Rs. 6000/- per year. Reg. XIII laid down in details the powers and responsibilities of the Registrars in the judicial system. The Registrars could try cases on *malguzary* land, the annual produce of which did not exceed 200 Sicca rupees in value. Similarly they were empowered to try and decide suits for *lakheraj* lands the produce of which did not exceed 20 Sicca rupees per annum. While thus authorising the Registrar to try suits, Reg. XIII directed that the decrees passed by him could be effective only when the Judge countersigned the same.¹⁴ This restriction consequently defeated the purpose of

the Regulation. So in 1794 the Supreme Council had to decide that the Registrars to the District and City Courts were to sit thrice a week for the trial of cases referable to them. Their decrees would be final in suits of personal property amounting to Rs. 25/- only. In all other suits too, unless appealed against within a limited time, their decrees would be final.

From the above it appears that the institution of Registrar took several years to make way into the British Indian judicial system in its formative period. The Registrars were at first needed not only to maintain registers of the details of the Indian employees of the Company, but also to help the transmission of abstract registers from different Courts to the Supreme Council. What was more, they saved the time and trouble of the District and City Judges from being occupied with the trial of petty suits and thereby enabled those Judges to determine causes of magnitude with greater expedition.

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INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

ANNUAL REPORT (1970-71)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to present to you the Annual Report of the Institute of Historical Studies for the year 1970-71. The pleasure is all the greater because the year 1970-71 completes the first decade of the life of the organisation and may, therefore, be regarded as an important landmark. When we started in 1961, it was with some amount of uncertainty that we looked ahead, not quite sure about the pace of progress we could make. Happily the most critical phase in the life of a new organisation is over, and we can now look forward to the future with confidence and assurance of strength. The first decade presented many hurdles in our way — official indifference, financial difficulties, accommodation problems etc. It redounds to the credit of our members, friends and well-wishers that we crossed all these hurdles with our determination and self-reliance. It is flattering indeed that an organisation started in 1961 could establish its position as one of the leading all-India academic organisations within one decade. To commemorate the completion of the first decade of the Institute's life, we propose to bring out a special illustrated brochure, giving the history and the activities of the organisation. Such a stock-taking at the end of each decade will give us incentive to work with more devotion and sincerity and achieve greater success in the next decade.

Membership

During the year under review the membership of the Institute recorded a slight fall.

Two factors were mainly responsible : first, the disturbed conditions in Calcutta and to a large extent in several other parts of the country; and second, the vagaries of floating members, who join one year to attend the Annual Conference but drop out in the following year. Perhaps, it is necessary to take some effective measures, like imposing an admission and re-admission fee or some other measures, to check the unfortunate trend of fluctuating membership, numbering about 50 or 60 every year. We should, at the same time redouble our efforts to enrol a substantially large number of new members in the coming year, so that the membership may record a steady increase in spite of the dropping out of 50 every year. In this we depend on the active co-operation of our members, and I appeal to each member to undertake the responsibility of enrolling at least one new member in 1971-72. We should aim at a total membership of 1000 in the next two years. In spite of the fluctuation in number, one happy thing is that the composition of our membership fully retains its all-India character. There is no State in India from where we do not have at least a few members.

Meetings

It is a matter of deep regret that not more than two Discussion Meetings could be arranged during the year under review. This was in sad contrast to our previous record, of holding at least six Discussion Meetings a year. Our failure to arrange more Discussion Meetings in 1970-71 was due : first, to the chronic disturbed conditions in the city which

made any advance planning impossible; and second, to lack of accommodation, the Meeting Room being diverted for office-work to meet the increased demand for office space. To remedy this unfortunate situation arising from lack of accommodation, we propose to shift to a new building from the year 1971-72, in a quieter part of Calcutta and with an accommodation which may meet our requirements for at least the next ten years. I can assure the members that after this shifting to new premises, we shall arrange Discussion Meetings as regularly as in the past, or perhaps more frequently.

New Fellows

The following new Fellows of the Institute were elected in 1970-71, under Article V of the Constitution :

1. Dr. P. M. Joshi, Professor of Medieval History, Deccan College and Post Graduate Institute, Poona.
2. Dr. A. R. Kulkarni, Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Poona.
3. Dr. V. G. Dighe, History of Freedom Movement Unit, National Archives of India, New Delhi.
4. Dr. G. N. Sharma, Professor of History, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
5. Dr. B. K. Apte, Head of the Department of History, Nagpur University.
6. Dr. D. K. Ghosh, Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Burdwan.
7. Dr. N. Subramanian, Professor of Ancient Indian History, Madurai University.
8. Dr. K. Rajayyan, Professor of Modern History, Madurai University.
9. Dr. A. Krishnaswami, Professor and Head of the Department of History, Annamalai University.
10. Dr. V. N. Hari Rao, S. V. University, Tirupati.
11. Dr. V. N. Datta, Head of the Department of History, Kurukshetra University.
12. Dr. Shibnarayan Ray, Head of the Department of Indian Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville-Victoria, Australia.

Annual Conference

The Eighth Annual Conference of the Institute was held at Jodhpur (Rajasthan), under the auspices of the University of Jodhpur, from 20th to 23rd October. The inaugural session was held on the 20th morning. Mr. V. V. John, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jodhpur, welcomed the members and delegates as Chairman of the Reception Committee. Mr. Justice Bery of the Rajasthan High Court inaugurated the Conference. The Conference was presided over by the most distinguished historical scholar in Rajasthan, Dr. M. L. Sharma.

From the morning of 20th to the morning of 22nd October the Conference Programme was, presentation and discussion of papers. Two broad themes were adopted for the Papers : (i) Sources of the History of Rajasthan (Ancient, Medieval and Modern Periods) and (ii) History in Modern Indian Literature. On the first theme 10 papers were scheduled to be presented and on the second 17. Some of those who were to have presented papers could not actually attend the Conference, but their papers will be included in the Proceedings Volumes. The 20 papers actually

presented on the two themes were of a high standard and the discussions on them were most lively. The attendance at all the sessions was very good and most of those present evinced an active interest and took part in the discussions. This seriousness of purpose offered a pleasing contrast to what has now become very common at many of the all-India Conferences of this kind. Another striking feature of the attendance was that while the total number was not very large (in fact the Institute's Annual Conference is deliberately kept confined to only those who are serious about the subject), the members attending came from all parts of the country and the gathering was most representative and all-India in character.

On the whole the Eighth Annual Conference was a great success, in keeping with the tradition set at earlier Conferences. Most of the Universities had co-operated with us by sending delegates to the Conference and the Railway authorities had also granted fare concession to participants in the Conference. We take this opportunity to offer our thanks to Mr. V. V. John, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jodhpur, Mr. Justice Bery of the Rajasthan High Court, Dr. M. L. Sharma, the President, Dr. Dasarath Sharma, the Local Secretary, and all his colleagues in the History Department, specially Dr. R. P. Vyas. We are also thankful to the writers of papers, to the rapporteurs and to all those who had taken part in the discussions.

Programme of Papers

**THEME : SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF
RAJASTHAN**

Papers by :

(Ancient Period)

- Dr. M. L. Sharma (Rajasthan Institute of Historical Research, Jaipur)
Dr. Dasarath Sharma (University of Jodhpur)

(Medieval Period)

- Dr. G. N. Sharma (University of Rajasthan, Jaipur)
Dr. V. S. Bhargava (Government College, Ajmer)
Dr. M. S. Ahluwalia (Punjabi University, Patiala)

(Modern Period)

- Dr. M. S. Jain (University of Rajasthan, Jaipur)
Dr. Sukumar Bhattacharyya (Jogamaya Devi College, Calcutta)
Dr. V. K. Vashistha (University of Rajasthan, Jaipur)

**THEME : HISTORY IN MODERN INDIAN
LITERATURE**
Papers by :

Bengali Literature :

- Dr. Tarasankar Banerjee (Visva-Bharati University)
Dr. Kalyan Kumar Dasgupta (Calcutta University)

Hindi Literature :

- Dr. H. S. Srivastava (Gorakhpur University)
Dr. R. R. Bhatnagar (University of Saugor)

Punjabi Literature :

- Dr. Ganda Singh (Patiala)

Urdu Literature :

- Mrs. Zubaida Yaseen Ali Khan (Osmania University, Hyderabad)

Assamese Literature :

- Dr. S. N. Sarma (Gauhati University)

Oriya Literature :

- Principal S. N. Choudhury (Kendrapara College)

Marathi Literature :

- Mrs. M. P. Karmarkar (University of Bombay)

Mr. N. H. Kulkarnee (National Archives,
New Delhi)

Gujarati Literature :

Dr. V. K. Chavda (Baroda University)

Tamil Literature :

Dr. N. Subramanian (Madurai University)

Telegu Literature :

Dr. V. Yashoda Devi (S. V. University,
Tirupati)

Kannada Literature :

Dr. K. R. Basavaraja (Karnatak University,
Dharwar)

Malayalam Literature :

Mr. M. G. Sankara Narayanan (University
of Calicut)

RAPPORTEURS

Dr. (Mrs.) Uma Das Gupta (Jadavpur
University)

Mr. Chittabrata Palit (Jadavpur Univer-
sity)

Dr. M. S. Ahluwalia (Punjabi University,
Patiala)

Dr. V. K. Vashistha (University of Rajas-
than, Jaipur)

Journal

The *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies* also maintained its steady record of progress, and all the four numbers of Vol X were brought out during the year under review. With the end of the year 1970-71 the *Quarterly Review* also completed Vol X of its publication. This is no small achievement when we consider the numerous difficulties, both financial and otherwise, which the journal had to face during the first decade of its publication. It is gratifying to note that our journal has established its position as the leading historical journal in India. Every endeavour is made to retain its high academic standard which has earned the appreciation

of history scholars not only in India but also abroad. The circulation figure of the journal maintained its steady yearly increase and if this trend continues we shall have to print more copies from 1971-72 than during the first decade of publication.

To commemorate the completion of the first decade of publication, it is proposed to bring out a special Index Volume, covering the contents of Volumes I to X.

The following numbers of the *Quarterly Review* had long gone out of print (and a few other numbers are also nearing that point): Vol. I (1961-62) nos. 1-4; Vol II (1962-63) no. 1; Vol. IV (1964-65) nos. 3 & Vol. VIII (1968-69) no. 1.

Orders for these numbers could not be met for the last few years, I am happy to report now that M/s. D. K. Agencies (461, Vivekanand Nagar, Delhi-7) have undertaken to reprint these out-of-print issues at their own cost on the basis of normal Royalty to the *Quarterly Review*. I am sure this arrangement will be welcomed by all who want to have complete sets of the *Quarterly Review* from Vol. I No. 1.

To meet the increased costs of paper, printing and postage it was decided to raise the Indian subscription rate from Rs. 15/- to Rs. 20/- from 1971-72. It may be hoped that this slight increase in the subscription rate will cover the annual deficit.

Library

The Institute's library specialises in historical journals and has most of the well-known historical journals of the world. Our collection compares favourably with that of any other library in India. Most of the journals we get in exchange, but some we have to subscribe. For lack of funds it was not possible to make any substantial addition to our collection of books. The additions in 1970-71

were mostly the volumes, not inconsiderable in number, which were sent for review or as gifts. One difficulty of building up a good library is lack of accommodation. But this difficulty will be removed when we shall shift to our new premises in 1971-72, where we shall have sufficient accommodation not only for proper stocking of our steadily growing collections but also for a fairly big reading room for the convenience of our members. We shall then be in a position to apply to the Government of India and the Government of West-Bengal for suitable annual library grants to enable us to develop our library into a big specialised reference library. In keeping with our all-India character we maintain our library services open to members all over the country. We send volumes by registered post to any place in India, provided the member concerned pays for the postal charges.

Research Service Bureau

The Research Service Bureau, whose main task is to help scholars, both Indian and foreign, with the services of research assistants for the collection of material in India, maintained its activity during the year under review, although on a very small scale. To make the Research Service Bureau more active and useful, additional funds are needed and unless the Government or the U.G.C. comes to our assistance, the Bureau cannot be activated in the way we would like.

Publications

It is a matter of regret that our publication programme did not progress according to plan. *The Sino-Indian Border Question* which was sent to the press during the year under review is not yet out. The delay is due mainly to difficulties in the press, which again are due to the chronic disturbed conditions in the city. Anyway, the work is nearly over and the volume will be out early in 1971-72. Two more volumes were also made ready for the press by the end of the year 1970-71: *Histo-*

rians and Historiography in Modern India and Historical Writings on the Indian Nationalist Movement. One difficulty about implementing our publication programme is lack of funds. When one volume comes out we have to wait for at least one year to realise the cost from the sale proceeds, and the next volume, although ready, cannot be sent to the press before the cost of the earlier volume is realised. It is necessary to have a revolving fund of at least Rs. 10,000/- to enable us to proceed with our publication programme with more regularity and promptitude.

In spite of the high academic quality of our publications, it is a matter of regret that our sales so far were not as good as we could have expected. I take this opportunity to appeal to our members to help our publication scheme by purchasing a copy of each publication (at 20% discount) and also by ordering for copies on behalf of their respective institutions.

Dictionary of National Biography Project

The Dictionary of National Biography Project made very good progress during the year under review. Biographical material on nearly 100 names added to the list in 1970 had been collected. Nearly all the biographical entries, on a little over 1300 names, had been received by the end of the year under review. Only a few entries were yet to come but we hope to receive these remaining entries also shortly. The volumes will be sent to the press in 1971-72. Vol. I will cover names from 'A' to 'D'; Vol. II from 'E' to 'L'; Vol. III from 'M' to 'R'; and Vol. IV from 'S' to 'Z'. Each volume will be of approximately 600-650 pages.

Biographical entries will be given in strict alphabetical order on an all-India basis. The alphabetical order under which the entries will be given will follow the surnames. But in some cases entries will go under names more popularly known. For the convenience

of readers there will be cross references to different versions of the names wherever necessary. At the end of each entry the name of the Contributor would be given as also, in a different type, the name of the Research Fellow who had collected the material. Each entry will also have a select bibliography. For the convenience of readers there will be given a separate alphabetical list of all the names given in each Volume and also an alphabetical list of the names of Contributors whose entries are published in that Volume. On the whole, our endeavour will be to help, in every way we can, those who may consult the DNB volumes.

The printing work has been entrusted to the Saraswati Press, Calcutta, one of the best presses in India, and every care will be taken to ensure the quality of production one would expect for a publication of this kind by the best international standard.

There is a sense of relief and pleasure when one comes to the end of a long journey, specially when there were many hurdles and the going was not that easy. The Project was undertaken eight years ago, in 1963-64. The first year was taken up by planning, setting up the necessary organisational machinery on an all-India basis, appointing and training Research Fellows in different States, drawing up tentative lists of names from different States to be included in the DNB, preparing guide-lines for collection of material and enlisting support and co-operation from Universities, newspapers, political parties, non-political associations and the Central and State Governments.

The next five years were taken up by collecting biographical material on the basis of an elaborate standard format. It was done by 16 Research Fellows in all the States and regions working under the supervision of the local University Professors. The Research Fellows evinced keen interest in their work,

with a sense of dedication of which we are really proud. We are also grateful to the University Professors who gave the necessary advice and guidance to the Research Fellows and also checked their work.

The last two years were taken up by writing actual biographical entries on the basis of the material collected by the Research Fellows. The task was entrusted to nearly 400 Contributors all over the country. In order to ensure uniformity of treatment, elaborate instructions were issued to the Contributors indicating length, style, arrangement of material, bibliography, etc. We are happy to note that the Contributors took their work with all seriousness and in many cases they undertook additional labour to collect supplementary material and to check up the material supplied. Of the 400 Contributors, nearly 300 are professional historians, drawn from all the major Universities in the country. It is most gratifying that we could secure the kind co-operation of all historians who have any professional standing. There is hardly any well-known historian who is not associated with the DNB Project. The remaining 100 Contributors are non-professionals. Most of them are men of eminence in public life, Union and State Cabinet Ministers, Governors, High Court Judges, Ambassadors, leading figures of all the Political Parties in the country, Vice-Chancellors, Journalists, Lawyers, Industrialists, Social reformers, Litterateurs, Scientists, etc. We are happy to note that these Contributors have fully justified their inclusion by bringing a freshness of approach and treatment which will enhance the value of the DNB.

From the detailed account given above it will be clear that the DNB Project has been completed in as short a time as one could expect for a Project of this magnitude. We do not want to appear boastful of our performance. But our love for modesty need not prevent us from feeling a legitimate sense

of gratification and pride that we have been able to complete such a gigantic Project within a much shorter time and at a much lesser cost than any other similar Project undertaken anywhere in India.

Finances

(i) General :

So far as the general finances of the Institute are concerned, the position is getting desperately worse every year with mounting deficits. The following figures will show the total deficit increased from year to year :

1962-63	111.27	1966-67	2,127.63
1963-64	586.98	1967-68	6,247.63
1964-65	1,405.10	1968-69	10,155.10
1965-66	2,584.67	1969-70	13,566.42
		1970-71	22,772.24

The financial position was gravely affected by the termination of Foundation Grants from 1968-69, amounting to Rs. 9,500/- a year. We had appealed in 1970-71 to the Ministry of Education, Government of India, to give us a recurring grant of Rs. 10,000/- to offset this loss. But unfortunately, the Government of India sanctioned a recurring grant of Rs. 5000/- only. We are happy, of course, at this first sanctioning of a recurring grant, which may be taken as a token of recognition by the Government of India of the services rendered by the Institute in the field of historical studies. We are thankful to the Government of India for such recognition. But at the same time the fact remains, as the Audit Report for 1970-71 will show, that even with the Government of India grant of Rs. 5,000/- there was a deficit of Rs. 9,210.82 in 1970-71 in the Institute's General Account.

It will be readily appreciated that a total accumulated deficit of Rs. 22,777.24 is a crushing burden for a young and small organisation. To maintain our activities as at present we have to take two steps :

- (1) To raise donations from members, industrialists and the general public to wipe off the accumulated deficit up to 31.3.71;
- (2) To get adequate funds for normal annual expenditure from 1971-72.

So far as the first step is concerned, we applied to the Income-Tax Commissioner for declaration of the Institute as a public charitable institution entitled to the benefit of Sections 11 and 80-G of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, under which all donations made to the Institute would be exempt from payment of income-tax. We hope to get the necessary Declaration Certificate shortly and that will facilitate securing donations from industrialists and the general public. I hope to get the kind and active co-operation of our members in securing such donations.

Regarding the second step, we have to appeal to the Government of India to increase the recurring grant from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-. We have also to request the Government of West Bengal for a recurring grant of Rs. 5,000/-. In that way the normal annual deficit may be met from 1971-72.

At the last Annual General Meeting in September 1970 it was resolved to increase the membership fee from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 25/- from the year 1971-72. This little additional annual income will be used to offset the impact of increased cost of paper, postage, etc.

(ii) DNB Project :

During the year under review we had revised our DNB Project budget. The total from 1963-64 to 1971-72 amounts to Rs. 7,50,000/-. This includes Rs. 1,75,000/- as cost of publication. But there is every possibility, in the present market trend, of the publication cost going up. Out of the total estimated expenditure, we have so far received Rs. 6,01,184 (Asia Foundation —

Rs. 2,43,184; Government of India — Rs. 1,99,000/-; State Governments — Rs. 1,59,000/-). There is thus a deficit of Rs. 1,49,000/-. We are hoping to get at least a part of this amount by additional grants from the Government of India and State Governments and donations from industrialists and businessmen. But we are afraid, if these additional grants and donations do not come within two or three months, the publication of the DNB may be held up. The position is not desperate but at the same time it is one which causes anxiety.

Conclusion

Before concluding the Annual Report, on behalf of the Institute of Historical Studies, I offer our thanks to the Government of

India and the Governments of Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, Kerala, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Panjab, Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal, Tamilnadu, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, for their kind financial assistance; and also to the Contributors who had offered us their helpful co-operation in the Dictionary of National Biography Project. I am also thankful to the press for giving publicity to our work. I also take this opportunity to thank the members of the Executive Committee and Editorial Advisory Committee and all the members and well-wishers of the Institute for their kind and active interest.

August 10, 1971
Calcutta.

S. P. SEN
Director

BOOK REVIEWS

Harper Encyclopedia of the Modern World, Edited by RICHARD B. MORRIS and GRAHAM W. IRWIN; Harper & Row, Publisher, 1970 : Price \$ 17.50; pp. 1271

In the era of ever expanding horizon of knowledge reference histories and aids have acquired a new significance. The '*shrinking world*' has thrown a new challenge to the educational concept and capability of mankind with a great urge for knowing the unknown in the civilized society. Heavy scholarly works have their own merits; but they are not an antithesis to concise, general learning. Hence, the importance of reference aids. '*Harper Encyclopedia*' is one of those few reference works which have a broad perspective of territorial and intellectual boundaries.

Though the starting point of the study of "the Modern World" (1760) is somewhat arbitrary, the volume makes a good attempt to diffuse knowledge of a variety of subjects and not simply general historical information. The '*Encyclopedia*' has been divided into two parts. Part I deals with "Basic Chronology" of political, military and diplomatic history by state, region and area. A "Topical Chronology" of social, economic and constitutional developments in the modern world and the history of science, thought and culture has been handled in Part II. It will be futile to expect details in such a volume, but one may find useful answers to many of his basic queries. It must be admitted that the section dealing with 'economic development and technology in an age of revolution' is unique in its approach and content.

A claim has been made that the present

work is "a world encyclopedia in a special sense". In the opinion of William H. McNeill "this new encyclopedia really takes on the world, and not simply its Western parts." But a careful reader will find that this claim is more apparent than real, especially in Part II dealing with topical chronology. The western bias is very much pronounced in the second part in general and in section entitled "Thought and Culture in an Age of Revolution" in particular. The reviewer holds that justice has not been done to East and South Asia and Africa in this section. What about great modern cultural and literary developments in India and China? Where is the description of eastern philosophy? Who can deny that Vivekananda, the great savant of the East, shook the western world by the renewed Vedantist philosophy? It may be conceded that these lapses are perhaps due to defects in the collection of necessary information. We are here concerned with facts rather than intentions. Notwithstanding the shortcomings which are unavoidable in a big reference work, the volume under review is remarkable for its planning, arrangement and style. It has introduced a new orientation in reference work design.

TARASANKAR BANERJEE

Elite Conflict in a Plural Society Twentieth Century Bengal.

By J. H. BROOMFIELD.
Oxford University Press, Bombay : Price Rs. 50.00; pp. 349.

Political movement in Bengal in the present century offers new ground for critical historical study. There are, however, few works dealing with this aspect of the history of Bengal. The volume under review is an

attempt to study 'institutional politics', particularly 'politics of the legislature' in Bengal, with particular reference to the attitude and approach of what the author calls the "bhadrals". True, a historical analysis of the approach and attitude of a social group in the political structure of a linguistic region is an interesting theme. But to be fruitful and reliable such a study should be scientific, and not simply based on a confused connotation of a phraseology which is applied loosely in social status-relationship.

The introduction itself is divided in two parts. Part I deals with the position of the 'bhadrals' in the Bengal Society, and Part II handles the mutual response of the 'bhadrals' and the British administrators. Who were these bhadrals? Commonly speaking, they were respectable educated gentlemen. "The bhadrals as a group had gained a new sense of cultural identity from their nineteenth-century experience in adapting local traditions to the challenging demands of their rapidly changing society" (p. 11). This loose expression has been applied uniformly in the complex politico-sociological phenomenon of the period making the study confusing and at times erroneous. In the opinion of the author "the advantage in the use of the Bengali word 'bhadrals' is that it emphasises the attribute which was most important to the members of the group themselves: their social honour" (p. 13). The author has applied the term as an expression for a 'status group' after the pattern of Marx Weber. Is it really a scientific application of the term? The author's study reflects a vague generalization of the characteristics of the educated middle class men in Bengal based on peripheral information about them. The matter has been made more confusing by introducing Max Weber's distinction between 'open' and 'closed' group. Catchy titles and phrases do not necessarily enrich a scholarly work.

Though the title refers to the twentieth

century, the author's main concern is with the study of the period between 1912 and 1927 which witnessed crucial developments in Indian politics. The reunification of Bengal in 1912 ushered in a new era of politics in the province. The floor of the legislature became the battle-ground for conflicting political ideologies. The failure of the Moderates became apparent. Politics of violence and communalism created inner rift in Bengal and offered a new opportunity to the imperialist rulers to divide the people and attempt to perpetuate their stranglehold. The role of the British administrators in the whirlwind of politics assumed a great significance. All these have been discussed in seven chapters. The 'Epilogue' outlines the developments down to the partition of 1947. The 'Conclusion' summarises the story of the period together with the author's views. It is difficult to agree with the analysis regarding the emergence of communal politics and conflict between the Hindu and Muslim elite. The author writes: "It is a striking fact that throughout this period of almost half a century the Bengal Muslim politicians unflaggingly asserted their community's right to a separate political existence. The strategies of Muslim politics were not constant, the type of Muslim politician with influence varied, and the political system underwent radical changes. But this determination to maintain a distinct political identity was throughout the basic factor in Muslim thinking" (p. 326).

The scope of the review will not permit a detailed discussion of the causes for the emergence of communalism in politics; but it is necessary to observe that the Congress movement and the Muslim politics are not two parallel trends from the beginning. The main current of the nationalist movement under the leadership of the Congress was not an exclusively Hindu affair. However, it may be said that the political movement of the Muslim community was an offshoot of the main nationalist movement. The separatist move-

ment was actually nurtured and protected by the imperialist rulers as that was the last means to maintain their hold. The author seems to be usually soft to the British when he concludes that "by their actions the British gave encouragement to the separatists" (p. 331). Separatism reproduced by the virus of communal politics was not simply incidental to British actions. It was the reflection of a cool, calculated and deep-rooted conspiracy of the British rulers; and the Hindu-Muslim elite at the height of their passion fell an easy prey to the vile imperialist game.

The author has taken pains to collect materials from government and non-government records and other materials. But he has somewhat neglected the speeches and writings of the persons who counted, though a few references of the works of B. C. Pal and some others may be found in the footnotes. It would have been helpful for the readers of such a work, if a select bibliography had been appended at the end.

It must be admitted that the author has attempted to break new ground with his study of the politics of a key British Indian province. The reviewer, however, remains unconvinced about the correctness of his methodology. He has indeed documented his study well and added charts and statistics to prove his point of view. But what has he communicated to the readers? It has been neither a Marxian analysis of the role of the educated middle class, nor a sociological examination of the role of caste, religion and group in the politics of Bengal. At best, it has described the social bases of an angular political action. Moreover, such a study remains incomplete if the developments of a particular region are not examined in the broader perspective of the Indian situation in general. The great merit of the work is that it will surely enthuse other researchers to make fresh enquiries along a new line.

TARASANKAR BANERJEE

Swami Dayanand By B. K. SINGH (N.B.T., India) pp. 136.

Sri Singh has brought out a popular biography of Swami Dayanand in the National Biography Series. The Book has been divided into nine chapters. The first three chapters bring out the early life and career of the Swami in the context of the general social and religious background of the country. Prof. Singh compares Dayanand with Buddha (pp. 13 & 15) but at p. 31 the author considers it safe to assume that 'Swami Dayanand got all that he wanted to know at the feet of the master'. The essential element of a comparison with Buddha (self-enlightenment) is missing. He has also made some sweeping generalisations. He calls West Asia as the epicentre of world politics in medieval times (p. 1); and contends that the Shudras formed the backbone of the Indian social structure (p. 5).

In the fourth chapter he has put Swamiji's task of reform in a proper perspective. In his zeal to make Dayanand argue with the traditional Pandits, he has put the Kumbha fair in 1866 at Hardwar (p. 34); again in 1869 at Prayag (p. 39) and again in April 1879 at Hardwar (p. 64). It is simply incorrect. Could the author not find other arguments for providing audience to Swamiji at these places? He is vague when he says that Dayanand's visit to Calcutta crystallized his views and then lists the various ideas of Dayanand (p. 44). Does he mean to suggest that all these were formed as a result of his visit to Calcutta? It is not correct to say that with the establishment of Arya Samaj at Bombay in 1875, the Arya Samaj movement gathered momentum all over North India (p. 52). It was only after its headquarters had been shifted to Lahore that the movement gained momentum and in fact it never made much headway in the Deccan. He calls Punjab, the citadel of Islam (p. 60); and considers the ten principles of Arya Samaj like the ten com-

mandments of Christianity from which 'the followers of the Samaj later drew their inspiration and strength'. (p. 62).

Chapter five contains a record of the places visited by Swamiji. The impression which is being conveyed is that his meetings were frequently disturbed which is not necessarily correct. Chapter six describes his visit to Rajputana and the seventh chapter describes his death. The eighth chapter brings out the emphasis on rationalism laid by Dayanand. The ninth chapter is particularly good since he has been able to bring out the contribution of Dayanand in instilling in the educated youths of the country a confidence and a craving for their rich heritage and pristine glory and thus saved them from falling an easy prey to the seductions of Western Culture (p. 120). He is right in saying that Dayanand's inspiration for the reform of Hindu Society came mostly from within (p. 121).

The book is readable; but does not create an impression of the work done by Swamiji. The narrative is rather uninspiring. Too many details of the places visited by Swamiji could have been avoided and some mention should have been made of his legacy in the building up of modern India, specially the contributions of the movement he had built up.

M. S. JAIN

The Aligarh Movement By PROFESSOR H. K. SHERWANI.

The brochure is the 2nd of the Sir Syed Memorial Lectures delivered by Professor H. K. Sherwani, an old student of the Muslim University, Aligarh. In the first lecture Professor Sherwani traces the background of the movement and then goes on to show the influence of the Aligarh Movement on Religion, Social Reform, Education and Politics. He concludes his 2nd lecture by saying that the Aligarh Movement ended when the ideal

of a self-governing All-India educational Institution of Sir Sayyid died with the acceptance of Government control over the proposed Muslim University.

Professor Sherwani is right in assuming that the Aligarh Movement was 'an all pervading movement' primarily 'for bettering the conditions of the Muslims' (p. 2). But he fails to show even a casual connection between Tipu's reforms, Ram Mohan's visit to Delhi and Sir Sayyid's movement; he contents himself by saying that Sayyid Ahmad 'must have realised' the failure of Tipu's measures or 'must have continued to meet' Ram Mohan. Professor Sherwani incorrectly argues that the foreign travel to England had a salutary effect on Ram Mohan's reforming psychology, for the simple reason that Ram Mohan's reforming zeal had begun much earlier than his journey to England.

Sayyid Ahmad's basic problem in religious reform was to re-interpret Islam and to prove it to be in accordance with Western scientific ideas. This was not the problem before the Wahabis. Nor did he agree with the Wahabi contention that India was a Dar-ul-Harb. Therefore, Professor Sherwani's contention that the Wahabi's tenets had a close resemblance with some of the basic principles laid down by Sayyid Ahmad (p. 5) may be true only in the sense that all reformers in Islam would have some similarities.

The motives which persuaded Sir Sayyid to undertake a visit to England were multifarious and, if it is to be judged by results, the outcome of the scheme of Muhammadan College of Aligarh was more important than any thing else. A man of Professor Sherwani's calibre should have been more careful to connect the discontinuation of Tehzib in 1876 with the beginning of Tafsir-ul-Quran in 1893 (p. 12).

Sir Sayyid's religious views were not taught

to the students of the Aligarh College who even did not know of the publication of *Tahzib-ul-akhlaq*. He himself was not a member of the committee entrusted with religious education. In the light of these facts Professor Sherwani's assertion can hardly carry conviction that Sayyid Ahmad's views about religious reform were the 'acme of the Aligarh Movement not only for...the extent of its influence but also for the permanence of its principles' (p. 16).

Professor Sherwani has failed to analyse the motives of Sayyid's speeches advocating co-operation of the Hindus with the Muhammadan college which could be found at p. 257 of '*Safarnama-i-Punjab*'. He is wrong in saying that the supporters of Hindi wanted to replace Urdu by Sanskritised Hindi (p. 23). He himself recognises that this was a move for a change of script only (p. 24). Professor Sherwani, it appears, did not care to go through Sayyid Ahmad's speeches opposing the National Congress; otherwise he would not have said that nothing in his speeches or writings shows that he had any antipathy against the Congress (p. 33). His assertion that politics was no part of the game might deceive those who do not have even a fragmentary knowledge of the Aligarh Movement. His attempt to whitewash Sir Sayyid's activities can hardly carry conviction. Sir Sayyid was undoubtedly a great leader but it is time that we dropped the habit to eulogise every action of Sir Sayyid and judge him in a correct perspective.

M. S. JAIN

Travels of Guru Nanak By DR. SURINDER SINGH KOHLI, Publication Bureau, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1969. Price Rs. 15/-.

Guru Nanak's travels are better known as 'Udasis'. The author has described the travels of Guru Nanak calling them the first, the

second, the third and the fourth 'Udasis' or journeys. Before coming to the subject, he has given a brief account of Nanak's birth-place and his early life. In the first journey, the Guru visited Punjab, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal, Assam, Orissa and the Madhya Pradesh. The second journey covered a wider range than the first, the Guru having visited Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, Madras, Ceylon, Kerala, Maharashtra and Gujarat. During his third journey the Guru visited Himachal Pradesh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Tibet, China and Kashmir. The fourth journey was the longest when Nanak adventured, like many of his age, to visit Aden, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Sudan and Abyssinia, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russo-Turkistan, Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

Dr. Kohli has given an account of the political conditions of the places in India and beyond but he has not thrown much light on the social and economic conditions of the people from the Guru's expressions and quotations. He has described these travels in two hundred pages, whereas the earlier writers like Shri Sewa Ram Singh, Shri S. Khazan Singh and Dr. Ganda Singh did better in a concise manner. However, it would have been a real service to the people had Dr. Kohli documented the account with comparative views of some of the Indian as well as foreign historians on this subject.

In the end the author has given six appendices bearing on the Legendary journey, which are very confusing for the students of this period of history. The bibliography given at the end shows that the author has not gone beyond the sources, to explore the subject, which had been tackled by more than a hundred writers. Being a man of literature, Dr. Kohli perhaps could not be expected to do more justice to a historical subject.

BAKSHISH SINGH NIJJAR

The Government and Politics of Tibet
By RAM RAHUL, Foreword by the Dalai Lama, Vikas Publications, Delhi, December, 1969 : Price Rs. 20/-.

Tibet remained secluded for centuries and hence the sources of information regarding the people and institutions in Tibet are limited. The Sino-Tibetan relationship since the middle of the 17th Century, when the Manchus came to power in China, was a kind of 'patronage relationship' between the Dalai Lamas and the Emperors of China. This was a relationship of religious leadership on one side and rather tenuous secular leadership on the other. Till the end of the 19th Century Tibet had her indigenous structure of government (1642-1895), with only two officials called Ambans representing the Emperor of China. In the early twentieth century, the Dalai Lama XIII declared de-facto independence of Tibet but neglected to secure for it international recognition. Tibet was to pay for this negligence 40 years later when she was forced to swallow the bitter-pill of the 17-point Agreement dictated by the People's Republic of China without any international intervention. Since the so-called liberation a new administration had been imposed by the Chinese on

what they call the TAR or Tibet Autonomous Region of China. But to understand and evaluate the later change it is necessary to know the earlier political and administrative system and that is what Dr. Rahul has attempted in the present work.

The author has neatly traced out the development of the dual administration, religious and secular, in what was essentially a theocratic state. It had an impact on the agrarian society and profoundly influenced social and economic institutions. The evolution of the political institutions like the Cabinet (Kasha), the Finance Department (Chanzo), and other executive and judicial bodies, essentially Tibetan and indigenous, has been carefully traced by the author. However, the power struggle between the Dalai Lamas and the Panchen Lamas leading to the formation of parties in Tibet has not been noticed adequately.

As the Bibliography shows, the author has devotedly collected data from all available sources and that has made his study comprehensive and authentic. The appreciation made by H. H. Dalai Lama in his Foreword has also enhanced the worth of the book.

S. K. PATHAK

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VOLUME XIV

(1974-75)

NUMBER 1

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(1974-75)

No. 1

EDITORIAL

When friends fall out :

When friends fall out, the quarrel becomes more violent and bitter than that between strangers. A most glaring example of this truth is the attitude of the present Minister of State for Education, Professor Nurul Hasan, and of the leading members of the new Government Baby, the Indian Council of Historical Research. Professor Nurul Hasan and the leading stars of the ICHR had been, only a few years ago, closely associated with the Institute of Historical Studies. Most of them had been members of the Institute, Fellows of the Institute, members of the Executive Committee and Contributors to the *Dictionary of National Biography*. But on supposed ideological grounds they have not only dissociated themselves from the Institute but are now the bitterest critics of the Organisation. To illustrate this point and also to take our readers into confidence, we are reproducing below a letter written by the Director of the Institute to Professor Nurul Hasan which will speak for itself. It is a most unfortunate situation but we have to face it boldly, hoping all the time that there will be a change in the not too distant future. The disfavour of a Minister of State and of those who bask in the sunshine of official patronage cannot

deviate us from our path as devotees of the Muse of Clio. We hope, some day the situation will change and our services to the cause of History will be recognised by all, including those who are opposed to us now on imaginary ideological grounds or personal considerations.

Letter to Professor Nurul Hasan.

DIR/0/66

6th March, 1974

My dear Nurul,

This is a purely personal letter and I hope you will respond to it in a personal way and not through your office Secretary.

We had been very good friends for many years down to the Patiala Session of the Indian History Congress in December 1967. You will surely remember that it was I who proposed your name as the General Secretary of the Indian History Congress in December 1963 and again in 1964. I was really delighted when I could carry my point with the Executive Committee of the Indian History Congress in 1964. Our personal relations were most cordial. You were closely associated with the Institute of Historical Studies as a member, as a Fellow, as a member of the Executive Committee (1966-69) and as a member

of the Editorial Advisory Board of the *Dictionary of National Biography*. It was from the Patiala Session of the Indian History Congress in December 1967 that our ways parted and I was surprised to see in one of the newspapers of the time that you took the lead in a signature campaign against me as a CIA Agent. If you had any doubts, you could have asked me for full details as a member of the Executive Committee of the Institute at that time. I could have proved to you with documentary evidence that we never received any foreign financial assistance except with the prior written approval of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Anyway, possibly you took the step at the time under the instigation of some young people, some of whom were my students and should have felt personally grateful to me.

I was happy to know in October 1971 about your appointment as Minister of State for Education, and you will remember with how much sincerity and cordiality I welcomed you at Trivandrum in October 1971, and moved a resolution of congratulations at the Indian Historical Records Commission Meeting at Trivandrum. I thought that we could be friends again as before.

I was very much surprised to know that soon after your assumption of office as a Minister you had called for the file of the Institute of Historical Studies and had recorded in it a note that it should be sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs before any further grant could be made to the Institute. It was on an unqualified clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs that nothing adverse was known against our organisation that you agreed to sanction a committed grant of Rs. 20,000/- for the Dictionary of National Biography Project and the normal Maintenance Grant of Rs. 5,000/- in the year 1971-72. We had applied for a grant of Rs. 10,000/-, but you had created in February 1972 the Indian Council of Historical Research and had recorded a note on our file that any fur-

ther grant to the Institute should have the approval of the ICHR. The result was, we did not get the enhanced grant for 1971-72. In 1972-73 the Ministry of Education had recommended strongly for a grant of Rs. 10,000/- for the approval of the ICHR, but the latter body approved of only Rs. 5,000/- and not the enhanced grant. This year we applied in November 1973 for a grant of Rs. 10,000/- (General Maintenance). Our case was referred to the ICHR. But unfortunately for four months the ICHR could not meet and take a decision on our application. The present position is that the ICHR is going to meet on 18th March to consider our case. As a Minister you ought to know that if the ICHR approves of the Grant on 18th March the grant will automatically lapse under normal Government financial rules. It means that you and the ICHR want to deprive the Institute of even the meagre financial assistance from the Government of India which we have been receiving for the last few years. Last year the ICHR first said that ours was not a historical organisation and then, strangely enough, asked us to apply for a grant from the ICHR itself. Since the ICHR consists of picked men, known for ideological and personal differences with me, I have not the least intention of applying to the ICHR for a grant. I would rather close down my shop than suffer the humiliation.

I have it from the most reliable authority in the Ministry that ours is the only case in the whole of India referred to the ICHR for approval. We are proud of this unique distinction but we do not understand why of all the institutions receiving grants from the Ministry of Education ours should be the only one to be referred to the ICHR for approval. There is nothing in the constitution of the ICHR which makes such a reference mandatory, but only your personal note on our file which has frightened the Ministry Officials. I feel flattered that our institution should appear so important to you for your personal consideration as a Minister.

I am writing this letter to you not in a mood of anger but in a mood of depression and surprise. It is true that when friends fall out, their quarrel becomes more bitter than between strangers. My purpose in writing this letter to you is to state clearly and frankly what is happening in your Ministry. Not that the Institute will close down if we do not get a grant of Rs. 10,000/- from the Ministry of Education. But what I do not understand is why the Ministry should refuse the meagre financial assistance which we have been receiving before you became a Minister. As I see it, the ICHR is a mere smoke-screen and you personally do not want to continue the General Maintenance Grant to the Institute for reasons best known to you. If that is not the position, there is no reason why ours should be the solitary case being referred to the ICHR and why should the Ministry tolerate the delaying tactics of the ICHR. If you are not really keen on stopping the General Maintenance Grant from the year 1973-74, you can easily issue immediate instructions to the Deputy Secretary, Department of Culture, for sanctioning a grant of Rs. 10,000/- as applied for without waiting for the opinion of the body which cannot meet even in four months.

I had the most cordial relations with every Education Minister since the time of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. It is my misfortune that when you, one of my closest friends at one time, became a Minister, the attitude of the Ministry totally changed. Perhaps, one day you will be no longer the Minister and I can again establish cordial relations with whoever succeeds you.

I shall be grateful if you kindly go through my letter carefully and ask yourself as an individual whether you have not been unjust and unfair to an institution with which you had been closely connected for years and to a person to whom you have every reason to feel grateful. May good sense dawn upon you,

so that you may issue immediate instructions to the Ministry officials to release the meagre grant applied for, without any reference to the ICHR.

This has been an unusually long letter as I wanted to explain things in detail. I hope you will have the patience to go through it and reply at an early date.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,
S. P. Sen.

Professor S. Nurul Hasan,
Minister of Education,
Government of India,
New Delhi.

Grants from the Asia Foundation :

One of the commonest charges levelled against the Institute of Historical Studies is that the Institute had received grants from 1963 to 1967 from the Asia Foundation, whose connection with the CIA was later publicised in the American Press and immediately taken up by interested elements in India.

We have to state in this connection that our position is perfectly clear. All the grants we had received from the Asia Foundation were with the prior written approval of the Ministry of External Affairs. On several occasions, after the disclosure of the CIA connection of the Asia Foundation, the Ministry of Education, Government of India, made enquiries about the grants we had received from the Asia Foundation. We are reproducing below the letters from the Ministry and our replies which will convincingly show to our readers that the real responsibility lies with the Government of India and not with us for accepting grants from the Asia Foundation. We accepted these grants in good faith

on the written approval of the Ministry of External Affairs on each occasion. The Government of India did not know about the CIA connection of the Asia Foundation before 1967. Then how on earth could we be expected to know it? We do not have any espionage system as the Government has. If in 1967 the CIA connection had been unearthed, the Government of India must face the music. No responsibility can be thrown on us at that stage.

In spite of all these enquiries in 1967-68 and our position having been cleared conclusively in the Ministry of Education, Professor Nurul Hasan, the Minister of State for Education, referred our case again to the Home Ministry and it was on a clear chit from the Home Ministry early in 1972 that Professor Hasan agreed to release the committed grant to the Institute. But as the letter from the Director of the Institute to Professor Nurul Hasan will show, he took care to see that the Institute did not get any enhanced grant to which it was fully entitled by its sustained services to the cause of history. He had a convenient smoke-screen, the Indian Council of Historical Research. This body, consisting of the Minister's own nominees and belonging to a particular ideological line of thinking, has arrogated to itself the position of a representative body of Indian historians, which it certainly is not, and of sitting in judgement over the work of a much older and much more representative all-India association of historians like the Institute of Historical Studies. We are, however, not afraid of Ministerial disfavour and have the courage to follow our own path of independent historiography. But we want to take this opportunity to publicly release all the facts about the Asia Foundation Grants in order to convince our readers about the correctness of our position and to refute by documentary evidence the baseless and motivated charges levelled against us.

(A) Letters from the Ministry of External Affairs :

(1)

O. P. BHASIN,
Under Secretary,

No. B.2302(43)/66.

April 1, 1966

Dear Mr. Lazaroff,

Please refer to your letter dated 23rd February, 1966, and our acknowledgement No. B.2302(43)/66, dated the 1st March, 1966, regarding assistance to the Institute of Historical Studies (Dr. S. P. Sen, Director), 21, Kenderdine Street, Calcutta.

We have no objection to the proposal contained in your above mentioned letter.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(O. P. Bhasin)

Mr. Louis Lazaroff,
Representative,
The Asia Foundation,
Post Box 149,
New Delhi.

(2)

O. P. BHASIN,
Under Secretary (ED).

No. B.230(24)/64

July 24, 1965

Dear Mr. Lazaroff,

Please refer to my letter No. B.230(24)/64, dated the 29th March, 1965 to Mr. James Greene, regarding Asia Foundation's proposal for additional grant of approximately Rs. 80,000/- to the Institute of Historical Studies, Calcutta.

2. We have no objection to your above proposal.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(O. P. Bhasin)

Mr. Louis Lazaroff,
Representative,
Asia Foundation,
Post Box No. 149,
New Delhi-1.

(3)

K. S. N. AIYER,
Under Secretary (ED).

No. B.230(24)/64

June 24, 1964

Dear Mr. Park,

Please refer to your letter of 19th June, 1964 proposing to grant an award of Rs. 24,000, as a supplementary grant to the Institute of Historical Studies, Calcutta. We have no objection to your proposal.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(K. S. N. Aiyer)

Mr. Richard L. Park,
Representative,
The Asia Foundation,
Post Box 149,
2, Hailey Road,
New Delhi.

(4)

K. S. N. AIYER,
Under Secretary

D.O. No. B/223(7)/62

Dated the 14th May, 1963

Dear Mr. Greene,

Kindly refer to your letter of the 9th May, 1963 regarding your proposed grant to the Institute of Historical Studies, Calcutta. We have no objection to your proposal.

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(K. S. N. Aiyer)

Mr. James Greene,
Assistant Representative,
The Asia Foundation,
2, Hailey Road,
New Delhi.

(B) Letters exchanged between the Ministry of Education and the Institute of Historical Studies in connection with the Asia Foundation Grants :

No. F.18-16/67-CAI(3)
Government of India
Ministry of Education

New Delhi, the 10th November, 1967

The Director,
Institute of Historical Studies,
21, Kenderdine Lane,
Calcutta-12.

Subject : *Grant-in-aid from Asia Foundation.*

Sir,

I am directed to request you to send to this Ministry the details of the grants received from the Asia Foundation up to date with the break up of the grant spent.

Yours faithfully,

Sd/-
(Mrs.) (S. Rao)
Assistant Education Adviser
to the
Government of India.

RS/9/11.

Gen/169/146

21st November, 1967

To
The Assistant Education Adviser,
Ministry of Education,
Government of India,
New Delhi.

Dear Madam,

With reference to your letter No. F-18-16/CAI(3), dated 10th November, '67 enquiring about details of grants received from the Asia Foundation up-to-date, I am enclosing copies of letters of grants from the Foundation, which will give you the amounts received and the items on which they are to be spent.

In this connection I should point out that all the details of the grants are available in your Ministry. Whenever the Asia Foundation sanctioned any grant to us, the Foundation officially sought the permission of the Ministry of External Affairs, which again referred the matter to the Ministry of Education. It was with the concurrence of the two Ministries, that the Foundation gave us grants from time to time. Regarding the break-up of the grant amount spent year by year, it is also available in the Annual Audit Reports of

the Institute, copies of which had been sent to the Ministry of Education, in connection with our application for grants from the Ministry. Anyway, we are sending copies of the Audit Reports up to 31st March, 1967. I am also enclosing a copy each of a Brochure on the Institute of Historical Studies and of the Annual Report for 1966-67.

Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(S. P. Sen)

Encl :

1. Letters of Grant from the Asia Foundation.
2. Audit Reports for 1963-64, 1964-65, 1965-66 and 1966-67.
3. Brochure on the Institute of Historical Studies.
4. Annual Report 1966-67.

ASIA FOUNDATION GRANTS

DICTIONARY OF NATIONALIST BIOGRAPHIES PROJECT

1963-64	Rs. 48, 246. 00	(Letter, dated June 3, 1963) (Ministry of External Affairs Approval Lett. B.233(7)/62—14th May 1963)
1964-65	Rs. 45, 644. 00 Rs. 23, 650. 00	(Letters, dated June 16 & 24, 1964) (Letter, dated July 15, 1964) (Ministry of External Affairs Approval Lett. B.230(24)/64 June, 1964)
1965-66	Rs. 45, 644. 00 Rs. 25, 000. 00	(Letter, dated June 21, 1965) (Letters, dated July 28 & August 4, '65) (Ministry of External Affairs Approval Lett. B.230(24)/64—July 24, 1965)
1966-67	Rs. 55, 000. 00	(Letter, dated February 7, 1966)
	<u>Rs. 2,43, 184. 00</u>	<u>(Ministry of External Affairs Approval Lett. B.2302(43)/66—April 1, 1966)</u>

(B) GENERAL SUPPORT GRANT.

1963-64	Rs. 13, 244. 00	(Letter, dated June 3, 1963)
1964-65	Rs. 13, 481. 00	(Letter, dated June 16 & 24, 1964)
1965-66	Rs. 13, 481. 00	(Letter, dated June 21, 1965)
1966-67	Rs. 9, 500. 00	(Letter, dated June 10, 1966) (Ministry of External Affairs Approval Lett. B.2302(43)/66 April 1, 1966)
1967-68	Rs. 9, 500. 00	(Letter, dated June 26, 1967)
	Rs. 59,206. 00	
1968-69	Rs. 9,500. 00	(Due in June 1968).

MOST IMMEDIATE
EXPRESS DELIVERY

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,
Sd.
(P. Gangulee)
Dep. Sec.

No. F.18-8/68-CAI(3)
Government of India
Ministry of Education

QUESTION FOR THE LOK SABHA
PROVISIONAL UNSTARRED

New Delhi, dated the 19th April, 1968

To
Shri S. P. Sen,
Director,
Institute of Historical Studies,
21, Kenderdine Lane,
Calcutta-12.

Subject : *Institute of Historical Studies,
Calcutta.*

Sir,

I am directed to send herewith a copy of the Parliament Question No. 21939 to be answered on 26th April, 1968, for the supply of necessary information.

This information may please be sent latest by 24th April, 1968.

D. No. "21939

Notice was received on the 6-4-68

Ministry of which the day
has been allotted HOME AFFAIRS

The question will be put
down for the sitting on the 26-4-68

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL
STUDIES

Shri K. ANIRUDHAN
Shri UMANATH
Shri C. K. CHAKRAPANI
Shri NAMBIAR

(a) name of the projects of the Indian Institute of Historical Studies financed by the Asia Foundation and amount of grant to each project : and

(b) number of foreigners employed in each project.

Gen/6/3.

24th April, 1968

To

The Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Education,
Government of India,
New Delhi.

Subject : *Parliamentary question regarding
Institute of Historical Studies.*

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. F.18-8/68-CAI(3), dated 19th April, I am giving below the particulars wanted :

(a) Projects for which the Institute of Historical Studies had received financial assistance from the Asia Foundation :

(i) Dictionary of Biographies of Indian Nationalist Leaders from the early years of the 19th century to 1947. Total received for the period of Grant, 1963-1967, . . . Rs. 2,43,134.00.

(ii) General Support Grant for academic meetings, and seminars and for purchase of historical journals for the Institute's library.

Total received for the period of Grant, 1963-1967, . . . Rs. 59,206.00.

All the Grants had the prior approval of the Government of India, vide Ministry of External Affairs letters :

No. B-233 (7)/62 dated 14th May, 1963.

No. B-230 (24)/64 dated 24th June, 1964.

No. B-230 (24)/64 dated 24th July, 1965.

No. B-2302(43)/66 dated 1st April, 1966.

On no occasion did we receive any Grant from the Asia Foundation without the prior sanction of the Ministry of External Affairs. Since we have been also receiving Grants from the Ministry of Education from the Financial Year 1965-66, we have been regularly sending Audit Reports and Annual Reports on our Project to the Ministry of Education.

(b) Number of Foreigners employed in each Project.

Not a single foreigner is employed in any Project of the Institute of Historical Studies.

In conclusion, I have to draw your attention to the fact that in reply to your Ministry's letter No. F-18-16, CAI(3), dated 10th November, 1967 enquiring about details of Grants received from the Asia Foundation up-to-date I had sent a full statement, with copies of correspondence with the Asia Foundation regarding Grants, along with my letter No. General/169/140, dated 21st November, 1967. Since all the details about Grants received from the Asia Foundation and Annual Reports and Audit Reports of the Institute are already with the Ministry of Education, I shall appreciate if the Ministry spares us from further enquiries on the same subject. The witch-hunting about C.I.A. connection may continue for a number of years. But we have no further information to furnish. Our position is clear. We received financial assistance from the Asia Foundation in perfect good faith, being assured of the bonafide of the Asia Foundation by the prior approval of the Ministry of External Affairs in each case. How on earth could we know of the CIA connection with the Asia Foundation, when the Government of India itself did not know it? If now the CIA connection has been unearthed, the Government of India must face the music. No responsibility can be thrown on us at this stage.

Yours faithfully,

Sd/-

(S. P. Sen),

Gen/0/4.

24th April, 1968

Dear Dr. Sen,

I am enclosing a copy of a letter to the Ministry of Education in reply to an enquiry about Asia Foundation's Grant to the Institute in connection with a Parliamentary Question. In the last paragraph of my letter I have used very strong language. I hope you will kindly appreciate my feelings and will not misunderstand. We had accepted Asia Foundation's Grant in perfect good faith, and you know that no grant can be actually made by the Foundation without a "no objection" certificate from the Government of India. We had supplied detailed information to the Ministry in November, 1967, in connection with the Asia Foundation Grant. Our record is clear. There is no foreigner employed in our Institute, nor did the Asia Foundation ever try to influence our policy in any way. With a strong Board consisting of men like Mahamahopadhyaya D. V. Potdar, Professor Nirmal Kumar Bose, Professor Bisheshwar Prasad, Vice-Chancellor K. K. Datta, Professor K. K. Pillay and others, there cannot be any question of being influenced even in an indirect way by any external agency.

I am writing this letter to you with a request that when the matter comes up in Parliament, kindly defend the Institute as best as you can against the senseless witch-hunting that is going on. The thing is, when calumnious charges are baselessly levelled against small academic institutions like ours, they have the effect of lowering the institutions in the public esteem. This is particularly painful for us when we have been carrying on a Project of the greatest national importance, *Dictionary of National Biography*, and are now almost at the point of successful completion in spite of acute financial difficulties. It is very depressing that while the entire nation should have thanked us for our noble task, we have been receiving only brickbats. I do hope that you at least, as Education Minister, will stand by our side

and vindicate the honour and prestige of our Institute.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Sd/-

(S. P. Sen)

Dr. T. Sen,
Minister of Education,
Government of India,
New Delhi.

IMMEDIATE D.O. No. F.32-3/62-CAI(3)

Dr. A. M. D'Rozario,
M.Sc. Ph.D. (Cantab.),
Joint Secretary.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION,
INDIA,

New Delhi,
16th May, 1968

Dear Dr. Sen,

Kindly refer to your letter No. Gen/0/4, dated the 24th April, 1968, regarding the project-wise grants received by the Institute of Historical Studies, Calcutta, from the Asia Foundation. The Education Minister has seen your letter.

2. I have gone through the papers and find that the information was asked in order to prepare a reply to a question to be answered in the Parliament by a sister Ministry. As the information was to be supplied in the Parliament it became necessary to ask for the same from you.

3. I can assure you that the Ministry will not needlessly trouble you.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Sd/-

(A. M. D'Rozario)

Dr. S. P. Sen,
Institute of Historical Studies,
21, Kenderdine Lane,
Calcutta-12

INDIANS IN THE WEST INDIES

DR. J. C. JHA

(*University of the West Indies*
St. Augustine, Trinidad, W.I.)

After the emancipation of slaves within the British empire in 1833, the largest and perhaps the most significant state-controlled immigration of indentured labourers to work in the sugar and cocoa plantations of the West Indies was from India. This was a time when the freed negroes were not willing to work in the estates of the West Indies and the Indian labourers were proving very useful in Mauritius. Naturally, therefore, John Gladstone, father of the liberal politician W. E. Gladstone of England, with the permission and goodwill of J. C. Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control of the English East India Company, Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Governor-General of India, Auckland, indentured privately for the same type of hard-working Indians to work on his two estates in British Guiana as also on those of a few other planters.¹ On 5 May 1838 the boat *Whitby* brought 249 Indians to Guyana (then known as British Guiana) after a voyage of 112 days from Calcutta and the following morning came 165 on the *Hesperus*.

Between 1839 and 1844 and again in 1848-50 Indian immigration to the West Indies was suspended because of the opposition of the anti-slavery societies of England and of the Calcutta press, but the flow of immigrants increased due to the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the recurrent famines and epidemics in North India in the second half of the nineteenth century. The indentured Indian immigration was finally ended in 1917 by the Government of India as a result of the resentment

of the Indian nationalist leaders.

In all more than 416,000 Indians came to the West Indies. British Guiana received 240,000; the annual average between 1864 and 1873 was 3,692, rising between 1873 and 1883 to 5,414 and between 1882 and 1891 to 4,084.² Trinidad received about 143,000. On 30 May 1845 came 237 on *Fatel Rozack* and the last boat S.S. *Ganges* brought 247 males, 115 females, 12 boys, 10 girls and 10 infants on 22 April 1917. The number of Indians introduced till 30 May 1848 was 5,162, but between 1851 and 1891 came 88,501.³ Jamaica, even though bigger in size than Trinidad, was less dependent on sugar and therefore only 36,584 Indians came there. Many of them perished, only 13,821 surviving by 1908.⁴

The smaller Windward islands also received Indian labourers: Grenada got about 3,792 between 1856 and 1885; St. Lucia 4,427 from 1858 to 1893; St. Vincent 2,507 from 1861 to 1880⁵; St. Kitts received only 300. According to the Census of 1901 there were 2,523 Indians in St. Lucia and 2,262 in Grenada. In later years many of them fled to the neighbouring countries.

The French and the Dutch Governments were also allowed by the British Government to bring Indian emigrants to their colonies in the Caribbean. To Surinam (Dutch Guiana) 34,304 Indians emigrated between 1873 and 1916. The French islands of Martinique and

Guadeloupe also got their quota of Indian labourers.

In the early years most of the Indian immigrants in Guyana and Trinidad who survived the rigours of climate and hard work, returned after an industrial residence of five years. The idea of colonial emigration evolved by Europeans was alien to the Indian mind, for the Indians always wanted to live according to their own style of comfort and values, without any interference with their customs and habits. They got a higher wage than that prevalent in India besides their passage to and from India; clothing, food and medicine were taken care of by the planters. Up to 1891 about 11,885 went back to India from Trinidad and between 1870 and 1890 only 1.98 per cent of Indians in Guyana returned. From 1854, however, only ten years' industrial residence could entitle them to a free return passage. The Indian immigrants began to settle in large numbers in view of new inducements like bonus or bounties and from around 1870 crown lands. The emigration agents of the West Indians in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay depots would look after the welfare of Indian recruits there and in the West Indies the Protector of Immigrants would see that they got their due.

The thrift of the Indians was proverbial: they would live a very simple life, save as much as they could and buy ornaments and land. Many started their own groceries. One Moolchan was indentured on the St. Madeline estate in Trinidad in 1853 and in 1873 he died a respectable merchant,⁶ leaving a property worth \$60,000. According to the *Sanderson Report* of 1910 the Crown lands sold to the Indians between 1885 and 1908-9 amounted to 69,087 acres.⁷ In Guyana the value of landed property owned by Indians in 1911-12 was \$972,761. Besides, they owned 13,384 heads of cattle and 3,022 heads of sheep and goat.⁸ In Surinam 3,068 Indians acquired 200,000 acres of land between 1903 and 1911, six out of every ten acres being bought by them.

It is in Guyana, Trinidad and Surinam that the Indians, generally called East Indians to distinguish them from the aboriginals (Amerindians) and West Indians (Negroes, Creoles, etc.), have been able to maintain their cultural identity, primarily because of their number: in Guyana they are more than half of the total population of three-quarters of a million and in Trinidad and Surinam they are slightly less than half. No doubt from time to time they have been exposed to new influences, even so much of the culture they brought from India has persisted.

A vast majority of the Indian immigrants in these countries was from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in North India—especially from the regions of Agra, Oudh and Bhojpur. In Trinidad up to 1870, 41.7 per cent came from the former two areas, and 29.3 per cent from Bihar.⁹ Those who came from the eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh—Azamgarh, Ballia, Gorakhpur, Banaras, Mirzapur, Gonda and Jaunpur—and those who came from Saran, Champaran and Shahabad districts of Bihar, brought the Bhojpuri language. Those from the western districts of Uttar Pradesh (*Pachhah*) Agra, Mathura, Aligarh, Bareilly, and Farrukhabad brought Awadhi, Vrajbhasha and other variations of Hindi, Magahi (Magadhi) of Patna and Gaya districts of Bihar, Maithili of North Bihar, and Hindi of Meerut area also came. A sprinkling of tribal languages of Chota-Nagpur in Bihar, Panjabi and Nepali could also be seen. From the South came Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam.

Today the old Indians of the indenture days and some of the second generation, even Tamilians and tribal people, speak the old form of Hindi. 'Seeta-Ram! Kaisan haal?' ('Good morning, how are you?') is the most popular form of greeting. The young people, generally of the third or fourth generation, have taken to English, but some of them now learn Hindi in the Hindu or Vedic schools and other institutions like Bharatiya Vidya Samsthan.

Indians in the West Indies have 'successfully rebuilt in exact and revealing terms the key institutions' of India, 'its ancestral but over-reaching social order'. Once they were free from their contract and acquired land the Indian village settlements—miniature Indian villages—came up with the *panchayat* system, the joint family system, kinship (*gotra*, *caste*, etc.), beliefs and practices, religious ceremonies, festivals, music and dance.

Indian place names like Calcutta Settlement, Madras Settlement, Patna Village, Fyzabad, Barrackpore, as well as street names like Agra, Ayodhya, Hyderabad, Nepaul, Ganges, Bengal, Mathura, Benares, Delhi, Bombay, Baroda, Cawnpore, Lucknow, etc., can be seen in several areas in Trinidad. In Guyana a village is called Rampur. Names of persons connected with Hindu gods and goddesses are very common among the Indians in the West Indies. Male names like Ramoutai (Rama-avata), Ramasharan, Ramaprasad (Rampersad), Ramkissoon (Ramakrishna) and female names like Sita, Parvati, Lachhamin (Lakshmi) are very common. Even typical Bihari or Uttar Pradeshi names like Katwaroo, Samaroo, Mangaloo, Buddhu (Boodoo), Bikhoo, Kangaloo, Jangaloo, Mootoo, Madhu (Madoo), Haridwar (Hardwar), Ramalagna (Ramlogan), Mooneelal, etc., can be seen in plenty.

In the late nineteenth century the Muharram procession of Taziya (Husain or Hose) and the Madrasi festival of firewalking used to be very popular in Trinidad and Guyana.¹⁰ Now the Hindus who form the vast majority in the Indian community in Guyana, Trinidad and Surinam celebrate Divali^{10a} and Phagwa (Holi)^{10b} in a big way.

The Diwali day is now a national holiday. In the evening thousands of wicks and coloured bulbs are lighted and the elaborate *pūja* (worship) of Lakshmi, the Goddess of Wealth, is done in the Hindu homes. I have had occasion to lecture to vast gatherings on Diwali and Holi days. In Guyana the occasion of

Phagwa is a national holiday. In the Aranguez Savannah of San Juan (Trinidad) twenty to thirty thousand Indian revellers assemble with coloured water in syringes, *abir* (coloured powder) and sometimes ordinary talcum powder. The National Phagwa Festival Council of Trinidad and Tobago organizes competitions in which *chowtal* singing groups or music bands, singing *jhumar*, *kabir*, etc., dancing, jumping and merry-making with complete abandon, take part. In the past, even Dhanimar, Dhruvad and Raga Basant were sung. *Chowtal* singing contests for bands (*Goles*) are now held both for North and South. Special brochures on the significance of this national festival are issued and the television, radio and newspapers carry special features. Sometimes *chowtal* parties from Surinam and Guyana also come to Trinidad to take part in the music and dance contests. The Taziya and Holi processions have in fact become the Muslim and Hindu carnivals in which other communities also participate. Besides the *Hori* (holi) songs the *birahas* have been very popular among Indians because they resemble the local calypso.¹¹ Some of the *birahas* in Surinam are sung to the accompaniment of *dholak*. The *rasiya* (ballads from West Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, etc.) are now no longer popular in Trinidad, but in Surinam these love and romantic songs are widely sung.¹² Indeed, Indian musical tradition has influenced the steelband music in the West Indies. There are more than a hundred registered Indian orchestras in Trinidad alone. The Hum Hindustani Orchestra is led by a person of African descent, Paul Ali. The *Tassa*, *Nagara*, dhap, Hurka and *dhol* have influenced the drumming among non-Indians also. Among the Hindu ritual songs may be mentioned *sohar* sung at the time of *chhathi*, celebrated on the sixth day after the birth of a child, and *barahi* on the twelfth day. Almost all wedding songs describe the marriage of Rama and Sita or Krishna and Rukmini. The songs from Tulsidas's *Ramayana*, Sur Das's *Sur Sagar*, Kabir's poems (*sakhis*), Mirabai's poems and *Hanuman Chalisa* are very commonly sung as *bhajan* to

the accompaniment of *dholak*, *majra*, harmonium, *dandatal* and *kartal*. In some areas *sarangi*, *tanpura* and *khajri* are also used. Of late the *bhajans* in modern Hindi (*Khari boli*) from Hindi films and the long-playing records of Manna Dey, Mukesh and Lata Mangeshkar have become very popular.

Indian classical music has touched only the periphery of the Indian communities in the West Indies. The famous dancer Vyjayanti-mala was booed when she refused to do a 'buddha nil gaya' item from the film *Sangam* and did an item of Bharat Natyam instead in the Naparima Bowl in San Fernando in South Trinidad in early 1970. However, *thumri*, *ghazal* and songs from Hindi films are very popular on the radio and television and in social gatherings and there are local Rafi, Mukhesh and Lata.

The epics and ballads of Alha and Udal (Rudal) and of Gopichand (Gopichan) are no longer very common, nor are the shows like Ramaleela, Krishnaleela, Harishchandra sabha and Indra sabha, because of the influx of Hindi religious movies, but at several places during the *Dashahara* festival scenes from the Ramayana are enacted and on the occasion of the birthday of Krishna (*Krishnastami*) Krishnaleela is also done.

In Trinidad the first Hindu temple was built around 1860¹³ and in Guyana there were two around 1870. In 1890 there were twenty-nine Muslim mosques and thirty-three Hindu temples in Guyana and in 1917 forty-three temples and forty-six mosques.¹⁴ Today hundreds of temples and mosques serve as religious, educational and cultural centres in the West Indies. A few churches, specially of the Canadian Presbyterian Church in Trinidad and Guyana are mainly visited by the Indians. Among the temples in Trinidad, the St. James Krishna Temple, the Shiva Temple on the Eastern Main Road, Tunapuna,¹⁵ and the one on Green Street, Tunapuna, are well-known. There are a few Hanuman temples also. The

St. Joseph mosque is one of the finest structures.

The *Sanatan dharma*, the *Arya Samaj*, the *Kabirpanth* and *Shivanarayan panth* are some of the important sects among the Hindus. Many Sanatanis and the *Aryas* believe in the sixteen *samskaras* (sacraments) but practise a few like the ceremonies connected with child-birth, *Janeu* (sacred thread), *Mundan* (hair-cutting), *Shadi* (marriage) and *Shraddha* (funeral and the ceremonies on the tenth, eleventh and thirteenth day after the death of a relative). A few families observe fast on the occasions of Shivaratri, Krishnastami, Ramanavami and *Ekadashi*. Some of the priests, popularly called *pandits*, know the Hindu scriptures like the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Puranas, the epics, etc. And the most popular *Yajna* is the reading of the *Bhagavat Purana* and the *Ramacharita Manasa* of Tulsidas when a thousand devotees assemble every evening. The *Satya Narain Katha*, the Hanuman (Mahabli) *Rota* (offering) and the worship of Surya (Sun God) are also popular among Sanatanis and special coloured triangular *jhandis* (flags) are hung in front of their homes and temples in honour of these gods. Recently some Yoga (meditation) organisations have also been formed.¹⁶

Among the Indian items of food, *roti*, *sohari* (soft *roti*), *bhaji*, and vegetables like *baigan*, *jhingi*, *karaili*, *lauki*, *murai*, and spices like *jeera*, *hardi* (turmeric), etc., are known to many non-Indians also. Among the Indian sweet dishes, *dahi*, *khir* (rice pudding) and sometimes even *laddu* and *jilebi*, are served and *Mohanbhoga* (made of flour, *ghee* and sugar) is offered as *prasad* in a *puja*.

The caste system was maintained to some extent in the past. Even today the social stratification based on caste, colour or creed is maintained to some extent: a Brahman—Tiwari or a Dubey or a Pandey—and Kshatriya (Rajput) usually Singh, asserts his superiority. The most common surname for a Brahmin is

Maharaj or Maraj. Some *sadhus* wear *dhoti*, *kurta* or *mirjai* and *pagari* (turban). On the occasion of Hindu wedding the groom wears *Jora-jama* and the bride *sari*, *choli*, etc. Older Hindu ladies wear the *orhani* (head scarf) whenever they go out.

Since about 80 per cent of the Indians came to the West Indies from the rural areas of North India where the rate of English education was negligible and the parents preferred their children to help them in agricultural pursuits, for several decades the Indians in these parts remained pure agriculturists. The Government and the planters also took little interest in their education in the early period.¹⁷ Gradually, however, the Christian missionaries started persuading the Indian children to go to the schools and the Susamachar Church was dedicated to the service of Indians in Trinidad on 7 July 1872.¹⁸ By the end of the nineteenth century some Indian Christians began to participate in the national life. Many still stayed away from educational institutions because they feared conversion to Christianity. Even as late as 1939 A.D. Tyson found a high percentage of illiteracy among the Indians in Trinidad, though he found 'a considerable number of highly educated and successful professionals and businessmen' among them. In recent years the Hindu and Muslim schools have accelerated the pace of literacy and now there are many important Indian doctors, lawyers and teachers. According to the Census of 1964, however, four-fifths of the Indians in Trinidad live in rural areas and the Indian community in the West Indies is even now by and large an agricultural community in the West Indies.

Among the leading lights of the Indian community of Guyana, Dr. Cheddi Jagan (his parents came from Basti district in Uttar Pradesh), leader of the opposition in the Parliament of Guyana, Dr. Balbant Singh, Senior Government Bacteriologist and General Secretary of the Gandhi Youth Organization, Mr.

R. B. Gajraj, C.B.E., one-time Speaker of the Guyana Parliament, Mr. Shridath Ramphal, Attorney-General and Minister of State, Mr. C. R. Singh, Knight of the Order of Orange Nassau, and among the leading families the Luckhoo, Jung Bahadur Singh, Kawal and Persad families may be mentioned. The Speaker of the Parliament, Shesh Narin, belongs to the Sanatan Dharma (Hindu) Mahasabha. In Surinam also there are a few Indians serving as Ministers of the Government like Dr. Adhein. Mr. Radha Krishna and Dr. R. P. Pandey are leading public figures. The Shantidol is one of the main cultural organizations of Surinam.

In Trinidad and Tobago organizations like the East Indian National Congress were organized very early and F. E. M. Hosein and Mr. Sharan Teelak Singh were Indian leaders in the second and third decades of the twentieth century and of the 1950's and 1960's Dr. Rudranath Capildeo, a mathematician, and Bhadase Sagen Maraj who died recently may be mentioned. Now, Messrs. Kamaluddin Mohammed and Errol Mahabir are Cabinet Ministers of the Government. Mr. Shimboonath Capildeo, a solicitor, and Mr. Rampersad Bhoolai, Mr. Jang Bahadoorsingh and Dr. D. O. Maharajh are the leaders of the Sanatan Dharma Mahasabha, Mr. L. Shiva Prasad, Barrister-at-Law and Deputy Mayor of Port-of-Spain, is the head of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and Shri Teelakdhari of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. Pandit Shri Jankie Persad Sharma, originally from Mathura area of Uttar Pradesh, and now Dharmacharya, and the famous novelist Vidia Naipaul were awarded the Humming-Bird gold medal by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in 1970. Mr. Hans Hanoomansingh, former M.P. and Chairman of the National Council of Indian Music and Drama, and Mr. Shani Mohammed, now a Government Minister, have done a good deal for the propagation of Indian culture on radio and television.

Even in the islands where the Indians now

form a small minority, they have retained a few aspects of their culture. For example, in Jamaica they continue to be rice-growers and the strong ties between the parents and the children are retained.¹⁹ In the French island of Guadeloupe the South Indian worship of a mother Goddess, similar to the Kali worship of North India is retained. About Martinique the following account of 1967 seems interesting : "Only the East Indians, descendants of the 10,000 who remained after the termination of (the) second attempt at indenture in 1887, constitute a self-consciously distinct element in the population. By face, occasionally by language, but primarily by endogamy and reli-

gion, the East Indians, or *coolies* as they continue to be called, maintain their separation. Concentrated in the north of the island, they still work in the sugar fields abandoned by the Negroes. Although individual East Indians have entered commerce and the professions, as a group they occupy the lowest economic level in the country. Their main distinction is their continued devotion to the worship of village deities, a persistence of the rural South Indian form of Hinduism practised by their low-caste ancestors. Both in Martinique and in Guadeloupe they have built temples and propitiate their deities by shamanistic possession and animal sacrifice".²⁰

REFERENCES

1. D. Nath, *A History of Indians in Guyana*, London, 1970, 2nd. edn., p. 8. Also I. M. Cumpston, *Indians Overseas in British Territories*, O.U.P., London, 1953, pp. 16-17. Acts V and XXII of 1837 were passed by the Government of India to legalise recruitment.
2. D. W. D. Comins, *Note on Emigration from India to British Guiana*, Calcutta, 1893, para. 18.
3. D. W. D. Comins, *Note on Emigration from India to Trinidad*, Calcutta, 1893, p. 24. Also Papers relating to the West India Colonies and Mauritius, 1859, p. 311 : Between 1845 and 1857, 11,458 Indians came.
4. *Sanderson Committee Report*, London, 1910, p. 74.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
6. J. H. Collens, *A Guide to Trinidad*, 2nd edition, London, 1888, p. 239.
7. Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
8. E. Williams, *History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago*, London, 1964, p. 120.
9. Report of Geoghegan, quoted in Donald Wood, *Trinidad in Transition*, London, 1968, p. 146.
10. D. W. D. Comins, *Note on Emigration from India to Trinidad*, p. 27. *Port of Spain Gazette*, 24 Sept. 1897. *Sanderson Committee Report*, p. 77, notes that in the early twentieth century the indentured Indians in Jamaica were 'allowed two days' leave for the great celebration of the Taziyah (Muharram festival). For Trinidad see Collens, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-237. See *Port of Spain Gazette*, 6 Aug. 1897 : here the Munsah festival is also mentioned.
- 10a. For the details of this festival in North India in the late nineteenth century see W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, second edition, 1896 (reprint, Delhi, 1968), pp. 295-297.
- 10b. *Ibid.*, pp. 313-326.
11. U. Arya, *Ritual Songs and Folksongs of the Hindus of Surinam*, Leiden, 1968, pp. 9, 11, 28-32.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 158.
13. Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
14. Peter Ruhomon, *Centenary History of the East Indians in British Guiana, 1838-1938*, Georgetown, 194, p. 25 : By 1938 the number of mosques rose to 50.
15. In 1895 and 1898 this temple was decorated and illuminated on the occasion of Diwali : *Port-of-Spain Gazette*, 27 Oct. 1897.
16. For Guyana Hindu see Ruhomon, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-260. Some of the facts on Trinidad and Guyana are based on the author's personal observation. See Morton Klass, *East Indians in Trinidad, a Study of Cultural Persistence*, pp. 137-169 and Arthur & Juanita Niehoff, *East Indians in the West Indies*, pp. 115-118. Also U. Arya, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
17. The Ordinance for promoting the education and industrial training of the children of Immigrants of Trinidad passed in 1856 was a tame effort : See Shirley C. Gordon, *A Century of West Indian Education*, pp. 50, 68-70, 81, 109, 122-5, 134, 265.
18. K. J. Grant, *My Missionary Memories*, Halifax,

1923, 96 ff. Babu Lal Behari (1850-1915), who hailed from Dumraon in Bihar (India), did a pioneering work in the field of education. Printing in the Hindi language was done by the Canadian Presbyterian Mission Press at Tunapuna : *ibid.*, p. 145. In Surinam by 1915 (J. McNeill and Chimman Lal, *Report to the Government of India on the conditions of*

Indian Immigrants in Four British Colonies and Surinam, Part II, p. 174) more than half of the boys of school-going age attended schools and Hindustani was taught to them.

19. Edith Clarke, *My Mother Who Fathered Me*, London, 1957, p. 186.

20. Michael M. Horowitz, *Morne-Paysan Peasant Village in Martinique*, New York, 1967, p. 13.

INFLUENCE OF METHODISM ON THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS, 1740-1819

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Introduction

This paper attempts a brief study of the impact of the Methodist movement on the industrial working-class people of England in the second half of the eighteenth century through the second decade of the nineteenth.¹ Beginning in about 1740 Methodism spread in England through the era of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. These years witnessed great social and political unrest. These years also saw the growth of working-class consciousness in England. The study of the impact of Methodism on the working class during these years becomes especially meaningful in the context of the verdict Methodism has received from historians. One distinguished historian has seen in the Methodist movement the basis of Britain's political and social stability in the nineteenth century.² Another has found the Methodist revival an opiate to the working-class people whose social and political aspirations were dampened by the excessive dose of Methodist spirituality.³ Still another, in recent years, has viewed Methodism not only as "a politically regressive ... influence", but also as "the Chiliasm of the defeated and the hopeless."⁴ Such a movement, according to this writer, attracted the working class between 1790 and 1830, because they sought in Methodism a compensation for the disappointment of their political hopes. Thus, according to him, the peak period of Methodist expansion coincided with the period when the forces of counter-revolution were on the ascendant.

Eric⁵ Hobsbawm challenged the Halevy thesis by arguing that the official Wesleyan conservatism has been exaggerated. Even within its own ranks Wesleyanism lost ground to politically radical Primitive Methodists. In fact, records show that "Methodism advanced when Radicalism advanced."⁶ Moreover, the Wesleyan connexion was not politically effective. It is unlikely that even a politically influential Wesleyanism could have prevented a revolution had the revolutionary conditions existed in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Hobsbawm's study views Methodism as having a minimal role in the working class agitation and violence in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century.⁶ E. P. Thompson has found Methodism not only a movement of despair, but also a phenomenon having "almost diabolical" effects on the working-class psyche.⁷ According to him, "most of the 'contributions' of Methodism to the working-class movement came in spite of and not because of the Wesleyan Conference."⁸ In general, both Hobsbawm and Thompson have dismissed Methodism's role in the working-class movements as purely incidental, while the latter's study even gives the impression of a moral reprobation of the Methodists for failing to turn the workers into political rebels. One relied excessively on statistics, the other, for reasons not clear to this writer, on Freudian psychology, in their analysis of the impact of Methodism on the working class. Unfortunately both these studies seem to have

based their conclusions either on inadequate evidence or on misleading interpretations of Methodism's impact on the working class.

This paper maintains that a proper understanding of the Methodist secular and theological ideals is necessary for an assessment of Methodism's impact on the working class. This essay thus attempts an analysis chiefly of the secular ideals of Methodism and their impact on the people, while the Methodist religious ideals are very briefly discussed. As the analysis unfolds, it will be seen that Methodism played a dual role in the English society. On the one hand, it served as a stabilizing influence by encouraging a spirit of charity, fortitude of mind, temperance of character, and submissiveness to authority. The Methodists' strict disciplinarian attitude appalled contemporaries such as William Blake, Robert Southey and William Hazlitt, and led some historians to speak of some kind of a "religious terrorism".⁹ On the other hand, "a very real service was rendered to the factory worker by a religion which supplied nearly all that the industrial system, the State, and the Church denied him."¹⁰ He was given a share in the management of the religious society and an opportunity to enter into a fellowship at the chapel, where perhaps for the first time in life, he experienced some kind of a social life. Methodism taught self-reliance to common people and gave them discipline and confidence. Disciplined and confident people make effective revolutionaries. This was the double social role of Methodism which, from the turbulent decade of the 1790s right through the period of Chartism, and down to the late Victorian era worked as a stabilizing influence, and yet, along with the force of political radicalism, supplied "the moral fervour that nevertheless goaded men to violence through frustration."¹¹

The working class of the eighteenth century consisted of three main groups—skilled artisans (who followed a recognized trade after a regular period of apprenticeship), less skilled

craftsmen (sometimes apprenticed workers, but regarded as possessing only a lower degree of skill), and labourers (miners, metal workers other than highly skilled mechanics, transport workers, and a large body of workers outside the recognized skilled trades).¹² According to the estimate of Patrick Colquhoun, published in 1814, the working classes, although comprising almost three-fourths of the population, "received less than one-third of the national income."¹³ They occupied the lowest position in the social hierarchy. The only effectually organized class in the community comprised those in possession of property and authority. The policy of the government was identified with the interests of those in power.

The eighteenth-century English society was a stratified one. Henry Fielding portrayed a kind of class-consciousness of the poorer segment of the society. He wrote: "By the poor... I mean that large and venerable body which in English we call mob... it is one of their established maxims to plunder and pillage their rich neighbours without any reluctance... in every parish almost in the kingdom there is a kind of confederacy ever carrying on against a certain person of opulence, called the squire, whose prosperity is considered as free booty by all his poor neighbours."¹⁴ However, this description of the poor, jealous of their richer neighbours, must not be the basis of a definition of their class consciousness. In fact, there existed a great deal of diversity among the ranks of the working class. The failure on the part of the authorities to recognize this diversity led Francis Place to complain later in the eighteenth century that "if the character and conduct of the working-people are to be taken from reviews, magazines, pamphlets, newspapers, reports of the two Houses of Parliament and the Factory Commissioners, we shall find them all jumbled together as the 'lower orders', the most skilled and the most prudent workmen, with the most ignorant and impoverished labourers and paupers, though

the difference is great indeed, and indeed in many cases will scarce admit of comparison.”¹⁵ It seems clear that the so-called lower orders did not constitute a cohesive group of workers having a clearly defined group identity. A fully fledged working-class consciousness, that is, the consciousness of an identity of interests between all the diverse groups of working people against the interests of other classes, did not develop till after the French Revolution.

Thus, before the 1790s, the working classes, loosely described as the lower orders, did not develop conflict groups in society and, hence, the various conflict situations, developing in the sporadic outbreaks of violence before the 1790s, did not assume the proportion of an intense conflict.¹⁶ In the language of one recent writer on violence in English society, the agitations before the 1790s were “reactionary-economic”, or “reactionary-religious”, or “reactionary-political”, which were, in general, “a resort to illegality to recover rights and privileges that were once enjoyed by a group and are now no longer enjoyed because they have been ‘stolen’.”¹⁷

But, by the end of the eighteenth century, one notices a change in the character of working-class agitations. Between 1790 and 1830 the growing working-class consciousness was “influencing, shaping, and finally dominating the simple economically motivated protests of earlier times.”¹⁸ The widespread unrest during this period became intense, impassioned, forward-looking, optimistic, and organized. As the nineteenth century began, its first two decades witnessed at least two intense conflict situations in the Luddite uprising of 1811-13 and in the massacre of Peterloo in 1819. The working class rebels show a marked difference of attitude and behaviour in 1819 from the 1740s. The point will be made clear if we compare two situations. In April 1740 a four days’ riot broke out near Dewsbury and several neighbouring villages as a mob sought to stop a load of meal and flour going into Lancashire. Having failed to achieve their end they damaged

several flour mills at Dewsbury and at Thornhill, assaulted the High Sheriff, and tried to hang and skin a millowner of Wakefield. This was a simple reactionary riot characteristic of the riots of pre-industrial England “when the object of most rioters was simply to preserve their own standards of living and to take vengeance against an ... individual oppressor.”¹⁹ The Dewsbury riot may be compared with the gigantic working-class demonstration of 16 August 1819 in Manchester. The leaders of this meeting were prepared to prove that working men could assemble for a non-violent demonstration. As Samuel Bamford reminded the six thousand demonstrators before they began their march, “they were going to attend the most important meeting that had ever been held for Parliamentary Reform ... marked by a steadiness and seriousness befitting the occasion ... such as would cast shame upon their enemies, who had always represented the reformers as a mob-like rabble.”²⁰ Bamford’s “address was received with cheers, it was heartily and unanimously assented to”, and thus six thousand demonstrators of Middleton, with strict discipline, a leader to every hundred men, singing popular songs, accompanied with musical bands, dance, but “with intent seriousness”, slowly marched toward Manchester. The transition from a nihilistic rabble to organized and serious political demonstrators cannot be explained without an understanding of the influences of the French Revolution and of Methodism. It is difficult to compare the relative strength of the influences of Radicalism and Methodism on the minds of the working class. At least this is not the focus of this essay. Suffice it to say, the Methodist movement, by inculcating the virtue of self-reliance and by instilling a sense of confidence among the workers, sensitized their minds to the possibility of a better life. At least some, if not many, workers received a training in leadership. Thus Radical ideas fell on a fertile ground. Thompson acknowledges that “the Methodist political rebel carried through into his radical or revolutionary activity a

profound moral earnestness, a sense of righteousness and . . . a 'Methodist' capacity for sustained organisational dedication and (at its best) a high degree of personal responsibility." ²¹ This is seen, Thompson goes on, in the self-discipline of the demonstrators of 1819.

II

Although E. R. Taylor concludes that no "coherent, comprehensive system of politics or political reform" ²² can be found in the pages of the *Works of John Wesley*, it will be difficult, indeed misleading, to suppose that Methodism was either *apolitically quiescent*, or, at best, slavishly attached to political conservatism. In fact, Methodism did propagate certain political ideas, though these ideas were formulated in moral terms. John Wesley rejected the radicals' theory of consent as unhistorical, immoral, and impractical. The theory was unhistorical because it never existed in reality. ²³ It was immoral because its source was located in the unmoralized will of the individuals who sought to sanctify the principle of self-interest. ²⁴ It was impractical because it called for a politically educated public. A proper political education required "not only a good understanding but more time than common tradesmen can spare, and better information than they can possibly procure." The realization of this difficulty perhaps prompted Wesley's remark: "I am no politician; politics lie quite out of my province." ²⁵ But this statement should not be literally translated to imply the Methodists' apolitical quiescence, for they clearly suggested that if the government failed to protect the civil liberty of the subjects, the latter had the right to "lament" or to "bear testimony" against a delinquent government. ²⁶

The Methodists denied the existence of personal right to franchise both on theological grounds and on the basis of experienced facts.

"Government", Wesley declared, "is a trust . . . but not from the people It is a delegation, namely, from God." ²⁷ In reality the government was not based on the consent of "all the members of a state", or "every free agent", or "every one that has a will of his own." ²⁸ Hence, it was undeniable that some degree of passive consent or obedience was the prerequisite of the stability of any organized community. The citizens were morally obliged to support the processes of the divinely ordained government. Personal right to franchise was also denied on the basis of personal experience of the Methodists. Painfully aware of the clumsy, passionate, frivolous "bawling mob", the Methodists objected to popular participation in government which would unhinge the foundations of a society created for human welfare. Nevertheless, the Methodists were convinced that the government failed to promote the welfare of the community. Wesley observed that the ruling classes were embroiled with each other for their own interests. "Such a feeling", Wellman Warner comments, "harmonized with the experience of the unenfranchised and the unpropertied in a political order in which the possession of property did, in fact, enable those who governed to identify the policy of the State with their own interests." ²⁹

To Wesley possession of civil liberty was not synonymous with possession of franchise. To him liberty connoted an inalienable right which man derived from nature. This concept of liberty was more clearly articulated in George Cubbitt's assertion that "all have equally a right to that liberty by which man may do all that really conduced to his well-being." ³⁰

The defined function of the government being the protection of civil liberty, orderliness became the *sine qua non* of social organization. Order did not imply the preservation of social status or the inequality of classes. Orderliness meant a "virtue of personal conduct, not a description of a kind of social structure." ³¹

III

The Wesleyans did not totally deny the individual's initiative. Barring the realm of politics, individual initiative in the spheres of religion, economy, and social activities was encouraged. This brings us to an examination of the economic ideas of the Methodists. Methodism did not direct people's attention to an after-life. Wesley warned his people: "The future is nothing to you. It is not yours; perhaps it never will be . . . Therefore live to-day."³² Since the Methodists addressed themselves to the unpropertied class, it was natural for them to extol material independence. The initiative of the unenfranchised denied in politics was recognized in economics. But the Methodist advocacy of economic enterprise and gain was no compromise with sheer lust for money. On the other hand, it was assumed that the process of money-making would entail a persistent industriousness which was the hallmark of moral character. An acute observer of life, Wesley, had realized that "the fault does not lie in the money, but in them that use it."³³ Thus he laid down a strict code of business conduct. Wesleyan business ethics constituted a series of injunctions against deceit, usury, unfair prices, dealing in "uncustomed goods", and unjust competition. "Gain all you can", was Wesley's qualified encouragement for economic gain.³⁴ Thus, in the sphere of economic activities, as in the sphere of politics, a moral sanction was incorporated.

The Methodists also formulated moral principles to guide the conduct of masters and workmen. It was pointed out that the authority of masters was merely functional and not inherent. "The poorest and the weakest have the same place and authority which the richest and strongest have", Wesley said.³⁵ He had espoused the cause of the tanners of Truro who demanded a just wage.³⁶

Wesley sought to provide an ethical ideal for economic activities. This ideal enjoined both

masters and workmen to engage in work beneficial not only for themselves but for the community as a whole. The Methodist economic ethics invoked the ideal of a divine calling and the Methodists made it abundantly clear that temporal business need not interrupt communion with God. A number of Methodist biographies and pamphlets bear testimony to the material success of many Methodists. For instance, Jonathan Crowther observed that "the Methodists in general are more rich than they were before they became such."³⁷ Joseph Sutcliffe saw many young men prosper in commercial life because of "virtue and temperance, . . . industry and economy, . . . and the blessing of God on their labours."³⁸ Yet, material success did not affect religious zeal. In fact, many traders and other occupational persons often devoted a good deal of their time working for the Societies as class-leaders, trustees, or local preachers.

IV

The persistence of religious enthusiasm even amidst material success may be explained by the Methodist principle for the use of money. Wesley was aware that material prosperity could and sometimes did lead to an "increase in pride, in anger, in the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life."³⁹ As a cure for this malady he declared: "If those who 'gain all they can', and 'save all they can', will likewise 'give all they can'; then, the more they gain, the more they will grow in grace, and the more treasure they will lay up in heaven."⁴⁰ This Wesleyan formula points to some of the social ideas of the Methodists. In the opinion of Warner, Wesley aimed at an economic equality which makes him "at least as revolutionary as [Robert] Owen. . . ." ⁴¹

Wesley criticized the common contemporary assumption that idleness was the cause of poverty as "wickedly, devilishly false."⁴² He endeavoured to eradicate poverty by encourag-

ing moderate living, by a sincere disposition to work, and by an employment for all. Another important method of poor relief was a programme of philanthropy. The essential principle underlying Methodist philanthropy was the assumption that money in excess of personal need must be utilized for social need.⁴³ In 1746 Wesley began to distribute medicine to the poor in Bristol and London. About this time a programme of 'lending stock' was launched to assist the poor foundry workers.⁴⁴ In 1787 Wesley started Strangers' Friends Societies in Bristol and in Liverpool for the relief of the "poor, sick, friendless, strangers."⁴⁵

V

It will be difficult to find a direct evidence of the influence of the Methodist political ideas on the working classes. Admittedly the working class political activism of the 1790s and later owed a good deal to the Radicalism inspired by the French Revolution and by the publication of Tom Paine's *The Rights of Man* (1791-92) and *The Age of Reason* (1792). But the moral fervour and the spirit of orderliness which characterized the Methodist political ideas must have had a leavening influence on the working-class political movements. The working-class consciousness was first manifested in the London Corresponding Society (1791-99) set up by the radical shoemaker Thomas Hardy (1752-1832). The organization of this Society derived ideas from the organization of the Methodist Society itself. The influence of the Methodist organization on the Political Protestants (initially organized in Hull in July 1818, and later spread to Crediton, York, Leeds, Wakefield, Newcastle, London, and Coventry), the Association of the Friends to Radical Reform (formed at Leeds in February 1819), the Radical Friends of Stockport, even led Mr. Wawn, a prominent Methodist at Newcastle, to lament that the Radicals "have adopted almost the whole Methodist economy, the terms 'class leaders', 'district meetings', etc., etc., being perfectly

current among them."⁴⁶ In the Methodist Societies workingmen were trained in organization, financial administration, and in the methods of communication. For a long time the terms "local preacher" and "labour leader" remained almost synonymous.

The working classes were profoundly influenced by Wesley's socio-economic ideas. Any examination of the extant class-lists of Methodist Society will reveal that the labouring masses constituted the single largest class of Methodists.⁴⁷ As early as 1755 one philanthropist of Manchester had described the poor as possessing "an abject mind...a mean, sordid spirit, which prevents all attempts of bettering their condition."⁴⁸ Methodism found in the poor "pure genuine grace, un-mixed with paint, folly and affection",⁴⁹ and sought to provide for them, not only social relief, but a training of mind and a drive for success. The combined effects of religious activism and economic drive brought about an overwhelming transformation in the life of a number of workers. James Everitt noticed the influence of Methodism on industry in every city, town and village. This may well be the hasty generalization of an apologist. But, in the opinion of a recent sociologist-historian, "there seemed to be an intimate association between 'performance-centred' economic behaviour and a vigorous alignment to Methodism."⁵⁰ Methodism attracted the poor especially in the manufacturing areas. In 1753 the Vicar of Bolton observed that most of the strolling Methodist preachers were "men brought up in labourious employment...miners, weavers, carriers, soldiers, petty school-masters, and such like."⁵¹

According to an official apologist of the Methodist movement, the achievements of the Methodist reformation of manners were significant in Kingswood, Cornwall, Newcastle, Coleford, Wednesbury, Whitehaven, Leeds, Sheffield, Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Chester, Norwich, Bath, and Bristol, where multitudes were "sober, holy

Christian men." ⁵² Cultivation of industriousness and manners often resulted in occupational progress. Often "proprietors of factories... chose sober and pious men for their foremen and overlookers." ⁵³ Sir Robert Peel (the Elder) appears to have said in 1787 that he had delegated most of his works in Lancashire to the care of Methodists, who served him extremely well. ⁵⁴ Perhaps one of the most significant recognitions of the influence of Methodism on the working class came from Rev. Joseph Priestley, a dissenting minister, who commended the Methodists: "To you is the civilization, the industry and sobriety of great numbers of the labouring part of the community owing." ⁵⁵ One critic found to his disgust that Methodism rapidly progressed merely because it afforded the labouring class "immediate temporal advantage." ⁵⁶ This criticism itself is a testimony to the success of the socio-economic ideas of Methodism on the working class.

One of the most significant social achievements of the Methodists lay in the sphere of education. Methodism and the Sunday-school movement were very closely allied. Even though Robert Raikes, a non-Methodist journalist, has been popularly regarded as the initiator of the Sunday-school movement in 1780, it was a Methodist, Hannah Ball, who, as early as 1769, had experimented with a Sunday school at High Wycombe. ⁵⁷ It is certain, as one writer has recently shown, that literacy in general was declining in England in the later part of the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth under the impact of the Industrial Revolution. But even during this period of slump in literacy the Methodists "must have played an important part in saving it [literacy] from collapsing altogether for a large section of the working classes." ⁵⁸ In the Methodist Sunday schools often the teachers were ordinary mill workers of the same class as the children they taught. The Sunday schools were important training ground for the working-class children as well as for the working-class teachers. Admittedly

discipline was very strict, often severe, in these schools. Perhaps strict discipline was the crying need for the training of the day. The Dames' Schools were notoriously severe in punishing children. In any case, Methodist discipline, however severe, did not seem to alienate children or their parents from their Sunday schools. A good deal of statistics show phenomenal growth of the Methodist Sunday schools in the industrial areas of England in the 1830s and 1840s. ⁵⁹

VI

The religious doctrines of Methodism underscored individualism. Wesley had an abiding faith in the possibility of salvation for every believer. Methodist hymnody is eloquent in its recognition of the individual. The hymns of Charles Wesley (John's brother) extolled the ubiquitous glory of the Lord:

"Thy sovereign grace to all extends
Immense and unconfined;
From age to age it never ends;
It reaches all mankind."

The psychological effect of the recognition of the individual, combined with experience in group-spirit created by the classes, and the realization of one's own life as a Steward responsible to God as well as to his neighbours, must have been great. The conversion inspired confidence in one's own worth, and even led to what a writer on the psychology of Methodism has called an intellectual regeneration. The mental vitality of the converts was perceptible in their discussion of doctrines and in their formulation of a Methodist theology based upon their personal experiences. From Wesley's correspondence with the illiterate people on such doctrinal points as 'election' or 'predestination' one may get some idea of the measure of the intellectual capacity of some, if not all, of the converts. ⁶⁰ Another evidence of the mental capacity of the converts is also furnished by those workers and traders who attained success in material life.

Methodism performed a dual function in the life of the converts. It first gave a recognition to individual souls, and then furnished a socializing experience by fostering group-spirit among the individuals. Raymond Williams has suggested that the culture of the working class consists of the basic collective idea from which the workers' manners, habits of thought, intentions, and institutions follow. According to William McDougall, "the group spirit destroys the opposition and the conflict between the crudely individualistic and the primitive altruistic tendencies of our nature... the individual identifies himself with the group... his self-regarding sentiment becomes extended to the group more or less completely, so that he is moved to desire and to work for its welfare, its success, its honour and glory, by the same motives which prompt him to desire and to work his own welfare and success and honour."⁶¹ The individual convert in the company of his fellowmen in bands or classes mutually shared his experience without any fear of obstruction. One of Wesley's early correspondents testified: "...we drink of one spirit and the Lord doth meet us, and that is no wonder we are Loth to part...."⁶² This spirit of group-consciousness together with the experiences of classes and connexions must have been a vital force behind the formation of workingmen's secular organizations.

Yet, with all its classes, connexions, societies, and conferences, the Methodist organization was autocratic in character. The entire organization was centralized under Wesley's supreme command, and after his death in 1791, it was placed under the autocratic leadership of Jabez Banting. While both workingmen and middle-class people saw in the Methodist movement the germ of a democratic system, they could not countenance the authoritarian and paternalistic character of the Methodist organization. The supremacy of the preachers in their own chapels, that of the superintendents over the circuits, and that of the conference over the connexion led to protests within the ranks of the Methodists, and ultimately, to

the various secessions from the parent body. In 1795 Alexander Kilham was expelled by the conference for advocating "equal right to vote" in the church government. He, along with William Thom, and two other expelled preachers, founded the Methodist New Connexion (nicknamed Tom Paine Methodists) in Huddersfield in 1797. Several years later, Hugh Bourne, William Clowes, and their followers, were expelled from the Methodist Society for violating the Society's injunctions on mass meetings outside the circuit boundaries. These expelled preachers founded the Primitive Methodist Church on 13 February 1812.

Perhaps these secessions indicated the growing unpopularity of the main body of the Methodist organization. The Primitive Methodists were predominantly a church for the lower classes. Many trade union and Friendly Society leaders were Primitive Methodists. Meanwhile, during the latter half of the period with which we are concerned, the parent body of the Wesleyan organization was acquiring middle-class status. According to Edwards, one indication of this changing character of the Wesleyan organization was the institution of the pew rents.⁶³ Perhaps the pew rents constituted one of the causes of the workers' disaffection with the Wesleyan organization.

Probably another important reason of the disaffection of the workers lay in the attitude of the Wesleyan churches to various reform agitations. Wesley's avowal of loyalty to the King was open and almost unqualified. In 1768, in the midst of Wilkite agitation, Wesley declared: "Do you blaspheme God or the King? None of you, I trust, who are in connexion with me. I would no more continue in fellowship with those who continued such a practice, than with whoremongers, or sabbath-breakers, or thieves, or drunkards, or common swearers."⁶⁴ The Methodists had associated Radicalism with Dissent, and their dislike of Dissent led to their apathy to Radicalism. During the troubled years of the French Revolution the Methodist Conference of 1792 decided:

- (1) None of us shall, either in writing or conversation, speak lightly or irreverently of the government under which he lives.
- (2) We are to observe that the oracles of God command to be faithful to the higher powers and that honour to the King is there connected with the fear of God.⁶⁵

The Methodists had frowned on all workers' combinations. They did not recognize the various reform movements of the 1780s and 1790s. They showed their dislike of Luddism. Instead of lending support to the national outcry against the massacre of Peterloo they adopted a conservative attitude: "We desire to record our strong decided disapprobation of the tumultuous assemblies which have lately been witnessed in many parts of the country, in which large masses of people have been irregularly collected."⁶⁶ John Stephens found Peterloo a "contest between vile demagogues and a venerable King; between anarchy and social order."⁶⁷

But the fact remains that the Methodists progressively gained in membership during the period under review. Edwards calculates that there were 56,195 members in the Methodist Church. By 1815 their numbers reached 181,709.⁶⁸ According to Bebb's estimate, in 1770 there were 49 Methodist Circuits with 29,496 members, whereas, in 1800, there were 161 Circuits with 109,961 members.⁶⁹ Both estimates seem to show a significant achievement of Methodism. Methodism had trebled its membership at a time when the membership of other religious denominations had remained practically stationary. It is also significant that Methodism was strongest in the manufacturing and industrial countries such as Staffordshire, Durham, Northumberland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Middlesex, and Cornwall.⁷⁰ There are several reasons for the progress of Methodism such as (i) the mobility of the Methodists *vis-a-vis* the inability of the

Established Church to quickly adapt itself to new conditions of the Industrial Revolution; (ii) the inability of the Established Church to expand due to the apprehension of tithe payers that an increase of churches would entail a further financial burden; (iii) the Methodist system of local preaching enabling chapels to be built anywhere, and, last but not least, (iv) the theology of Methodism which made Christian experience available to all. Then, as Wearmouth has aptly observed, "Methodism attracted men because it gave them opportunity to exercise their mental and moral powers. It gave something to do, and thus made them feel they had a share in, and a responsibility for, the success of the movement."⁷¹

It is quite misleading to try to explain away the growth of Methodism during the era of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars as "a component of the psychic process of counter-revolution."⁷² It will be interesting to investigate how many frustrated revolutionary leaders joined the Methodist Church after 1795. Unfortunately, the scope of this paper precludes such discussion. The various secessions from the Wesleyan Church should not be regarded as a loss to Methodism. If we remember that there was no fundamental dichotomy between the parent body of the Methodist Church and its secessionist branches, we must recognize their combined achievements as one.⁷³

VII

We must also recognize that Methodism was no political movement *per se*. A "religion of the heart", its avowed aim was a moral regeneration of man, and not the reform of his environment. This does not mean that the Methodists were altogether opposed to the necessities of reform. Their social activities militate against such assumption. The greatest contribution of Methodism was to the building

of character through discipline. Admittedly, a Methodist's life was bound by numerous restrictions, a fact seen by Thompson as "a pollution of the sources of spontaneity."⁷⁴ The Methodist discipline may seem to modern critics as undesirably severe, but one must not overlook the conditions and the circumstances under which the Methodists operated, and the kind of human material they had to deal with. A great majority of Wesley's followers came from the lowest strata of the population, uneducated, indisciplined, and ill-mannered. Many of them had actual experiences of the violence of the day, many might have actually participated in some violence. Most of them had no knowledge of the grace and benefit of group-spirit. As their schooling began after their conversion, necessarily the schooling had to be strictly disciplined. The result of such an education was not altogether so dismal as Thompson would like his readers to believe. Perhaps the Duchess of Buckingham had seen potential revolutionaries when she complained that the Methodist preaching made the lower classes forget their allotted stations in life. Methodism was much more than an attempt to awaken men's conscience. As Arthur Whitney has concluded, it was an active agent of social dynamism.⁷⁵

In politics, as we have seen, Wesley had his own distinct philosophy which emphasized stability of political life, and which discouraged any revolutionary agitation. But, in one sense, he himself was a revolutionary. Methodism launched an assault against the old social values which stood on the economic helplessness

and the political impotence of the masses. The Methodist teachings and practices sought to deny economic inequality and economic exploitation. The Methodists diverted the attention of their followers from practical politics (which would not have been profitable for them in their existing mental and moral condition) to a reform of their manners and morals, and to an aggressive initiative in socio-economic enterprise, thus sensitizing them to an awareness of their latent strength. Liberalism was thus inherent in the Methodist movement since it created the context of liberalism by seeking to build better men in society and by encouraging economic equality for all. Economic equality was sure to lead to an aspiration for political equality. Joseph Priestley predicted that Methodism "would accomplish far more than its leaders could foresee, even while clothed in its conservative disguise." Perhaps Priestley was right. Wesley succeeded in accomplishing what he never intended to do. "Like a strong and skilful rower" Wesley "looked one way, while every stroke of his car took him in an opposite direction."⁷⁶

Unfortunately, Anthony Armstrong's *The Church of England, the Methodists and Society 1700-1850* (University of London Press, 1973) has appeared too late to be of any use for this paper. Armstrong's work discusses a number of important secondary sources left out by this writer for the sake of brevity. Nevertheless, Armstrong's views on the impact of Methodism on society do not significantly differ from the thesis of this paper. See pp. 83-102 of Armstrong's book.

TABLE I.
METHODISTS.

The following view of the numbers of Members in the Methodist Connexion in England and Wales, with the proportion they bear to the population of each County, is extracted from Mr. Haigh's Map of "The Methodists' Circuits," published in the present year :—

	<i>Popu- lation</i>	<i>Cir- cuits</i>	<i>Mem- bers</i>	<i>One in</i>		<i>Popu- lation</i>	<i>Cir- cuits</i>	<i>Mem- bers</i>	<i>One in</i>
Berkshire	131,977	5	1,233	111	*Middlesex	1,144,531	3	7,542	152
Bedford	83,716	4	1,790	47	Monmouth	71,333	3	886	82
Buckingham	134,068	3	993	134	Nottingham	186,873	5	4,680	40
Cambridge	121,909	3	1,223	99	Northampton	162,483	6	2,412	67
*Cornwall	257,437	11	12,891	27	Norfolk	344,368	9	5,315	64
Cumberland	156,124	5	2,459	63	Northumberland	198,965	5	3,035	65
Cheshire	270,098	6	5,809	46	Oxford	134,327	4	1,880	71
*Devon	439,040	13	4,524	94	Rutland	18,487	0	0	0
Dorset	144,499	4	1,450	99	Sussex	232,927	4	1,100	211
Durham	207,673	7	6,039	34	Surrey	398,658	1	1,600	249
Derby	213,333	9	6,148	34	Suffolk	270,542	5	1,725	151
Essex	289,424	4	1,478	189	Somerset	355,314	10	5,735	62
Gloucester	335,843	7	4,744	70	Stafford	341,824	10	9,903	35
Hampshire	282,203	4	1,916	170	Shropshire	206,266	5	2,633	78
Herts	129,714	0	0	0	Wiltshire	222,157	5	1,941	115
Hereford	103,231	3	858	120	Westmorland	51,359	1	424	121
Huntingdon	48,771	2	680	71	Worcester	184,424	5	1,980	93
*Kent	426,016	13	6,505	64	Warwick	274,392	2	1,935	130
Leicester	174,571	6	4,330	40	York	1,175,251	48	50,976	23
Lincoln	283,058	16	11,640	24	Wales	717,108	18	8,634	83
Lancaster	1,052,859	22	20,776	50	Total	11,977,663	296	211,887	56

The above numbers, it must be observed, are actually joined in connexion, exclusive of the eight thousand additional members, and it is estimated that the Methodist Congregations contain six times as many individuals as there are members upon their Class Papers.

* Southern counties.

Source : A. Aspinall & E. A. Smith, eds., *English Historical Documents 1783-1832* (N.Y. : Oxford University Press, 1959), XI.

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1. This essay will try to limit its study up to 1819, the year of Peterloo, which, according to this writer, demonstrated a significant change in the organisation and character of working-class agitation. It should be further noted that this paper does not attempt to discuss the influence of Methodism on the agricultural workers.
2. Elie Halevy, *The Birth of Methodism in England* (tr. and ed. Bernard Semmel, The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 51. See also Halevy's *History of the English People in 1815* (tr. Watkin and Barker, Paperback Edition, Benn, 1961).
3. J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Town Labourer: the New Civilization 1760-1832*, Preface by Asa Briggs (Anchor Books, N.Y., 1968). Although the Hammonds recognized that Methodism "was in fact an admirable school for democrats, equipping working men

- for popular leadership", they appeared to have accused the Methodists of teaching the working class "not the reform of their material conditions", but preaching that "they should learn resignation amid the painful chaos of a world so made to serve the inscrutable purposes of God." See Chapter XIII, pp. 231-45.
4. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), pp. 42, 46, 382.
 5. Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Methodism and the Threat of Revolution in Britain", *History Today* (February, 1957), p. 124. The periods of rapid Methodist recruitment during the first half of the nineteenth century are also, with the exception of 1820-24, the periods of mounting popular agitation: 1793-94, 1813-16, 1831-34, 1837-41, 1848-50. Probably, "radical agitation drove other workers into Methodism as a reaction against them, or that they became Methodists and Radicals for the same reasons." *Ibid.* Thompson's conclusion is exactly opposite and more definitive: "On the contrary, it is possible that religious revivalism took over just at the point where 'political' or temporal aspirations met with defeat." *Working Class*, p. 389.
 6. Hobsbawm points to the small number of Methodist members relative to the population—about half a million out of a total population of 18 million in 1851. This calculation appears to have ignored a large number of Methodists who were not registered members. R. F. Wearmouth has reminded us that "Methodism was always greater than its annual assemblies. . . ." See his *Methodism and the Working Class Movements of England, 1800-1850* (London: The Epworth Press, Reprint, 1947), p. 157.
 7. *Working Class*, p. 368. Thompson has seen Methodism's religious role as "a ritualised form of psychic masturbation." *Ibid.*
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
 9. W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1891), II.
 10. Sydney G. Dimond, *The Psychology of the Methodist Revival; An Empirical and Descriptive Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 253.
 11. T. A. Critchley, *The Conquest of Violence; Order and Liberty in Britain* (N.Y.: Schocken Books, 1970), p. 96. Professor Alfred North Whitehead observed that "the Methodist preachers aimed at saving men's souls in the next world, but incidentally they gave a new direction to emotions energizing in this world." *Adventure of Ideas* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1933), p. 27.
 12. G. D. H. Cole and Raymond Postgate, *The British Common People, 1746-1946* (London: University Paperbacks, 1961), pp. 67-68. J. T. Ward has warned against broad generalizations about clearly demarcated 'middle' or 'working' classes. Yet it is certainly possible to sense a growing class consciousness. *Popular Movements C. 1830-1850* (Macmillan, 1970), p. 7.
 13. *Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire* (London, 1814). Cited Cole and Postgate, *British Common People*, pp. 144-145. For a population chart based on Colquhoun's estimate, see p. 71.
 14. *The History of Tom Jones A Foundling* (London, 1749).
 15. Cited M. Dorothy George, *London Life in the Eighteenth Century* (Reprinted by The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1951), p. 210.
 16. For definitions of conflict group and of intense conflict see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Society* (Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, January 1972), pp. 7, 9. For the details of popular agitation and of mob violence in the eighteenth century England see R. F. Wearmouth, *Methodism and the Common People of the Eighteenth Century* (London: The Epworth Press, 1945), Section 1, Chapter 1).
 17. Critchley, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 6.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
 19. Critchley, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 12.
 20. Samuel Bamford, *Passages in the Life of a Radical* (London, 1844), I.
 21. Thompson, *Working Class*, p. 394.
 22. *Methodism and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1935), pp. 27-28.
 23. If the people were actually the source of civil power, "why then", Wesley asked, "should not every man, woman, and child, have a voice in placing their governors?" Wesley was obviously hinting at the property qualification of franchise in a further question: "Is he not a man, whether he be rich or poor?" The Revolution of 1688, so much eulogized by the Radicals, was seen by him as "not . . . of the people . . . no, nor even the Parliament", but "a few hundred lords and gentlemen." See "Some Observations on Liberty occasioned by a Late Tract", John Emory (ed.), *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.* (Third American Complete and Standard Edition, N.Y.: Carlton & Phillips, 1853), 7 vols., VI, pp. 300-321. See also "Thoughts Concerning the Origin of Power", *Ibid.*, pp. 269-74.
 24. Wesley argued that a man has "no right at

- all to be independent, or governed only by himself." If one's own indisciplined will constituted the quintessence of freedom, then "all the devils in hell", "guided by their own will" were really free, while "all the angels in heaven . . . guided by the will of another" were "slaves". Wesley, *Works*, VI, p. 311.
25. Cited Wellman J. Warner, *The Wesleyan Movement in the Industrial Revolution* (Longmans, 1930), p. 89.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
 27. Wesley, *Works*, VI, p. 311.
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
 29. Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, p. 103.
 30. *Strictures on Mr. O'Connell's Letters to the Wesleyan Methodists* (London, 1840), pp. 14-15.
 31. Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, p. 109.
 32. Cited, *Ibid.*, p. 137.
 33. "The Use of Money", Wesley, *Works*, I, p. 441.
 34. Wesley, *Works*, I, p. 442.
 35. Cited Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, p. 148.
 36. Nehemiah Curnock (ed.), *The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.* (Standard Edition, London: The Epworth Press, Bicentenary Issue, 1938), 7 vols., VII, p. 528.
 37. *The Methodist Manual* (Halifax, 1810), p. 214.
 38. *A Review of Methodism in a Discourse Delivered on Laying the Foundation-Stone of New Street Chapel, York* (London, 1805), p. 36.
 39. "Thoughts Upon Methodism", Wesley, *Works*, VII, p. 317.
 40. *Ibid.*
 41. Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, p. 195.
 42. Curnock (ed.), *Journal of Wesley*, IV, p. 52.
 43. Wesley said: "If, therefore, you do not spend your money in doing good to others, you must spend it to the hurt of yourself." Cited Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, p. 209. Wesley also protested against the idea of personal inheritance, prevailing fashions in dress, cruel sports, and immoral pastime ("foul remains of Gothic barbarity").
 44. Under the 'lending stock' program any poor person, on the recommendation of the class leader, and on providing a security, could obtain a small loan of 1 to 5 pounds which could be paid back in instalments.
 45. Maldwyn Edwards, *After Wesley; A Study of the Social and Political Influence of Methodism in the Middle Period (1791-1849)* (London: The Epworth Press, 1935), p. 118.
 46. Cited Wearmouth, *Methodism and Working Class Movements*, p. 77.
 47. But, according to Edwards, by the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, the Methodist Church, while still increasing greatly in numbers, and attracting artisans and workmen, had ceased to be the church of the worker, and was controlled by the respectable middle class people. *After Wesley*, p. 91.
 48. John Clayton, cited in Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, p. 167.
 49. John Telford (ed.), *The Letters of John Wesley* (Standard Edition, London: The Epworth Press, 1931), 8 vols., III, p. 229, VII, pp. 343-44.
 50. Neil J. Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 71.
 51. *Ibid.* It must be noted here that Primitive Methodism, a leftist offshoot from the Parent Methodist Church, exercised considerable influence on the agricultural labourers.
 52. Thomas Olivers, *A Defence of Methodism* (London, 1785).
 53. Sutcliffe, *Review of Methodism*, p. 37.
 54. Luke Tyerman, *The Life and Times of John Wesley* (N.Y. 1871-72), 3 vols., III, p. 499.
 55. Cited Warner, *Wesleyan Movement*, p. 175.
 56. Anonymous, *Methodism Exposed*, with the History and Tendency of that Sect.
 57. H. F. Mathews, *Methodism and the Education of the People* (London: The Epworth Press, 1949), p. 36.
 58. Michael Sanderson, "Literacy and Social Mobility in the Industrial Revolution in England", *Past and Present*, No 56 (August 1972), p. 82.
 59. Calculations for Lancashire in E. Baines, *The Social, Educational and Religious State of the Manufacturing Districts* (London, 1843). For Sheffield, see G. C. Holland, *Vital Statistics of Sheffield*, 1843). For Manchester, see Mathews, *Methodism and Education*.
 60. Manuscript letters in Coleman Collection, Dimond, *Psychology of Methodist Revival*, p. 205.
 61. *The Group Mind* (G. P. Putnam, 1920), p. 78.
 62. Cited Dimond, *Psychology of Methodist Revival*, pp. 212-13
 63. Edwards, *After Wesley*, p. 147. It must be noted that the pew rents were utilized on various useful projects. Also these rents did not bar the entry of those unable to pay. Almost every chapel had allotted some seats for those unable to pay.
 64. Cited Wearmouth, *Methodism and Common People*, p. 254.
 65. Cited Stuart Andrews, *Methodism and Society* (Longman, 1970), p. 75.
 66. Cited Edwards, *After Wesley*, p. 33.
 67. *Ibid.*

68. *After Wesley*, p. 143. See also Appendix I "Table to Show the Increase of Methodism Between 1789-1815", pp. 165-72.
 69. E. Bebb, *Nonconformity and Social Life 1660-1800* (London, 1935), cited Smelser, *Social Change*, p. 69. For the Methodist population in 1824, see Table I attached. (Source : A. Aspinall & E. A. Smith, eds., *English Historical Documents, 1783-1832*, N.Y. : Oxford University Press, 1959, XI).
 70. With few exceptions the Methodist influence may be said to have been stronger in the industrial north than in the agricultural south. Probably the country-side with its tradition of parsonage manor did not offer any promise for evangelical activities. Then, even in the mainly agricultural countries, such as Lincolnshire, Bedfordshire, Leicestershire, Methodism touched only the craftsmen, artisans, freeholders, and yeomanry. Nevertheless, one notices quite strong Methodist influence in such southern countries as Cornwall, Devon, Kent, and Middlesex. Also, Methodism, particularly Primitive Methodism, exercised great influence on the agricultural laborers. See Letter from Major-General James Willoughby Gordon to Viscount Sidmouth, dated Merthyr Tydvil, 14 March, 1817, in A. Aspinall, *The Early English Trade Unions; Documents from the Home Office Papers in the Public Record Office* (London : The Batchworth Press, 1949), p. 231.
 71. Wearmouth, *Methodism and Working Class Movements*, pp. 7-8.
 72. Thompson, *Working Class*, p.
 73. Taylor observes that the Primitive Methodists and the Bible Christians both ecclesiastically and spiritually remained Methodists, although their Methodism was of a modified type. The distinction was rather succinctly described by Rev. H. B. Kendall : "Church order and regulation were of much less moment than soul-saving and individual edification ; these must be attended to whatever become of Church order." *Methodism and Politics*, p. 105.
 74. Thompson, *Working Class*, p. 372.
 75. Arthur P. Whitney, *The Basis of Opposition to Methodism in England in the Eighteenth Century* (New York University, 1951), p. 67.
 76. Comment by a critic, cited Wearmouth, *Methodism and Working Class Movements*, p. 157.
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BAL SHASTRI JAMBHEKAR AND BOMBAY— 1830-1840*

(A REVIEW ARTICLE)

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Bombay and Western India in 1830 was awakening from the resounding defeat of the Maratha Power by the British in the eighteenth-twenties. The people were adjusting themselves to their new rulers and facing totally strange and new ideas from the West. It must have been a time of stress and sometimes deep shock in the face of the new outlooks, quite contrary and irreconcilable with our old traditions. Bombay City had the advantage of being a sort of window to the West in many ways. For nearly two hundred years she had been in the possession of the British and had been an active trading port. Indians here had acclimatised themselves to the western world. Many were attracted to the city in search of knowledge and occupation. From here came the great names of western India in the eighteenth-thirties : Jagannath Shankerseth, Dadoba Pandurang, Bhau Daji and Bal Shastri Jambhekar. The last-named has been neglected and almost forgotten. Yet, he is perhaps the most remarkable of the great men of that age—the age of Ram Mohan Roy and others. Shri G. G. Jambhekar has compiled three volumes of 'Memoirs and Writings' of Bal Shastri in which he has attempted to fill in this lacuna. Besides this, the work is a valuable source material for the early British period. Through the

extracts quoted from contemporary newspapers and letters we get a valuable insight into the social, economic and political background of the Indian Society, as well as some knowledge of the way the Indian public was thinking.

The first volume starts with a short biographical sketch by the author. It is rather difficult to accept as historical truth the inordinate importance and greatness he attaches to Bal Shastri. In fact by claiming that Bal Shastri was a Mahatma—the greatest Indian of the age—he is doing disservice to a personality who did much, but certainly would not himself have accepted such a title. Such statements only ridicule an otherwise able intellectual and versatile individual. The style of the author is cumbersome and therefore makes difficult reading. At the same time the material is very informative. Bal Shastri was born in a Karhada Brahmin family in the village of Pampurla in South Konkan, probably in 1812. His childhood and early boyhood were spent in the village. He was educated at home in the Brahmanic manner under the guidance of his father since there was no public elementary school in the village. Neither were there any printed Sanskrit or Marathi books at that time. The printing press was introduced into India by the British. Learning was therefore mainly done by word of mouth and through the use of a few hand-written manuscripts. Having mastered Sanskrit and Marathi with remarkable

* Memoirs and Writings of Acharya Bal Shashtri Jambhekar, 3 vols., by G. G. Jambhekar, Poona, 1950.

rapidity and skill, Bal Shashtri was taken to Bombay at the end of 1825.

Bombay had now become the headquarters of the expanding British power in Western India. The Peshwas and the Marathas had been defeated and the whole of their territory was in the hands of the British. In 1819 Mountstuart Elphinstone became the Governor of Bombay and rapidly began to exert himself in reorganising the Province. Elphinstone was a new brand of British statesmen. He was strikingly different from the earlier servants of the East India Company against whom Cornwallis and Wellesley had bitterly complained. He inaugurated an era, to be followed by Metcalfe and Malcolm, of upright and honest administrators in their appointed spheres of activity.

The new rulers were entirely different from any conquerors India had had before. Never before had she been conquered by a power whose centre of gravity lay outside her soil. The Indians and the English lived in worlds apart. English education could do something to bridge this gap for at least a microscopic section of university-educated Indians. The East India Company was reluctant to start English education in India, but vernacular education was also not encouraged and the ancient system of educational endowments of land was stopped. Thus, the average Indian was left neither with vernacular nor with English education. Mountstuart Elphinstone, however, seems to have had different ideas. He advocated and organised both English and Vernacular schools with the motives both of providing the East India Company with Indian assistants as well as spreading of Western culture. He was directly responsible for the formation, in 1822, of the Bombay Native School Book and School Society. This organisation was put in charge of Captain Jervis—the engineer of Bombay, who, from all accounts, appeared to have endeared himself to his pupils as an able administrator. A new Engineering Institute was started under his supervision in 1823. He

also felt that, since only a few Indians would be able to start learning the English language, as many translations of English books as possible should be made into the vernacular. The Society also opened a few Vernacular Schools in Bombay City and outside. These, however, were not immediately popular till an Indian Assistant Secretary, Sadashiv Kashinath Chatre, was appointed to popularise these schools and to reassure the Indians who were afraid that their children would be converted to Christianity. Bapu Chatre was amongst the first to translate English books into Marathi—notably *Æsop's Fables* and *Berquein's Children's Friend*. The society had also started the Central English School and it is here that Bal Shastri began studying on his arrival in Bombay. An interesting light is thrown on the type of Englishmen available for teaching by the author. Both Mr. Murphy and Mr. Smith were Corporal and Sergeant respectively in the Artillery. They both seemed to have had some University training, but probably came east to escape from some difficulty at home. It is known that the servants of the East India Company were not of the very best calibre in the early days. Whatever that may be, these gentlemen seem to have acquitted themselves quite well as school masters.

By 1828 Bal Shashtri had spent four years studying English and other disciplines in the school, always coming out at the top of the class. He was then appointed a tutor in Mathematics. In 1830, at the age of 17, he was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Society in place of Mr. Chatre, who retired. From this time onward he became a zealous teacher, translator and journalist. There is no doubt at all of Bal Shastri's great intellectual abilities. He was a great teacher and soon went from the Society School to the newly-established Elphinstone College, in 1834, as an Assistant Professor and worked with Prof. Orlebar in the Mathematics Department. In 1838 the college entrance classes started to help the entry of students to the College were put in charge of Bal Shastri. By 1841 Bal Shastri had

become a beloved member of the Bombay Educational Service and was appointed Educational Superintendent of the III Division (South Maratha Country). He was the first Indian to attain such a high post in the educational field. In 1842 Prof. Orlebar went on leave to England and Bal Shastri was appointed as a temporary Professor but on three-fourths of Mr. Orlebar's pay ! Indians were certainly not the equals of Europeans even if their services were equally valuable ! Bal Shastri was acknowledged to be a very competent teacher of Mathematics by all who were concerned at the time. A lot of testimony has been provided by the author on this score. From all the evidence he has put together, I do not think there is any doubt of Bal Shastri's intellectual capacities. He seems to have mastered, besides Mathematics, English, Geography, Astronomy and languages. He must have been a very painstaking, versatile and indefatigable worker. He also found time to study epigraphy and contributed a few articles on inscriptions to the Asiatic Society's journal. Here again we are told that Bal Shastri could only contribute articles, but could not be a member of the Society ! Bal Shastri does not seem to have made any protest against this discriminatory and patronising attitude of the British rulers. In fact he seems to have accepted the position quite passively. There is never a hint of his objecting to the British Raj, or making protests against their attitude, except in making certain political demands. Mr. Jambhekar's assertion that Bal Shastri was the first historian of modern India on the ground of a few publications in the Asiatic Society's Journal is too widely off the mark. Nor can we accept Mr. Jambhekar's assertion that Bal Shastri was a pioneer in social reforms. Except for the general endorsement of liberal ideas in his weekly, he openly espoused only one cause—that of young Sheshadri, a Hindu boy who had been brought back to the Hindu fold from the missionaries. His readmission into the Brahmin fold was due mostly to the efforts of Bal Shastri who induced Jagannath Shankershetth to take up the cause ; otherwise, he seems to have been

neutral. He seems to have stood on the fringes where cases of Sati, child marriage, etc., were concerned.

It is in the field of Journalism, apart from education, that Bal Shastri made his greatest contribution.

Bengal had been in the forefront where newspaper printing was concerned. Ram Mohan Roy was one of the founders of the Indian Press. He brought out a bi-lingual Bengali-English magazine. In January 1832 Bal Shastri began a fortnightly bilingual Marathi-English paper in Bombay. There had been Gujarati papers before this (the *Sama-char*) but Bal Shastri was the first to start a newspaper in Marathi. Its aim, as Bal Shastri put it, was to encourage amongst Indians "The pursuit of English literature and to open a field of free and public discussion on points connected with the prosperity of this country and the happiness of its inhabitants."

The selections from the *Durpan* given in Vol. II are extremely revealing of the ideas of that small minority of the Indian public coming in contact with the Europeans. Bal Shastri shines here as a fearless exponent of ideas, criticising where necessary, praising where he deemed fit. As Bal Shastri himself said, "Personality shall not disfigure nor servility stain the pages of the *Durpan* !"

The selections are from 1832 to 1840, when the *Durpan* stopped publication. Bal Shastri had a keen mind which he applied to various contemporary problems. The writings reflect the social, economic and political opinions of the intellectual Indian elite. These seemed to correspond closely to the ideas of the more liberal-minded Englishmen. Politically, the modern educated Indian seems to have had no idea of opposing British rule at that time. Bal Shastri reflected the views of these people when he wrote : "when we behold the country, which was but a century ago the scene of violent oppression and misrule, enjoying

security and freedom and observe its inhabitants acquiring a superior knowledge of the Arts and Sciences of Europe, a bright example is presented to our minds of what a good government can do when willing to ameliorate the condition of obedient and docile subjects." This does not mean that the Indian mind was servile. While appreciating their rulers, they were sensible of their own abilities and rights. Following the discussions in Parliament at the time of the renewal of the Charter in 1833, the western educated Indians began to ask for a greater share in the administrative posts of the Company. Bal Shastri reflected this opinion in many issues of the *Durpan*. For example, in April 1832 he writes : "It was the opinion of Mr. Elphinstone, than whom India has not seen a greater statesman, or more enlightened and liberal minded man, that the progress of education would soon create a necessity for the admission of Natives to the superior offices in the service of the State, all of which (except perhaps those of a political nature and the higher military command) both justice and good policy required should be thrown open to them as favourable opportunities are offered and indeed ultimately filled by them exclusively. It is in vain to expect that men will ever be satisfied with merely having their prosperity secured, while all places of honourable ambition are shut against them. This mortifying exclusion stifles torrents, humbles family pride and depresses all but the weak and worthless." Thus, though he himself had attained a considerable position under the British he was neither complacent nor satisfied and realised that Indian advancement at that time, was, at least in the political field, limited.

Similarly, the liberal-minded, though perhaps orthodox, Bal Shastri drew the attention

of the public to certain evils of our society. He carried on a campaign against the immoral traffic in girls who were kidnapped and turned into prostitutes and against female infanticide. He also encouraged the building of an Indian hospital and female education. In the economic sphere, we find in his writings general approval of the Government's policy with suggestions for improvement. For instance, he advocated the removal of all internal excise duties. There was, however, at this time no great outcry, as at a later stage, against the economic exploitation of our country. Probably events were too close to allow them to understand what was happening.

The *Durpan* amalgamated itself with the *United Service Gazette and Chronicle* in June 1840 and stopped independent publication. Immersed though he was in a great deal of intellectual activity, Bal Shastri found time to sponsor another publication, this time a Marathi Monthly called the *Dig Darshan*. It was, as he said, "to contain a summary of intelligence, short essays and articles, original and select, on subjects connected with Geography, History, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry and general science with occasional illustrations in dithography." His aim here, as in most things, was educational. He particularly valued the Press as a medium of education and felt that by it "public morals had been purified, while subjects have been taught obedience, Rulers and Princes have been restrained from exercising power in an absolute and arbitrary manner." Indeed some of the most beneficial and important changes that have been brought about were by the power of the Press. Bal Shastri contributed enormously by pioneering in this field. The three volumes are well worth attention for any social study of this period.

MIR JUMLA'S PEACE WITH THE AHOMS

SUNILKUMAR DAS

Mir Jumla's Assam campaign (1661-63 A.D.), a crowning event of the age, marked the last phase of the Mughal north-east frontier policy. A premeditated scheme of Imperial conquest, the Assam campaign of Mir Jumla, may well be regarded as a grand climacteric in the history of the Ahom-Mughal relations. Ever since the conquest of Kamarupa,¹ the extension of the Imperial domain in the north-east at the cost of the Mongoloid state of Assam had been a favourite item in the foreign policy of the Mughal Emperors. The dismal failure of some of the Mughal enterprises in the past, the memory of which was still "fresh in their minds, failed to be an eye-opener to the Mughals. Assam—an accursed land of magic and witchcraft, of rain and pestilence, with its elephants, musk-deer and varied aromatic plants, gold, silk, etc., exercised an ever-increasing ravenousness upon the Mughals who made the last, but the most daring and decisive attempt at its conquest under Mir Jumla, the greatest general the age produced.

Towards the end of 1657 A.D. (1067 A.H.), Shah Jahan, the Mughal Emperor, fell ill in Delhi and there broke out at once a scramble for succession to the throne.² The retroactive influence of the confusion and disorder in the central authority was soon felt in the distant Brahmaputra valley, where the Mughal prestige had been greatly shaken. Energetic and ambitious as he was, Prannarayana, the ruler of Koch Behar, was not slow to take advantage of the political turmoil to throw off the Mughal yoke. He openly bade defiance to the Mughal authority, stopped the payment of tribute and declared independence.³ Jayadh-

vajasinha (1648-63 A.D.), the reigning Ahom monarch, taking advantage of the helplessness of Mughal Kamarupa, captured it after a skirmish, from the clutches of Prannarayana who had already anticipated him in an attack thereon.⁴

By the end of June, 1660, when the troubles of disputed succession had ended in Aurangzeb's final triumph, the newly enthroned emperor deputed Mir Jumla,⁵ the Bengal Viceroy, to restore the Mughal authority in the north-east frontier by the punishment of the refractory Koch vassal and by the recovery of Kamarupa from the hands of the Ahoms.⁶

Mir Jumla's campaign against Koch Behar⁷ symbolized the beginning of a grandiose policy of armed imperialism. The conquest of Koch Behar on the 19th December, 1661,⁸ and the consequent flight of Prannarayana⁹ may well be explained as the inevitable and ominous prologue to the historic drama, of which the Assam enterprise was a tragic epilogue. The kingdom of Prannarayana became incorporated into the Mughal dominion¹⁰ after an existence of more than a century and a half as a separate state. The subjugation of Koch Behar was followed by the reconquest of Kamarupa¹¹ which was again followed by a gigantic attempt upon Assam with a view to proceeding in the face of insurmountable difficulties to the far distant China.¹²

Mir Jumla traversed far into the interior of Assam as far as its capital Garhgaon¹³—a distance of about 200 miles in less than 6 weeks with very little loss to his army and navy even in the face of insuperable difficulties presented by man and Nature. This was, indeed, a

great exploit of arms unprecedented in the annals of Mughal India. The year 1662, which saw the expedition was, after all, an extraordinary one, and this is testified by the statement of Baduli Phukan,¹⁴ the renegade Commander-in-Chief of Assam. The rains began earlier than usual with uncommon violence and converted the whole realm of Assam into one huge swamp. For about 6 months (May to October, 1662) military operations were completely paralysed and the Mughal companies were compelled to lie 'cabined, cribbed and confined', in their water-logged cantonments isolated from one another, cut off from the fleet and constantly pestered by the Parthian tactics of the Ahoms. To augment the misery of the beleaguered army, pestilence and famine soon broke out with tremendous fury working a great havoc on it.¹⁵ The bright picture of Mir Jumla's campaign soon faded away so that the history of the rest of his campaign is not unlike that of Napoleon's ill-fated irruptions into the territories of the Czar; and rain, pestilence and famine did as much injury to the Mughal general as snow and frost did to the French monarch.

Undaunted by the freaks of Nature and of Fortune which Mir Jumla could neither have foreseen nor averted, he prepared manfully to confront them as best as he could. As soon as the rains and diseases had subsided, he boldly resumed the offensive and once more he carried all before him. But, just at the moment when the fugitive Ahom king was about to fall into his grip, his own fatal illness together with the extreme unwillingness of his discontented and distressed soldiery to continue further warfare—spending another rainy season in Assam where no provision could come by land or water and where rains were expected to start towards the end of January, a part of hell whose climate was worse than that of Babel—compelled the general to retrace his steps leaving his task unfinished.¹⁶ A treaty was entered upon in the month of January, 1663, at Ghilajharighat, the terms of which were as follows:

(a) Jayadvajasimha was to 'rule as a vassal' of the Emperor, and to send an ambassador to the Mughal Pro-Consul at Gauhati,¹⁷ and to remain obedient to his feudal lord.

(b) He was to send immediately his daughter¹⁸ together with the daughter of the Tipam Raja¹⁹ to the Imperial harem.

(c) He would have to deliver immediately a war indemnity of 20,000 *tolas* of gold and 1,20,000 *tolas* of silver.²⁰

(d) In order to mitigate the cost of war, the Ahom king had to pay 3,00,000 rupees in cash and 90 elephants to the Mughal emperor within the next twelve months beginning from January, 1663, in three equal monthly instalments as the balance of indemnity.²¹

(e) He would have to deliver the sons of the Buragohain, Bargohain, Barpatra Gohain and Raja Sahur Phukan, the four pillars of the State, as hostages to be detained at Gauhati pending the payment of the indemnity as determined.²²

(f) The Ahom king was further required to pay an annual tribute of 20 elephants, of which 10 tusked and 10 female.²³

(g) Besides, he had to cede to the Mughals, the territories which lay west of the river Barnadi on the north and the Kallang on the south banks of the Brahmaputra. By this stipulated treaty, the Mughals were to acquire more than half of the province of Darrang, extending from Samdhara on the Bharali in the east to Gauhati and as far as the Manha (Manas) in the west. In the *Dakhinkul* (south bank), the Mughals were to secure their control over Desa Rani,²⁴ Naga hills, Desa Beltola and Dumaria.²⁵

(h) Finally, Jayadvajasimha was required to release the Mughal captives carried off especially from Kamarupa, and, at the same time to extradite the family of the renegade

Baduli Phukan, whose members were thrown into prison by the Ahom king.²⁶

As a military exploit, Mir Jumla's Assam campaign was a success. He overran Assam almost to its furthest limits, kept hold of the capital Garhgaon, forced the Assam king to make a humiliating treaty, realised huge indemnity and secured the promise of a large cession of territory and further payments. His brilliant enterprises as well as his conclusion of the treaty of 1663, the terms of which were mostly favourable to the Mughals, led Jagadish Narayan Sarkar²⁷ to the suggestion that "Mir Jumla may well claim to have secured 'Peace with Honour'."

But the contention of Jagadish Narayan Sarkar is debatable on the following grounds :

It would be no exaggeration to suggest that the triumph of Mir Jumla was extremely illusory and its political consequences were short-lasting.²⁸ The terms of the treaty, as we have seen, were mostly favourable to the Mughals. It was possible only because of the awe-inspiring presence of Mir Jumla and his persistent resolve to continue warfare to the end even in the face of appalling sufferings, odds and dangers. This suggested to the Ahom King the necessity of complying with the preliminary stipulations of the treaty quite promptly and satisfactorily, so as to induce the Mughal general to retrace his steps from Assam as early as possible.²⁹ He sent his daughter to the Imperial harem with a handsome dowry, paid the first instalment of indemnity, delivered hostages as a pledge for the balance and released the Muslim prisoners of war. But the most important stipulations, such as the payment of the balance of indemnity and territorial cession, seem never to have been carried out and remained practically a dead letter.

Jayadvajasimha had to cede to the Mughals almost the whole of the *Sarkar* Darrang, the home of wild elephants and centre of several strategic positions controlled by the hill chieftains subordinate to the Ahom King. The

Muhammadan sources are entirely silent as to whether Darrang was actually occupied by the Mughals. Only the *Alamgirnama*³⁰ expressly refers to Gauhati (included in Kamarupa) which continued to be the frontier of the Mughal domination in the Brahmaputra Valley. The cession of territories, according to the Persian and Assamese chronicles, was nominal.³¹ This is proved by the fact that in the reign of Cakradhvajasimha (1663-70 A.D.), the able and energetic successor of Jayadvajasimha, the only Mughal *thana* mentioned as having been attacked by the Assamese is that of Bansbari³²—a *mauza* in the extreme south-west corner in the District of Darrang near the mouth of the Barnadi. It is situated on the left bank of the Barnadi—a little to the east of Gauhati. No other fortified post is said to have been established by Mir Jumla for protecting the Imperial authority in the District of Darrang. This is also supported by the *Fathiyah-i-Ibriyah*³³ which records that Mir Jumla threw up garrisons only in Gauhati and Kajali. It appears, therefore, that almost the whole of the District of Darrang as far as the river Barnadi in the east remained absolutely unprotected. The cession of the territories of Rani, Beltola and Dumaria Raja was also equally ineffective. Their subservience to the Mughal general was nothing but a paper agreement. Actually these sturdy hill people, who preferred independence to domination, did not allow their dominions to be a part and parcel of the Mughal empire, not even of the Kingdom of Jayadvajasimha who had to be satisfied only with their nominal vassalage. Hardly had Mir Jumla turned his back, when they retransferred their allegiance to the Ahom king, for the subsequent history revealed that some of the hill chieftains, especially the Dumaria Raja allied with the Ahoms in their warfare with the Muslims.³⁴ The resentment of the frontier chiefs to accept the Mughal authority and their persistent loyalty to the Ahom king served as grounds of complaint of the Bengal Viceroy, the successor of Mir Jumla.³⁵ The most glaring justification for the emptiness of the territorial concession was the letter of

Aurangzeb addressed to Cakradhvasimha³⁶ expressing his readiness to maintain the demarcating line set up by the treaty of 1639 signed by Allah Yar Khan and Momai Tamuli Barbaruah on behalf of the Mughals and Ahoms respectively. All this, therefore, leads to the suggestion that the treaty of 1663, with all its intents and purposes, was treated no better than a scrap of paper by the Ahoms. Realising probably the futility of these paper concessions, Mir Jumla did not take them seriously. That was why he did not make any attempt to protect the ceded territories by establishing military garrisons in them.

Regarding the payment of the balance of war indemnity, the Assamese chronicles provide us with a confused and self-contradictory account, while the Persian sources are completely silent so far. Jadunath Sarkar, on the basis of the confused account recorded in the *Buranjis*, was of the opinion that the promised war indemnity was paid in full, though not in one year's time as stipulated, because the last instalment was paid as late as May, 1667.³⁷ But the repeated demands for the payment of arrears of indemnity made by the successive Mughal *Faujdar*s upon the king of Assam³⁸ do not seem to justify his argument. It is also interesting to note in this connection that ascending on the throne Cakradhvasimha vigorously prepared himself to wipe off the stain of the last discomfiture together with the humiliating treaty. Ever since his accession, he was in no mood to pay off the balance of the indemnity, though in order to gain time to recoup his strength he dallied with the Mughal envoys on several idle pretexts.³⁹

In addition to that, Mir Jumla did not take away the hostages—the only guarantee for the redemption of war indemnity, along with him, but left them behind at Gauhati when they were soon released. He thus voluntarily threw away the trump card in his hands.⁴⁰

The Assam campaign of Mir Jumla thus stood in the end to be nothing more than a

plundering raid not unlike Alexander the Great's Indian campaign. It was in the true sense of the term a barren enterprise, though he returned from it laden only with riches⁴¹ which were accumulated by the cruel method of exhumation of the Ahom tombs⁴² and vast spoils of war gained at the enormous cost of about 20,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, huge materials, honour and prestige to boot. Very soon Kamarupa was again incorporated into the Ahom dominions,⁴³ and Koch Behar slipped away from the Mughal clutches, and not an inch of territory was actually added to the Imperial domain. What was worse still is the fact that the security of the existing Mughal possession was greatly threatened.⁴⁴ The most aggressive promenade of Mir Jumla to crush the proud Ahom king⁴⁵ and subjugate his territory still in the hey-day of its prosperity, involving untold miseries to its king and people, gave rise to an inevitable and strong nationalistic reaction⁴⁶ which greatly affected the future of Mughal Kamarupa. The growth of national consciousness and patriotic feelings attained such a high pitch that it produced a strength of purpose and unity of action unparalleled in the Ahom history, the first fruits of which were reaped in the reign of Cakradhvasimha with the ultimate result that within two decades of Mir Jumla's return Kamarupa was lost for good.

Mir Jumla's campaign, it seems in the end, was a rash and wild venture which is attested by the account of the unnamed Dutch sailor⁴⁷—a contemporary of the general.

The Assam expedition of Mir Jumla unfolded itself like a Greek tragedy. Deaf to the voice of experience, reason and prudence, Mir Jumla was carried away by his soaring ambition, reckless spirit of adventure and inordinate thirst for military glory to attempt a daring raid into Assam,—a land intersected by good many hills and dales, rivers and *nalas*, bogs and morasses. Above all, the land is marked by a violent rainy season, the duration of which was three-fourths of a year. Further,

its insalubrious climate, pestilence and disease 'separated it (Assam) from the world, like the letter aliph,'¹⁸ and it was strewn with graves of many a past adventurer.¹⁹ It was in this land where all energies of a superman were foiled by an invisible Fate. His splendid conquests of Koch Behar²⁰ and Assam only within a very short time were snatched away and the thread of his life was cut off²¹ amidst misery and chaos, not by any human foe, but by the elemental forces of flood, famine and pestilence. The unbroken triumphs of his life brought to him in the end only dust and ashes. In this connection, the suggestive title *Fathiyah-i-Ibriyah* meaning 'the conquest that serves as warning about the emptiness of human glory' given to the narrative of Shihab-ud-Din Talish, the admiring *waqia-navis* of the general, is aptly appropriate.

Loyal to his master Aurangzeb, it was, of course, a necessary duty on the part of the Bengal Viceroy to recover the lost territories (i.e., Kāmarupa) from the clutches of the Ahoms and restore thereby the lost prestige of the Mughal emperor. This was undoubtedly not a hard task on the part of a veteran general like Mir Jumla. The Imperial authority was actually re-established in February, 1662, i.e., within a month of his triumphant march from Koch Behar. Had he stopped there and desisted from implementing his chimerical scheme of wiping out the Ahom king altogether,

he would possibly have retained his hold over Koch Behar and Kamarupa, and would have gone down to posterity as an invincible general who had never known defeat. But as ill luck would have it, Assam proved to be in the end the grave of Mir Jumla's reputation. It is suggested in this connection that even if he had succeeded in annexing the whole of Assam, he could not have retained his conquests on a permanent basis for several reasons.²²

It seems, therefore, that although a military feat redounding greatly to the credit of Mir Jumla, his Assam campaign will ever stand as a monument of his great political folly.

In fact, if the success of an undertaking is to be judged by its ultimate result, the brilliant enterprise of Mir Jumla may well be regarded as a disastrous failure; for, it ended in producing far-reaching adverse political circumstances. The complete fulfilment of the terms of the treaty and the retention of the Imperial suzerainty over the Brahmaputra Valley would have enabled Mir Jumla to claim peace with honour and thereby finish his enterprise with success. But this was never achieved. The most daring and imprudent piece of imperialistic venture, though undertaken by the greatest general of the age, proved, in the end, an abortive enterprise, an impractical and visionary scheme.

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5. Mir Jumla became the Governor of Bengal in June, 1660/Ramazan, 1070 A.H. (See *JASB*, *loc. cit.*; J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 156).
6. See J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 178; *AAA. loc. cit.*; *PAB*, p. 119; *RS*, pp. 224f.; *AB (SM)*, p. 76.

7. Mir Jumla started against Koch Behar on the 18th Rabi I, 1072 A.H./November 1, 1661 (see *MU*, Vol. II, *loc. cit.*).
8. *MA*, *loc. cit.*; *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 65; *MU*, Vol. II, p. 198; J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 180; *AAA*, p. 299.
9. See *JASB*, Vol. XLI, pp. 66-68; *MU*, Vol. II, *loc. cit.*; *Kamarupar Buranji*, ed. S. K. Bhuyan, 1958, p. 76.
10. On the completion of the conquest, Mir Jumla renamed the city from Koch Behar to Alamgirnagar. (see *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 68; *MU*, Vol. II, p. 199; J. N. Sarkar, *loc. cit.*).
11. *JASB*, Vol. XLI, pp. 69f.
12. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, *Life of Mir Jumla*, 1951, p. 223, note 1.
13. Garhgaon was captured by the Muslims on the 17th March, 1662 (see *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 75; *MA*, *loc. cit.*).
14. *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 91. Baduli joined the Nawab's standard on the 30th November, 1662, at Silikhatali (see *Ibid.*, p. 92; *KB*, p. 63; *AB(SM)*, p. 81; *Assam Buranji* (1641-81 A.D.), ed. S. K. Dutta, 1938, p. 21; *Ms. Assam Buranji*, No. 59, f. 61).
15. See *MA*, p. 26; N. Manucci, *Storia-Do-Mogor*, tr. W. Irvine, Vol. II, 1007, pp. 99-101; F. Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, tr. A. Constable, 1891, p. 172; *JASB*, Vol. XLI, pp. 86, 88, 91-92; J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-87, 194-95; *BPP*, Vol. XXIX, p. 23.
16. *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 93; *MA*, p. 27; J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 200f; *BPP*, Vol. XXIX, p. 24. Tipam (95°29' E., 27°16' N.) was the furthest point of Mir Jumla's advance in Assam.
17. *KB*, p. 68.
18. Of his four daughters, Jayadhvasimha sent Nang-sheng, his eldest daughter, to the Mughal harem (see *Satsari Assam Buranji*, ed. Bhuyan, 1969, p. 33).
19. *AB(SM)*, p. 83; *KB*, pp. 65, 67. Following J. N. Sarkar (*op. cit.*, p. 201), Jagadish Narayan Sarkar (*op. cit.*, p. 269) pointed out that Jayadhvasimha was required to send his daughter along with the sons of the Tipam Raja. But this statement appears to be wrong.
20. *AB(SM)*, p. 83; *KB*, pp. 66-67; Khafi Khan, *Aurangzeb*, 1952, p. 57. According to W. Robinson (*Descriptive Account of Assam*, 1841, p. 166), the Ahom King had to pay an indemnity of 20,000 *tolas* of gold, 1,00,000 *tolas* of silver together with 40 elephants. But this account is not supported by other sources.
21. See *AB(SM)*, *loc. cit.*; *KB*, pp. 65, 67f; *PAB*, p. 127.
22. *AB(SM)*, *loc. cit.*; *KB*, pp. 66, 68; *AB(SD)*, *loc. cit.*; *SAB*, pp. 164f.
23. *KB* *loc. cit.*; *AB(SM)*, *loc. cit.*; *PAB*, *loc. cit.*
24. For details of Desa Rani (Nakirani?) see *JBORS*, Vol. 1, p. 182 and note.
25. *AB(SM)*, *loc. cit.*
26. *KB*, p. 66.
27. *Op. cit.*, p. 269.
28. J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 203f.
29. In this connection, it is to be noted that the recognised principle of Ahom diplomacy was the adoption of means to secure the withdrawal of a hostile army from the country by promises of indemnity and tributes to be followed by an open defiance of the treaty terms when they could mobilize sufficient power to recover their lost possession. Therefore, the treaty which was soon to be entered into, was usually considered as a mere scrap of paper by the Ahoms.
30. Md. Kazim, *op. cit.*, Bib. Ind., 1868, p. 1068; cf. *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 97.
31. *JASB*, Vol. XLI, *loc. cit.*; *PAB*, p. 128.
32. *AB(SM)*, p. 91; *KB*, p. 96; *SAB*, p. 169; *AB*, p. 197.
33. See *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 96; *Ms. Assam Buranji*, No. 59, f. 62.
34. *PAB*, *loc. cit.*; *AB(SM)*, p. 97; *AB(SD)*, p. 28; *AB*, p. 200.
35. See J. N. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
36. *AB*, p. 191; *PAB*, p. 131; *AB(SM)*, p. 89; *KB*, p. 86.
37. *Op. cit.*, p. 208.
38. See *AB(SM)*, pp. 87, 91; *KB*, pp. 87, 88; *AB*, p. 187.
39. *KB*, pp. 89, 90.
40. *AB(SM)*, p. 92; *PAB*, p. 127.
41. Bernier, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
42. For details see *JBORS*, Vol. 1, p. 193; *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 82; *JIH*, Vol. V, pp. 369f; Manucci, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 100; *BPP*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 24f; Tavernier, *Travels in India*, ed. V. Ball, Vol. II, p. 278; *Deodhai Assam Buranji*, ed. S. K. Bhuyan, 1962, p. 160.
43. Gauhati remained the frontier Mughal headquarters till it was captured in *Rajab*, 1078 A.H./December, 1667. (See *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 97).
44. Cakradhvasimha drove the Muslims from Kamarupa and extended his sway as far as the river Manas (see *AB(SM)*, *loc. cit.*; *KB*, pp. 91f; *AB(HB)*, p. 49; *AB(SD)*, *loc. cit.*; *AB(SM)*, *loc. cit.*; *ABS*, p. 34; *SAB*, p. 95; *AB*, p. 200).
45. *Asiatic Researches*, *loc. cit.*
46. See speeches of the king and his ministers delivered in the war council summoned by

- Cakradhvajasimha (*PAB*, pp. 133f).
47. *BPP*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 15f.
 48. *JBORS*, Vol. I, p. 183.
 49. See *Ibid.*, p. 188.
 50. Koch Behar regained its independence in May, 1662, baffling all subsequent attempts of Mir Jumla to reduce it to the state of vassalage of the Mughal empire (see *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 87; *KB*, pp. 77f).
 51. Mir Jumla died on Wednesday, March 31, 1663/2, *Ramazan*, 1073, A.H. (see *JASB*, Vol. XLI, p. 96; *MA*, p. 27).
 52. The circumstances which could stand against

the permanent occupation of Assam by the Mughals, were : its topography, the love of independence of the people, the unreserved military resources of its king, weakness of the Mughal navy in comparison with that of the Ahoms, distance between Assam and the Imperial seat of government and the extreme unwillingness of the Mughal soldiery and their strong aversion for this land of flood, earthquake, pestilence, and of magic and witchcraft. All these, therefore, militated against the possibility of a permanent occupation of the country by the Mughals.

THE DEPREDACTIONS OF THE MARATHAS IN THE PAKAUR RAJ (BIHAR)

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The Pakaur Raj¹ was subject to the depredations of the Maratha plunderers called 'Bargees' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 'Bargees' had always been notorious for their warlike spirits and plundering habit. They would at intervals pour down in the province in vast numbers, and if there was any resistance they would come to an engagement and, having routed their enemies and putting them to the sword, massacre the whole village, and, plundering the houses and seizing the cattles, put fire to the houses, demolish any temple they could find and go away. These intermittent ravages of the Marathas harassed the people very much and they had no means to protect themselves from the ravages of these warlike plunderers. There were many beautiful temples in these parts built with black stones and very nicely carved, which were demolished by the Marathas. On the north-east of Pakaur we have seen the ruins of a beautiful temple. There were many images in the temple hewn out of black stones. There were groups of figures and images beautifully executed in relief work, the principal image being of Basudeva in autotype and the other figures in bas-relief. The temple stood on the west bank of a large tank called Deul Dighi and people called it the temple of Basudeva. Many pieces of stones of the temple bearing beautiful carvings are still to be found in many places at Pakaur.²

All the inlets and outlets of these wild regions were very narrow, with deep jungles on both

sides, and the passes were so tortuous and unsafe being constantly crossed by hill streams that it was practically a task of great difficulty to proceed on the way without some guide hired to point them out. These passes were called Ghatees, and guards called Ghatwals were kept at the entrance with a grant of Jagir lands which they enjoyed rent-free. These guards, fully armed, used to keep watch day and night at the mouth of the openings on a large tree, their houses being situated near, hid within deep jungles. These Ghatwals, at the time when Brahmottar lands were resumed, took settlement of their Ghatwali tenures from the Government as Sikni Taluk of the Zamindar. The rent assessed for the Ghatwali Jagirs was then paid through the Zamindar to the Government. All the Ghatwals had a large drum made of bronze, called Jajharghani Dunka, and whenever the Ghatwals could notice that the Maratha plunderers had arrived they used to beat the drum with a peculiar note and others taking up the alarm of danger beat their own drums and thus within a very short time all the people were apprised of the coming danger. A great confusion then ensued and all the people, with their property which could be moved, retreated to the strong fortresses of the Raja, situated on hills within the deep and impenetrable jungles.³

There are traces of these hill fastnesses in many places within the Pargana though the forests which preserved them are gone. On

the west of Pakaur where there was a deep forest in days gone by, there was a strong fastness and a path on the east of the fort. The place where this stronghold existed is now called *Gadhir Ban*, and the path is called the *Banghati* (the path of the forest). Within a couple of miles on the west of Pakaur is a place called *Pathar Chali*, a beautiful valley surrounded on the south-west and north by impassable hills covered with deep and thorny jungles. ⁴

The eastern side only is open, having a passage, between two hills, of only about five yards in breadth. This place was the retreat of the Raja and his subjects in troublesome times. This time Bhupati Shahi was on the throne of Pakaur, who ascended the gaddi in 1040 B.S. or 1633-34 A.D. It is said that there was a fort at *Pathar Chali* strongly built with stones. About fourteen miles on the west of Pakaur there is a hill called *Cachnapahar* where there are many secret caves formerly used to keep treasures in safety. One of these caves had five narrow openings to admit light and air and one broad passage by which one could enter into it. On one occasion, Hand, a Sub-Divisional Officer of Pakaur, entered this cave with many persons, lights and arms. Having proceeded a few yards he came back being unable to penetrate further and to make out the extent of the cave. We threw stones at the openings of this hollow place which disturbed the countless bats living in the cave and, as they flapped their wings, it produced a hollow and dismal sound. There is one trace left from which it will be seen that the incursions of the 'Bargees' were sources of the greatest trouble and inconvenience to the people, who lived in constant dread of the plunder of their property and massacre of their lives. One year in the month of Asvin (September-October), during Durga Puja festival, the ceremony had commenced when the 'Bargees' arrived. The *Jajharghani Dunka* proclaimed the note of danger and a great confusion ensued. The people fled for their dear lives and the Raja with all his subjects ran to the forest fastnesses. But the customary promise

(*Sankalpa*) that the Puja should be offered to Durga Devi had been said ; so it was absolutely necessary to fulfil the promise and offer the sacrifice of goats and buffalos. In this strait with the opinion of the *Raj-Pandit* five balls of mud were arranged giving it the name of *Pathe-Durga*, i.e., Durga Devi on the road, and the Puja and offerings were offered before that symbol. This custom of offering Puja to *Pathe-Durga* has been preserved from that time. The image of the Devi is duly placed on a raised dais, all the Pujas are offered before the image. But on the last day when the concluding ceremony of offering goats is to be performed, it is done before *Pathe-Durga* and the ceremony is concluded. ⁵

One year there was no sufficient rain and there was a failure of crops. The Marathas poured down the province and retired after plundering the villages and putting the houses to fire. The people suffered a lot due to the ravages of these plunderers. ⁶

In the time of Rani Chandramayee (who succeeded to the gaddi in 1160 B.S. or 1753-54 A.D.) the Marathas (*Bargees*) once came down in the rainy season. All the *Ghatwals* sounded their *Jajharghance Dunkas* and proclaimed notes of danger. All the villagers in great confusion came to the Rani to help them in saving their properties and they advised her to retire to the hill fastness. This she boldly declined to do and sending all the females and old men with the children to the impassable hill-fastness, she assembled all the able-bodied youths and supplying them with arms she herself got upon a palanquin and proceeded to give battle to the Marathas, promising to give them a lesson once for all, or perish in the attempt. Her courage put some fire into the breasts of the hardy youths, accustomed in the use of arms, and near *Ishakhpur* they took their stand with the hill stream on one side and impenetrable forests on the other side. The Marathas did not expect to meet opposition in this way. They, however, boldly advanced and soon engaged hand to hand in mortal combat. The men of *Ambar*, seeing their beloved Rani

boldly encouraging them in the fight, gave up all thought of showing their backs to the enemy and fought with desperate courage. Every inch of ground was familiar to them, being the scene of their daily pursuit of chase, and for three days this battle continued with only short respite at night. The brave Rani, without any thought of her own safety and without rest or food, supplied her warriors with hasty meals, continually encouraged them and nursed the wounded with her own hands with great care. The Marathas with continuous fight for three days without food became weak at last and wanted to run away to save their lives. But that was not possible, for they were blocked up with the deep and thorny forest on two sides and the hill stream running in high

flood on the third side. There was a small bridge across the stream which had been pulled down by order of the Rani. The men of Ambar once for all cleared up all the scores with their enemy, the Marathas, and not a single 'Bargee' escaped with his life. At sunset complete victory was proclaimed through the efforts of the brave little band of Ambar, and it was then that the Rani broke her three days' fast. The description of this battle was very simply written in the old language in coarse papers, and we received them in their worm-eaten state. The field of the battle was named Randanga, which name is still borne by a small village, and the place where the first proclamation of victory was made is still known by the name of Fattehpur.⁷

REFERENCES

1. The Pakaur Raj, situated on the Loopline of the East Indian Railway, lies in Pargana Ambar of the present Santhal Parganas district. The name 'Ambar' was given after the province of Ambar in Rajputana, the home of Man Singh. The Estate was established by Gopal Tiwary, a Brahmin (of Sandilya gotra) of Kanauj, some time during the reign of Akbar.
 2. Private papers of the Pakaur Raj Family.
 3. *Ibid.*
 4. *Ibid.*
 5. *Ibid.*
 6. *Ibid.*
 7. *Ibid.*
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BOOK REVIEWS

History of the Punjab (A.D. 1000-1526). Editor, Fauja Singh, M.A., Ph.D., Volume III, Department of Punjab Historical Studies, Punjab University, Patiala, First edition, 1972. Price not mentioned.

One of the healthy and fruitful tendencies in Indian historiography in recent times is the emphasis on regional studies. Such studies have been made by individual scholars like E. Gait (*History of Assam*), R. D. Banerji (*History of Orissa*), and M. S. Commissariat (*History of Gujarat*). But regional studies involve co-operative effort also. More than a quarter of a century ago the Dacca University planned and published a two-volume *History of Bengal*, Ancient and Medieval Periods, edited, respectively, by Dr. R. C. Majumdar and the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar. The series was continued by the University of Calcutta, and *History of Bengal 1757-1905* edited by Dr. N. K. Sinha was published in 1967. *Bihar Through the Ages*, edited by R. R. Diwakar, then Governor of Bihar, was published in 1959. The book under review falls under the second category of cooperative work.

The idea of a Comprehensive History of the Punjab from the earliest times in eight volumes was happily conceived some years ago by the Department of Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University. It is in the fitness of things that Sardar Kirpal Singh Narang, Vice-Chancellor, has written a foreword to the present volume covering the period from A.D. 1000-1526. Though it is third in the series, it is the first one to be published in English. Its Punjabi version was published in 1968.

Planned on a fairly comprehensive basis and edited by Dr. Fauja Singh, the book is practically the handiwork of local talents. It con-

sists of an Introduction and 17 chapters. Except two contributors, Drs. Paramatma Saran and K. A. Nizami, the remaining ten are all local academicians, connected with Una, Kurukshetra, Chandigarh and Patiala. Six are associated with Patiala. Among these twelve contributors Sri Ram Sharma has the major share of 5 chapters (chs. 1, 4, 9, 10 and 16). Three have two each,—Gurbux Singh (chs. 2 and 3), K. A. Nizami (chs. 7 and 8) and Bhagat Singh (chs. 12 and 13). The rest have one each—P. Saran (ch. 5), Bakhshish Singh Nijjar (ch. 6), Buddha Prakash (ch. 11), L. M. Joshi (ch. 14), Sant Singh Sekhan (ch. 15), Jit Singh Sital (ch. 17, Part 1) and Attar Singh (ch. 17, part 2). The Editor has written the Introduction besides the Editor's note. But the addition of 'Editor' at the end of the Introduction when the name of no contributor is given at the end of any chapter should better have been avoided.

A careful perusal of the book would make it abundantly clear that notwithstanding the best wishes and efforts of the Editor, all the chapters, as is perhaps natural in a co-operative effort of this kind, have not been of uniform merit. The chapters appear to be disjointed. The various sections or parts in a chapter also suffer from lack of unity in presentation.

The Editor's Introduction is fairly critical and comprehensive. But portions of it anticipate discussions in some subsequent chapters, e.g., causes of the downfall of the Hindus or their position in the State. The Editor has referred to two views regarding the position of the Hindus (p. 7), direct and indirect. While the latter has been clearly noted, the former has not. How could the Sultans of Delhi resist invasions from 10th century on-

wards (p. 3) ? Chapter I properly deals with Islam, its founder, beliefs and institutions, since the Punjab came under the influence of Islamic Civilization with the advent of the Turks. Is it quite correct to describe the Caliphs as 'deputies' of the Prophet (as on p. 26)? Chapter 5 critically discusses the causes of the 'precipitate fall of Hindu India' with due emphasis on military factors.

The geographical position of the Punjab on the main route of the Muslim invasions and conquests in Northern India has affected the course of her history which is fairly well known from standard books. But even the well-known facts gain a new significance, when studied from the regional angle.

Political and administrative history forms the theme of eight chapters. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal, respectively, with Punjab on the eve of the Muslim Invasions, Punjab Under the Ghaznavid Occupation and Ghori Invasions.

The next three chapters (6, 7 and 8) though entitled 'Administration', describe the political events of the Mamluk, Khalji and Tughlaq periods, respectively, interspersed with some administrative details. The role of the nobility during the period has not been separately discussed.

Chapters 9 and 10 deal, respectively, with Timur's Invasion and The Punjab under the Sayyids and the Lodis.

The 'People's struggle against political tyranny' described in ch. 11 strikes a new note in historiography but the connotation of the word 'people' should have been defined first.

'Political Theory as practised in the Punjab' and 'Local Government Institutions' form the subject matter of chs. 12 and 13, respectively. The subjects are no doubt highly interesting. But the treatment leaves much to be desired. There are profuse quotations from different writers but the ideas appear to be somewhat

confused. How could the Republic of Medina translate the principles enunciated by Iqbal (p. 229)?

The remaining four chapters deal with society and culture. Chapter 14 refers to Religious beliefs and practices but there are long references to Kashmir (pp. 301-2). The bearing of this on the religious history of the Punjab has not been brought out. Again we read here of 'Persian religion' (p. 293 f). The expression is a novel one, implying religion of the Parsis.

Social conditions are touched upon in chapter 15. But it is a string of certain facts only and the picture is vague at places. We read of 'The Ministers of the Yadava rulers of Devgiri, the Sena rulers of Bengal and the Pandits of Mithila wrote many new books emphasizing and extolling the continuous use of these superficial rituals, as a result of which not only in the Deccan and eastern India but actually in the whole of the country the people's energies---material, mental and intellectual---began to be frittered away in the pursuit of such superstitions and in the performance of useless customs and practices.' (p. 325). There is no discussion of the origin of *Purdah* (p. 328). Curiously enough we read of Sheikh Farid Shakarganj (p. 320 and elsewhere) in place of Ganj i Shaker. The survey of the social conditions of the Muslims is incomplete, haphazard and short, covering only four pages in a chapter of 26 pages.

In chapter 16 (Economic Conditions), a more coherent picture could perhaps have been obtained by rearrangement of the paragraphs. The sources of information have not always been indicated. Nothing has been said about State workshops (p. 369). Notwithstanding lavish expenditure it is difficult to understand how 'rulers and administrators' constituted a 'drain' on economy (p. 369) if drain is used in the sense of taking money out of the country. The articles in which Punjab had an all-India market (p. 370) have not been specified.

Chapter 17 (Languages and Literature) consists of two parts. It is not known why Part I starts with details of political history (pp. 372-3), and the contributor has taken pains to give the full name and exploits of Iltutmish (377-78) and political details of Nasiruddin, (378), Kaiqobad, Jalaluddin (380) and Sikandar Lodi (384) in this chapter. No attempt has been made to classify the branches of Literature. There are some contradictory statements (p. 385). Part II of this chapter gives a useful survey of the history and development of the Punjabi language and literature and the literary influence of Guru Nanak. But no notes or references have been given.

The book does not contain a critical discussion of the development of fine arts like Art and Architecture, music or painting at all. Space for these could have been found by condensing the book, by rearrangement of facts, but avoiding references to political details in chapters on culture and by avoiding numerous repetitions (e.g., pp. 28, 30, 220 and elsewhere).

All the chapters are informative. But the most controversial part of the book is the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims. The book emphasizes "the communal concept of Muslim rule" (p. 258) but the true connotation of the term has not been adequately explained. No doubt the story of Muslim rule has been associated with much bloodshed, tyranny and oppression but it is difficult to agree that the Muslim conquest brought "the evolution of Indian culture to a standstill" (p. 311).

Readability has not been always ensured. Use of expressions like the following have clearly affected style, e.g., pioneers of the Sultanate period (p. 1); his rule was the beginning of the Mamluk Sultans (p. 2); during the reign of the Turks (p. 7); it appears (p. 149); decided him (p. 206); reign of Tughlaq dynasty (p. 381).

The spellings of proper names adopted are not in accordance with the accepted forms and some are definitely wrong. A few examples are noted below: *Khamas* for *Khams* (iv), Qutab for Quth, Khizar for Khizr, Rukan for Rukn, Fakhar for Fakhr, Unmayid for Umayyad, Alwalid for Al Walid, Altabri for Al Tabari, Baksh for Bakhsh, Qadar for Qadir, Brown for Browne, *malechhas* for *mlechhas*, *Chitarni* for *Chitrini*. Sometimes the same word has been spelt different—Al Koofi (p. 46), AlKufi (p. 57). The title 'Sen' of Asit Kumar has been dropped (259). The late Muhammad Habib was not a Dr. (p. 201).

Certain fundamental pre-requisites have not been supplied.

Location of place names is essential for understanding the narrative, especially for one who is not familiar with the geography of the Punjab. But this has not been given in the case of towns, villages, etc., e.g., 347, 349 (water mills). The use of the word Haryana in 12th century (p. 105) is intriguing.

Similarly identification of persons and writers with the time when they flourished have not been given. Such details are necessary (e.g., pp. 327, 333, 381). Dates of some rulers have been given in sectional headings (ch. 10 and elsewhere) but not in all cases. As there is no bibliography it is not possible to understand the proper significance of the works of the authors and their bearings on the course of events.

Notes and references are appended to all chapters (except the Introduction and Section II of ch. 17). The absence of any reference to Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, vols. 1 and 2 in notes of ch. 2 is highly surprising. But the absence of a detailed and critical bibliography is a serious defect of the book. The inclusion of a map would have heightened its value.

There is no errata but almost every page bristles with printing mistakes, showing lack

of due care in proof correction. Quotation marks have not been completed (pp. 248, 312).

Nevertheless, the scholarly world will be thankful to the Punjabi University and the Editor for bringing out in one handy volume of a little over 400 pages the history of the Punjab from Mahmud to Babur for nearly 525 years.

J. N. SARKAR

Sri Aurobindo : An Interpretation. Editor : V. C. Joshi. (Issued under the auspices of Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 1973). Published by Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, pp. x + 174. Price : Rs. 25/-.

The volume under review is a collection of seven illuminative papers contributed by leading scholars belonging to diverse disciplines. The papers range widely in orientation and content. But the central concern of these essays is an attempt—and a fairly successful attempt, we must admit—at providing the readers with an appraisal and interpretation of some of the more important aspects of Sri Aurobindo's creative genius.

In a brief but charming Foreword, Dr. Karan Singh has focussed our attention on the relevance of Sri Aurobindo's life and thought to the human predicament as this century moves towards its close.

Shri B. R. Nanda has contributed an introductory biographical sketch covering mostly the Seer's pre-Pondicherry years. His narration is vivid and his perceptive analysis shows flashes of insight.

A lucid essay by Dr. V. Madhusudan Reddy deals cogently with the philosophy of integralism as propounded by the Seer of Pondicherry. We are sorry to note that long passages from Sri Aurobindo's own writings have been incorporated—let us hope, inadvertently—in the body of the essay without proper

acknowledgment in the form of quotation-marks.

Prof. Sisirkumar Ghose has offered us a critical evaluation of Sri Aurobindo's poetry. The scintillation of his style never for a moment fails or fades. His paper is laced throughout with felicitous expressions and beautiful turns of phrasing.

Shri A. K. Majumdar, in his "Sri Aurobindo's Interpretation of the Gita", has treated a sub-line theme with admirable clarity and excellent judgment.

In a paper entitled "Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought", Shri Sanat Kumar Banerji expounds and elucidates the salient features of the Seer's views on the subject.

Dr. V. K. Gokak has contributed an interesting paper bearing the title "Sri Aurobindo on Applied Science in *Savitri*".

The concluding essay by Dr. Madhusudan Reddy treats of Sri Aurobindo's vision of human unity. Readers will be struck by the architectonic skill and masterly grasp with which Prof. Reddy has handled his chosen theme.

An exhaustive index at the end has enhanced the value of the volume. The printing and get-up of the book, also the paper used, are very good indeed.

We heartily commend this volume to the serious attention of all those who are interested in the study of Sri Aurobindo's life and thought.

JUGAL KISHORE MUKHERJEE

Mountstuart Elphinstone : The Indian years 1796-1827, by R. D. Choksey, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1971, pp. 465 + VIII, Bibliography, Index, Genealogical chart, Facsimiles of handwriting, 2 plates. Price : Rs. 60/-.

Mountstuart Elphinstone, the founder of the British rule in Western India, has left an indelible impress on our history as an astute diplomat, liberal statesman and able administrator. Although his role in ending the Peshwa rule constitutes his chief title to fame, he is remembered by the Indians for his progressive administration, and for his wise educational and social reforms, which produced a renaissance in Western India.

Elphinstone came to India in 1796 at an early age of 17 and spent the next thirty-two years of his life in our country. Beginning his career as a humble clerk, he rose to the position of the Governor of Bombay. His professional success was due to his proved personal merit supported by the influence of his uncle William Elphinstone at home, and his cousin John Adam at Calcutta. Elphinstone retired as the Governor of Bombay in 1827.

Back home, Elphinstone did not rest on his laurels. A man of scholarly bent of mind and a keen observer, he wrote his *History of India*, a *magnum opus*, which was published in 1841. During his long retired life, he was regarded as the "Nestor of Anglo-Indian politics", and his opinion was often sought on Indian affairs. He was offered the Governor-Generalship of India, which he declined on grounds of ill-health. Long after his death in 1859, Elphinstone's memory was secured from oblivion by Sir Edward Colebrooke's writing his biography in two volumes, which was published in 1884.

The aim of the present biography as stated by its author is to give "a picture of the times as Elphinstone saw and experienced". Another reason which induced the biographer to undertake this work is to discover the man that Elphinstone was.

For purposes of a biography, the character of the man no less than his exploits have to be delineated. To achieve this end, the author has dug through a mass of material on Elphinstone, preserved in the India Office Library, London.

The biography falls into 24 chapters. The first chapter "Elphinstone Home and Family" forms an entity by itself and is based on the Elphinstone Family Book by Sir William Frazer. The remaining 23 chapters are divided into 5 books which deal entirely with his career in India from 1796 to 1827. These 5 books are : his *Early Years* (1796-1808) ; his *Kabul Mission* (1808-1809) ; his *Residency at Poona* (1810-1818) ; his *Settlement of the Deccan* (1818-1819), and his *Governorship of Bombay* (1819-1827).

In unfolding the Indian career of Elphinstone, the method followed by the author is to make the subject of the biography to tell his own story, quoting Elphinstone's letters and passages from his journal verbatim. The result is that Elphinstone's eventful career, and distinctive achievements are buried under the mass of much irrelevant detail, the author failing to realise "the imperative need of winnowing biographic information, of dismissing the voluminous chaff while conserving the grain".

Innumerable instances can be cited to show this. Having said that his meagre financial position and bleak prospects during his retired life had become an obsession with Elphinstone, there was no need of loading the book with the figures and statistics culled from the journal. The minute and unnecessary details furnished about "Elphinstone in India" mar the smoothness of the narrative, making the perusal dull and tedious.

Some of the observations of the author are open to debate. One wonders whether the biographer has enough historical evidence to prove that the Maratha debacle at Panipat in 1761 at the hands of Ahmed Shah Abdali "was an Afghan effort to support the toppling Mughal" (p. 28). The author rightly emphasises Elphinstone's desire to abstain from hurting the religious prejudices of the indigenous people, for he knew that therein lay the greatest danger to British rule. But he adds : "This fear was, indeed, prophetic. The mutiny of

1857, and later the *Mahatma* (italics are mine) both utilised this power over the minds of the people which gave many unhappy moments to the British raj in India" (p. 226). This statement with reference to Mahatma, to say the least, is preposterous. Again there is scope for difference of opinion when he says that "law of the Jungle (that) mostly prevailed in Western India at (on) the advent of the British" (p. 429).

Finally, it must be said that the author could not reconcile his twin aims of portraying the personality of Elphinstone and at the same time providing the scholars with "the original material, administrative, political and social". Having failed to observe the criteria of a good biography and the canons of a rigorous historical method, the present work is neither biography nor history. In spite of all this, one must give due credit to the author for his painstaking efforts in collecting the material not easily available to the Indian scholar.

J. V. NAIK

Farasi Biplabey Mudrasphiti, by Dilip Kumar Biswas and Shekhar Kumar Ghosh, D.M. Library, 42 Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-6. Price : Rs. 10/-.

This is a Bengali version of the original American book *Fiat Money in French Revolution* published about one hundred years ago. It is, however, a timely publication in these days of inflation and scarcity. This book describes the outbreak of the French Revolution, acute financial crisis of the Government, the introduction of paper currency based on the confiscated Church property but not on a single ounce of gold reserve, controversies over the first and subsequent unrestricted issues,

unprecedented inflation, price rise but no corresponding real income of the people, universal sufferings, and how after six years the real value of the paper currency was reduced to less than one per cent. All these no doubt contributed to the inflation but in addition, there were other factors : (i) the production and supply was much less than the demand, (ii) unrealistic price fixing of essential commodities by the Government, as the maximum price so fixed was much less than the cost, (iii) the consequent hoarding by the producers and traders, (iv) the rise of black market despite stringent laws including death penalty for the law breakers, (v) requisitioning of commodities and food for the army and the government, detrimental to the interest of the civilian population, and (vi) dislocation of trade and banking.

The book under review has several appendices not to be found in the original book. The facsimile of the original issue of the assignat (paper currency), metal and paper coins and ration card is a novel feature. The pictures of the revolutionary leaders, guillotine and the imprisoned Mary Antoinette before she was beheaded are the added attractions of the book. Though the original footnotes in English are there, the authors have added their own in Bengali to make the meaning of words, names and events clear for the reader.

It is printed in mono type and on map litho paper and the get-up is excellent. This reviewer hopes that the present book will serve the reference purpose for students in University examinations. Unfortunately, there are printing mistakes, despite a corrigendum. The next edition is expected to be free from this defect.

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
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
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EDITORIAL

Annual General Meeting :

The Fourteenth Annual General Meeting of the Institute of Historical Studies was held on 28th September 1975. In presenting the Annual Report for 1974-75 the Director highlighted the activities of the Institute for the year under review. It was particularly a year of solid achievement—completion of the monumental Dictionary of National Biography Project. The Annual Report brought out the multifarious activities of the Institute which have rightly won for the organisation a leading place among the all-India academic institutions. The membership showed some increase from the previous figure. But what is gratifying about the character of membership is its all-India composition. There is not a single State from where we do not have at least a few members. In that sense the Institute can proudly boast of being the most representative historical association in India.

In the Annual Report the Director referred to the regularity of publication of the *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies* and maintenance of its academic standard and its popularity. Only those who have experience of conducting a journal of this kind will appreciate how difficult it is to ensure regularity of publication. Most of the other historical journals in India are in long arrear. Ours is possibly the solitary

exception and we are determined to ensure its regularity of publication despite numerous hurdles in the way. We always have a good number of papers in the waiting file and approved papers have to wait for several months before they can be published. We are happy to note that our journal has maintained its record of having the highest circulation, both in India and abroad, among Indian historical journals.

The Annual Report referred to the new acquisitions of books and journals in the Library and to the progress of the publications programme. It is gratifying to note that our publications are becoming increasingly popular and there is a great demand for them from booksellers and institutions all over the world. It is a happy recognition of the fact that an IHS Publication is a quality publication.

The Annual Report also referred to the activities of the Research Service Bureau in spite of financial hardships and to the progress of the Project of Who's Who in the Freedom Movement in Bengal (1905-'47) entrusted to us by the Government of West Bengal. If the work progresses at this rate, we may reasonably hope to complete the Project in two more years. Only those who have experience of conducting a large Research Project of this kind, will appreciate the difficulties in the way and the

inevitable delays in the process of execution.

In spite of the proud achievements of the Institute in the academic field, the financial position is steadily deteriorating, as was clearly brought out by the Director in the Annual Report. The Annual Report gave telling figures of mounting deficits from year to year, from 1962-63 to 1974-75. The unfortunate situation can be best described by quoting from the Annual Report itself.

“One thing is clear from this dismal picture of the General Expenses Account of the Institute. Unless we get a higher grant from the Government of India (at least Rs. 15,000/- per year), the annual deficit cannot be avoided and the accumulated deficit will go on mounting from year to year. It may be pointed out here that out of a total budget of nearly one lakh of Rupees for the General Expenses Account, the contribution of the Government of India is Rs. 5,000/- only. No academic society of this kind can ever maintain itself unless it gets a minimum external subvention of 25% of its total budget. We may add here that the Institute of Historical Studies being an all-India Organisation and not a State Organisation, the Government of India should undertake the maximum responsibility for adequate financial assistance to keep it functioning properly. If the Government of India increases its contribution to Rs. 15,000/- a year from 1975-76, it will still be contributing only 15% of the total budget on the General Expenses Account. We take this opportunity to make an appeal to the Government of India to kindly sanction a recurring grant of Rs. 15,000/- per year to save a great national association of historians and to enable it to continue its services to the cause of historical research in this country as before. This is clearly a moral obligation for the Central Government in a Welfare State.”

To meet the alarming trend of mounting deficits year by year it was resolved at the last Annual General Meeting to increase the

membership fee of the Institute from Rs. 25/- to Rs. 35/- (Ordinary Members) and from Rs. 400/- to Rs. 500/- (Life Members). In view of the fact that most of our members are University or College teachers it was a hard decision to take. But we were forced to take the decision to save the Institute from an abrupt closure. By taking this decision we can show to the Government of India that we have done all that is possible on our side to augment the resources of the Institute. It will now be for the Government of India to come forward and help in filling up the breach between our essential requirements as an all-India Institute and our own financial resources.

Corresponding to the rise in membership fee from 1976-77, the annual subscription rate of the *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies* had to be increased from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 30/- (India) and from \$ 7.50 to U. S. \$ 9.00 (foreign) with effect from Vol. XVI (1976-77). The increased costs of production imposed a severe strain on the financial resources of the journal. For the last two years the *Quarterly Review* account showed a deficit. Under the circumstances there is no alternative but to increase the journal subscription rate. We hope, our readers will kindly appreciate our difficulty and will not object to the increase of the annual subscription rates. Even under the revised rates our journal will be the cheapest of its kind in India.

Supplementary DNB Project :

Encouraged by the enthusiastic response to the first DNB Project, the Institute of Historical Studies has undertaken the first DNB Supplementary Project, covering the period from 1947 to 1972, to bring the DNB up-to-date. Like the first DNB Project successfully completed, the First Supplement Project will also cover the biographies of men taken from all walks of life—politics, education, social and religious reforms, literature, science, journalism, law, administration, industry, etc.—who had made some significant contribution to

social development or to national life during the first 25 years after Independence. Like the first DNB Project, the Supplement will also be truly national in character not only from the point of view of the persons whose biographical sketches will be included but also from the point of view of the writers drawn from all over the country who will contribute the biographical sketches. The first DNB Supplement will be in three volumes of 500-600 pages each, and will include about 1,000 biographical sketches. The sketches will be given not State-wise but in strict alphabetical order for India as a whole. It will help the development of national consciousness among the young men and women of the Post-Independence generation and will promote a feeling of national integration so vitally needed today.

The DNB First Supplement Project will take six or seven years to be completed. The work will be divided into 3 stages—collection of biographical material, writing of biographical sketches and editing. The estimated cost of the Project is Rs. 7.50 lakhs. Of this amount we hope to get Rs. 2.50 lakhs from the Government of India, Rs. 2.50 lakhs from the State Governments and Rs. 2.50 lakhs from the Institute's own resources. In view of the unique national importance of the DNB First Supplement Project and of the successful execution of the First DNB Project in four volumes, we have every reason to hope to get the needed financial resources from the Government of India and all the State Governments.

By the successful execution of the First DNB Project in four volumes the Institute of Historical Studies has fully established its credentials. It may, therefore, be hoped that the Government of India, the State Governments and the generous public will readily offer the needed financial assistance to the Institute for the completion of the second monumental Project.

Annual Conference :

The Thirteenth Annual Conference of the

Institute of Historical Studies was successfully held at Panaji, Goa, from 7th to 10th November 1975, under the auspices of the University of Bombay's Centre of Post Graduate Instruction and Research, Panaji, Goa. The Conference was inaugurated on 7th November at the Kala Academy Hall by Shrimati Shashikala Kakodkar, Chief Minister of Goa, Daman and Diu. In her inaugural address she referred to the rich cultural and historical past of Goa, going back to the most ancient times. From the 16th century Goa served as a bridge between the East and the West. There developed a new cultural pattern based fundamentally on the old. Shrimati Kakodkar referred in particular to the rich treasure of historical material in the Goa Archives and invited scholars from other parts of India to take more interest in utilising this mass of historical material.

In the unavoidable absence of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Bombay, Professor D. B. Wagh, Director of the Centre of Post-Graduate Instruction and Research, welcomed the delegates on behalf of the Reception Committee. He said that it was the first occasion when the Centre of Post-Graduate Instruction and Research had the pleasure and privilege of hosting an all-India Conference of this type and hoped that it would draw the attention of scholars from other parts of India to the history and culture of Goa.

Dr. S. P. Sen, Director of the Institute, while welcoming the delegates on behalf of the Institute gave a brief account of the activities and progress of the Institute during the last 15 years which had rightly earned for the Institute a leading position among the all-India academic societies. He also explained the scope and historical interest of the two themes for discussion.

Dr. Ganda Singh, formerly Professor of History and Director, Panjabi Historical Studies, Panjabi University, Patiala, in his Presidential Address referred to the valuable

contributions made by the Institute to the cause of historical studies in this country during the last 15 years. He next dealt with the state of historical research in India and the problems facing the researcher. He emphasised the need of tapping historical material in the custody of private individuals, families and institutions and in particular referred to the historical material in the correspondence of Christian Missions in India.

The Conference was attended by about 150 delegates representing all the States and Universities in India. There were also some foreign scholars. The paper-reading sessions were held at the Dhempe College. On the principal theme—*Western Colonial Policies and their Impact on Indian Society*—there were about 60 papers, relating to various aspects of the theme and to various regions of India. On the second theme—*Sources of the History of the Former Portuguese Possessions in India*—there were 10 papers in all. The standard of papers and the level of discussions on them were quite high, in keeping with the past tradition of the Institute's Annual Conference. This was the first time that an all-India historical Conference was held in Goa and the response of the local scholars clearly indicated its stimulating effect on further historical studies. It also gave an opportunity to scholars from other parts of India to know more about the history of the former Portuguese possessions. It is to be hoped that after this Conference there will be increasing interest in exploring the rich treasure house of historical source-material preserved in the Goa Archives. From all points of view the Annual Conference was a success.

We take this opportunity to offer our thanks to Shrimati Shashikala Kakodkar, Chief Minister of Goa, Daman and Diu, for kindly inaugurating the Conference. We are also grateful to the authorities of the University of Bombay for kindly hosting the Conference.

Our thanks are also due to Professor D. B. Wagh, Director of the Centre of Post-Graduate Instruction and Research and Chairman of the Reception Committee, to Dr. B. K. Apte (Professor and Head of the Department of History), the Local Secretary, and his Departmental colleagues, to the Principal and teachers of the Department of History of the Dhempe College and finally to the most helpful band of student volunteers who did so much to ensure the comfort of the Delegates. We also thank the writers of papers, the participants in the discussions and the *Rapporteurs* for their contributions for the success of the Conference.

Publications :

Our monumental publication—*Historians and Historiography in Modern India*—which was first published in 1973, had got out of print in 1975. On account of great demand for this volume from historians, Universities, Degree Colleges and Public Libraries we are reprinting the volume which will be available in February 1976. Because of the increased cost of production the reprinted edition will be priced at Rs. 100/- (India) and U. S. \$ 25.00 (Foreign). Since the book is in great demand, we would request our members and subscribers to let us know immediately about their requirements to avoid disappointment.

Our forthcoming publication—*The North and the South in Indian History : Contact and Adjustment*—which had been sent to press in 1975 is expected to be out by the end of February 1976. It contains the papers read at the Tirupati Session (1971) of our Annual Conference. This is the first historical attempt to study the interaction between the North and the South throughout the ages, and covering the principal aspects of life and culture. It will undoubtedly be a valuable contribution to national understanding and national integration.

THE BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN WAR OF 1882

* DR. JOHN V. CRANGLE

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The British naval bombardment of the city of Alexandria on July 11, 1882 initially produced only shocked outcries from the peace interest at home ; later, when the Gladstone ministry undertook the invasion and occupation of Egypt, exposing its intention to subdue and administer the country,¹ the opponents of military intervention mobilized an energetic and articulate anti-war movement which continued its agitation until Gladstone's fall from power in 1885. This movement defined the nation's anti-war constituency, showing its variegated membership and limited influence.

In his famous Midlothian campaign of 1879-1880 Gladstone had repudiated Disraeli's controversial "forward policy" on the grounds that it was immoral in principle and dangerous, sanguinary, and costly in practice ;² therefore, the friends of peace felt completely betrayed when the Liberal Prime Minister led Britain into imperialistic war against a backward Arab country. Such a tergiversation by England's most conspicuously pious and audibly moralistic politician inevitably aroused indignation in those who had taken seriously the Liberal shibboleth of "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform."

Politicians, clergymen, intellectuals, and workers united. This coalition of intellectual dissenters, political mavericks, religiously motivated witnesses, economic and legal theorists, and frustrated ethnic dissidents embarrassed the second Gladstone ministry (1880-1885)³ by incisively criticizing its Egyptian policy. By

virtue of their access to the House of Commons, their meetings, demonstrations, and rallies as well as their utilization of public manifestos and letters they were able to attract considerable public attention to their cause. Yet they did not succeed in stopping the war nor in their effort to get the ministry to withdraw from Egypt. Though they may have had Liberal ideals and Christian morality on their side, they were unsuccessful in getting the government to stop doing in Egypt what they had so boisterously denounced Disraeli's late ministry for doing in Afghanistan and Zululand.

Gladstone's government was clearly compromised and vulnerable. Liberalism as an ideology had a strong pacifist inclination ; it inclined to the theory that war was morally repugnant, economically debilitating, and generally unnecessary ; it held that war disrupted trade, increased taxes, and wasted capital. Early in his career Gladstone subscribed to these ideas. He said he felt that colonial policy definitely should be formulated with a view to the permanent maintenance of peace and prosperity in the Empire and the strict limitation of expenditures. Speaking about the costly lessons learned from the colonial policy which led to the American Revolutionary War Gladstone remarked :

I thoroughly believe that a sound colonial policy has no tendency to separate the colonies from this country. Yet I do not think that the expenditure of large sums from the imperial treasury tends to streng-

then or perpetuate the connexion....⁴

Gladstone believed that wise rule would be more lasting and less expensive, but that if colonies did leave then "instead of the connexion being severed in the midst of bloodshed, as was the case with the United States, it may arise from the natural and acknowledged growth of those communities into States..."⁵

The Liberal Party had made a major issue of its opposition to Disraeli's expansionistic imperial policy in its successful general election campaign of 1880. Gladstone had said during the campaign that the British Empire should not be expanded, remarking "We have taken to settle the affairs of a fourth, or nearly a fourth, of the entire human race, scattered over the world, and isn't that enough..."⁶ On another occasion during the campaign he remarked of Disraeli's adventures in Afghanistan that "our hands were full already."⁷ Sir William Harcourt had told the Southport Liberal Club that Disraeli's imperial wars had "hugely increased debt and expenditure" and had provoked "contempt abroad" while leaving "a path strewn with the slain bodies of thousands."⁸ Liberal candidates hammered on the evils of overseas wars for empire even charging that wars were deliberately provoked "to divert the attention of the people from their own affairs (i.e., the cause of reform) by plunging them into costly and unnecessary wars abroad."⁹ Thus the Liberal victory of 1880 gave rise to the assumption and expectation that Gladstone would absolutely avoid overseas adventures and expansion.¹⁰

It was quite shocking then that the man who had indicted Disraeli for "disturbing confidence, perplexing business, and upsetting the fabric of civilized society in the world"¹¹ should head the government which imitated the Tory attacks on the Afghans and Zulus by attacking the Egyptians. The ministry appreciated the hypocrisy of the adventure and tried for a time to delay intervention, hoping it would prove unnecessary.¹² Sir Wilfrid Lawson,¹³

who was emerging as a foremost foe of intervention, discerned the weakening of anti-interventionist will in the cabinet, which he attributed to the machinations of the Whigs, and on May 26, 1882 demanded assurances from the ministry and the Prime Minister that there would be no intervention.¹⁴

Powerful Whig ministers demanded an intervention, however, because of their fear that the nationalist movement, led by Colonel Arabi,¹⁵ endangered the Suez Canal and the route to India.¹⁶ The ministry, which had nearly fallen in late March because of divisions in the cabinet related to the simultaneous crises in Egypt and Ireland,¹⁷ struggled to avoid intervention, but the Tories exacerbated the anguish of Gladstone and the other opponents of war by insisting on a landing designed to suppress rebellion and to secure the canal.¹⁸ The Prime Minister reluctantly concluded that he would have to take some action. The ministry took the first fatal step in the hopes of avoiding an invasion by ordering the commander of naval forces sailing off the coast of Egypt to issue an ultimatum demanding the cessation of construction of fortifications in the harbor of Alexandria by the Arabists.¹⁹

The Daily News, the leading liberal newspaper, warned against the emerging policy of the ministry, arguing that only the insecurity of the Canal would justify an invasion and that war for any other purpose would "embark the country on an unnecessary and unprofitable contest" in violation of the ministry's stated position.²⁰ The British commander broke the deadlock when, as was the wont of proconsuls in those days, he commenced hostilities without ministerial authorization by bombarding Alexandria on July 11, 1882.²¹ The act caused Gladstone to capitulate to interventionist pressures; he ordered an invasion and occupation, but with the proviso that order would be restored and a military withdrawal effected as expeditiously as possible.²² The intervention, of course, led to the permanent transfer of authority in Egypt to Britain.²³

The Daily News bemoaned the bombardment, even before the ministry announced its occupation plan, as a plunge into the "fatal abyss of intervention in the affairs of another country" and as an intolerable imitation of the Afghan and Zulu wars of the late Disraeli ministry.²⁴ In the months that followed the opponents of intervention lashed back at the ministry by organizing peace groups and by utilizing the media to agitate, inform and to propagandize against continued occupation and hostilities.

The anti-war movement did not emerge suddenly as a monolithic and dynamic force. Rather it mobilized slowly having its origins in historical Liberal doctrine, humanitarian ideology, religious dissent, and pacifism. The movement had been there all along and could be lineally traced back for decades and even centuries. Certainly, the anti-war position had been the basis of John Bright's resignation from the cabinet in protest against the Crimean War. Clearly, the anti-war position had provided Liberals, including some of those who split with the ministry over Egypt, with a basis for the opposition to the Afghan War²⁵ and the subsequent Zulu War of 1879.²⁶ What happened then in 1882 was that the anti-war position was manned and fortified anew, albeit with a much smaller complement than had been the case in 1878 and 1879 because of the fact that so many Liberals went over to interventionism with the attack on Egypt. Though depleted in numbers, the anti-war movement was able to play upon the guilty conscience of ministers and of many other Liberals who, indeed, were at pains to reiterate their intention to terminate the intervention as soon as possible.

Opponents of British involvement in Egypt pointed out that the invasion was but the most calamitous in a series of European misdeeds in the country. Prior to the war, A. J. Wilson²⁷ had shown how the Khedive of Egypt had been manipulated by European financiers in the interests of the bondholders. Branding these financial interests "the eleventh plague of

Egypt," he explained that the burden of the bonds ultimately fell upon the Egyptian peasantry and that Disraeli's purchase of the British interest in the Canal had been engineered by agents of the bondholders.²⁸ M. G. Mulhall²⁹ further discredited the British presence in Egypt with an article published three months after the invasion. Mulhall exposed European contractors for gouging the Khedive on construction work.³⁰ Even *The Times*, a Conservative and imperialistic newspaper, described the financial plight of Egypt in a revealing fashion.³¹

The anti-interventionists began their agitation against further involvement in Egypt long before the actual invasion. John Bright impugned the Disraeli ministry's policy in 1879 by asking the rhetorical question, "What is the exact object of the intermeddling which has taken place, and which many of us fear may lead to great difficulty and perhaps, disaster."³² The deposition of Khedive Ismail and his replacement with Prince Tewfik, one of his sons, provoked the outrage of certain Liberal M.P.s who charged that the Tories had engineered the coup and had installed Tewfik as a puppet of the bondholders.³³ Prior to the general elections the Opposition repeated the allegation that European bondholders and their meddling had caused the breakdown of government, the rise of anarchy, and general social dislocation.³⁴ Liberals continued to denounce Britain's interloping because they believed it tended ultimately toward invasion and occupation.

The Liberal victory of 1880 gave false assurances to the anti-interventionists, and by early 1882 they had come to the conclusion that Gladstone's ministry had developed the same tendencies as that of his late adversary. The prospect of intervention increased as the months passed and disorder spread over Egypt. A small group of Peace Radicals and Irish Nationalists joined hands in parliament in an attempt to prevent war and occupation. Led by Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Henry Labouchere³⁵ the Peace Radicals warned that further in-

tervention would violate the national rights of the Egyptians, inhibit the reform movement at home, traduce upon the finest principles of Liberalism, including the peace ethic, and upset the financial operations of Britain. The Irish Nationalists, on the other hand, emphasized the relationship of British exploitation in Egypt to the plight of Ireland and the cause of Home Rule. The Irish saw the opportunity to place additional pressure on the ministry by harrassing it in the interests of Home Rule.³⁶

Lawson became the most vigorous anti-war Radical. Prior to hostilities he insisted that parliament be consulted before war began³⁷ and strongly opposed meddling in Egyptian politics.³⁸ He impugned government reports of disorders in Egypt because he felt that they were exaggerated in order to justify British intervention.³⁹ Frank Hugh O'Donnell⁴⁰ emerged as the foremost Irish Nationalist opposed to intervention. He reminded the British of Ottoman opposition to meddling⁴¹ and charged that Europeans had provoked much of the disorder in Alexandria.⁴²

The warnings of Lawson and J. J. O'Kelly⁴³ relative to the danger of military intervention were Cassandra-like⁴⁴ until the British fleet shocked the nation by bombarding Alexandria without ministerial approval.⁴⁵ Lawson at once inquired after the loss of Egyptian lives⁴⁶ and suggested that the British commander had ignored opportunities to negotiate.⁴⁷ He also demanded a clarification of the government's confused explanations by asking, "Are we now at war with anyone, or are we not?"⁴⁸ O'Donnell condemned the bombardment both for its immorality and absurdity.⁴⁹

Outside of parliament opposition to the war mounted. The London Workingmen's Club met at the Westminster Hotel to protest and, after receiving anti-war letters from two M.P.s (Richards and Burt), they adopted the motion of a workman which read :

That this conference expresses its deep in-

dignation at the action of the Government in bombarding the forts of Alexandria, and emphatically protests against further armed intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt.

Sir Wilfrid Lawson, who was loudly cheered upon rising, said that the Egyptian people were justified in defending themselves and that the Liberal Party led by Gladstone, the same man who had excoriated the Turks for their actions in Bulgaria, had departed from the hallowed principles of "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform" and had fallen into the abyss of imperialism more deeply than either Disraeli or the Turks. The meeting adopted a motion, moved by a plumber, that the ministry "withdraw the fleet and retire from such an unequal and unjustifiable contest, which has been mainly entered into in the interests of the bondholders." Workingmen were also at pains to recognize "the rising aspirations of the Egyptian people."⁵⁰ This opposition to the war by members of the working class encouraged the Executive Committee of the International Arbitration and Peace Association which argued that the British masses were anti-war and that the conflict was also unpopular in France.⁵¹

The progress of the war was marked by continuous criticism. The Irish Nationalists and the Peace Radicals demolished ministerial propaganda justifying the invasion. O'Donnell said that reports of Egyptian rioting and burning were distorted⁵² while Lawson charged that allegations of Arabi's complicity in attacks on Europeans were false.⁵³ Lawson questioned the legal grounds for the intervention⁵⁴ and likened the war to the much maligned wars of the Tories made on the Afghans and Zulus.⁵⁵ Lawson also debunked news stories on the war by observing that Arabi "had no special correspondent to write home and say what he had and had not done. The special correspondents were all in our interests and gave us only our side of the questions." He impugned allegations to the effect that Arabi was merely a noisy self-styled leader, noting that even the imperialistic

Daily Telegraph conceded that the Colonel was very popular with the Egyptian masses.

Meanwhile Lawson was active outside of parliament in organizing resistance to the war. He served as the leading politician and first chairman of the Egyptian Committee, a coalition of anti-war activists. The first meeting of the group was held at Memorial Hall in London on July 20, 1882 where Dr. William Clarke,⁵⁷ Secretary of the anti-war Transvaal Committee which opposed British policies which had led to the Zulu War of 1879, said that Gladstone was following the path cut by Disraeli. Clarke alleged that the Liberal attitude toward Egypt was very much like the Tory position on Afghanistan which had eventuated in war in 1878.⁵⁸ Lawson also tried without success to secure the cooperation of the Cobden Club with the Egyptian Committee and the anti-war movement. The Club deliberated on Lawson's request for a motion against the bombardment of Alexandria but refused to take an official position on the issue.⁵⁹

The Liverpool Peace Society joined with the Egyptian Committee, the International Arbitration and Peace Association and dissident politicians. The Society lauded the parliamentary opposition to the war and officially denounced the ministry for violating the principles set forward in the Liberal platform of 1880. A motion also encouraged the peace Radicals to continue their agitation against the war.⁶⁰ *The Daily News* supported the anti-war movement thereby adding prestige and publicity to the effort for the nation's major Liberal newspaper wielded considerable influence among Liberal voters and politicians. *The Daily News* and the Liverpool Peace Society joined in praising John Bright when he resigned from the ministry in protest against the invasion of Egypt.⁶¹

Lawson moved strongly against the war after the bombardment and on August 16, 1882 he condemned the war as

...a manifest violation of International Law and Foreign Law. It was, in plain English, a sin against God and man; and (therefore) he had ventured to make this protest... in a cause utterly opposed to the peace, the honour, and the true interests of this country.⁶²

At the same time Sir George Campbell,⁶³ a politician who had made a speciality of Egyptian matters,⁶⁴ came out strongly on the side of the anti-war movement. He appealed to Gladstone's "heart and kind feelings" to find "some equitable compromise in the matter before embarking in the great bloodshed." Basing his arguments on Liberal principles, he warned of the costs and tax burden of hostilities and affirmed the Liberal sympathy for emerging nationalisms, observing that "there really was a strong feeling in Egypt against what had been called European domination." He also impugned "one sided stories of European residents in Egypt" and added that "if ever there was a race struggle, this is one."⁶⁵ Campbell subsequently wrote an article on the background of the war which charged that the bondholders had undermined the financial stability of the Egyptian government and that they had tried for months to inveigle the Disraeli and Gladstone ministries to intervene in the country.⁶⁶

Lawson fought all efforts to glorify and promote the conflict. When Gladstone moved a Motion of Thanks to the military commanders on October 24, 1882 Lawson placed the ministry on notice that he would move the previous question.⁶⁷ He also joined with those who focused attention on brutality and abuses occasioned by the invasion. He took note of a *Daily News* report that Egyptian office-holders had been imprisoned in wretched cells.⁶⁸ In the same manner O'Kelly complained of a *Times* report of pillaging by soldiers.⁶⁹

The war was not stopped, however, and anti-war critics changed their approach when it became apparent that Britain had in fact taken over the government of Egypt. Some

critics, such as the Rev. Henry Dunckley,⁷⁰ a veteran of the opposition to the Zulu War of 1879, defined the major question as the quality of the government which would administer the country. Dismissing the ministry's protestations, Dunckley predicted that the ministry would not withdraw and urged Britain to prepare for a protracted occupation. He recommended that the period be used to train Egyptians for eventual self-government.⁷¹

Two years of occupation provided sufficient evidence of the consequences of British control. R. T. Reid,⁷² a perennial partisan of unpopular causes, charged that the occupation had not helped the masses and that if anything the quality of government had decreased.⁷³ Evelyn Baring,⁷⁴ looking at the matter from another perspective, explained the ineffectiveness of the ministry by observing that Gladstone did not push reforms because he thought that the occupation would be too brief to effect them and that the policy of withdrawal, implemented in Afghanistan at the outset of the regime, would be quickly and successfully applied to Egypt. Baring regarded the prospect of rapid withdrawal a chimera and advocated continued occupation and reform.⁷⁵

One of the most articulate and knowledgeable critics of the intervention and occupation was Wilfrid Scawen Blunt.⁷⁶ This man gave considerable impetus to the anti-war movement because of his reputation as a specialist on Egypt and because of his prominence as a poet and man-of-affairs. Blunt knew both Colonel Arabi and Gladstone personally and he had as much respect for the former as he had contempt for the latter. Blunt condemned the invasion as but one symptom of Gladstone's hypocrisy and wrote :

His public life was a fraud ...The insincerities of debate were engrained in him....He learned to look upon the vote of the House as the supreme criterion of right and wrong in all public things.... He had acquired the power of putting on a character at will,

even I believe, to his inmosts thoughts.... Certainly, it was the light (in) which his actions showed him...in his betrayal...of the Egyptian cause.

Blunt posed as the champion of Arabi and the nationalist movement and spoke in oracular tones against British policy in the Near East which he believed was directed by the greed of the bondholders and exacerbated by the truculence of the politicians. Prior to the invasion he quarreled with his adversaries⁷⁷ and was impugned by them as a charlatan. The eastern correspondent of *The Times* dismissed the poet, alleging "Mr. Blunt professes to represent the National Party. That party repudiates him. I know of no respectable native who does not deprecate his support."⁷⁸ Blunt defended his pose in a letter to the same newspaper by asserting that Granville had acknowledged his role as an intermediary between British officialdom and the Arabists.⁷⁹

Because of Blunt's support of the Nationalists British officials in Cairo sought authority from London to expel him should he continue his interference.⁸⁰ Blunt was not to be silenced, however, and sided with the Colonel when British authorities placed him on trial. Blunt complained that Arabi was denied legal counsel by "those who have designed the prisoner's death." He wrote Gladstone that the other Nationalist defendants "are denied all justice".⁸¹

Blunt's claim to a spokesman's role with the National party was made credible when Col. Arabi wrote a public letter to Blunt from Cairo, dated November 23, 1883, in which he addressed the poet as "my friend, the preserver of my life, Mr. Wilfrid Blunt". The Nationalist defined himself in a way which made the prosecution less cogent, saying "I have offered myself as a legacy (wakf) to the freedom of my country, nor does anything interest me except the deliverance of the people of my native land from the pit of those vipers and from the fangs of the great dragon". Arabi cried out

that his credo was the same as "the wisdom of the enlightened men of the English nation who are zealous of their nation's honor".⁸²

The British government avoided the mistake of making a martyr of Arabi. The three major charges against him (provocation to riot, abuse of the white flag, and incitement to massacre) were dropped. Blunt interpreted the results of the trial as a victory for the British supporters of Arabi who had been denouncing the proceeding as a travesty of justice.⁸³ Nevertheless the anti-war interest continued to lionize Arabi and to condemn the bombardment, invasion, and occupation as a violation of Liberal principles and international law.⁸⁴

Blunt lauded Arabi as a patriot who was trying to save Egypt from foreign domination.⁸⁵ The poet's initial hope that Britain would liberate Egypt from the Turks⁸⁶ was dashed by the occupation. He branded the invasion a "contradiction of every principle he (Gladstone) had professed two years before...and a brutal and stupid aggression, a war of intrigue, undertaken in the interests of cosmopolitan finance".⁸⁷ Blunt saw the National Party undermined by Sir Evelyn Baring and remarked after a conversation with the latter that "whatever Mr. Gladstone might dream or pretend to dream about restoring the National Party and recalling the exiles, nothing was further from Sir Evelyn's mind".⁸⁸

Blunt's association with the anti-war movement was not entirely cordial. He was disappointed with Lawson because he thought the Radical knew little of Egypt and that his position was too weak :

Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Mr. Frederic Harrison,⁸⁹ who are valiantly pleading the cause of peace, stop short...they call the war unjust, unnecessary and unwise. They wish it over.... They do not see the justice or the patriotism in the Egyptian cause.⁹⁰

Blunt realized that, unlike the other anti-

war activists, he not only opposed the war but was in "violent sympathy with the enemy" in spite of his affection for England.⁹¹ Unlike the others, he was not only negative, but positive as well—he wanted to see Egypt independent.⁹² He did find an ally in Sir Randolph Churchill for whom he had great respect. In his struggle for Egypt Blunt wrote "by far the most effective ally I had found in parliament had been the young leader of the fourth party" who had "a large sympathy with the weak and oppressed." The poet thought Churchill not only a friend of Egypt but a friend of India as well.⁹³

Lawson eventually adopted some of Blunt's views, and, in spite of the fact that the peace party was received with coolness by all except the Irish members,⁹⁴ the Radical became more outspoken. He denounced Liberal plans for suppressing the nationalist movement and returning Egypt to the status quo ante bellum for it was, he said, nothing more than "the grinding down of the people of Egypt to obtain money for the bondholders, nothing more nor less". He found it disgusting that the ministry had descended to "lawless military violence" and partisanship of the bondholders.⁹⁵

The peace party minimized the issue of the security of the Canal and reiterated its vilification of the bondholders and its allegation of the illegality of the invasion. Lawson likened the bombardment to the "personal government" of Disraeli and his minions which had fomented the Afghan and Zulu wars without parliamentary authorization. The war was "an act of international atrocity...it was a cowardly, a cruel, and a criminal act. How did they lead up to it? They sent their fleet into those waters. What for? To overrule the people of that country and to establish a Government which they favour."⁹⁶

A segment of the Irish Nationalist delegation hammered indefatigably at the ministry's intervention. This offensive was tactical and was part of a strategic plan to pressure the ministry to embrace the idea of Home Rule.

In 1882 "the verbal war in the House," O'Donnell sardonically remarked, "was unrelaxing,"⁹⁷ the campaign of obstruction was carried out "with every symptom of pleasure" and the Egyptian warhanded the Parnellites a ready-made excuse for maligning the ministry. As it happened tensions had reached a new high just prior to the invasion when sixteen Irish M. P.s. were expelled on July 1, 1882 for "persistent and willful obstruction".⁹⁸ Lashing back at the ministry O'Donnell said British interloping was "a triumph of usury".⁹⁹ Later, when the ministry moved into Egypt, the Parnellites blamed the venture on British chauvinism, saying that "waves of popular emotion forced the hands of the Government".¹⁰⁰ O'Connor Power¹⁰¹ fulminated that the ministry had set "an example of a grave violation of International Law by invading a peaceful and independent country."¹⁰² The Irish ridiculed the British public's jingoism, remarking of the relish with which war news was published that "every cannon shot was telegraphed home and gloated over in England". There was no glory in the war, James F. X. O'Brien¹⁰³ observed, nor was there any courage nor justice in aggression.¹⁰⁴

The Irish Nationalists and Peace Radicals pounced on the ministry's Motion of Thanks to the armed services. Lawson denigrated the services of the British commander and said that his actions, stripped of their camouflage, could most succinctly be described as having "commenced hostilities unnecessarily when he had command of the British fleet." Condign treatment of the commander would be visitation of "public censure and condemnation." Indeed, Lawson concluded, the public payment of the salary of Lord Alcester,¹⁰⁵ the commander who was to be thanked, should be halted, but if paid at all it should be paid by public subscription taken among the mass of jingoes in the realm.¹⁰⁶ The Parnellites treated the Motion of Thanks to even greater abuse. The motion was ridiculed as some sort of "practical joke" by J. J. O'Kelly who added that the commander's service consisted in "cruelly and

heartlessly bombarding the defenseless town of Alexandria." The Irishman jested that a reward to Alcester would be an act of "political pick-pocketing" on behalf of a man who though "pretending to be civilized, attacked a practically unarmed people, and used the powers of civilization for the purposes of destruction."¹⁰⁷

Justin M'Carthy¹⁰⁸ belabored the ministry saying that the "Liberal Party were ashamed of the transaction which allegiance to their chiefs led them to approve." Pointing to the campaign promises of 1880 he said,

It must be very hard for the honourable Members opposite to find their great Liberal Government, which came to power in 1880 with anti-Jingo cries, turning out a filibustering and marauding one, and masquerading in the stolen clothes of those very Jingoes whom they had so vehemently denounced.

M'Carthy chastised the Liberals for hypocrisy in their opposition to Tory imperialism, remarking sardonically that "their hands were never so red with blood as were those of the present Government in crushing the efforts of patriotic men."¹⁰⁹

In 1883 the attention of the anti-war movement turned increasingly toward the government's involvement in the Sudan. The movement's protests appeared unable to move the ministry toward withdrawal from Egypt and, once the hostilities in Egypt had ended, the vigor and volume of anti-war activity markedly declined relative to Egypt while increasing in relation to the Sudan. The constitution of the anti-war movement remained much the same in the Sudan crisis. The Peace Radicals, a scattering of dissident Liberals, a coterie of Irish Nationalists, and a handful of journalists and humanitarians continued the agitation.

Lawson and the Irish Nationalists continued

their jeremiads for months after the invasion. Speaking at Mayport in 1884, Lawson expressed his obdurate opposition to the invasion; he said that Gladstone had ignored his true friends, the partisans of peace, to follow the siren call of expansionism and that the Prime Minister had compromised himself further by negotiating with his erstwhile adversary, the Turk. As for the invasion of the Sudan, Lawson charged, "It was a tyranny and a crying disgrace that the troops of this country should be enjoying enslaving the people of Sudan."¹¹⁰ The Radical blamed the Tories for pressuring the ministry; he somewhat exonerated the Liberal Party by asserting that the "Tories...had hounded on the Government to carry fire and sword into Egypt."¹¹¹ In his constituency of Carlisle he branded Egypt a "white elephant", condemning the Liberals for hypocrisy: "They said they were peace, retrenchment, and reform people, yet they supported the policy of bombarding Alexandria and invading Egypt while they called out it was peace." He could not "believe the massacring of Egyptians was peace". He pointed out the sticky problem of withdrawal which Britain had confronted in recent years in various parts of the Empire, observing that "Egypt was a curious place. It was more difficult to get out of than to get into. So the Israelites had found...it was only by a miracle that they got out."¹¹²

For Britain there was to be no miracle in

Egypt. The Gladstone ministry, beset by Tory imperialists who blamed the Liberal Party for "abject imbecility" and "degraded and servile worship of the Prime Minister" regarding the intervention policy,¹¹³ Egypt turned out to be a political, diplomatic, and military desert; like the Hebrews, it took the British forty years to find their way out. The ministry, charged by the imperialist interest with "the immediate and paramount duty of the defence of the land from the possibility of a barbarous invasion... of the Arab and Negro tribes of the Sudan into Upper Egypt...(which would) threaten the very existence of law and order in the valley of the Nile,"¹¹⁴ felt compelled to subdue the disorders in the Sudan. Next, it undertook to stabilize the government and finances of Egypt, a complicated and protracted business which, in view of Britain's preoccupation with the vital link of the Suez Canal, was evaluated according to the strict criteria of imperial security and maritime strategy.¹¹⁵ The anti-war movement could not significantly influence British policy in Egypt because the perceived security interest of the Empire in the Near East was much more highly valued than the ostensible commitment of the Liberal Party to the principles of peace, retrenchment, and reform. The peace movement tried to recall the Liberals to their professed ideals; the Tories worked for the opposite effect; the Gladstone ministry, of course, showed by its actions what Liberalism had become—anti-expansionist in word but annexationist in deed.

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2. See author's "The Issue of Imperialism in the Liberal Campaign of 1880," *Indian Political Science Review*, VIII, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 41-54.
3. R. C. K. Ensor, *England, 1870-1914* (Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 607-608.
4. *Hansard*, III, 104, April 16, 1849, p. 354.
5. Gladstone hoped that in years "after the termination of the political connexion a community of feeling will still subsist in a similarity of laws and institutions." *Ibid.*, p. 335.
6. Robert Blake, *Disraeli* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 675-676.
7. *Manchester Guardian*, November 27, 1879, pp. 5-6; and *ibid.*, December 1, 1879, pp. 6-7.
8. *Ibid.*, October 7, 1879, p. 8.
9. *Ibid.*, April 29, 1879, p. 6.
10. The Liberal victory was by no means a mandate against imperialism. There were many other issues before the electorate. On the ambiguity of the election see H. J. Hanham, *Elections and Party*

- Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone* (London: Longmans, 1959), p. 200.
11. Gladstone campaign speech. *Manchester Guardian*, May 14, 1879, p. 5.
 12. Most Liberals disdained the European creditors of the Khedive, known popularly as "the bondholders," as jackals. Gladstone personally reviled them for their greed. Robinson and Gallagher, pp. 91-92.
 13. Sir Wilfrid Lawson (1829-1906) was a Radical M.P. who favored many reform causes during his long career. He adamantly opposed imperial expansion and war. He was an articulate and witty speaker in parliament and at public meetings and rallies. *D.N.B.*, Supplement 1, 1, pp. 428-431; *Annual Register* (1882), 124, p. 152.
 14. *Annual Register* (1882), 124, p. 140.
 15. For details on Arabi's revolt see the Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1908), I, pp. 176-180; *Annual Register* (1879), 121, pp. 212, 213, and 219.
 16. Granville, Hartington, and Northbrook were the chief partisans of intervention. *Annual Register* (1882), 124, p. 140.
 17. J. L. Hammond, *Gladstone and the Irish Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1938), p. 290.
 18. *Annual Register* (1882), 124, pp. 141-144.
 19. Robinson and Gallagher, pp. 111-112. *Times*, July 7, 1882, p. 5.
 20. *Daily News*, July 10, 1882, p. 5.
 21. Marlowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 315, 319, and 320.
 22. Robinson and Gallagher, pp. 119-121. The pressures mounted by jingo organizations such as the Patriotic Association of London were intense. At a meeting at St. James Hall the Association urged "a resolute British policy... in Egypt and the East." The Tory influence was obvious: Lord Waterford chaired the meeting and Lord Stanhope, H. D. Wolff, and Baron de Worms were in attendance. *Times*, July 6, 1882, p. 5.
 23. Marlowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-286.
 24. *Daily News*, July 12, 1882, p. 3.
 25. For details on the anti-war movement of 1878 see my article "Liberal Opposition to the Afghan War of 1878," *Afghanistan: Historical and Cultural Journal*, XXV, No. 3 (December, 1972), pp. 56-67.
 26. For details see my *The Decline and Survival of British Anti-Imperialism, 1878-1885* (unpublished dissertation; Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina, 1969), pp. 80-104.
 27. A. J. Wilson (1831-1881) was the son of a well-educated missionary. Educated at Tübingen and Edinburgh, he worked and travelled extensively in India where he edited the *Bombay Times*. In later life he moved to the Orient whence he contributed articles to the *Daily Mail* and the *Pall Mall Gazette*. *D. N. B.*, XXI, p. 549.
 28. A. J. Wilson, "The Eleventh Plague of Egypt," *Fortnightly Review*, New Series XXV (May, 1879), pp. 787-797.
 29. M. G. Mulhall (1836-1900) was a statistician who researched the geography and economy of overseas territories. He wrote many volumes including *The Dictionary of Statistics* (1883) and *The Balance Sheet of the World* (1896). He later became a newspaper publisher in Argentina. *D. N. B.*, XXLI, Supplement, pp. 1079-1080.
 30. M. G. Mulhall, "Egyptian Finance", *Contemporary Review*, XXXII (October, 1882), pp. 525-534.
 31. *Times*, December 25, 1878, p. 8. The controversial question of the role of financial motivation has been considered by M. K. Issa, "The Economic Factor Behind the British Occupation of Egypt in 1882", *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, I.V, No. 318 (October, 1964), pp. 43-57.
 32. *Hansard*, III, 247, June 23, 1879, pp. 429-430. Some of Bright's colleagues in the House of Commons charged that the Tories were plotting further intervention in Egypt on behalf of the financial interests in Britain. *Ibid.*, June 20, 1879, pp. 307-310.
 33. *Ibid.*, June 26, 1879, pp. 725-729.
 34. *Ibid.*, 249, August 11, 1879, pp. 681-695.
 35. Henry Labouchere (1831-1912) was the member of a wealthy family who turned to Radicalism. In parliament he attacked the Whigs and supported reform. He founded the weekly publication *Truth* and contributed to the *Daily News*. He opposed imperialism in the Egyptian and South African wars while favoring Home Rule. *D. N. B.* (1912-1921), pp. 316-318.
 36. For details on the Irish utilization of imperial grievances in the cause of Home Rule see my "Irish Nationalist Criticism of the Imperial Administration of India, 1880-1884", *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies*, XI, No. 4 (December, 1972), pp. 183-188.
 37. Lawson asked "whether the House of Commons will have an opportunity of expressing its opinions on this policy of intervention before hostilities are permitted to be commenced." *Hansard*, III, 269, May 23, 1882, pp. 1404-1405; and *ibid.*, May 26, 1882, p. 1703.
 38. *Ibid.*, June 2, 1882, pp. 1937-1938.
 39. *Ibid.*, June 7, 1882, pp. 364-365.
 40. Frank Hugh O'Donnell (d. 1927) was an able but difficult member of the Irish Nationalist delegation who contended with Parnell for its leadership but was unsuccessful. He pioneered the tactic of obstruction in parliament. He espoused many humanitarian causes, especially that of reform in the Empire. Thomas Power O'Connor, *The Parnell Movement: with a sketch of Irish Parties from 1843* (New York: Benziger, 1886), pp. 271-272, 491.
 41. *Hansard*, III, 269, May 22, 1882, p. 1259.
 42. *Ibid.*, 270, June 15, 1882, p. 1260. This charge repeated that of the Executive Committee of the International Arbitration and Peace Association which two weeks earlier adopted a resolution memorializing Lord Granville that "the present difficulties in Egypt have, to a great extent, arisen from foreign interference" and urged "a policy of non-intervention in the internal administration of Egypt." *Times*, July 1, 1882, p. 10.
 43. J. J. O'Kelly was born in Dublin and at an early age became a patriot who favored violent means of liberating Ireland. He entered parliament in 1880 and became a partisan of Home Rule by constitutional means. He contributed to the *Daily News* and *Freeman's Journal*. O'Connor, *Parnell Movement*, pp. 353-363.
 44. O'Kelly warned against reported French plans for invasion and occupation. *Hansard*, III, 270, June 16, 1882, p. 1420.
 45. Marlowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 315, 319, and 320.

46. *Hansard*, III, 272, July 11, 1882, p. 94.
47. *Ibid.*, July 17, 1882, p. 708.
48. *Ibid.*, July 21, 1882, p. 1222.
49. O'Donnell also deplored the inaccuracy of artillery fire "which, directed against forts.....(fell) into the habitations.....of the people of Alexandria." *Ibid.*, July 17, 1882, p. 709
50. *Times*, July 15, 1882, p. 10
51. *Ibid.*, July 17, 1882, p. 9.
52. *Hansard*, III, 272, July 24, 1882, p. 1547; *ibid.*, 273, August 3, 1882, p. 585.
53. *Ibid.*, July 31, 1882, pp. 216-217.
54. *Ibid.*, August 8, 1882, p. 1145.
55. *Ibid.*, August 16, 1882, p. 1931
56. *Ibid.*, 1931-1933. In a letter to the editor Lawson also urged that the Egyptian Chamber of Delegates be allowed to vote on a portion of the budget, recalling British protestations that Europeans should avoid interference in the domestic affairs of the country. *Times*, August 17, 1882, p. 8.
57. Dr. William Fairlie Clarke (1833-1884) was born in India and educated in medicine at Oxford. He was an ardent social reformer and humanitarian who wrote numerous tracts on temperance, medical missions, and charitable causes. *D. N. B.*, IV, pp. 452-453.
58. *Manchester Guardian*, July 21, 1882, p. 8.
59. *Ibid.*, July 24, 1882, p. 8; *Annual Register* (1882), 124, p. 152.
60. *Manchester Guardian*, July 25, 1882, p. 8.
61. *Daily News*, July 15, 1882, p. 4; and *Manchester Guardian*, July 25, 1882, p. 8.
62. *Hansard*, III, 273, August 16, 1882, pp. 1934-1935.
63. Sir George Campbell (1824-1892) in early life worked in the administration of India and wrote the official history of the Mutiny. He held judicial and commission posts and served as Lt. Governor of Bengal (1871-1874). He wrote on the Empire and published *The Ethnology of India* (1865). He served in parliament as a Liberal from 1875-1892. *D. N. B.*, XXII (Supplement), pp. 383-385.
64. Campbell had earlier critically outlined the plight of the country in his article "The Situation in Egypt", *Fortnightly Review*, New Series XXV (June, 1879), pp. 787-797.
65. *Hansard*, III, 273, August 16, 1882, pp. 1935-1938.
66. Sir George Campbell, "The Reconstruction of Egypt", *Fortnightly Review*, New Series XXXIII (January, 1883), pp. 38-50.
67. *Hansard*, III, 274, October 24, 1882, p. 32.
68. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1882, p. 171.
69. *Ibid.*, 272, July 24, 1882, p. 1541.
70. Henry Dunckley (1823-1896) was a Baptist minister and Liberal journalist who wrote prodigiously on social and political questions. Elected to the Reform Club in 1878, he agitated against exploitation, privilege, and squalor. *D. N. B.*, XXII (Supplement), pp. 594-595.
71. Henry Dunckley, "Egypt, Europe, and Mr. Gladstone", *Contemporary Review*, XXXVI (July, 1884), pp. 1-23.
72. R. T. Reid (1846-1923) was a Liberal lawyer elected to parliament in 1880. A loyal supporter of Gladstone on most issues including Home Rule, he was opposed to expansion and exploitation and supported the Boers in the South African War. He became Lord Loreburn, and Lord Chancellor in later life. *D. N. B.* (1922-1933), pp. 714-717.
73. R. T. Reid, "Our Obligation in Egypt", *Fortnightly Review*, New Series XXXVI (August, 1884), pp. 199-216.
74. Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer (1841-1917) served in India before becoming a British Commissioner in Egypt and in 1879 Controller. He disliked involvement in the Sudan but authorized the Gordon mission. *D. N. B.* (1912-1921), pp. 20-28.
75. Robinson and Gallagher, pp. 130-131.
76. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (1840-1822) was a poet, diplomat, and traveller who lived in Egypt (1858-1869). He disliked the European bondholders and their meddling and deplored the exploitation of the natives. He opposed the interventions in Egypt and the Sudan and was pro-Boer. He wrote many polemics against imperialism and militarism. *D. N. B.* (1922-1930), pp. 84-86.
77. *Times*, July 6, 1882, p. 5.
78. *Ibid.*, July 1, 1882, p. 10.
79. *Ibid.*, August 2, 1882, p. 3.
80. *Ibid.*, August 2, 1882, p. 3.
81. *Ibid.*, October 10, 1882, p. 5.
82. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1882, p. 6.
83. Blunt expressed his satisfaction at the outcome of the trial after the major charges were dropped and the proceeding concluded. *Times*, December 5, 1882, p. 6.
84. Lawson emphasized the fact that the opposition to the intervention had not waned but said that through an error the strength of the movement in parliament was not mustered for a critical vote on the war in early 1883. *Times*, February 19, 1883, p. 10.
85. Blunt explained that he had "love, respect, and sympathy for Arabi and his rebels, patriots fighting for their freedom." Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, "The English Revolution, a Personal Narrative", *Nineteenth Century*, XII (September, 1882), p. 324.
86. Blunt said that he "communicated my thoughts on these things to Mr. Gladstone, confident of his sympathy". *Ibid.*, pp. 327-328.
87. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *India Under Ripon: A Private Diary continued from his "Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt"*. (London: T. F. Unwin, 1909), p. 4.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15; diary entry for September 14, 1883.
89. Frederic Harrison (1831-1923) was an author, social reformer, and activist. He wrote on history, literature, and philosophy, advocating positivism. He served on two royal commissions, taught at Workingmen's College in London, and ran unsuccessfully for parliament in 1886. *D. N. B.* (1922-30), pp. 406-408.
90. *Nineteenth Century*, XII, p. 324.
91. Blunt also charged that Britain lacked another public man with the "courage to say without reserve, 'God speed the right! as I do in the coming struggle'". *Ibid.*, p. 324.
92. While in Egypt he "registered a vow that I would devote a share of my energies thenceforth to the cause of freedom for the Arab race." *Ibid.*, p. 327.
93. India under Ripon, pp. 9-10. On the other hand Blunt said his arch opponent in Egypt was Sir Auckland Colvin who had denounced Blunt in the

- newspaper published by British interests in India. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
94. *Annual Register* (1882), 124, p. 149.
 95. *Hansard*, III, 272, July 25, 1882, pp. 1701-1710.
 96. *Ibid.*, July 12, 1882, pp. 167-170.
 97. F. H. O'Donnell, *A History of the Irish Parliamentary Party* (2 vols. ; London : Longmans, Green, 1910), II, pp. 164-165.
 98. O'Connor, I, pp. 252-253 ; Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Parnell and His Party* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 83.
 99. *Hansard*, III, 273, August 10, 1882, pp. 1397-1398. O'Donnell said the Anglo-French intervention was "a triumph of usury not excelled in the most horrible imaginings of usurious excess."
 100. O'Connor, I, pp. 308-309.
 101. O'Connor Power was a Fenian who attended the Home Rule Conference of 1873 but only belatedly accepted legal means of agitation. Elected to parliament he joined the obstructionists. Jules Abels, *Parnell Tragedy* (New York : Macmillan, 1966), pp. 35, 51, 56, 62, 69, 70, 182, and 269.
 102. *Hansard*, III, 280, June 8, 1883, pp. 56-59.
 103. James F. X. O'Brien (1828-1905) was the son of an Irish merchant. He participated in the violence of 1848 and joined the Fenians in 1862. Imprisoned during the Fenian revolt of 1867, he was later released and elected to parliament as a Parnellite. He broke with Parnell over the divorce crisis. *D.N.B.*, (Second Supplement), III, pp. 33-34.
 104. *Hansard*, III, 280, June 8, 1882, pp. 76-78.
 105. Frederick Seymour, Lord Alcester (1821-1895) entered the Navy in 1834 and became a commander in 1847. He participated in the Crimean War and became a Rear Admiral in 1870. He commanded the Mediterranean Fleet which bombarded Alexandria without ministerial authorization and thus began the war. *D. N. B.* XVII, pp. 1258-1259.
 106. *Hansard*, III, 280, June 8, 1883, pp. 38-47.
 107. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
 108. Justin M'Carthy (1830-1912) participated in the Young Ireland Movement and the abortive revolt of 1848, but later came to believe that Irish interests would be best served by appealing "to the conscience and reason of England's best citizens." He became a journalist, an occupation which he pursued after his election as a Parnellite in 1879. *D.N.B.* (1912-1921), pp. 351-352.
 109. *Hansard*, III, 280, June 8, 1883, pp. 80-81. At the time M'Carthy spoke Ireland was virtually under martial law. Dorothy McCardle, *The Irish Republic* (New York : Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1965), p. 52.
 110. *Times*, November 11, 1884, p. 7.
 111. *Ibid.*, January 26, 1884, p. 9.
 112. *Ibid.*, February 1, 1884, p. 7.
 113. *Times*, February 18, 1884, p. 12.
 114. "The Egyptian Question", *Edinburgh Review*, CLIX (January 1, 1884), p. 145.
 115. Grant Duff, a Liberal stalwart who would become Viceroy of India, defined imperial interests, in Egypt as : (1) "absolute freedom of Isthmus transit" : (2) "good government of the valley of the Nile." Grant Duff, "British Interests in the East", *Nineteenth Century*, VII (April, 1880), p. 659.

PRESENT STATE OF AMERICAN ZIONISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS OF 1967

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Ever since the creation of Israel as a state and a national home for the Jews the whole position of American Zionism has changed.¹ So long as the Jewish State was not in existence for the mass of American Jews Zionism was a practical programme.² They could work for it without creating suspicion as to their loyalty and allegiance as citizens of the United States. But when Israel emerged on the political map of the world as a sovereign independent state in 1948 the American Zionists were faced with a challenge. Their own belief that a respectable Jewish life was only possible in Israel now seemed impracticable even to them. That's why when the long cherished national aspiration for a Jewish homeland finally came to fulfilment, there was no exodus. The American Jews did not go to Israel. With a way open, they came to discover that they did not belong to that far off Mediterranean shore but they belonged to where they were in America.³

In the post-Israel era the irrelevance of their ideology has made the American Zionists put on a new outfit to suit the changed situation. Hence, while the pre-Israel Zionist stand was the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, post-Israel Zionist programme has stood for the preservation of Israel, the hard-earned fruit of their toil.⁴

The rapid decline of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the major Zionist political organisation, did not mean Zionism became a spent force in America. In the changed

context, with its revised political aspirations, the post-Israel American Zionism seemed to have a greater appeal to the American Jewry.⁵ Various polls taken before the birth of Israel showed that more than ninety per cent of the American Jews favoured the establishment of a national Jewish homeland. After Israel was born they expressed by an even higher percentage their solidarity with Israel and their willingness to support the constructive programme. A survey conducted by the American Jewish Committee in Riverton (Trenton, N. J.), a typical Jewish community of 8,500, revealed that of the responding parents 94 per cent displayed a positive attitude toward Israel, 2 per cent were indifferent, another 2 per cent had mixed feeling, and only 1 per cent had taken a negative position. In case of Jewish children, substantially the same results were yielded. A survey conducted by the same Committee in Baltimore in May 1948, immediately after Israel was founded, found that 95 per cent of the respondents were of the feeling that American Jews should help Israel. They went even to the extent of saying that this help should not be jeopardized even if the Government of the United States decided not to support Israel.⁷

The creation of Israel filled in American Jewish mind a sense of pride as a nation. An individual American Jew no longer suffered from the complex of being a person having no national identity. This feeling gave him the confidence to associate himself with a people that was no longer nationally uprooted. Use

of a few Jewish words, preferably in Israeli pronunciation, keeping of Israeli art objects and Israeli amusement patterns have come to form an indispensable part of American Jewish life.

The solidarity of the American Jewish community with the state of Israel found expression during the Arab-Israeli conflicts. All the time whenever Israel was put in trouble the American Zionist lobby became active and came to its support. The sympathetic stand taken in most of the cases by the Washington Administration to Israel can be attributed to overall strategic and economic interests of the United States, yet the pressure extended by the Zionist pressure groups to influence the Administration should not be under-estimated. President Harry S. Truman himself has confessed in his Memoirs about the Zionist pressure over him during the first Arab-Israeli conflict of 1949 and the consequent tacit understanding between him and Dr Chaim Weizmann, the President of Israel.⁸

Leaving aside this first Arab-Israeli crisis, as it was a time when American Zionists were not disintegrated, Zionism in America has continued to remain as an effective pressure group in American politics.

In 1953 when Israel attacked Qibia, the United States cut off its aid to Israel. But this did not last long. The American Zionists became operative to give the impression that it was an unauthorized attack done by nervous settlers. Significant pressures were brought to bear upon the White House and the Department of State during the New York mayoral campaign. The result was that the incident was soon forgotten and American aid resumed. In the spring of 1954 when Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, stated the substance of the American Middle Eastern position which seemed very much neutral *vis-a-vis* Arab-Israeli disputes the American Zionists and the Israelis protested vehemently.

He was subjected to much pressure and even a campaign was launched to remove him. The Israeli State Broadcasting System in Tel Aviv called for "Jewish Unity" and urged :

Let the Democratic Party and the Republican Party realize that their Jewish members are organized not only as Americans, but also as Jews who have vital Jewish-interests. Let the American people and government feel the pressure and realize what millions of American citizens think about the present anties around us here in Israel. The idea of Jewish Unity, which we formerly considered good for Russian, Polish and German Jewry, cannot be bad for America.¹⁰

The American Zionist lobby was considerably to blame for John Foster Dulles's disastrous refusal to finance the Aswan Dam Project. Israel's attack on Egypt against American warnings and during the Presidential elections when the fear of losing the Jewish vote was at its most acute, was not a way of showing gratitude for all the American aid she had received. As a result, Israel was not made to suffer for long and Zionist pressure continued to have its influence on American policy.¹¹

The significant influence which the Zionist lobby and pressure groups have been continuing to wield over the American administration gives natural urgency to the question why is it so. Zionism as a concept has lost its charm after the birth of Israel. Now in America very few are Zionists in its original sense though in Zionism's revised meaning many Americans are still Zionists. In 1954, the American Zionist Council, which embraced all the Zionist bodies in America had a membership of 750,000, a decline of about 25 per cent from its peak in 1948. In 1967 the largest American Zionist group was Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization. Its membership was 300,000.¹²

Moreover, not only the number of Zionists in America is not much now but Jews are not

in good number in political positions too. In 1967, there were no more than sixteen or eighteen Jewish members in the House of Representatives and only two Jewish Senators, Jacob Javits and Abraham Ribicoff. Few Jews have served as representatives of America in foreign countries, either as ambassadors or as lesser officials. The total number of Jewish ambassadors designated by the United States in the twentieth century would not be more than five.¹³ Only in political process and affairs of State their involvement is significant. Scores of Jewish legislative and legal assistants serve in the offices of the Senators and Representatives and help to administer the countless agencies of government.

Thus if the number of the American Zionists is not so impressive, if their participation in the Congress and ambassadorial staff is not much, then what is there, that makes the Zionist lobby so powerful. The answer is "myth of Jewish vote". Both Democrats and Republicans feel that if they take an anti-Israel stand they would lose the Jewish votes. As the percentage of voting among Jews is very high, so naturally no major political party in America can afford to displease the Jewish community. For example, in the 1964 election 81 per cent of all eligible Jews cast their votes, compared to the record 62.8 per cent of the population as a whole.¹⁴ The Zionists exploit this fear among the political parties in favour of Israel. None of the numerous political interest groups in Washington is better entrenched than the "broker of the Jewish vote".¹⁵ Zionists have been successful in frightening the politicians through this. But actually this 'Jewish vote' idea is a myth. The Jews in America never vote as a community. A study made by the Columbia University for *Life Magazine* in 1952 revealed that 37 per cent of the Catholics, 36 per cent of the Jews and 23 per cent of the Protestants were affiliated with the Democratic Party. So far Republicans were concerned 22 per cent of the Catholics, 6 per cent of the Jews and 45 per cent of the Protestants were affiliated to it.

Most significant thing that this study revealed was that 58 per cent of the Jewish Americans were affiliated with neither party.¹⁶ So it cannot be said either of the party has a first mortgage on the Jewish votes. Yet the mythical unit attributed to the Jewish people by Zionist propagandists works in the psychology of the American political parties and they surrender to Jewish nationalism. This is because a professional politician is too much apprehensive of the reverse consequences of disregarding the bluff of the "professional Jew", and an American Jew will not take the Zionists to task for usurping his voice and peddling his vote. Thus emerges the felicitous alliance between American politicians and Zionists.¹⁷

Another very important reason why the political parties always take a pro-Israel stand and never dare to displease the Jews on this issue is that although in America now very few Jews claim themselves as Zionists yet they brand themselves as pro-Israel. The average American Jew wishes Israel good without considering himself as Zionist. Membership in various Zionist organizations in America has fallen to one-fifth of what it was in the 1940s, and leadership has also largely passed on to Jews born not in the United States, still there is hardly a Jew who does not identify his feelings with those of an Israeli. In a survey of a large southern community made in 1959 one question was asked: "Should we raise money for Israel?" It revealed that eighty-nine per cent of the respondents were in favour and only 8 per cent expressed disapproval. But the question: "Should we belong to a Zionist group?" the 'yeas' fell to 45 per cent and 'nays' rose to 50 per cent. And only 4 per cent approved the idea of American Jews becoming citizens of Israel.¹⁸ This study had revealed two things: one, that only a minute fraction of American Jews believe in the traditional concept of Zionism, that is, a respectable Jewish life can only be possible in Israel; and, two, that while comparatively a much smaller number of Jews want to become Zionists a substantial number of them feel sympathy for

Israel. It is to be noted here that not only Jews, even many non-Jewish Americans also are sympathetic to Israel, this may be due to Jewish influence or due to basic traits of historical tradition as an emigrant nation. Like support for the Irish Free State, solidarity with Israel is a normal part of life for most of the Americans. In April 1966, the steel workers of America arranged a dinner at which Israel bonds worth more than \$900,000 were bought by labour and management in an industry which had few Jews.²⁰

That Zionism continues to be a potent force in American life and that most Jews in America feel a sense of solidarity with the state of Israel was very much revealed during the six-day Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. After the withdrawal of U. N. Forces from the Egyptian borders on Nasser's request when a threat of attack on Israel began to mount the Zionist press, pulpit and platform in the United States became vocal and active. From all sides they were bent upon pressurizing the American administration to take a pro-Israeli stand.

As the crisis in the Middle East unfolded, concern for and identification with Israel by Jews in the United States reached a peak. Its main outward forms were : mass rallies, fund-raising, and a "Volunteers for Israel" movement. While in these many non-Jews also participated yet it was mainly the Jewish community which initiated and sustained the upsurge of popular support for Israel.²¹ The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations which represented twenty-one major religious and secular groups, in May 1967 to express its sympathy and a "deep sense of solidarity with the people of Israel". A cable was sent to Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel, which read in part : "A united American Jewish community sends you this expression of comradeship and commitment in support of your determination to seek a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." In Los Angeles some 35,000 attended a mass rally organized by the Jewish Federa-

tion of Los Angeles.²² In late May when the situation became tense as the Arab armies closed in on Israel's borders the Zionist organization of America and its constituents across the country leapt vigorously into action. A meeting of the National Executive Committee on May 27-28 at New York City turned into an emergency rally. Its aim was the total mobilization of the ZOA membership for support of Israel in the current crisis. The steps that were taken or were to be taken, as the meeting decided, included community rallies, telegrams to the President and Government officials, contacting the Senators and Representatives and statements in the press and on the air.²³

On May 28, in New York an estimated 45,000 people marched along the city's West Side. This was the largest pro-Israel demonstration since the birth of Israel. New York Deputy Mayor, Dr. Timothy Costello said in a brief address that New York had the largest Jewish population of all the cities and that all New Yorkers, regardless of their religion, "cannot pretend to be objective about Israel in the crisis." New York, he said, had strong bond with the Jewish Nation and hostile powers should know that "Israel is here to stay."

In the meeting other speakers like Dr. Joachim Prinz, chairman of the conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish organizations, and Rabbi Israel Miller, President of the American Zionist Council also emphasized on the solidarity of the American Jews with Israel. Michael Arnon, Consul General of Israel in New York, said of the demonstration that : "We are made to feel that we are not alone." It is interesting that to this Zionist success messages of greetings were received from Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, and New York Senators Jacob Javits and Robert Kennedy.²⁴

Almost during the same time in a statement, a spokesman for the conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organiza-

tions said: "We are asking all Jews to charter planes and buses if they have to, and to come by rail to get the greatest representation possible." Meanwhile the chanting Jewish students staged a demonstration outside the United Nations, urging United States support for Israel in the present crisis. The students carried festoons, sang the Israeli national anthem "Hatikvah", and chanted slogans.²⁶ The New York Mayor John V. Lindsay in a statement described the Middle East situation as a "sheer tragedy" and criticized the Arab nations for what he termed their "provocative posturing and military manoeuvring". The United Nations should, Lindsay said, "reassert at once its peacekeeping responsibilities and supremacy."²⁷ Dr. Joachim Prinz, head of the Jewish presidents' group, said emotionally at a news conference at 515 Park Avenue, New York, the ZOA headquarter: "I reject the idea of treating Israel as though it were just any other nation."²⁸ In 7 June's *New York Times* a full page space was donated by the Jewish War Veterans of the U. S. A. which is America's oldest Active War Veterans Organization urging on the U. S. administration to come to support Israel.²⁹ The next day thousands of Jews arrived to participate in a national rally for Israel in Lafayette Park. The estimated strength of this assembly was 20,000.³⁰

Side by side with organizing mass rallies and demonstrations fund-raising for Israel also continued. Already on April 1 the American Zionist leaders had come in a general agreement on the need for an overall Zionist organization to which individuals unaffiliated with any Zionist group could belong. It would, it was thought, give greater moral and financial support to Israel. Now as the situation grew tense by the end of May the National Executive Committee of the ZOA launched a Public Affairs Emergency Fund, to systematize and enlarge to the maximum the ZOA effort on behalf of Israel.³¹ Special emergency fund-raising campaigns were launched in America and soon the reports indicated that financial

contributions had exceeded all previous records. Contributions to the central offices of the emergency fund in America were reportedly coming in so fast that "officials often had no idea how much they had collected."³² On June 19, Israel Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, who had just returned from a tour of Jewish communities in America and Western Europe, told the Knesset:

...I can say with assurance that never has such a movement of solidarity with Israel electrified world Jewry... a mass movement of such proportion, which carries away with its momentum even those who have so far denied the national significance of their Jewishness, such a movement has never existed until today.³³

The general feeling of sympathy among American Jews for Israel in her days of crisis also found expression in the "volunteers coming to Israel throughout June from different parts of the world. America also contributed. Among those already in Israel 520 had come from the United States.

The Jewish youth, even, who had hitherto showed indifference to the cause of Israel, on the news of Israel's danger in May-June 1967, jumped in favour of Israel. It is true that today's young Jews of the American campuses are more likely to stage demonstrations and carry pickets against the war in Vietnam than attending Zionist meetings, yet the sudden outburst of feeling sympathetic to Israel among the American Jewish youth proved that although in normal times they may seem to be indifferent yet in times of crisis Israel can still count upon widespread outbursts of support among American Jewish youth.³⁴

This spontaneity of feeling which swept all walks of Jewish American life during the 1967 Middle East crisis found expression in opinions expressed in Congress too. On May 31, 1967 Roman C. Pucinski (from Illinois) asked to be incorporated in the Congressional Record one

speech which he had delivered on the occasion of the 25th anniversary observance of Zionist Day in Birmingham, Alabama, where he spoke :

We must support whatever measures are necessary by the United States to impress upon the Egyptian government the dangers of miscalculating America's unyielding and unbending determination to preserve the sovereignty of Israel, which we helped to establish 19 years ago.... Surely one of the great examples of man's infinite capacity for growth is Israel itself. In the 19 brief years since independence, Israel has confounded the cynics, amazed the non-believers, and captured the imagination and hearts of men of peace the world over.³⁵

It is to be noted here that while the majority of the American population during the Arab-Israeli confrontation of May-June 1967 took a Zionist pro-Israel stand there existed a significant and vocal minority who strongly opposed the lines taken by the Zionists. When the Zionists launched a massive rally on June 8 in New York, Dr. Norton Mezvinsky, execu-

tive director of the American Council for Judaism, the most important anti-Zionist group, told a news conference in New York that the organizers of the rally "do not speak for all of American Jewry". Dr. Mezvinsky charged that the rally was a "Zionist show" aimed at "pressurizing the Government into an inflexible position of being 100 per cent behind Israel right or wrong."³⁶ Established in 1943 the Council has remained critical of Zionism in America. In its 1960 Convention at Denver Mr. Lessing Rosennald, the Council's Chairman, had accused the Zionists of misusing the public fund. He said that a sizeable amount of the fund raised by the United Jewish Appeal was spent by political parties in Israel.³⁷ But however vocal this anti-Zionist Council may have been it does not command much influence over American Jewry. As compared to its 20,000 membership the combined membership of other Jewish organizations, some of whom are Zionist, some having Zionist leanings, embrace "a majority of the 5.5 million Jews in the United States."³⁸ The 8th June's Zionist rally in New York itself consisted of not less than 20,000 men, women and children.

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EMERGENCE OF THE THAKIN MOVEMENT IN BURMA

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In the period from the concluding years of the last century down to the immediate post first great war years, Burmese national movement was in the formative stage. In the next decade and half the national movement and nationalism developed and Burma was plunged on many occasions in nation-wide freedom movement both on violent and non-violent lines. In this period attempts were made to institutionalise the development in the national politics aiming to make further progress. Parties were formed. But on account of the weakness of the leadership and of many other reasons, the national movement could not be crystalized into a definite form of any national political institution which could lead the country's freedom movement against the British rule. This vacuum in the domain of the political institution coupled with the economic difficulties made possible the birth of a new movement which has come to be known as the Thakin movement.

This paper seeks to trace the history of the formative years of the Thakin movement, which roughly extends from 1930 to 1938.

Thakin, meaning master, began to be used as an appellation before the names of the members of Dohbama (We Burmans) Society (League) which was formed in July 1930 on the model of the Irish Sinn Fein movement.¹ The Burman youths adopted this title mainly to show the superiority of the Burmans as a race. Thus the word Thakin connotes revolutionary spirit, strong nationalism and honour.

The movement launched by these Thakins

enjoys a special position in the history of the freedom struggle of Burma. They brought new potentialities in Burmese nationalism and gave a new dimension to the freedom struggle of the Burmans. Among the many factors which led Burma to independence, the Thakins' role is very significant. They spearheaded the freedom struggle to its successful conclusion.

Thakin movement was born in early 1930s when politics in Burma were "at a very low ebb". The revolutionary attempt to regain freedom became unsuccessful with the failure of the Tharrawarddy rebellion (1930-31), which demoralised the old revolutionaries. The General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) which since the beginning of the national movement in Burma had been the rallying point of the nationalists, with the beginning of 1930s started declining. The Soc Thein faction of this GCBA was declared unlawful because of its link with the Tharrawarddy rebellion. Heavy repression came down on the party and it became impossible for this group of the GCBA to function further. The other group, U Chit Hiaing GCBA, participated in the 1932 elections as non-separationists (of Burma from India) with the pledge that it would not accept office after the election. But as soon as it entered the Council, it started scrambling for the post of ministership or other office of profit and completely ignored the mass movements. This apathy towards the mass movement and the scrambling for office faded its image in the public. Thus by the middle of 1930s the GCBA which was once the vanguard of the people in the national movement, practically disappeared from the

political scene.

The period from 1933 to 1936 was politically barren. The Burmese failed to exert any influence in shaping the country's destiny. Home rule was an unanimous demand of the people, but the British government while preparing the constitution did not pay heed to this demand. The Burmese politicians had failed to plunge Burma in the mass movements as happened at the fall of 1920, because they had no organised political party and moreover the older leaders were at this time more interested to get berths in the government rather than to launch any movement for the freedom of the country. Then again some unscrupulous people were trying to create a sort of national consciousness among the Burmans by indulging in racial riots between the Indians and the Burmans. The governor exploited this political situation in his favour and acted like a dictator, completely ignoring the popularly elected council.

These developments reacted on the people very sharply which led to create a frustration among the people and plunged Burma into a "political doldrums". The economic position was also no better than the political. The world-wide economic depression of early 1930s made the Burmese exports cheaper in the international market, which in turn, caused unemployment problem in Burma acute. The people from the rural areas rushed to the urban areas for jobs, but in vain.

These political and economic conditions set many young minds moving and paved the path for the growth of the youth movement in 1930s, which culminated in the Thakin movement.

In July 1930, Moun Ba Thaung in collaboration with other Burmese youths and the Bengal Revolutionaries active in Burma founded the political institution of the Thakins—Dohbama Society (or League).² Soe Thein GCBA followers—U Ketu, U Asaya, Shin Ariya, and others—and Soe Thein himself

actively participated in this organisation.³ It was formed on the line of the Irish Sinn Fein movement. The objects of the Society were to inspire Burmese nationalism and to encourage the use of the Burmese language.⁴ In 1933, it confederated into "All Burman Youths League". This organisation assumed the name of "Dohbama Asi-Ayaon" (We Burmans Society) in 1935 when the Thakins Ba Sein, a close associate of the Bengal revolutionaries, was elected its first president. "Dohbama Asi Ayaon" stood for complete independence. It considered the Burma Government Act, 1935, as a "new charter of slavery". It professed to work in non-violent manner on the lines of the Indian National Congress.⁵ It contested the elections under the 1935 Act with the object of wrecking the government from within.⁶ The Thakins formulated a revolutionary parliamentary programme. While their representatives fought inside the council chamber, the Thakins organised militant mass action outside the council chamber.⁷

Very soon it became popular and the rallying point of the students and youths.⁸ It organized branches throughout Burma. There were more than two hundred active workers all over the country. The organisation was led by the emerging student leaders, Aung San, U Nu, U Ne Win, M. A. Rashid, Thakin Soe, Tham Tun, and others.

Though the party manifesto favoured the non-violent creed, a section of the leaders including Aung San believed in violent method. So it accommodated many revolutionaries and Communists like Thakin Soe, Than Tun, Harinarayan Ghoshal and others and the extremist Phongyis (Buddhist Monks). These revolutionaries established many secret cells to organise terrorist activities. For these activities many members of this organisation were convicted by the government.⁹

"Do Bama Asia Ayone" had a Burmese weekly as its organ. The aims and objects of this weekly were "to foster patriotism among

Burmans and install new ideas in connection with the present political situation in the country."¹⁰ They were the most severe critics of the then existing Burmese political leaders. As a result they were liked by only a few politicians in Burma.

The activities of this Society even spread among the industrial workers of the industrial units and among the peasants of the villages. They formed many trade unions and peasant organisations with a view to safeguarding the interests of the respective classes and to mobilize this most exploited section of the population in the national struggle for political independence and social liberation. This was the first indigenous effort to organise the people who were engaged in the economic production of the country on the basis of their trade in the national struggle.¹¹

This organisation had also a volunteer corps. The main function of this corps was to maintain peace and order in the mass meetings and the conferences held under the auspices of this society.¹²

Thakin's Political Ideals

The Thakin movement was guided by Thakinism. This Thakinism in its initial stages drew inspiration from the German philosopher, Nietzsche, who draws a sharp dividing line between master morality and slave morality. The conception of Superman was adopted to the condition of the country and "Live Dangerously", "Trans-value your values or perish"—well known sayings of Nietzsche, became the motto of young Thakins. They began to sing Dohbama (We Burman) song in which there was the Fascist note. Dohbama clearly was an expression of racialism and the word Thakin denoted superiority complex of Burmans as a race. "The very word Thakin—we were masters ourselves before—is an appeal to the glory that was past (Fascist) and is in itself an expression of the desire for freedom."

But this Thakinism guided by Fascist philosophy could not get root in the soil of Burma. In spite of favourable political conditions Thakins could not be popular till 1933. This fact led a section of Thakins to question the efficacy of the Fascist philosophy. Being pressurised by this section Dohbama Society was confederated into All Burma Youth League which had a tendency to Thakinism but opposed to Fascism. It was then that Thakinism was re-oriented on the basis of modern political ideas, mainly Communist ideology, and there was a marked drift towards the left. From that day Thakinism was not only for complete political independence of Burma but for social freedom and the entire recasting of the economic structure of the country. This is the first time in the history of the Burmese freedom movement that the question of recasting of the economic structure was brought in. It gave up all Fascist tendencies and emerged as a progressive political movement and the rallying point of all anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist forces of Burma.¹³ As a result both the British Imperialism and the vested interests made it the target for ruthless repression.

Indian Influence

It has already been mentioned as passing references what were the relations between the Thakins and the Indian freedom movement. Actually Bengal revolutionaries active in Burma inspired the Burman youths to establish such a type of movement. Some time in 1930 the Burma Jugantar Party, the Central revolutionary organisation of the Bengal revolutionaries active in Burma, deputed one of its executive members, Kedareshwar Bhattacharji, to organise the Burman youths with a view to send them abroad by ships with the assistance and cooperation of U. Ottama, the radical leader of the Burmese nationalists. Bhattacharji was also given responsibility to spread revolutionary literature in Burma. With a view to organise the Burman youths and the Phongyis, he, with the sincere help of U. Ottama started an association—

"Duo Burman" meaning "We the Burmans", some time in 1930. Many Phongyis and Non-separationists (of Burma from India) had become members of this association. The object of this association was to organise the Burmans and infuse revolutionary ideas into them.¹⁴

"Duo-Burman", should be actually read as "Doh Bama" having the same meaning "We the Burmans". This word "Duo-Burman" is not found in any other records excepting in one, but "Doh Bama" is referred to in many other records. It is quite possible that in the record under reference the word "Duo-Burman" has been wrongly mentioned instead of "Doh Bama" and when the meaning is given as the same, there is no difficulty in accepting "Doh Bama" in place of "Duo-Burman". We have already seen that 'Doh Bama' Society was founded by Moun Ba Thang in 1930. His connection with the Bengal revolutionaries is unquestionable. Thus it will not be wrong that both the "We the Burmans" organisations were one and the same and it originated out of the collaboration of the Indian and Burman revolutionaries. This Dohbama Society was the precursor of the Thakin movement.

Apart from this the Thakins had also close relation with the mainstream of the Indian national movement. In 1935 some leading Thakins came to India.

At that time they came in touch with the various revolutionary organisations in India. They toured many places in India and studied the technique, methods, activities and programmes of the Youth organisations in India. They were assured by these Youth organisations all possible help and co-operation for the furtherance of the revolutionary activities. Indian journalist-cum-politician of Burma, Sri Hari Rao, accompanied them in their India tour.¹⁵ These Thakin leaders had also established connection with the Indian Communists at that time. Subsequently some Thakins had

come to India to take training in revolutionary works.¹⁶

Their connection with the Indian National Congress was not negligible. A section of Thakins used to attend the Congress sessions regularly. While formulating their policies and the party constitution they consulted the local Congress leaders in Burma. The Congress ideology of non-violence had appealed to an important section of the Thakins. Thakin Nu in his speech in a mass meeting on 9th January, 1937 asked the Burmans to emulate Gandhi and Nehru in their struggle for freedom.¹⁷

In 1937 when Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in the capacity of the Indian National Congress President visited Burma, Thakins took the lead in welcoming him. Wherever Pandit Nehru went, the local Thakin leaders had come forward to welcome him. They arranged public receptions in various places.

At that time Pandit Nehru attended the Second All Burma Students' Conference. Aung San was the president of the Conference. In course of his presidential speech Aung San expressed deep respect towards India and paid warm tribute to Pandit Nehru. He termed the presence of Pandit Nehru as "a happy augury for the students' movement and for the forwarding march of the aspiring youth in this country". Ko Ba Hein, Chairman of the reception committee of the conference welcoming Pandit Nehru sought his guidance and instructions to lead the Burmese national movement, because he considered him also as the leader of the oppressed people of Burma. He expressed a hope that "a real patriot like Panditji will stimulate the spirit of sacrifice in the Burman students".¹⁸

All Burma Students Union requested Pandit Nehru on 28th January, 1938, to send "a message of good will and encouragement" on the occasion of their Third All Burma Students' Conference at Bassein in the 2nd week of April, 1938. This letter reveals that there were

regular exchanges of visits of student leaders from India to Burma and vice-versa. In his message on 8th February, 1938 Pandit Nehru wished a great success to the conference and trusted that "there is full cooperation in this movement between Burman and Indian students in Burma".¹⁹

All these signify that the Burmese and the Indians had a very close cooperation in the freedom movement of both the countries.

However the vested interests in Burma attempted to destroy this cooperation between the Indians and the Burmans in their freedom struggle against the British rule. The British and the Indian capitalists in Burma had been extending their field of exploitation in Burma without caring for either the political or the economic interests of Burma. This inevitably created bad feelings among the Burmans for Indians and vice-versa. This violently exploded

in anti-Indian riots in 1938.

But the Thakins who by that time emerged as the leading voice of the Burmese national movement stood against the riots and worked to maintain cordial relations between the Burmans and the Indians.²⁰

Conclusion

Certain political and economic conditions in which Burma was plunged in the early 1930s, created the background of the emergence of the Thakins movement which very soon became the rallying point of the anti-British forces in Burma. This movement being formed under the aegis of the Bengal revolutionaries active in Burma, remained all through the period under review very friendly to the common Indians in Burma and maintained close relations with the mainstream of the national movement in India.

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VERNACULAR EDUCATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICS IN BENGAL (1835-1870)

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At the beginning of our period, the battle for education was not ranged between English and Vernacular but between Anglicism and Orientalism. It is needless to raise the storm of the latter controversy again for an interpretation of the Imperialist scheme. It is beyond dispute that the natives themselves threw in their lot with English education which was supposed to be the bread-winner and source of enlightenment as well. Besides Rammohan's advocacy of Western education (vide his letter to Lord Amherst, dated 11 December, 1823)¹, a typical example of popular attitude may be cited from a Bengali Weekly dated 7 March, 1829 : 'The efforts made during the last five or six years for spreading English language and learning in the country are really remarkable. Formerly, we heard that Indians only learnt a little English for securing jobs as clerks. But we now find with surprise that Indian boys venture to study the most advanced texts and the most abstruse subjects in English and have mastered even the most difficult branches of English learning.'²

But the real controversy exists over English education vs. Vernacular education and is more fundamental for an understanding of the structure of politics. Here too, Vernacular education should not be confused with cultivation of Vernacular literature and language as such. The former involves mass participation and is a matter of planning and policy by Powers that be. The latter is simply a cultural quest with no other criteria, though complementary to the former.

These preliminaries over, we can now take the plunge into our subject. We can try to answer the following question : 1) How far was the official policy responsible for an elitist education and with what justification ? 2) What was the role of the elite in the matter of Vernacular education ? 3) What was the politics of the situation ?

For the first, one has to begin with Macaulay's legendary Minute of 2 February, 1835. The Vernacular, according to Macaulay, 'contains neither literary nor scientific information and are moreover so poor and rude that until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy to translate any valuable work into them.'³ Nobody would really contest the idea that the Vernacular being in a very rude form, had to be enriched from some other quarter. What was the natural fountain for the Vernacular then ? Needless to say that it was Sanskrit of which the Vernacular was the offspring. So, retention of Sanskrit with a view to promoting the Vernacular was a desideratum if the ultimate goal was Vernacular education for the masses. But the claim of Sanskrit and for that matter, Vernacular, was brushed aside by that laconic judgment that 'a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.'⁴ A very late admonition of this attitude came from Monier-Williams, the Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford, which was meant for home consumption : 'How is it then, that, knowing all this, Englishmen, with one hundred and fifty

millions of Indian fellow-subjects, have hitherto paid less attention to the study of this language than other nations who have no material interest in the East? Greek and Latin are more dead than their elder sister Sanskrit can ever be and yet, we make these essentials of education. We instruct our children in them for the mental discipline they impart, for their bearing on European speech, for the ideas to be gained from their literature and the light they throw on the past, present and future history of kindred nations. All these reasons, and many more, commend the study of Sanskrit to English scholars'.⁵ This has been adduced not as a plea for Orientalist education but for the development of the Vernacular. Macaulay himself was a keen Classical scholar for the reasons stated above and it is interesting to note that reading Greek Classics in original was his sole recreation during his Indian sojourn.⁶ In retrospect, Manomohan Ghose, a competition-wallah of the '60's admirably sums up what was needed in 1835: 'We heartily rejoice that the advocates of the latter, with Lord Macaulay at their head, carried the day; yet we confess we should have been still more glad if a compromise had been effected and, if in addition to a sound and thorough English education, a certain degree of proficiency in their own classical languages had been made compulsory on all students of our principal educational establishments'.⁷ But this was lost sight of. Why? That is the capital question. Let me quote Macaulay from his Minute again: 'It seems to be admitted on all sides that the intellectual improvement of those classes of the people who have the means of pursuing higher studies can at present be effected only by means of some language not Vernacular amongst them'.⁸ The governing class was thinking of classes in the native society on whom to bestow the benefit of one lac of rupees, earmarked for education, and the class of their choice already had 'the means of pursuing higher studies' and proved it by founding the Hindu College. They were the elites by virtue of their wealth and intellectual

superiority to the rest. It was the common concern 'on all sides' to effect further improvement upon them, and uncommon neglect of the multitude who had no private means to elevate themselves and really depended on Government bounty. The blueprint of elitist education was given by Macaulay in classical frankness: 'We must at present do our best to found a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern,—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.'⁹

The first part of this aspiration came true. An English-educated class of thoroughly 'white-washed' men did arrive on the stage. But they were left not so much 'to refine the Vernacular' as in most cases, to monopolise English education and fortify their elitist position by it. The gap between the microscopic elite and the mass of people was too wide to be bridged by filtration alone. As Sir Edward Ryan, the President of the Calcutta School Book Society, noted in its proceedings of 30 April, 1836: 'Hitherto this reasonable expectation has not been gratified and it is much to be regretted that most who have received an English education, instead of leading the van among the best writers in their own language are generally in the rear, far behind those whom they consider their inferiors. After studying English, some of them have deemed Bengali and Hindustani contemptible and unworthy of their notice and have considered no great disgrace, not to be able to speak or write a sentence correctly in either of them. The welfare of India requires that this sentiment should be abandoned and one of an opposite nature embraced, viz., that whatever acquaintance anyone may have with foreign tongues, it should be considered a disgrace if he cannot

write his own correctly. The friends of education ought to inquire, whether sufficient time and attention are bestowed upon their mother-tongue and whether it is sufficiently impressed upon them that the object of their education is not so much to make them authors in English as good writers in their own language.'¹⁰

But the purpose of the Raj was served. A class was going to emerge who were aliens in their own soil, despising every thing vernacular and native—an army of Her Majesty's most obedient servants. In an era of confidence, Metcalfe dispelled the fear of Bentinck that English education was as good as weapons in the hands of the natives. Wrote Metcalfe : 'His Lordship, however, sees further danger in the spread of knowledge and the operations of the Press. I do not, for my own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these causes Without reckoning on the affection of any, it seems probable that those of the natives who would most deprecate and least promote our overthrow, would be the best-informed and the most enlightened among them....'¹¹ C. E. Trevelyan wrote his gloss on it in 1838 when he called the middle class, 'a creature of our own' with 'no notion of improvement but such as rivets their connection with the English, and makes them dependent on English protection and instruction.' They were so because, 'there is no class of our subjects to whom we are so thoroughly necessary as those whose opinions have been cast in the English mould ; they are spoiled for a purely native regime ; they have everything to fear from the permanent establishment of a native government ; their education would mark them out for persecution.'¹²

Filtration apparently was designed to feed the few against the many for reasons other than educational. The process from the few to the many lacked locomotion for three concrete reasons according to official apologists, including Macaulay and Trevelyan : a) The destitute state of the Vernacular ; b) The delay in the

preparation of books in the Vernacular and absence of qualified teachers ; c) Paucity of funds. One has but to look up the editorial on the importance of Vernacular schools by J. C. Marshman in the *Friend of India* for a reply. He clearly affirms that it is 'a kind of illusion' to expect a native youth to acquire the treasure of English education in a few years and transfer it to his benighted people. 'Let us reflect on the portion of knowledge usually furnished to the great bulk of our English youth', says he, 'Let anyone compare these stores of knowledge.....with the volumes which have been already given in the Vernacular tongue of Bengal and nothing would be easier than to increase these to any number were due encouragement held out by Government'. He dismisses the idea that Vernacular was ill-equipped for both 'enlightening or enriching the native mind'. After all, through it 'valuable ideas may be conveyed in language so plain as to be comprehended the moment they are heard, in which the native youth delighted with the novelty of the idea he has comprehended to-day possibly spreads it through the neighbourhood to-morrow morning.'¹³

As to preparation and supply of books, the Annual Reports of the Calcutta School Book Society give a good index of Bengali books prepared and circulated by the Society :

Table

Report:	Year :	Period :	Books Distributed	
			Vernacular :	English
12th	1840	1836-39	20,363	72,205
13th	1845	1840-44	31,303	74,244
15th	1852	1848-51	58,125	65,766
20th	1858	1858	55,822	46,323

Source : Calcutta School Book Society Proceedings, 1840-1858

It is obvious from the above table that there had been a steady increase in the circulation of Bengali books in our period and after the establishment of 101 Vernacular schools by Lord Hardinge, there was a big jump so much as to overtake the circulation of

English books. No serious attempt was made by the Government to give the Vernacular system a fair trial and as such, Vernacular teachers had no material prospect. The 1844 Normal School Scheme looked like window-dressing and even after Wood Despatch of 1854, Grants-in-aid was a half-way house. That explains lack of teachers. The so-called leaders of the people reared in English nurseries failed to live up to the expectations. As the *Friend of India* observed in 1845: 'A Normal School for our Vernacular schools is, if possible, still more necessary than one for our English seminaries. This fact was painfully forced on the mind in the recent examination of candidates for the post of Bengali teachers. Those who presented themselves to the examiners consisted either of men who knew little or nothing but were anxious for the salaries or of those whose minds had been contracted during the laborious routine of a Sungskrit education.'¹⁴

The last plea of limited resources appeared extremely weak to Marshman who in a leader snapped: 'But is a nation behind none in alertness of intellect in the common concerns of life, to be given up on this account by a Christian, a European Government? ... We dare not answer this in the affirmative when we know that above three Millions Sterling are now openly required for annual transmission to Britain from the labour of those very heathens...'¹⁵ The Government, after all, had an imperial commitment and tried to do the greatest good—as far as funds beyond Home Charges permitted—of the greatest number as far as it tallied with the imperial interest.

But the Anglo-Indian Press, conducted partly by the 'Free Traders' and partly by the the Missionaries and cosequently prompted by their peculiar calling forced the hands of the Government to do something in the matter. The *Bengal Hurkaru* and the *Friend of India* in a number of editorials took up the cause. The Government decided to appoint the Rev. William Adam to investigate the matter. The

result was his momentous 'Report on the State of Vernacular Education in Bengal' in three parts, the product of three years' thorough-going research into the subject.

Adam came to the following conclusion in 1838: 'It is impossible for me fully to express the confirmed conviction I have acquired of the utter impracticability of the views of those . . . who think that the English language should be the sole or chief medium of conveying knowledge to the natives.'¹⁶ He was convinced of the futility of the filtration theory as an honest means to promote national education. It was like building castles in the air, without any firma terra beneath, without any succession downwards to the grassroots. English education, according to him, would create a dichotomy of the minority and the masses.

Lord Auckland appreciated the importance of the issue and confessed that an appropriation of 24,000 Rupees for Vernacular education out of a revenue of 13 million Rupees was insufficient and the root of all controversies. He even admitted that in a vast country like India, people must look to the Government for education. But then, he had to toe the old line, and repeated: 'The first step must be to diffuse wider information and better sentiments amongst the upper and middle classes.' Auckland states the reason unaware of the construction to which his statement could be put: 'We are dealing with a poor people, to the vast majority of whom the means of livelihood is a much pressing object than facilities for any better description or wider range of study—our hold over them is very imperfect and our power of offering motives to stimulate their zeal is but of confined extent. The agency which we can employ for reforms is extremely narrow and liable to constant derangement.' He appears candid as to the limitations of Imperialism here and has no hesitation to admit that 'Vernacular can be a useful medium, more readily and largely accepted and more economical'.¹⁷

So, the old policy of 'leaving the peasant without the bread of elementary education while the rich have the luxuries of Bacon and Milton' as the Rev. Long put it, was continued. Long laments in 1854 that 'there is now an awful gulf between the lover of Shakespeare and the 37 millions in Bengal' and holds the Government responsible for giving up Vernacular education. 'Their first act in this case was to set aside Mr. Adam's plan,' he writes, 'the only one feasible for this country. Mr. Macaulay, their President, knew nothing of the people; his knowledge of India was limited by the bounds of the Mahratta ditch.'¹⁸ In fairness to Macaulay, it was really bound by the British interest to which he was pledged.

In 1845, Lord Hardinge set up 101 schools in 37 districts for Vernacular education as a concession to the intense campaign by the Anglo-Indian Press. The *Bengal Hurkaru* wrote searchingly on the subject in 1843: 'There is nothing inconsistent in supporting Vernacular education and supporting English education too. One sort of instruction is necessary for one class, the other sort of instruction is necessary for another class. Whatever tends to enlarge the mind, to quicken the thoughts, to correct prejudices, to convey truth must be useful whether it be conveyed in Bengali, English or Hindee. And as one of these modes of education may be alone practicable in one place and a different mode alone practicable elsewhere, the one that is alone applicable to each particular case, should be alone adopted.'¹⁹ Filtration theory was grudgingly given up under such pressure but the Hardinge Scheme was intended to be a mere lip-service to the cause. The subject was placed under the Board of Revenue and as Long tells us, 'the Board itself was apathetic and took no real interest in the question.'²⁰ As time wore on, the Government had to alter its policy or at least to make a show of it. Lord Dalhousie affirmed that Thomason's Vernacular Education Scheme was 'not only the best adopted to lessen the ignorance of North Western Provinces but also the plan best suited for the mass

of the people of Bengal and Behar.'²¹ Lieutenant Governor Halliday in his evidence before the Select Committee said: 'You ought to give a good vernacular education to the masses, at the same time that you give opportunities to the classes who have leisure to do so to acquire a knowledge of English literature and science.'²²

The proceedings of the Vernacular Literature Society show the tremendous response the official patronage could elicit from the natives on this issue. When the Government took kindly to Vernacular education and translation became remunerative, natives of all descriptions vied with each other for the work. Two letters, one by a Second Teacher of a village school in Jessore and another by a writer in the Bengal Accountant's office to E. B. Cowell, the secretary to the Society in 1858, offering to translate Macaulay's *Hastings* and Lamb's *Tales from Shakespeare*, clearly illustrate the trend.²³ Though following Wood's Despatch of 1854, Grants-in-aid system was introduced, Vernacular education remained largely a private enterprise and the Government could not be persuaded to a full commitment.

The official policy has engaged our attention long enough. The role of the elite *vis-a-vis* Vernacular education is the next aspect to which we turn to see how far it abetted Government lukewarmness. It has already been stated that cultivation of Vernacular literature was not the same as promotion of Vernacular education. The first had a long tradition associated with such institutions like the Fort William College (1800), the Calcutta Bible Society (1811), the Calcutta School Book Society (1817), the inauguration of the Vernacular Press, the *Samachar Darpan* of Serampore (1818), etc. The first took up Vernacular to acquaint officials with the language of the people, the second to facilitate proselytisation, the third to prepare text books mostly in English and partly in Vernacular and the last to cater news to the wider reading public. But for the School Book Society, no other body had an explicit aim at mass education. The

Anglo-Bengali Dictionary of Ramkamal Sen and *Neetikatha* of Radhakanta Dev and the *Gaudiya Vyakaran* of Rammohan are instances of a cultural quest. Rammohan's religious tracts and papers like the *Sarbatattwa Deepika* were geared to religious and social reform.²⁴ Even the foundation of the Sarbatattwa Deepika Sabha in December, 1832, had in view, improving 'ourselves in our vernacular tongue' as its sponsors, Joygopal Bose and Monimohan Ghosh would have it.²⁵

English education was the rallying cry for natives right from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Both conservatives and liberals had joined their hands in 1816 to found the Hindu College which remained the citadel of English education in Bengal ever afterwards. In 1838, Trevelyan was in a position to report that in Calcutta alone, 6000 boys were learning English and that 'the people are greedy for European knowledge and crowd to our seminaries in greater numbers than we can teach them.... Where would have been the wisdom of entertaining the 1200 English students who beset the doors of the Hooghly College with lectures on the absurdities of the Pooranic system of the earth.'²⁶ By people, of course, he meant 'the middle and upper classes'. This is attested by the *Chandrika*, a leading Bengali newspaper of the day. With reference to the Hardinge Scheme, the editorial laments that the scheme has failed to attract people as it proposed to teach Vernacular and not English.²⁷ The *Sambad Probhakar*, another leading Bengali Daily, gives a vivid description of the craze for English education and the neglect of the Vernacular in one of its editorials on the Young Bengal.²⁸ A typical example of this craze is the following extract from a self-estimate by a Young Bengal: '...Perhaps, Young Bengal has become too much of an English student..... We, for our part, are certainly not prepared to deprecate the taste that has preferred Addison, Milton and Bacon to the *Chundee*, the *Bidyasundar* and the *Madhava Malati*.... It is all very well to speak of rescuing the language of the country

from contempt and refining it and making it worthy of a rising people. But it is not quite so easy to raise and refine a language hitherto common only to fishermen and shopkeepers and adapt it to literary purposes.... Better for them, better for the country, shall be the introduction of a foreign tongue. Who wants them to learn Bengali?..... You cannot eradicate impurity from the language without sacrificing it altogether. Why hesitate to make the sacrifice?'²⁹ It was better for them certainly but whether it was also better for the country is quite another matter. But the whole community of Young Bengal did not share his sentiments to be sure, as we shall see later. Still this being the driving force, most of the native attempts to promote education was reduced to setting up of English schools, whether it was the Oriental Seminary or the Seal's Free College in Calcutta or English schools in the district towns. Vernacular as a medium for mass education was a far cry. The anti-thesis of this trend is also noticed, though in a subdued form. The *Reformer* in an editorial in 1832 dismissed the opinion that 'the communication of ideas' was the 'exclusive monopoly' of English which according to him, was 'a very scanty language and barren of words' to start with. If English could be reconstructed with the aid of Greek and Latin, Bengali could also be developed, drawing from Sanskrit, its natural fountain. 'In short', he concludes, 'the question seems to us to resolve into this: whether it is easier to enlighten and civilise the mass of the people in India by instructing and informing in their own language or by teaching them English as a preparatory step towards that object. We think great as may be the advantages of teaching English, the former is easier method of conveying knowledge.'³⁰ About the same time, wrote *Gyananeshun*, a mouthpiece of the Young Bengal: 'The ideas may be English, but the dress in which they appear should be entirely native; the sciences of Europe should be in a manner denizenized in this country to conduce to its advantage.'³¹ Those who were prepared even to sacrifice Vernacular for English

obviously tried to make the knowledge of English their own monopoly to the exclusion of the masses and the surest passport to service and distinction, next to land. Their class consciousness is clear in the following statement from the Young Bengal which we have quoted earlier: 'As a matter of necessity, therefore, and not of preference, the poor of Bengal must read the Bengali tongue. But why it should be considered unpatriotic for those who have good opportunities to learn English, to neglect the indigenous Vernacular (so dirty as we have shown it to be), we do not understand.' S. C. Dutt, the author of the pamphlet, even scouts the objection that 'the prospect of obtaining situations of dignity and emolument under the Government and of rising thereby to an elevated rank in society', is the real spur that has suggested the preference and bluntly says: 'We are quite prepared to admit that many, say all, commence the pursuit of an English education with the object alluded to in view.'³² This was the general situation in the metropolis. As a correspondent to the *Hurkaru* noted in 1844, 'Circumstanced as the native community in the metropolis is at present, they have not the least inclination for the cultivation of the Vernacular in preference to that of the English and should no peculiar privileges be held out for a successful cultivation of the former, no native would be willing to impart Vernacular education to his children.'³³ Thus, an urban elite behaved like lackeys of the Raj and forgot that the whole of India and not the city of Calcutta needed reformation. In the inimitable style of the Rev. Long, 'Young Bengal, equally with the proud Brahman despises 'the vulgar tongue' reminding us of the English Squires in Locke's days, who could not write correct English—though they could 'sport Latin Verses'. And this is justified on the plea that there is so little in Bengali to read.....' Of course, those natives who wish their sons to get employment in offices where a knowledge of English is requisite would wish all the Government funds for education to be given to English schools, the high road to affluence, forgetting that the land revenue of Bengal

amounts to three and a half million sterling, besides five millions from salt and opium and that the peasantry have a claim on those revenues for an education suited to their circumstances, a quid pro quo. English education to affect the mass must have a Vernacular medium. Oil by itself will not mix with water.'³⁴ He bewails their lack of 'patriotism or love of the masses of their countrymen; when, instead of lending a helping hand to improve the literature of their country, they stand aloof, boxing themselves up with Shakespeare;' specially for the reason that the peasantry of Bengal needed 'the weapon of knowledge' to fight against the zemindary oppressions. The omission was more glaring because they did it 'knowing that the Council of Education spent 8,000 Rupees annually for their education while the wealthy merchants and zemindars have four lakhs spent on them.'³⁵ But Long seems to have forgotten that most of them belonged to the landed elite and some were directly 'managing their paternal estates.'³⁶ To the Supreme Government of India, this was much too well known and they made the most of it to maintain the Raj with minimum expenditure and concessions. The Educational Report for 1856-57 reads: '...the plain fact appears to be that in the lower provinces, the lower classes have not yet learned to appreciate or desire education, and that the higher classes generally are not actually desirous that their inferiors should be educated.'³⁷ As a Missionary observes apropos, 'The Government of India, true to its traditional policy of having legislation and education for the rich and not for the poor, for the high caste man and not for the low caste man, has here sternly refused the application of the Bengal Government to do something effective for enlightening the masses.'³⁸ But does not *divide et impera* flourish in a situation where 'the greatest oppressors of the peasantry are their own countrymen?'³⁹

Though the rich, the high caste and the landed elite largely collaborated with the Raj in shaping the educational policy, a meritocracy—irrespective of caste, land or riches—began to

assert their position and assail this monopolistic scheme of education. N. K. Seal, a low caste member of the intelligentsia apparently outside the chosen few, wrote feelingly about Vernacular Education in such stirring words as these : 'When a man goes to acquire a foreign tongue, leaving aside his own, it is just the same as when an infant leaves his own mother and clings to the nurse.... An European would be ashamed in his own community and country if he were a competent master of Bengali but totally unable to write or to understand his own language.... Such is not the case here with the natives.... The richest Baboos are now raising English seminaries either through hostility to the Missionaries or through some other motives. Little do they think of establishing Bengalee *Pathshalas* and spreading Bengalee literature which could alone prove beneficial to the benighted sons of Bengal.'⁴⁰ The same writer wrote more incisively in a late number of the *Literary Gazette* : 'A country can never be benefited and reformed if knowledge be confined within the reach of the few. I cannot call a community happy and a nation civilised when two or three hundred of the influential men are only educated amongst a million of people.... Besides, if you begin the work of education with the chosen few, leaving the poor, unfortunate multitude in utter darkness, it will be the work of ages to effect any good for India.... The higher classes of people, absorbed in great riches and intoxicated with their own importance take very little care for their own improvement, much less for the improvement of their poor ignorant countrymen.'⁴¹

The year 1840 (January) saw the birth of the Hindu Pathshala, attached to the Hindu College and solely devoted to the promotion of Vernacular. Pandit Ramchandra Vidyavagish, its illustrious Professor, in his inaugural address made it plain that it was 'impracticable to enlighten a nation through the medium of a foreign language so long as the mutual intercourse and daily transactions of its inhabitants are carried on in their vernacular dialects' and asked : 'How can the whole of British India

which contains a population of a hundred millions be adequately instructed if but a small fraction of its inhabitants be Educated at great expense through a foreign language ?'⁴² The movement for Vernacular Education mounted. The Vernacular newspapers edited by the rising professional elite took up the issue in earnestness. The *Sambad Probhakar* of the poet Iswarchandra Gupta strongly deprecated the Government policy of educating the few at the expense of the masses on the one hand and on the other, took the Young Bengal to task for their neglect of the Vernacular. The latter, according to *Probhakar*, had money, resources and time to undertake writing good textbooks in Vernacular, drawing from their Western learning. But they would rather have discourses in English than see Vernacular prosper.⁴³ The *Sambad Purnochandroday* edited by Advaita Chandra Adhya, in an editorial deplored that the Hardinge scheme failed due to the apathy and non-cooperation of the landed aristocracy. They went out of their way to set up English schools for their pecuniary prospects and declined to build even a school-house for Vernacular education. The Government behaved accordingly.⁴⁴

The landed aristocracy came in for more trenchant criticism at the hands of this new generation of meritocracy. In a remarkable speech on the occasion of the foundation of a Vernacular school and a library in Krishnagar in 1856, Mr. Kalidas Maitra, a Deputy Inspector of Schools, made a fervent appeal to the landholders, moneylenders and businessmen and the English-educated *Bhadralok* in general to take up the cause of Vernacular Education, when after years of neglect, the Government had seriously decided to do something about it. He specially admonishes the zemindars and the moneylenders for their deliberate negligence to promote Vernacular Education for fear of providing the peasant with weapons against their own class. He deplores the idea that the peasant's ignorance was the landlord's bliss and handle for illegal extortion. The British Government, he points out, at one time

felt that education of the masses would make the imperial hold over the people precarious and lead directly to sedition. But the Government has turned from denial of justice to earning the gratitude of the masses by spreading education. He asks the zemindars to follow suit. Addressing the peasants, he exhorts that exploitation was not something ordained for them. They could arise and awake and arm themselves with education to end the tyranny of the gomastas and mahajans. In fact, nothing in society, he asserts, was ordained and the future was manipulable with acquisition of learning.⁴⁵

Thus, an elite conflict is discernible in what has preceded, over Vernacular Education vis-a-vis social justice. The meritocracy was trying to gain upon the entrenched elite. The contest had begun and in our period, the latter tended to absorb the former. The response of the first political organisation in Bengal, the Bengal British India Society, to this issue illustrates the point.⁴⁶ The BBIS was virtually a complementary body to the Landholders' Society with no intention to become a rival institution and formed to discuss all other matters of public welfare *sans* land-tenure. But its members were a fairly representative body of the young radicals, some of whom really wanted to 'extend the just rights and advance the interest of all classes of our fellow subjects' as put by Tarachand Chakrabarty, moving the third resolution on the foundation day of the Society.⁴⁷ In 1844, soon after its creation, the society expressed its concern for the neglect of Vernacular Education. Pearychand Mitra in his secretarial address appealed to the Government for promotion of vernacular texts by awards to the writers and setting up of vernacular schools in populous villages and affirmed that 'the state of the agricultural community in the Mofussil is lamentable; they are generally—nay wholly unable to understand their rights and duties and are totally incapable of protecting themselves against the fraud and oppression to which they are often subjected.' He felt convinced 'that to effect a radical cure of the disease the light of education must be

shed amongst them as extensively as possible', and urged the Government to extend the benefits of education to the peasantry who ultimately paid for it by contributing the bulk of the land revenue to the Government treasury.⁴⁸ But like its concern for the peasants on the economic front for which it sent questionnaires to investigate, the zeal for the issue at stake also proved to be a damp squib. Indianisation of services, Justice, Police, etc., figured again and again but nothing was heard of either land reform or vernacular. Though Pearychand came out with a lengthy article on the zemindar and the ryot in the *Calcutta Review* (July, 1846), the other issue hardly received attention. The reason according to the *Friend of India* was 'a few Deputy Magistracies judiciously bestowed' and 'the exaggerated statements' and inflammatory addresses of the Young Bengal 'died into an echo'.⁴⁹ Even the President, William Theobald, cautioned them for trying 'to become too prominent either by the nature or number of the subjects undertaken'.⁵⁰ All these are evidently true. The sub-elite was too weak to defy the mandate and played the second fiddle to the dominant elite. One may even suspect that many of them deliberately did. In 1851, the two bodies, the Landholders' Society and the Bengal British India Society merged into one, bringing it home to careful observers that the former absorbed the latter. But whatever had happened organisationally, some of the members individually stuck to their guns. Pearychand Mitra was one such rebel. He was destined to become the first Bengali novelist and the co-editor with Radhanath Sikdar of *Masik Patrika*, the most lucid ladies' journal of the day in vernacular and closely co-operated with the Vernacular Literature Society since its inception. Stalwarts like Vidyasagar could bend the energies of the Government and their own more effectively for the spread of Vernacular education in the '60's, and rally a large number of kindred spirits while the British Indian Association glibly held brief for the landholders in all cases affecting them. The Pathshalas or vernacular schools started by some landholders towards the close

of our period were mostly in opposition to the proselytising activities in the Missionary schools. Their sudden espousal of the ryot's cause during the Indigo disturbances can be accounted for by their more direct and pressing hostility with the Indigo planters. Even as late as 1869, when the Rev. Lalbehari Day was pleading for compulsory Vernacular education in Bengal before the Bengal Social Science Association (19 January, 1869), no less than

four members got up to object to it.⁵¹ A missionary, however, had pointed out in 1858 that the grants-in-aid was 'equivalent to one in judicial matters—that no police or magistrates be provided for thieves, unless the thieves themselves consent to defray half the expenses.'⁵² It remained for the professional middle classes to overtake the landed elite and champion the cause more enthusiastically in the '80's.⁵³

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A NOTE ON TWO OLD COINS

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Collection of a horde of old Silver coins numbering twenty-nine had been made by the Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, Assam, Gauhati, in the year 1965 through the efforts of my predecessor in the said Department. These coins were found while digging earth in a village called Kadali-

gaon, near Barhampur in the District of Nowgong.

In this collection there is an important coin which bears legend in Persian¹ script as follows :



Obverse



Reverse

Coin of Daulat Shah

Obverse

- 1) *As-Sultan al Azim*
- 2) *Shams-ud-Duniya Wa'd Din*
- 3) *Abu al Mazaffar Daulat Shah*
- 4) *As Sultan*

Reverse

- 1) *Al Imam*
- 2) *al mast'asim Amir*
- 3) *ul mu'minin*

Meaning—The great king Shams-ud-Duniya Wa'd din (Pillar of the World and religion) Abul Muzaffar Daulat Shah.

Meaning—In the time of religious chief Mustasim, commander of faithful.

The legends on obverse are within a single line square but two sides of the square are cut off and the legends on reverse are inscribed in a doubled line square which is again within a circle. The coin is round-shaped, weighing 11 grams and measuring 28mm in size. The coin is undated and it does not bear the name of the mint-place. There is a wavy line over the word *Imam*.

As the coin is undated and without the mention of the mint-place, the question of identification of the monarch arises.

From the appearance of the coin which resembles in toto the style which has been found in the coins of the Bengal Sultans and Governors who ruled the country under the Delhi Sultans and occasionally independently, and the practice of mentioning the name of Caliph for indicating the time of the issue of the coin, which is also present in this coin, it may be assigned to a mediaeval Muslim ruler of Bengal, Daulat Shah by name. Almost all the mediaeval Muslim rulers of Bengal, like the Sultans at Delhi, followed the practice of mentioning the name of the Caliph in their coins as a token of the Caliph's recognition to their authorities. As soon as one assumed power by any means he used to send presents indicating his assumption of power to the Caliph of Bagdad, the highest pontiff of Islam, who in return recognised his authority. Recognition from the Caliph to a particular ruler in India practically stopped opposition, if there was any, to his authority. Some times this formal recognition from the Caliph comes even after two or three years since the assumption of the power, but the ruler from the very beginning used to mention in anticipation the name of the Caliph on the reverse of his coins. This practice is found followed in this coin under discussion. As the names of Daulat Shah on the obverse and Abbasid Caliph Mustasim on the reverse are very clearly inscribed on the coin and as mention of the name of Mustasim limits the issuing period of the coin to that of the Caliphship of Mustasim and as during the

period of religious leadership of Mustasim there was in India only one ruler bearing the name Daulat Shah and he was Daulat Shah bin Maudud, so the identification of the issuing monarch of the coin under discussion with Daulat Shah bin Maudud may possibly be made. The discovery of the coin in question, found along with the coins of other Bengal rulers, viz., Feroz Shah (A.D. 1302-1318), Bahadur Shah (A.D. 1310-1323) and Mubarak Shah (A.D. 1338-1349), also gives weightage to the identification of the issuing potentate of this coin with Daulat Shah bin Maudud of Bengal.

On the death of Bengal Governor Nasiruddin, the son of Delhi Sultan Shams-ud-Din Iltutmish, in the month of May, 1229 A. D. (A. H. 626) the Bengal throne had been usurped by a partisan of Iwaz, Malik Ikhtiyar-uddin Balka (the colt) Khilji who ruled in Bengal from Lakshnavati for about one and half years and was de-throned and killed by Iltutmish by the first part of 628 A. H. (Nov. 1230 A. D.). Till the discovery of this coin there was nothing in extant as a token of the reign of this rebel chief except a coin dated 627 A. H. in which he describes himself as *Daulat Shah bin Maudud* and which retains the name of *Iltutmish*, the Sultan of Delhi, and herein lies the importance of this coin, being the second token of the reign of Daulat Shah who expelled the imperialists from Bengal bag and baggage.

Its legend is to some extent different from that of the coin, recorded in the *History of Bengal*² as his father's name, i.e., *Maudud* and the name of *Iltutmish* are not mentioned there. It may be presumed that Daulat Shah issued coins with different legends if not more than two at least. Non-mentioning the name of Sultan Iltutmish gives the idea that immediately after the capture of the throne of Bengal, Daulat Shah issued coins retaining the name of Iltutmish therein as a mark of latter's sovereign authority and most probably a few months later, as he ruled the country for

eighteen months only, since the issue of his earlier coins Daulat Shah assumed independent status and signalled it by issuing coins without retaining the name of Iltutmish which possibly enraged the latter, because the political maxim of the period was that the Delhi Sultan was not to bother about the person who was on the throne of Bengal so long he (the Delhi Sultan) was in receipt of allegiance as supreme authority from the Bengal ruler. But it caused much concern to a Delhi Sultan only when discontinuance of such acknowledgement took place on the part of a Bengal ruler. The resultant consequence was an expedition by Iltutmish against Daulat Shah as stated earlier.

This also gives an idea about the time of issue of the coin under discussion, that it might have been minted in the latter half of the year 627 A. H., as Iltutmish's expedition against Daulat Shah took place in the early part of 628 A. H. It may be said with some degree of certainty that the coin, issued in 627 A. H., in which Daulat Shah described himself as *Daulat Shah bin Maudud* and retained the name of *Iltutmish* therein, might have been minted in the early part of the said year when he was yet to assume his independence.

It is also important in another respect also that no reference of any coins of this ruler can be found in Mr. Botham and Mr. Friel's work : *Supplement to the Catalogue of Provincial Cabinet of Coins, Eastern Bengal and Assam* nor in the main volume³ of this Supplement or in Mr. H. N. Wright's *Coins of Sultans of Delhi and Contemporary Dynasties* with same legends as found in this coin. A very scanty reference to the coins of this ruler has been made in the *History of Bengal*.⁴ It bears great importance in the fact that it opens a new vista in the history and numismatics of Bengal.

The next coin of our discussion is of Shri Bharatha Singha or Bharathi Raja whom the main body of the Moamarias under the religious leadership of one Pitambar Mahajan installed at Rangpur in 1791 A. D. and one

Sukura was appointed his *Barbaruah*, the chief Administrator. During the reign of the Ahom king Gaurinath Singha (A. D. 1780-1794), the Moamaria Chief Bharatha Singha could not be fully suppressed though he had been driven eastward from Rangpur by Purnananda Bura-Gohain. But Bharatha Singha maintained his power bravely till 1797 A. D. as his coins issued in that year are in extant. He was finally suppressed and was killed during the reign of Kamaleswar Singha (A. D. 1795-1810) and with the suppression of Bharatha Singha the uprisings of the Moamarias practically came to an end.

During my recent visit to Sri Sri Dinjay Mayamara Satra, a famous religious institution which played a very important political role in the history of Assam towards the end of the Ahom rule, I came across one gold coin of Bharatha Singha. The coin has been nicely preserved in the custody of the *Satradhikar* Sri Jibanananda Chandra Goswami of the said Satra. The coin being an octagonal one, weighing 11 grams and measuring 22 mm. bears legend in Assamese scripts on obverse "1) *Sri Sri Bhagadatta* 2) *Koludbhava Sri Bha* 3) *ratha sinha Nripasya* 4) *Saka 1718*" and on the reverse "1) *Sri Sri Krisna* 2) *Charanara-vinda* 3) *Makaranda Pramatta* 4) *Madhu Karasya*". Meaning—(Coin) of king Bharatha Singha of the excellent lineage of Bhagadatta, a bee intoxicated with the nectar of the lotus-like feet of *Sri Krisna, Saka 1718* (=1796 A. D.). In artistic design the coin resembles those of the Ahom monarchs. The influence of Ahom coins in shape, size, design and weight is found to a great extent in this coin and the legends are also intensely devotional in expression like the Ahom coins. But there is a striking difference in respect of the winged dragon figure which is invariably found either facing right or left on the bottom of any Ahom coins of its size, but such dragon mark is absent in this coin of Sri Bharatha Singha though Mr. Botham in his work *Catalogue of Provincial Coin Cabinet—Assam* records one silver coin of the said ruler with the dragon.⁵

Bharatha Singha describes himself on his coin as a descendant of Bhagadatta, the Assamese hero who took part in the War of Kurukshetra as described in the *Mahabharata*, unlike the Ahom 'Svargadevas' (i.e., monarchs) who used to describe themselves as descendants of Indra.

The importance of this latter coin lies in the fact that till the tracing out of the present coin in the possession of the said *Satradhikara*, it was not known that Bharatha Singha minted gold coin at all. Mr. Gait just mentioned that Bharatha Singha opened mint, but as regards

the metal of the coin issued by the said king he was silent on this point. In Mr. Botham's above mentioned work also only a few silver coins of this Moamaria hero are recorded under the group of Ahom coins which may give one the impression that Bharatha Singha was an Ahom monarch, which he was not.

Thus it may be said that these two coins will be of great value to scholars who are interested not only in the history of the periods, but also in Indian numismatics.

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THE DHALBHUM ESTATE UNDER THE COMPANY'S RULE

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The Dhalbhum Estate, in Chotanagpur, was the first to come into contact with the East India Company. Mir Kassim's assignment of the revenues of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong was made in September, 1760. With effect from the date of their acquisition, the Company established in those three districts the usual *zamindari* courts. In 1765, the grant by Emperor Shah Alam II of the Dewani of Bihar, Bengal and Orissa confirmed the Company's right to the area granted by Mir Kassim and added some more territories to it. Thus as a part of Midnapur district Dhalbhum estate came into contact with the East India Company.

Dhalbhum was bounded on the east by Midnapur district, on the north by Manbhum and on the south by the Mayurbhanj estate. The founder of the estate is said to be the descendant of the famous Parmar dynasty of ancient India (10th century A. D.). After the death of Bhoj Raj (1010-1055 A. D.) the Parmar dynasty got weaker and Hutmish invaded Malava. The descendants of Bhoj Raj were dislodged and they founded new kingdoms in various places of India. One of them, Jagaddeo by name, founded a new kingdom assuming the title *Dhabal Deb*.¹

The East India Company at first made no attempt to exert control over these areas, valued though they were for their trade in silk, lac and other products. The *zamindars* of these areas, taking advantage of their situation, assumed an independent attitude and refused

to pay any revenue to the East India Company.² Great difficulty was, therefore, found in reducing the chiefs of the hilly country of the west and in stopping their predatory raids. The continuance of this sort of independence was thought undesirable and also detrimental to the commercial intercourse, which hitherto subsisted between the Bengal Provinces and the districts to the west of Midnapur.³

The river Subarnarekha was the western boundary of the East India Company's territory in Midnapur until the cession of Orissa by the Bhonsla Rajah of Nagpur in 1803. Before 1803, there were Maratha enclosures east of Subarnarekha and British enclosures west of the river.⁴ The Company's *parganas* west of the Subarnarekha were Nayabasan, Ghatseela (Dhalbhum), Belerachour and other places. The Maratha *parganas* to the east of the river were Bhogra, Camarda, Patashpur and others.⁵ All the Maratha *parganas* in Midnapur and the adjoining districts west of the river were under the Maratha *Faujdar* at Balasore. The Maratha governor at Cuttack was placed over him. This situation gave rise to disputes and inconveniences. The most urgent problem was of checking the entry of contraband salt from the other side of the frontier.

The Maratha districts east of the Subarnarekha produced a considerable quantity of salt. At any point on the western boundary, moreover, Maratha salt could be easily conveyed across the river into the Company's territory. With a view to preventing smuggling of this an

arrangement was made with the *Faujdar* of Balasore in 1785, according to which he agreed to dispose of the salt of these districts to the Company.⁶ But these arrangements could not altogether prevent smuggling of Maratha salt. The salt was thus sold in the Company's territory, resulting in a great loss of revenue to the government. When George Foster went to see Raghuji Bhonsla in Nagpur in 1790 he made an attempt to throw this commerce 'into a clear and simple channel'. His object was to secure for the British an exclusive right to the purchase of Maratha salt. Raghuji gave orders to sell at a fair price the entire salt to the Company. But it was found that either he was not serious or his orders could not be carried out.

The Maratha salt was smuggled through the Western Jungle. To the west of Midnapur there lay a stretch of wild country, about eighty miles in length and sixty miles in breadth. In the midst of the jungle and hills where the Company's and Maratha lands met the chief of Dhalbhum would refuse to point out his boundary or afford any assistance. When the smugglers were seized he "sent a message by Ordub Rawut to Rogonaut Dass Bhuyah Zeemindar of Pergannah Upper Baug in the Maratha country desiring him to oppose the seizure on the plea of its being made within the Maratha Frontier. The Zeemindar of Dhalbhum formerly passed 36000 bullocks with salt. And there are 10 or 11000 salt bullocks in the limits of Dhalbhum but said to be in the Maratha boundary which will shortly be passed."⁸

The Midnapur judge had to release the salt seized by the Company's servants. After this smuggling went on unchecked. The *Darogah* of the *Chokey* at Thanna Huldeepokhar wrote, "I am like a traveller seated at the chokey. By me nothing can be done"⁹

In March, 1766, the government resolved upon a measure to send an expedition into the country to the west of Midnapur.¹⁰ The

Resident at Midnapur sent an ensign, named John Fergusson, against them.¹¹ The Resident maintained, "The party, which you are appointed to the command of, is destined, therefore, to proceed against those Zemindars, with a view to reduce them to a proper subjection to our Government on payment of a just revenue, to enforce their obedience to the authority of the Resident of Midnapur and to encourage if possible the merchants of the Western districts to open again their wonted communications with these provinces."¹²

It should, however, be mentioned that the government was more interested in securing the *zamindars'* submission than in taking a temporary advantage of it.¹³ The *zamindars*, taking advantage of their situation, had assumed an independent attitude since the time of the Maratha trouble during Alivardi Khan's government. So Graham, Resident at Midnapur, was of opinion that the end would be best achieved by receiving payment of an equitable rent, and claiming one of their nearest relations to reside by way of hostage at Midnapur.¹⁴

Mr. Fergusson's task was by no means easy. First, the chiefs of Samkakulia, Jambani, etc., submitted. Then he secured further submission from the chiefs of Jarong, Ameynagar, Roypur, Fulkisma and Supur.¹⁵ But with great difficulties he had to acquire the allegiance of the chief of Dhalbhum. The chief of Dhalbhum resided at Ghatseela. He had been busy preparing for a struggle. He had posted troops in all the passes leading to his *zamindaree* and was determined not to admit a 'Fringi' in his country on any account.¹⁶ Moreover, he had allied with Damodar Singh and other tribal chiefs.¹⁷

In the meantime Fergusson was acquainted with a circumstance which helped him to adopt a 'divide-and-rule' policy. A breach had for some time existed between the Rajah and Jagannath Dhal, his nephew and heir, whom he had driven from his territories and

who at that time resided with the zamindar of Barabhum. Fergusson thought of siding with his nephew.¹⁸ He contemplated setting up the nephew against the Rajah of Dhalbhum. Thus he wanted to enlist the sympathies of the people, whom the Rajah's suspicious and distrustful temper had alienated to such a degree as to oblige him to shut himself in his fort lest he should be murdered.

Fergusson sent two envoys to the Rajah of Dhalbhum, calling upon him for the last time to acknowledge allegiance to the Company. But they were turned away by a force of 150 horsemen at Jambuni in Dhalbhum.¹⁹ So, Graham, on the 12th March, 1767, asked him to proceed immediately for the reduction of the Rajah of Dhalbhum.²⁰ Fergusson soon completed his preparation. Mogul Roy, *zamindar* of Jatbunia, came with 150 men and the *zamindar* of Jambuni attended with 100 men for his assistance. These two *zamindars* were the Rajah's enemies.²¹

In the middle of March, 1767, Fergusson began his march. But he was opposed by a force of 2,000 men who had entrenched themselves and made a parapet in a plain about 3 *coss* from Jambunia.²² The position was carried without loss. Next day, they again tried to attack, but they were kept off by 'Seven rounds of grape and two or three platoons from the sepoys'.²³ "The enemy soon abandoned their posts, and betook themselves into the channel of the nulla, with a view....., of flanking us in the storm."²⁴ Fergusson, therefore, had to keep up a running fight till he reached his camp at Chakulia. The same tactics were again adopted and he had to fight his way for 32 miles through thick jungle.²⁵

At last on the 22nd March, 1767, he reached Ghatseela.²⁶ On reaching Ghatseela Fergusson met a *Vakeel* sent by the Rajah. He was ready to offer "Rs. 5,000 to buy me and my army off from proceeding any further."²⁷ The *Vakeel* was told that if His Rajah paid the Company the said amount as yearly revenue

he would forgive him. Immediately a man was sent to the Rajah but he did not return with an answer. As a result Fergusson again started his march. On that day the Rajah's force fought bravely but without making headway. At about 9 a. m. Fergusson could storm the fort. But the force of the Rajah had already abandoned and fired the fort.²⁸ Fortunately, however, the British troops were able to save some grain from the flames. Even then the Rajah did not submit but fled among the hills.²⁹

Fergusson had no faith in the Rajah. So he decided not to re-install him who had no regard for treaties and was "great nuisance to his neighbours, constantly disturbing them".³⁰ He thought that the best method of managing the estate would be setting up his nephew. And should his nephew be unwilling or unable to pay a proper revenue, Fergusson believed, it was Mogul Roy of Jatbunia who would undertake to pay the Company's revenue and retain the estate if furnished by a small party of sepoys to garrison the fort.³¹ The people also assured that they would offer their help to enable the new Rajah to pay revenue. They also agreed to remain under any chief appointed by the Company.³²

Fergusson sent a *perwannah* to Jagannath Dhal, nephew of the Rajah. When he received the *perwannah*, he made preparations, departing directly. He was, however, detained by Enderjeet, *zamindar* of Aditbhum, and a friend of the ex-Rajah of Dhalbhum.

At last, early in April, 1767, Fergusson surprised the ex-Rajah, took the old man prisoner and sent him to Midnapur. His nephew, Jagannath Dhal, was installed in place of the ex-Rajah on his promising to pay a yearly revenue of Rs. 5,500. Jagannath Dhal was presented with a horse, sword and several other things.³³ The ex-Rajah was given an allowance of Rs. 30/- per month by his nephew.³⁴ Thus the Rajah was invested in his stead with the *zamindary*. But yet the

peace was not secured. There lived, in the west of the district, four robbers, who had made a point of living by plunder. One in Ghatseela was the head of the league, the second lived in Barabhum, the third in Amai-nagar and the fourth in Burdwan. The Raipur *zamindar* complained of the one who lived in the estate of Dhalbhum.

In August, 1767, Rajah Jagannath Dhal was ordered to capture that leader of robbers. But he failed to do so. Strong measures against the Rajah were thought advisable, but Fergusson suggested a delay of at least two months because he had no sufficient gun-carriage. Moreover, rains had set in and the water in the fort-ditch at Ghatseela made entry into the fort difficult. In the meantime the Rajah expressed his submission, but as he did not obey the summons and see Fergusson at Balarampur, Fergusson marched against him.³⁵ He led only two companies of sepoys. In spite of the rain and water in the fort-ditch, he captured the fort.³⁶ Rajah Jagannath Dhal fled to the jungles, but soon surrendered himself and was forgiven.

In 1768, troubles started again. Rajah Jagannath Dhal had neither the intention, nor the means to discharge his financial obligations. He soon annoyed the British by his hostile designs and by his refusal to pay revenue. Fergusson was ordered to keep him within the fort until he paid up his arrears of revenue.³⁷ He, however, constantly evaded compliance with the Resident's orders. Moreover, he appeared to have made a plan to assume independence. G. Vansittart, Resident at Midnapur, apprehended, "Should leisure be allowed him for the full execution of his purpose, several others of the Zemindars should probably follow his example, we should lose possession of great part of the Jungle during the rainy season, and afterwards be put to much trouble...."³⁸ Two companies of sepoys were, therefore, sent under Lt. Rooke to reestablish the British authority and to remove the Rajah's advisers, to whom his faults were

ascribed.³⁹ But the British force failed to secure Rajah Jagannath Dhal, who, with all his principal *Sirdars*, had taken refuge some twenty *coss* from his fort.⁴⁰ One Nimu Dhal, elder brother of the Rajah, was captured by the British forces. In July, 1768, Lt. Rooke was relieved by Captain Morgan who intended to make Nimu Dhal Rajah. Nimu Dhal proposed that if he was chosen Rajah, Kirpasindoo should be his *Dewan*, being the fittest person and having authority in the estate.⁴¹ But it was found that the *zamindars* and *Sirdars* were determined to support Jagannath Dhal against the Company. On the other hand, the consequence of making Nimu Dhal Rajah would be that the Company could not possibly get any money from the estate for three or four years. Kirpasindoo also advised Captain Morgan to persuade Jagannath Dhal to come in as all the principal people would support his cause.⁴² Captain Morgan, however, made Nimu Dhal Rajah and Kirpasindoo his *Dewan* on the 16th July, 1768.⁴³ He also went on persuading Jagannath Dhal to come in. He informed Jagannath Dhal that he would try to make him Rajah again, as Nimu Dhal would not be able to pay the Company's money.⁴⁴ The Company's intention was to continue Jagannath Dhal as Rajah as the new Rajah, Nimu Dhal, was "as poor as a church Mouse"⁴⁵ who would be satisfied with a few villages.

Capt. Morgan disliked his task intensely. The rebel *Sirdars* under Jagannath Dhal did not muster in force, but lurked in small bands in the jungle, never coming to close quarters. Capt. Morgan found the whole country up in arms against the British authority. All the landed chiefs sided with the ex-Rajah of Dhalbhum with their followers. Capt. Morgan was subjected to a most harassing jungle warfare. The rains, moreover, had set in. The rivers were all swollen and it was impossible to cross them. Capt. Morgan wrote to the Resident, "I wish to God, this business was over, for I am really tired of doing nothing, and my poor sepoys fall sick continually. I

have now 'above sixty men ill of fever.'⁴⁶

At last in August, 1768, Capt. Morgan managed to cross the Subarnarekha and set out for Holdipukhur in pursuit of Jagannath Dhal. He succeeded in getting the *Sirdars* to come in and on the 23rd September, 1768, the Resident at Midnapur reported to Richard Bechar, "The Pergunna is now entirely settled again".⁴⁷

But towards the end of 1769 the *Chuars* of Pachet and Patkum in the South-West were up in arms under Jagannath Dhal. A body of 5,000 *Chuars* invaded Dhalbhum and forced Rajah Nimu Dhal to retire to the fort of Narsingharh with a small body of the Company's sepoys.⁴⁸ An expedition of five Companies was immediately sent from Midnapur under Lt. Nun and Capt. Forbes.⁴⁹

In January, 1770, the rebels committed many acts of violence. They completely surprised Lt. Nun's sepoys, killing and wounding a considerable number. They also cut down the sepoy pickets left at Kuchang by Captain Forbes. "Again in November, the rebellious freebooters usurped an independent authority and committed excesses with impunity."⁵⁰

In the meantime, Jagannath Dhal was strengthening his position by receiving these disaffected elements to his side. In February, 1773, Jagannath Dhal again attacked the new Rajah of Dhalbhum with a large force. According to the Resident at Midnapur such disturbances were a common feature in these days. He wrote to Warren Hastings, "As soon as the harvest is gathered in, they carry grain to the tops of the hills, or lodge it in other fastnesses that are impregnable; so that whenever they are pursued by a superior force they retire to these places, where they are quite secure, and bid defiance to any attack that can be made against them. The zemindars are mere freebooters, who plunder their neighbours and one another, and their tenants are a banditti whom they chiefly employ in their outrages..... The

effect of this, I may say, feudal anarchy, is that the revenue is very precarious, the Zemindars are refractory, and the inhabitants rude and ungovernable."⁵¹

As the disturbances were on a larger scale than usual, Captain Forbes had, again, to be sent with forces to restore order and preserve peace.

Again in 1774, the Chuars rebelled under Jagannath Dhal. The lieutenant in command informed the government that unless Jagannath Dhal was subdued, the Company could never receive an anna from that side of the Subarnarekha river. Jagannath Dhal claimed that he ought to be Rajah and unless and until he was restored to his claim he would never cease destroying the country with fire and sword.⁵² At last in 1777 Jagannath Dhal was re-instated in the estate on his agreeing to pay a revenue of Rs. 2,000/- for the first year, Rs. 3,000/- for the second year and Rs. 4,000/- for the third year. In 1800 the British government extended the Permanent Settlement to Dhalbhum and the estate was settled at an assessment of Rs. 4,267/-.⁵³

Till 1832, it appears, nothing happened in Dhalbhum estate to cause disturbance to the government. In 1822 Ram Chandra Dhal, a descendant and Rajah of Dhalbhum died. He was succeeded by Baikunt Dhal, his eldest son, who was in power for only three years. Chitreswar Dhal, then a minor, succeeded him. As he was a minor, the management of the estate and of the police was entrusted to *Bara Thakur** Jugal Kishore, the youngest brother of the late Rajah Ram Chandra Dhal. The young Rajah's person was placed in charge of Hikim** Narsing Dhal, the elder brother of Jugal Kishore.⁵⁴

Jugal Kishore, an intriguing and unprincipled man, failed in managing the affairs of the estate successfully. He neglected the payment of the revenue, dismissed Gangadhar Panigrahee, old *Dewan* and his assistants, and filled

their posts with favourites of his own. He also deprived many of the dependent *Talukdars* and other subordinate tenants of their lands and bestowed them on others. He enhanced the rents of *raiya*s and imposed several new cesses. As a result the oppression of the people was carried to the extreme.⁵⁵ It appears that he also shared with the salt *chowki daroga* and salt merchants.

The money, thus obtained, was spent lavishly by Shamsher Khan, his *Dewan*, who had come to Narsinghgarh during Baikunt Dhal's reign as a merchant and become intimate with *Bara Thakur* Jugal Kishore.⁵⁶ In course of time he was installed in the office of *Dewan*.

When Chitreswar Dhal attained the majority, he went to Midnapur and was invested with the management of his estate.⁵⁷ But the weakness and inexperience of the young Rajah made him a tool in the hands of his uncle, who possessed supreme powers and the seals of the estate. Sham Sher Khan went to Midnapur to attend the court. During his absence Jugal Kishore, on the advice of two favourites, Mahbuli Shah Faquir and Kalu Mia, dismissed Sham Sher Khan.

Shortly after this Rajah Chitreswar Dhal tried to get rid of the undue authority of the *Bara Thakur*. But he failed.⁵⁸ The Rajah made another attempt to have the seals which the *Bara Thakur* had hitherto kept. But when he refused to deliver them up, the Rajah went to Beliapaharee and tried to prevail on the *sirdar* of that place to pay him the rent of the estate which had hitherto been paid to the *Bara Thakur*. Asman *Sirdar* of Beliapaharee went to Barabhum and brought the *Chooars* into Ghatseela where they were shortly joined by all the *Ghatwals*. The country was henceforth in a state of insurrection.

Who is to blame for bringing the insurgents into the estate is hard to say. *Bara Thakur* and the Rajah brought accusations against each

other. But the *Bara Thakur* seems the immediate cause of the irruption of the Barabhum *Chooars* into Dhalbhum. During his management of the estate, the *Bara Thakur* contrived to take possession of a number of villages and the quarries situated at Beliapaharee. For this he paid no rents to the Rajah, who of course wanted to induce him to do so.⁵⁹ The officials of the British government went to Beliapaharee and sent for Asman *Sirdar* and the head of the merchants and prevailed on them to agree to pay the rent to the Rajah instead of to the *Bara Thakur*. On losing his influence over these people and finding his finances tottering, the *Bara Thakur* probably sent Asman *Sirdar* to Ganga Narayan.⁶⁰ He, perhaps, tried to kill two birds with one stone by this means; to get the Rajah killed by the *Chooars* and if he joined them, to get him out of the estate through the government.⁶¹ On Lt. Tining's going there the *Bara Thakur* induced Asman *Sirdar* to surrender himself. This proves his influence over Asman *Sirdar*. Lt. Young who for some time commanded a detachment in Dhalbhum wrote, "the *Bara Thakur* was evidently well-acquainted with the *Chooar's* proceedings".⁶² Lt. Trimins, an officer in Dhalbhum, was convinced that the *Bara Thakur* was in league with the insurgents.⁶³

It is, however, beyond doubt that the Rajah assisted the *Chuars* when they came to Narsinghgarh. On hearing of the approach of the *Chuars*, he assembled his men but subsequently when Raghunath Singh (follower of Ganga Narayan) brought his forces to attack the fort Narsinghgarh, the Rajah sent a party to meet him and gave him food, etc.

Bara Thakur Jugal Kishore's plan to oust the Rajah from the estate, by bringing insurgents from outside, thus failed. However, Rajah Chitreswar Dhal was temporarily removed from the estate for the murder of two men in April, 1833. The trial was held before the sessions court at Midnapur by Joint Commissioner, Wilkinson.⁶⁴ As he had no children, uncle Nursing Dhal was placed in

charge of the estate. He was also entrusted with the management of the police.⁶⁶

But the magistrate of Midnapur did not find the Rajah guilty.⁶⁶ Yet Wilkinson was not in favour of the Rajah's returning to the charge of his estate and management of the police without obtaining the orders of the Governor-General in Council, as he was aware of the Rajah's dissolute habits.⁶⁷ He asked the magistrate of Midnapur to retain the Rajah at Midnapur.⁶⁸

The government agreed to Captain Wilkinson's proposal and authorized him to direct the detention of the Rajah at Midnapur for the present⁶⁹ as it was considered essential that the Rajah should not be permitted to return to his estate or to interfere with its management. At last in March, 1834, Rajah Chitreswar Dhal was permitted to return to his estate.⁷⁰

In 1833, the Dhalbhum estate was transferred to Manbhum.⁷¹ But in 1841, the Assistant Agent to the Governor General strongly recommended the transfer of this estate to the charge of the Assistant in charge of Kolhan.⁷² It was found that the Rajah, though entrusted with the police, was not sincere in performing his duties. Major J. K. Ousley, Agent to the Governor General, South West Frontier, was also in favour of this transfer.⁷³ So, in 1846, the estate was again transferred to Singhbhum.

Meanwhile, in 1842, a decree was issued by one of the civil courts of Midnapur against the Rajah of Dhalbhum⁷⁴ and other decrees had already been handed down against him for a considerable sum of Rs. 24,326l-.⁷⁵

The Principal Assistant, Manbhum, urged careful consideration of this subject and recommended the suspension of the decrees.⁷⁶ He stated that Rajah Chitreswar Dhal, being a minor, his uncles, Nursing Dhal and Jugal Kishore, were appointed his guardians by the Court of Wards. Nursing Dhal and Jugal Kishore Dhal accordingly collected the rents

which they spent for their own purposes. But as they were to fulfil their engagements, they borrowed, in the name and on behalf of the minor, money which they paid to the collector as land revenue.

Major Ousley also, in his letter dated the 8th October, 1843, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, wrote, "I regret that, I should have failed in explaining sufficiently clearly, the danger that exist from the enforcement of the Court's order in regard to the Midnapur Decrees against the Ghatseela Dhalbhum Rajah, whose estate if sold, could not be taken possession of without disturbances and would create alarm in the minds of all the chiefs in the Agency."⁷⁷ He also recommended that the powers which the government had conferred on the Agency-authorities⁷⁸ of investigating and adjusting accounts between zamindars and moneylenders, and of reducing the rates of interest on loans, should be extended to the revision of decrees.⁷⁹

The government, however, stated that should the amount of interest accruing since the date of decrees be so great as to render it impossible to realize the sums due without selling the estate, the government was disposed to authorise the revision of such decree by him.⁸⁰

In 1847, one Messrs Cockerell & Co. tried to force the Rajah of Dhalbhum to give it several extensive factories, which he declined. Meanwhile Messrs Cockerell & Co. obtained a decree against the Rajah⁸¹ amounting to about Rs. 10,000/-. But the Governor-General's Agent, S. W. F., directed the interest due by the said decree to be reduced one-fourth under orders from the government, dated the 13th October, 1834 and the 20th November, 1843.⁸² Ultimately, Messrs Cockerell & Co. had to put a stop to their business and it proved a great blessing to the country.⁸³ The inability of the firm to pay their *malguzaree* regularly to the Rajah had obliged him to default.

One of the most striking features of the

relations between the East India Company and the Dhalbhum estate was the collection of revenue payable by the Rajah. The revenue was collected by means of notice and attachment. In case of the Rajah's falling into arrear, he was served with a notice to pay it by a fixed day. Should he fail, such a portion of his estate as might be considered sufficient to secure the payment of the balance was brought under attachment. There being an arrear of Rs. 3,319/- in July, 1853, Huldipokhar, Kalkapur, Keeseebundee and Asunbunee were brought under attachment.⁸⁴

So far as the police administration by the Rajah was concerned, it was, like other estates of Chotanagpur, a failure. The Rajah was too fond of amusement to give much attention to his duties as the head of the police.⁸⁵ The Rajah was a person of no principle. His entire affairs were in the hands of a few crafty individuals who turned everything to their own advantage. The police were more corrupt here than in any other estate.⁸⁶ The salary of a *burkundage* was supposed to be Rs. 2/- per month. It is believed, however, that he got nothing from him though he lived as if he were in a position carrying five times that

sum. Yet J. C. Hungtone, 1st class Assistant, Singhbhum, recommended that the police be left in the hands of the Rajah. He also suggested that the Rajah, like the chief of Saraikela, be given the rights of deciding cases except petty thefts, assaults, etc., because he believed that the Rajah would exercise them whether those were given to him or not. For, it was ridiculous to suppose that people would come from distant places to him to have their cases decided.⁸⁷ So, Hungtone was of opinion that it was desirable to attempt to introduce another system for the police.⁸⁸

In his letter of the 1st October, 1851, the Principal Assistant wrote, "I have always had cause to be dissatisfied with the Police of Dhalbhum, which appears to be more a terror to the peaceable inhabitants than to offenders."⁸⁹

Ricketts, a member of the Board of Revenue, thought it inadvisable to leave the police of a *pergunnah* containing 58,000 people in the hands of a person of such a character. But at the same time he recommended that the police should remain under the power of the Rajah of Dhalbhum.⁹⁰

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BOOK REVIEWS

Indiens Weg zur Nation, by Wilhelm von Pochhammer, published in 1973 by Carl Schünemann Verlag Bremen, West Germany. Price not mentioned.

Immanuel Kant is probably the first German who systematically discussed India in his lectures on 'physical geography' during the later half of the eighteenth century. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), a student of Kant in Königsberg, wrote for the first time systematically about the cultural developments in India (art, religion, literature and philosophy) which he gathered from the travel accounts like those of Pierre Sonnerat, Carsten Niebuhr, Mackintosh, Ziegenbalg and others as also from the English and German translations of Sanskrit works published till then. It is Herder who made the German reading public aware of the existence of a high culture in India and introduced India significantly to his fellow men. Thereafter followed a stream of writings on India, the latest addition to it is probably Wilhelm von Pochhammer's *Indiens Weg zur Nation* (India's Passage to Nationhood). As stated by the author, it is a political history of a subcontinent. This comprehensive work, published in Bremen in 1973 by Carl Schünemann Verlag, comprises about a thousand pages. It is divided into eleven chapters (starting from 2500 B. C.) and includes an appendix. The author has given five maps which are very informative. The register of names and dynasties is also comprehensive and informative.

In the introduction the author states that this book originated from a practical need. As an officer in the German Foreign office he was sent to Calcutta in 1924 in the capacity of a Consul. That was his first encounter with India. He had the good fortune to come to know "the benevolent mentor" (der wohlwollende Mentor) Chittaranjan Das personally

who introduced him to the background of India's struggle for freedom. It is through C. R. Das that the author came to know Mahatma Gandhi. This book was written as early as in 1932 and contained the prognosis that India would attain freedom within the next thirty years. On the advice of the Foreign Office Von Pochhammer refrained from publishing it at that time. Carsten Niebuhr, a German, referred probably for the first time in history to the political freedom of India from the foreign yoke (C. Niebuhrs Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern, 2. Band, Kopenhagen, 1778, pp. 19-20). During his long tenure of office in India for about fourteen years the author (Von Pochhammer) had the opportunity to enlarge his horizon through his Indic studies, through his personal contacts with the Indian politicians. He calls the present work to be only observations ("Betrachtungen") which a politically thinking observer undertakes in order to find out how 'the things have really been' (he quotes Ranke), or how they would have run their course. This one-sided stand point appeared to him to be useful, since the history of India has been very often represented to the American and European readers with a strong emphasis on its cultural and religious achievements. While the European historians discussed the European history right from the beginning from the stand point of political events ("Staatsaktionen") and considered other fields of life only step by step, it is, according to the author, just the other way round for India.

According to the author, the first question which such types of observation raise is : Has there ever existed an "India" with a political unity ? Have the people of this subcontinent ever felt themselves as *one* nation ? Today India is a State and her people feel themselves as *one nation*. Has it also been the case

earlier ?

Von Pochhammer points out that the European historians who followed the line of Indological studies and also those Indian students of history who had European schooling have taken this unity for granted. They try to cover the obvious contradiction of such ideas by the formula—"Unity in diversity"—a formula which has often been used by the Indian politicians. But that does not make away with the fact that by this "unity" only cultural one can be meant and that, seen politically, the course of Indian history ran parallel to that of European history where—likewise on the basis of a common culture—different peoples formed separate states. The relation of the separate Indian states to the common culture is, according to Von Pochhammer, the actual theme of Indian history, and it took three thousand years of preparatory time to reach the solidarity of a state.

Von Pochhammer has tried to show through his observations that the political history of India has begun in the different centres of power and in different periods.

The author is aware of the insufficiency of material, be it archaeological, numismatic or linguistic research, which is necessary for writing any thing on Indian history. It is not difficult either to evaluate the materials got through tradition or to select from the abundance of material now available. The author wants to examine critically the inscriptions of the rulers and the panegyrics written by their admirers and the writings of the present-day politicians. He has not spared even the writings of Mahatma Gandhi when he says that it even holds good for the publications of Gandhi in relation to whom it is often difficult to differentiate where the apostle in him stops and where the soberly thinking politician begins (Es gilt ebenso auch für die Veröffentlichungen Gandhis, bei denen es oft schwer ist zu unterscheiden, wo bei ihm der Apostel aufhört und der nüchtern denkende Politiker beginnt. p. 21):

The author further states that his observations do not have the ambition to represent in detail all the complicated political incidents. He has therefore made a selection of events and consequences which have a significant political bearing and has tried to examine them in that light. It is on this account that the author has consciously pushed back the participation of the Britons in the modern history of India in favour of an evaluation of this epoch from the Indian point of view. This is surely a very healthy approach and chalks out a new line of studying Indian history, which does not seem to have been followed by any foreign historian before.

The most striking feature of the book is its comparative approach. Thanks to the scholarship of the author, he has set the Indian political developments, probably for the first time, against a global background. On the one hand he has compared the developments of one period of Indian history to those of another (Din Ilahi of Akbar and Brahmadharma) and on the other, to the developments of other parts of the world in the same period. This is undoubtedly an achievement which keeps the reader of this book spell-bound. Every page of this book enriches the mind of its readers.

The author has elaborately discussed the border problems of India in different ages which have a very important political bearing today. While discussing the Maurya dynasty, Von Pochhammer refers to Seleucus and the peace treaty of 305 B. C. thus : the security of the north west border, which was to become one of the main problems of Indian foreign policy, has never been solved so successfully as the treaty of 305 B. C. (Die Sicherung der Nordwestgrenze, die von da an zu einem Hauptproblem der indischen Aussenpolitik werden sollte, ist niemals wieder so erfolgreich gelöst worden wie durch den Vertrag von 305 v. Chr. p. 80). In discussing the spiritual development of this period from the point of view of political developments, the author refers to the similar developments in Germany

in the thirteenth century. This approach undoubtedly stirs the imagination of the readers and *opens up new lines of research*.

One of the most interesting and well-written chapters is India's spiritual regeneration (Part VIII, ch. 9) where Von Pochhammer discusses the Renaissance of India in all its important aspects. One wonders (thanks again to his profound scholarship and discerning eye) when it is found that the author compares Gerhart Hauptmann's famous drama *Die Weber* with Dinabandhu Mitra's *Nildarpan*. The former deals with the condition of the Silesian weavers while the latter discusses that of the Indigo planters, both falling almost in the same period. About Paramhansa Ramakrishna he writes that in the nineteenth century no prophet proclaimed God with such force, neither in Hinduism nor in any other religion. (Mit solcher Urgewalt hat im 19. Jahrhundert kein Prophet Gott verkündet, weder in Hinduismus noch in einer anderen Religion. p. 490). It may not be known to many that the journalist Gopal Hari Deshmukh (1823-1892) gave the call "Quit India" in his papers about fifty years before Mahatma Gandhi did it. (p. 491). In the concluding remark to this chapter the author states that the regeneration of India was made possible through the powers of religion which, since the beginning of the fifteenth century, found its zenith in Sri Ramakrishna and led to a living revival of the tradition (zu lebendiger Belebung der Tradition). The Western influence, as the author states, appeared as a healing shock which necessitated all to examine what was one's own, to reform it and to form a new synthesis with what has come down through tradition. With the dispassionate spirit of a historian Von Pochhammer points out that the example of a *Sati* can also be found in the European literature. (Selbst wir Europaer empfinden es ja nicht als skandalös, wenn im 3. Akt der "Gotterdammerung" Brunhilde ihre *Sati* vollzieht. p. 492). The importance of social work in the development of Indian politics has been rightly pointed out by the author when

he says that the foundation of Gandhi's mass movement was laid by men like Gokhale, Ranade and Vivekananda in their social works.

His deep study of Indian history and culture with a world perspective, his insight into the spiritual treasures of India have all led Von Pochhammer to utter the following concluding remarks of his book which appear prophetic: What Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo and Gandhi have proclaimed to their people may temporarily recede to the background under the pressure of economic developments, technical advancement and the worries of foreign politics; but their ideas are strong enough to re-appear in times of need. They will stimulate India to emerge in the great ideological struggle on the earth and help it in her own individual way to find a synthesis between spirit and matter, between necessities of politics and humanity. That can be a contribution which will be beneficial to the whole humanity. That will be a performance for which the Indian people are preordained than any other nation.

This book of rare qualities will go down to posterity as a treasure to be read and preserved. This life-work of a fine scholar which illuminates the mind at every page should be translated into English and all the Indian regional languages.

PRANAB GHOSH

A Statistical Account of Bengal, by W. W. Hunter, D. K. Publishing House, price Rs. 100/-

Surely a reprint of Hunter's Statistical Account, a pioneering work on Bengal's social and economic history, deserves wide welcome. Hunter warns the reader that the statistics should be accepted as "approximate estimates only". Indeed, statistics have always a margin of error and should be used with caution.

What seems to be particularly useful is Hunter's observations based on records and actual field work. Apart from manuscript records preserved in the India Office, Hunter collected materials from the reports of District officers and also from personal researches in the Bengal districts.

This volume on the 24-Parganas and Sundarbans offers a splendid survey of mid-nineteenth century agrarian relations. It is revealing that the jotedar emerged as a social category in rural Bengal. In the section on the occupations of the people Hunter gives the following figures on persons engaged in agriculture: zamindars 3118, talukdars 337, patnidars 79, jotedars 4191, ordinary cultivators 288,977. The jotedars have been described as 'small landholders'. Elsewhere he tells us that the upper castes had a tendency to give their lands in *bhag* cultivation. Although the existence of sharecroppers and agricultural labourers, who came mostly from lower castes and Santals, points to land alienation, Hunter tells us that the majority of the peasants comprised of occupancy ryots. Since lands were being reclaimed in the Sundarbans, peasants could move to new lands, and this acted as a deterrent against eviction.

Hunter repeatedly refers to rise in prices and wages, and improvement in living standards. Partly the rise in prices and wages was the result of the growth of export oriented jute industry, which led to the extension of jute cultivation. But urbanisation had hardly begun. The so-called towns were "mere collections of villages" and sometimes district headquarters. Garden Reach, Budge-Budge, Agarpara, Titagarh were all villages where agriculture was the main occupation of the people. There was hardly any perceptible tendency among the people "to gather into towns and seats of commerce", Hunter could have added that this tendency was not fortuitous in view of the slow pace of industrialization.

SUNIL SEN

The Rigvedic Era, by Umapada Sen, published by Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta-12, 1974, price Rs. 30/-

In the present work the author has tried to show, on the basis of textual analysis and astronomical evidence, that the *Rigveda* was composed about 3500 B. C. According to him the *Rigveda* represents the oldest civilization of India of which the Indus civilization is only a later offshoot. He says that the Aryans did not come to India from the north-west. The Indus was absent in the Vedic age and the original settlement of the Vedic Aryans was in the Kashmir region. He believes that the hymns of the *Rigveda* have not been interpreted properly, and this is the cause of all confusion regarding everything of the *Rigveda* era. According to him, the materials supplied by archaeology, anthropology, and philology as clues to the understanding of the Aryan problem are all worthless. Even post-Rigvedic literature and works like *Avesta* are of no value. It appears that the author has no idea about the modern researches on his subject. He lives in his own castle of imagination. So far as his own methodology is concerned, we are sorry to say that, like his illustrious predecessors, who depended on astronomical evidences, he has also failed to supply tangible premises from which a clear-cut conclusion can be drawn. He is a free-lance, but this does not matter. He should only remember that in historical research there is no place for belief, sentiment and *a priori* principles.

N. N. BHATTACHARYA

Bangali Buddhijibi O Bichchinnatabad, by Amalendu De, published by Ratna Prakashan, 14/1 Peary Mohan Ray Road, Calcutta-27, Price Rs. 65/-

The author has taken up for scientific historical study a problem which is of crucial importance to the Bengali-speaking people in India as also in Bangladesh. The title of the

book, which is written in Bengali, has been translated by him, as follows : "Bengali Intelligentsia and Separatism." Having regard to the role which the Bengali intelligentsia played in the nationalist movement, and the impact of separatism on the movement for the partition of the country, the facts and conclusions offered by the author transcend the limits of regional history. The author's approach is logically different from those who look upon separatism as a primarily political movement. He emphasizes the social, economic and cultural aspects of the Bengali Muslims' search for a distinct identity which gradually raised barriers between them and their Hindu neighbours. The data collected by him demand fresh consideration of the convenient theory that separatism was entirely a product of the 'Divide and Rule' policy of the British Imperialists.

Chapter I deals with certain questions arising out of the Bengal Renaissance. Apart from interesting comments on the views of Rammohan, Radhakanta Dev and David Hare, the author gives us a revealing analysis of the religious and social reforms in the Muslim Community sponsored by the Farazis

and the Wahabis. Chapter II explains the socio-economic background of separatism in the 19th century. The impact of Hindu revivalism and the obstacles to co-operative effort for progress by the two communities are clearly indicated. Chapter III brings us to the present century : the Muslim reaction to the partition of Bengal (1905) and the Swadeshi Movement ; the complications of the land system ; the growing numerical superiority of the Muslims ; Muslim culture ; and political developments from the establishment of the Swarajya Party to the consolidation of the Muslim League. The story, however, is not carried to its logical conclusion, i.e., the Partition of 1947.

The author has naturally raised some controversial issues, but he has given chapter after chapter and verse for every important statement. He has made the fullest use of primary and secondary sources and scrupulously followed all canons of historical research. This scholarly venture in a field far away from the beaten track deserves a hearty welcome.

A. C. BANERJEE

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